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FOREWORD 
 
Cities are formed not only by what happens  
but also by what fails to happen,  
by the force or inertia of tradition  
and by the almost random decisions of individuals  
which sometimes have unthinkably long consequences. 
Gillian Tindall  
The House by the Thames 
 
In our day most cities, old and new, face significant challenges in the process of developing and redeveloping their 
urban areas. This requires, among other aspects, innovative approaches to the ways they plan and manage their 
land resources. The analysis of experiences with land management, successful or failed, can help to produce more 
efficient cities in the future. That may be one of the reasons why this issue has become an essential part of the 
agendas of many governments in the world, facing increasing problems such as demographic and economic 
changes, access to land, provision of public services and urban infrastructure, housing demands and so on. 
The aim of this research is to develop a more scientific and critical approach to urban land management in Cuba. 
There, land management has been addressed in a very improvised and fragmented way, to the extent that it could 
have irreversible consequences for the city’s spatial, social and economic integrity. 
My first approach to urban management started in 1990 when, after graduating as an economist from Havana 
University, I obtained a job as part of a team of well known urban planners gathered around a new institution, the 
Comprehensive Group for the Development of Havana City, GDIC, created one year earlier by the Cuban president. 
Among its main objectives, the Group had the mission to study the urban dynamics and complexities of the capital, 
prepare its Strategic Plan and create community based workshops to contextualize and validate the planning ideas at 
the grassroots level. 
In 1993, after learning that urban economics was an incredibly interesting subdivision of my career and a specialism 
that very few Cuban economists had identified, I decided to go in depth into this area of knowledge and, with the 
support of my employer, applied for an eighteen month Masters Course on Urban Management and Development 
offered by IHS1 and Erasmus University in Rotterdam, The Netherlands. That period was a step forward in my 
personal and professional development as it made me face the challenges of methodological and theoretical rigor 
with the additional challenge of courses imparted in English language.  
I graduated from the Masters Course on April 1995, left Holland, a country that I learned to love and respect, and 
returned to Havana, where in a two year period many things had changed. One of the important things that struck me 
                                                          
1 Institute for Housing and Urban Development Studies. 
xiv 
 
had to do with a shift in policies, in order to find solutions to the crisis which started in 1990, euphemistically called 
“special period”. Part of the new policy was an opening to businesses with foreign capital for tourism and real estate 
development. Our urban team became suddenly involved in the evaluation of urban land for potential projects to be 
located in different parts of the city, and it was partly our responsibility to have the right diagnosis and to make the 
right suggestions for the urban contexts for the new investments. 
Thanks to these circumstances, the Group introduced a new input into its development goals: urban land 
management. The opening to foreign businesses was fortunately paralleled by an academic opening that gave us the 
opportunity to up-date our knowledge about urban land through direct contact with different institutions. I was 
particularly lucky to be able to continue my relations with the previously mentioned Dutch organizations, and I started 
to collaborate with another: the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, LILP. 
From 1996 to 2006, LILP experts from different countries and cities from all over the world came once and 
sometimes twice to Havana in order to share their experiences and substantial studies about urban land 
management and land markets. They shared this with the following Cuban institutions: the GDIC, the Institute of 
Physical Planning, the Office of the City Historian, the Ministry of Finance, and other recently created Land and 
Property valuation departments. At that time I was offered the invaluable opportunity to enter the Latin American 
network of land experts. 
From 2001 until 2007 I worked with the City Historians Office, the leading institution in the rehabilitation of the Historic 
Centre of Havana that functions as a quasi autonomous, self financed local entity. There I had the opportunity to 
apply and share the knowledge and capacities provided by the land experts that visited us, for the development of 
tourism, real estate, housing and public infrastructure investments. Part of the qualitative and quantitative information 
used in this research was gathered during that period.  
Since 2007 I work for the United Nations at the UNDP Cuban Headquarters, coordinating the Local Human 
Development portfolio as program officer. The aim of this program is to accompany and support the country in 
different areas such as social development, economic decentralization, capacity building, leadership, gender equality, 
new technological advances, and better accountability. Part of our efforts are dedicated to introduce advanced ideas 
and projects to foster human development, strengthen local government capacities, and develop the necessary 
institutional arrangements to guide and coordinate local development following strategic criteria, sustainable 
approaches and adequate technologies. In addition to that I also perform as focal point for governance and 
knowledge development in permanent dialogue with other regional UNDP offices and entities of the UN system. 
Ricardo Núñez Fernández MSc. 
Havana, Cuba, July 2011. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO URBAN LAND MANAGEMENT IN CUBA 
 
1. A short history of urban land management in Cuba 
This book is about urban land management in post revolutionary Cuba and about what it should become in order 
to build a better city and a better society. The research explores the five decades that followed the revolution of 
January 1959, widely recognized as a legitimate social movement that totally reversed the previous political, 
social, and economic structures, and fostered new policies for economic and social development.  
In Cuba, as in other highly centralized countries, planning instruments became the preferred means to achieve 
economic efficiency and to foster territorial development, replacing the role of the market in search of more 
equitable progress. Since the first years of the Revolution, the market stopped acting as the mechanism for 
assigning and managing land. The government authorities sincerely aspired to obtain higher efficiency and quality 
through the planned provision of social services, and to mitigate the social segregation that had marked the 
capitalist production of space in preceding times. Land allocation for housing, industry, public service 
infrastructure, tourism and real estate was centralized by the government, which approved physical and economic 
development plans for the whole country, provinces and municipalities.  
In the 60s, the first steps were aimed at dismantling the institutional and operational framework that had shaped 
the buying and selling of land and building, and land rents and taxes in the real estate market. The whole 
situation drastically changed for landowners and developers when the state declared itself the first purchaser, 
with the clear intention to reduce speculation by controlling the prices, avoiding the intermediaries, and instituting 
public mechanisms to assign and redistribute the land and property stock.  
About one decade later, in the 70s, centralized planning became one of the most important instruments to deal 
with economic and territorial development, while a new legal system introduced mechanisms for confiscating and 
transferring the majority of land and building property to the state public institutions. The central government, 
represented by the State Council and a board that linked ministries representing the different sectors of the 
economy, approved the plans according to the identified social and economic priorities.  
The administrative structure was complemented with a planning system, established through the process of 
institutionalisation, since 1976. This planning system had two fundamental dimensions. In the first place there is 
the planning of the economy – global, sectoral and mercantile (enterprises). And in the second place there is 
physical planning – territorial and urban – assumed by the Physical Planning Institute. This technical division into 
territorial and urban reflects, in our opinion, organizational and technical issues. In general terms, territorial is 
used for planning at country scale and for the political administrative division, including rural and urban areas. It is 
very connected with the country’s economic and social development, with the overall organization of the system 
of settlements, designation of agro-industrial areas and population distribution. It is expressed through master 
plans and zoning. Urban planning, on the other hand, deals with provincial and municipal urban centres and their 
land use plans, urban and construction ordinances and micro-location approvals and restrictions of the different 
investments in the physical space. 
In theory, both types of planning –economic and physical- are expected to work out strategies and to improve the 
consistency of territorial and urban development, even although the first one works with a five year prospect and 
the second one with twenty or more. Nevertheless, a one-year plan was the instrument which was most 
employed, and it supported a sectoral perspective rather than a territorial one.  
2 
 
The allocation of the investment budgets and the resources to implement the plans followed a top down model, 
from the national to the provincial, and from there to the municipal level and finally the community. It is important 
to emphasize the influence of political decisions, which have determined the processes, and we can see how, in 
the case of urban land, these decisions take precedence over considerations such as location advantages, urban 
regulations, and specific social demands.  
In the 1960s, 70s and 80s, economic and physical planners concentrated their efforts on the allocation of land 
and redistribution of property in line with government social priorities, making urgent decisions that would have 
long term impacts, such as the location of prioritized large social programs, experimental urban and industrial 
projects, and the redistribution and reuse of former private properties. They also needed to reconcile the 
decisions from the top authorities with more technical problems such as densities, building codes, construction 
technologies and standards.  
The authorities believed that the economic efficiency worked out in the plan determining the city’s land use would 
lead to a superior urban structure, more manageable, productive and comprehensive.1 Nevertheless, problems 
gradually appeared, as a result of the excessive centralization in land use allocation and in the design of urban 
functions: the mismatch between the establishment of priorities and the needs of local actors; the lack of 
economic and financial vision in the distribution of resources for land management; the application of excessive 
regulations and bureaucratic procedures in some areas; the gaps in relevant legal areas such as tenancy 2; and 
the lack of integration among all of these aspects. A critical look at the results shows a permanent lag between 
the planned and the achieved, limited opportunity for popular participation in local planning and management, and 
the lack of administrative, technical and financial capacities to face the growing deficits of urban infrastructure, 
and other city problems.  
At the end of the 80s, Cuba still lacked a consistent method to fully exploit the capacity of urban land and 
increase its economic efficiency. In 1968 the government had fixed a symbolic price of four pesos per square 
meter for all land, in both urban or rural areas, and this remained the same until 1985, when a group of urban 
planners became concerned with a practice that could compromise the future of valuable areas of Havana. Then, 
some differentiation was introduced by the use of differential land prices. Although it was merely administrative, it 
was the first attempt to raise awareness about the economic relevance of land management and about the effects 
of land use on present and future land value, as well as other external, demographic and environmental 
concerns.  
Taking account of the economic value of land and property was, despite the technical concerns of many urban 
planners, not required of the land use plans for the new development programs: any land, at any location, could 
be used for whichever use was needed according to the urban plan.Other land management issues, related to 
legal and fiscal aspects about land and building property, were “administered” by different entities, after the 
property registers and other pre-revolutionary offices had been closed. It was not the economic significance of 
land which the Cuban government focussed on, but issues of fairness: the design of policies was oriented to 
social equity, creating instruments and mechanisms to favour social and cultural integration, and prioritizing 
investments for the public benefit.  
It is no secret that planning and legislation in Cuba were not prepared to face the impact of the new realities 
which arrived in the 90s after the disintegration of the socialist block. Once again, historical events forced major 
structural changes in Cuba. The unprecedented crisis threatened not only the built environment but also the 
economic, social, moral and cultural aspects of life. The search for new markets and foreign partners became the 
                                                          
1 Núnez Fernández, Ricardo. “Urban Land as a factor for social and economic inclusion. The Havana Experience. Research on urban land 
markets in Latin America”, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2000. 
2 Among other actions, land registers were deactivated and the tax systems were dismantled, property tax was eradicated by law. 
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country’s most urgent need. For thirty years, the government had been the only provider and the main consumer 
of land. As a result, the different state institutions were not trained in the use of appropriate methods, and they 
had no effective financial and legal instruments when negotiating land values with a diversity of financial actors. 
There was no alternative but to learn rapidly.  
Four basic changes were made 3 that radically transformed the situation: 
• Enterprises were decentralized to deal with the diversification of economic agents and the new role of 
non-government actors in the economy.  
• The economy was opened to foreign capital and joint ventures. 
• The public administration of the state economy was reformed. 
• New planning methods were introduced. 
The development of new projects with foreign entrepreneurs and other providers of financial capital required the 
creation of joint ventures, and this required that the land and buildings included in these ventures be valued. The 
number of agreements with these international economic associations is shown in the Annex 1.  
The Cuban authorities followed two lines. One was to reorient economic development, making changes to the 
legal, economic and administrative frameworks; the other was to maintain the social progress achieved by the 
Revolution. The overall strategy was to adjust the development model so as to insert the domestic economy into 
the international networks, without compromising the basic principles of the country, namely: rejection of the 
predominant neo-liberal policies of privatization, of low budget social programs, of deep inequalities, and of a 
small role for the government in the social and economic life of the country. The chronology of reforms 
accomplished in a relatively short period is given in the Annex 2, and it shows the degree of change and its 
impact on the organization and management of the Cuban society.4 
These changes reflect the government’s efforts to replace bureaucracy with efficiency and to make the rigid 
procedures more flexible by decentralizing management, while at the same time encouraging the traditional 
strengths of the Revolution and keeping economic development under the control of government institutions. 
The opening to foreign investment was the most important adjustment, for it necessitated thinking about land not 
only in terms of its social use but also in terms of its highest and best (economic) use. In the middle of constant 
debate among institutions and national and international experts, and within a short time, the country produced a 
new institutional framework, introduced international valuation methods, and created legal instruments to 
articulate practices for credible land and building valuations for projects with foreign investors.  
But the atmosphere of opening and change started to weaken after 2004, when the government returned to high 
economic centralization, reassured by the advantageous economic relations with Venezuela and China. This 
decision was a setback for many foreign investors, who lost confidence in the negotiations over land and 
buildings. And many Cuban entities lost their credibility, even the few that by then had acquired a certain degree 
of experience in land and property valuation and in business management.  
The Cuban authorities have been trying to protect the achievements of the last 50 years, at the same time 
recognizing the serious malfunctions and vulnerability of the present economic model. In the second half of 2009, 
the government launched a set of programs, some of them with an impact on urban land. These are targeted at 
                                                          
3 García Pleyán, Carlos. Principios fundamentales para la ley del suelo, planeamiento territorial y urbano, La Habana, Instituto de 
Planificación Física (IPF) 1997. 
4 González, Alfredo. Conferencia presentada en el Seminario del Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Económicas (INIE). Ministerio de 
Economía y Planificación. La Habana, Cuba, Noviembre, 1996. 
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public infrastructure, the vulnerability of cities and towns to natural disasters, housing repairs and new 
construction on vacant or recycled land, reduction of illegalities and corruption in the public management linked 
with construction permits and ordinances. This time, the authorities are looking to develop the potentials within 
the country rather than opening to foreign capital: but the institutions and mechanisms are structurally the same 
as those that have been criticized above for discouraging the motors of economic growth. 
In 2011, some of the rules about urban land management were changed. It was not possible to take these into 
account in the research. Nevertheless, they are summarized in AnneX 35, with comments on the relevance of 
those changes for the main argument and conclusion of this research 
 
2. The problem 
In the past ten years, the Cuban institutions that deal with economic and urban planning have shown a growing 
concern for land management and land valuation. These institutions are willing to assume a wider perspective 
and to go beyond the customary appraisals and price setting which were introduced in order to complete a 
transaction with a foreign investor. Nevertheless, there is still little understanding among the local actors of the 
potential for developing land fully and appropriately, nor of the conceptual and technical complexity of doing this. 
It is both interesting and alarming to see how the value of land and properties is not mentioned in most of the 
current government strategies. It does not even appear in the ongoing intellectual debate about property, at least 
not directly. The enormous possibilities for mobilizing financial resources through land values, or for using that 
value as collateral in credits and other financing, are largely ignored. The municipal and provincial authorities lack 
a coherent property register of state and private property, with land and building values. There is no discussion 
about introducing public policies for capturing land values. Plans, whether economic or spatial, do not consider 
the importance of land and property values, and the authorities are blind to the importance of valuation for the 
development of Cuba. 
The discussion on urban land continues to be absent in most of the specialized Cuban literature about planning 
and economic policies. In very thorough essays about the present challenges and future recovery of the Cuban 
economy and cities, nothing is said about how this could be helped by adequate public land policies and 
management mechanisms. In practice nothing has yet been changed in land management, nor has it been 
discussed whether this could generate resources to promote urban development. For example, there are very 
clear signals in city daily life of financial transactions with land and buildings, yet there is no understanding of how 
this could be used to stimulate urban development.  
The issue is complex, and there is a void of almost half a century of not dealing with urban land management and 
land value. But those reasons are not sufficient to justify the continued lack of vision in this respect, all the more 
when the Cuban cities are in desperate need to reverse the deterioration and stagnation that affects them.  
It is our contention, which will be supported with arguments and facts in the following chapters, that there are 
many problems with urban land management in Cuba. We distinguish between the following types of problem: 
a) the urban land management does not always lead to land being used efficiently. 
Decisions about land use are not influenced by considerations of the economic consequences of the decisions. 
This affects the economic efficiency with which land is used. This is explained in chapter 2.  
b) the urban land management does not always achieve the social aims which have been set for it. 
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The land management responds to a social welfare approach, but national policies and development priorities 
have not been sufficiently connected to the specific needs and living conditions of the people. The urban 
strategies and action plans have been only partially implemented: as a result there are huge housing and 
infrastructure shortages and there is a lack of balance between new construction and rehabilitation of existing 
stock. These aspects are covered in chapter 3. 
c) the procedures do not always satisfy the aims of transparency and democratic decision making. 
Popular participation in land management issues is very limited. The interface between the community and the 
local government is narrow: the existing framework is more formal than effective, public entities have their 
language while the people have another. The grassroots organization, the Popular Council, has very limited 
decision making powers and no sources of income for development other than those distributed centrally. There 
are few possibilities for acknowledging and tackling effectively the needs and problems of the population. These 
aspects are covered in chapters 3 and 4. 
d) the procedures are not always followed correctly. 
The lack of clear and flexible land legislation clouds the understanding of rights and obligations about the use and 
ownership of land and buildings. The existing rules and procedures are the opposite of what they should be: they 
are unclear, unpredictable, inflexible, discretional and bureaucratic. Therefore they are subject to corruption and 
to the development of an informal sector based on social networks which act as a flexible mechanism to deal with 
real problems. There are violations of existing regulations and procedures because there is no judiciary control 
and because they are inflexible. These mechanisms are covered in chapters 3, 4 and 5.  
In this book, we focus on the first sort of problem: increasing the efficiency with which land is used. We do not 
ignore the social aims of urban land management: we look for ways of increasing the efficiency which do not 
harm those social aims. Nor do we ignore the problems with the procedures: these are described and analysed, 
especially in chapters 3 and 4, but our concern with procedures for the effects that they have on the efficiency of 
land use and on the related social aims. So the following question is addressed in this book: how could land 
management be changed so as to increase the economic efficiency with which land is used?  
This book goes beyond analysis and criticism: the last chapter puts forward in addition recommendations for 
improving land management in Cuba. What changes in policies, instruments and practices might be expected to 
lead to better outcomes? For this I want to use the academic and practical experience about planning and 
economic policies already present in Cuba, which has not yet been fully applied to land management. It is 
important to recognize that in the past two decades, some of the Cuban institutions dealing with economic and 
urban planning have shown a growing concern for land management and land valuation: they are clearly willing to 
take a wider perspective and go beyond the customary practices.  
This investigation is centred in Havana, capital of Cuba and largest city of the country - Annex 3 - where all the 
tensions and contradictions around urban land are present. Its urban fabric offers many opportunities for 
rehabilitation and preservation of existing spaces and buildings, renewal of deteriorated areas, redevelopment of 
vacant land with new building projects, recycling of industrial facilities and so on. Despite the advanced 
deterioration in Havana, there is still time to plan and manage its regeneration coherently, and to reverse the 
negative impacts accumulated for many decades. Havana city, according to an expert opinion, can awake the 
greatest dreams and the darkest fears,5 for it could become in the future the expected, desired city, 
                                                          
5 García Pleyán, Carlos. “La Habana 2050”, Revista Temas, No. 120, La Habana, Octubre-Deciembre 2004. 
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reconstructed, safeguarded: but it could also be the destroyed, sacked and abandoned city, sold to the highest 
bidder.6 This future could be better planned for through consistent urban land management.7 
 
3. Urban land management 
Policies for urban land and for rural land have similarities and differences. However, in this work, we concentrate 
on urban land and on how policies for that can help it to be used more efficiently. 
The land market is a mechanism for allocating land that theoretically allows the most suitable person or the one 
most in need – defined as the highest bidder - to get hold of a particular property and to put it to its highest and 
best use. The performance of urban land markets, driven by the interaction of land demand and land supply, 
influences the location, density, shape and price of residential, commercial and industrial development. This 
interaction is determined by the combination of many variables – physical, social and economic - and creates 
value that is expressed in land prices.8 However, this relationship based on competition can also cause conflict 
because, differently from other commodities, each land parcel at a given location is unique and irreplaceable, 
making the supply a fixed variable (even if demand should increase and prices rise), sometimes inducing 
landowners to speculate, driving up land prices and withholding land from the market.9 Moreover, private 
decisions about land use can cause positive or negative external impacts, and land markets are volatile.  
Economic experts10 have long studied the imperfections of land markets. It is widely recognized that the market 
prices are not the best land coordinating mechanisms.11 That is why, even in most market based economies 
there is always involvement of the state, controlling through land planning, fiscal policies, regulatory and tenure 
systems to achieve a more balanced social outcome, and promoting developments that benefit the low income 
sectors and other vulnerable groups. Many experts emphasize the importance of public-private partnerships 
where the strengths of both sectors complement each other in order to guide, for example, land development and 
more participatory projects.  
Zetter and Hamza12 bring out an important issue about the performance of market economies and central (i.e. 
government directed) economies: both have generated outcomes very different from the ones they envisaged. 
For example, in Cuba the housing policies are supposed to provide each family with a decent dwelling, but the 
inefficient performance of legal and economic instruments for exchanging land and buildings plus the limited 
housing production and the deteriorated existing stock cause a serious housing shortage –see Annexes 15 and 
16. The conclusion can be drawn that neither the state, nor unrestrained market forces, are able to meet the 
basic needs of the majority of people.13 
This is the reason why the state has always played an important role in the control, regulation, and development 
of land at different levels, even in liberal and capitalist societies. The degree of participation of the state, and its 
relations with other social actors, range from societies with predominantly public control to those where the 
                                                          
6 Ibid. 
7 See chapter 2. What do we mean by better urban land management? 
8 Serra, M. V. David E. Dowall, Diana Motta and Michael Donovan. Urban Land markets and Urban land development. An examination of 
Three Brazilian Cities: Brasília, Curitiba and Recife. UC Berkeley, IURD Working Paper Series, Institute of Urban and Regional 
Development, 2004. 
9 Ibid. Page 10. 
10 Needham, Barrie and G. De Kam. “Understanding How Land is Exchanged: Coordination Mechanisms and Transaction Costs”. Urban 
Studies. Vol. 41. UK, Glasgow, September 2004. 
11 Ibid. Even the theories of land markets and land prices, the bid rent theory and others could incorporate the possibility that land is 
exchanged under certain imposed constraints. 
12 Zetter, Roger and Hamza, Mohamed. Market Economy and Urban Change. Impacts in the Developing World, London, Earthscan 
Publications Ltd, 2004. 
13 Ibid. 
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market prevails. But there is always a need for some kind of planning and for the design of clear property rights, 
laws and land use regulations. Only then can cities achieve an equitable distribution of and access to land for 
housing, infrastructure and the provision of services.  
In the literature on urban studies there are significant references to land management, land use planning, land 
markets, land values, financial management, and also to the validity of urban economics as the discipline which 
can help to analyze the problems of cities, using the models, concepts and tools of economics. Also, it is 
recognized that land management is a broad concept that connects many areas of knowledge, including 
urbanism, economics, geography, sociology, urban and cultural anthropology. It has a rich and diverse theoretical 
background and is constantly being enriched and adjusted by learning from practical experience. However, it is 
less common to find agreement about how land management should be defined. 14 Maldonado,15 for example, 
states that land management can be defined as the joint public interventions into land markets, destined to 
achieve the political and ethical objectives that are assumed collectively for the conservation, transformation and 
occupation of the territory. In other words, it is all the actions taken to regulate land use in order to distribute rights 
between land owners and the community. This author emphasizes the area of collective negotiations, market 
regulations and also the conciliation among social actors, aspects that gain relevance in the Latin American 
context where uncontrolled market forces and the pressures from the low income sectors for land regularization 
are very important. 
Needham and De Kam, on the other hand argue that adequate land management is about the efficient and 
articulated design of public and private rules for the well functioning and coordination of development. In this way 
they stress that, once the planning objectives are clear, the best way to implement them is to rely on good rules. 
Some of these rules may be issued to stop distortions that already exist and need to be corrected, and others to 
put into practice new mechanisms. These and other experts stress the importance of the coordination and trust 
instruments for land management, also referring to the dimensions of the management process: the structures, 
mechanisms and actors.16 
In this work we will use the term land management in the following way. By urban land management we 
understand the government activity of systematically planning, guiding and coordinating the use of 
urban land in a sustainable manner, designing and applying a consistent land policy with an institutional 
framework, instruments and mechanisms to influence indirectly or determine directly the way in which 
land is used for social benefit.  
 
4. The process of land management 
Land can be managed by national, regional, provincial and municipal governments. The definition and scope of 
each territorial scale may vary from country to country and even between cities and regions in the same country 
according to geographical conditions, the political, economic and financial situation, social commitment, and the 
size of metropolitan areas.  
At the national level it is important to foster a balance between the urban and the rural areas, to foresee the major 
infrastructure development, and to plan the land use so as to support the dynamics of the economy in a 
sustainable manner. At the city level, land management involves land laws, land rules to establish how urban land 
                                                          
14 This could be partially explained by the broad, adaptable meaning of the concept of management which implies many aspects: carrying 
on or conducting a process; the skilful and reasonable use of certain means to accomplish an end; the negotiation and arrangements 
needed during a given process; coordinating actions among many actors. 
15 Maldonado, María Mercedes. (Ed.) Reforma Urbana y Desarrollo Territorial. Experiencias y Perspectivas de aplicación de las Leyes 
9na. De 1989 y 388 de 1997. Bogotá, Universidad de los Andes, Centro  Interdisciplinar de Estudios Regionales, CIDER, 2003. 
16 Needham and Kam. Vol 41. Urban Studies, 2004. 
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and property rights may be transferred and valued, land use plans which indicate how it is wished that land in 
particular locations be used, fiscal instruments for land taxation, and ordinances for land use and construction.  
Land management requires co-ordinating the interrelation between the different government structures and other 
stakeholders, all working in a system where land policy accompanies urban, social, environmental and economic 
policy, which latter policies cannot be integrated unless there is a political vision about land development. A well-
integrated urban land policy should accompany the state policies for other sectors and agendas such as 
urbanization, housing, social upgrading programs, cultural diversity, development of inner city areas, provision of 
urban and service infrastructures, location of industrial facilities, sustainable development, risk management and 
environmental protection. All of these policy goals are linked in one way or another to the ways in which we use 
land. 
The design of land policies can be the result of a practical process of working with urban land, or of the wish to 
implement an ideal vision. Implementing land policy requires a long time of practice, trial and error, before seeing 
the expected results, all the more reason to apply it from the very early planning stages.17 The instruments and 
mechanisms created for land management vary largely, according to the characteristics of countries, cities and 
communities. Evaluating the successful practices and failures therefore turns out to be very specific for each 
case. Nevertheless, there are always common problems and similarities that produce transferable experiences.  
Land use planning is one of the most important instruments of land management, and it can be very effective 
when the authorities are clear about their objectives. A coherent physical planning system contributes to the 
success of one of the basic goals of all nations, which is to work towards a long term sustainable future. The use 
of innovative and flexible strategic planning tools is crucial to maximize the potential of land and to pay the 
necessary attention to development needs and requirements.  
Local planning agencies are very important in order to guide land-use decisions towards the identified target 
areas, and to ensure the participation of the various actors (public, non-public, private and so on). Participatory 
planning, together with adequate regulations, has been successfully applied in different cities of the developed 
and developing world, such as The Netherlands, Brazil and the US. Harrison considers land use planning as an 
inherently political activity, and says that the actual process of planning is being increasingly politicized through 
community action, more elaborate public enquiries, and direct attempts to involve people in decision making 
through public participation. 18  
Land planning,19 as part of land management, should seek to generate coherence, balance and social equity in 
the provision and location of urban services and infrastructure, substantially improving the re-distribution of wealth 
and opportunities. But this cannot happen isolated from the rest of society. It must be coordinated with public land 
authorities and with the country’s economic potentials. Without putting all these together, the dream of achieving 
an effective land management is not feasible. A comprehensive and realistic land planning process should accept 
the urban conflicts 20 and work in permanent interaction with the urban actors. This could reduce the uncertainty 
of long term ideal plans for city growth, and produce more realistic economic and investment decisions.  
                                                          
17 Deininger, Klaus W. Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction. World Bank, 2009. 
18 Harrison, A. Economics and Land Use Planning. London, Croom Helm, 1977. 
19 Needham, Barrie. Planning, Law and Economics: The rules we make for using land, UK, The RTPI Library Series, Routledge Taylors 
and Francis Group, 2006. Urban planning is about protecting the interest in land which are not protected by property rights…and so it 
is…in the first place about determining the private law rules (property rights) by which the market should work, in the second place about 
determining the public rules to supplement (but not replace) those private rules. 
20 Lungo, Mario and Rolnik Raquel. “Strategic Management of urban land. El Salvador Research program for development and the 
environment”. PRISMA, 1998. 
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In the 60s and 70s, land planning was mainly understood as determining the best spatial arrangement of activities 
and the most suitable intensity of use for each parcel of land within the area being planned.21 One decade later, 
that approach came under a lot of criticism, mainly for the lack of connections with economic and political issues 
during implementation of the physical plans. The benefits of establishing connections between all these 
dimensions became a central point of discussion among urban economists. Land use planners alone were not 
doing so well, and economists working with land markets also needed spatial planning.22 
When making physical plans, the traditional studies of the occupation patterns, determining the densities and 
intensity of uses, and the levels of intervention in the urban fabric taking account of the infrastructure capacity and 
quality, are still useful. However the evident failure of physical planning when applied to achieve a long term 
vision23 disconnected from economic investment trends, has led to the search for different approaches and 
instruments. This has gradually led to the adoption of economic concepts and tools for land use analysis, 
introduction of more flexible time frames, more participation and cooperation among actors, and more inter-
institutional relations. 24 Since the 80s, environmental factors and cultural values have gained importance in 
physical planning, as have fiscal, legal and tenure instruments as a way of improving management (see later).  
One important part of the debate in Cuba is that, in the planning stages it is usually only the technical staff who 
are involved, while the actors in charge of management, investment and making the final decisions are seldom 
present. 25 Another debate is the extent to which the successful lessons from developed countries are 
transferable to the developing ones, where problems such as informality, spatial segregation, congestion and 
pollution are enormous. In Latin-American countries, the practice of urban land management has gained from the 
experience with contrasts such as between serviced land and vacant land, the formal and the informal land 
markets, inclusion and exclusion, security and insecurity, gated communities and illegal settlements. 
 
Effective land management must have a strong legal framework to establish the laws that guide and oversee 
urban land development, that limit development and that protect land and the environment. The design and scope 
of the laws are important, because a too permissive legal framework can allow land and building which cause 
irreversible damage, but excessively prohibitive laws can inhibit desirable development. Among the expressions 
of a responsible legal framework are the land laws, land use acts, urban renewal and redevelopment acts, and 
other legal alternatives.26 
The fiscal and regulatory instruments are the public and private rules regulating the use of land. Such 
instruments derive from fiscal and legal policies, and they are enforced and observed by agencies which are 
responsible for land and property rights, taxes, tax incentives, administration and exchange of land development 
rights, land acquisition, land tenure, land transferability, and legitimacy issues. These instruments need to be 
flexible, accessible and accountable.27 Some countries have developed Financial Control Units 28 or General 
Accounting Offices. These instruments should give incentives to desired investments and should protect the 
                                                          
21 Harrison, A. Croom Helm, 1977. Chapters 1-3. 
22 Ibid. page 14 paragraph 2. In part stimulated by a growing awareness of the failure of private markets…, economics has developed 
tools of analysis particularly relevant to the field of land use planning. 
23 Garcia Pleyán, Carlos. Temas, October/December, 2004. 
24 Smolka, Martim. The functioning of Urban Land Markets in Latin America, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy,1997. 
25 Beier, G. and others. “The task ahead of cities in developing countries”. World Development, Vol 4, Oxford, 1976. 
 National economic planners are generally concerned with monetary, trade, fiscal and employment policies. On the other hand, urban 
planners are concerned with spatial structure and design and have a limited capability and/or opportunity to analyze socio economic 
processes. These two strands of analysis must be brought together. Virtually all national policies have territorial consequences. 
26 Priemus, Hugo and Gerard Metselaar. “Urban Renewal Policy in a European Perspective”, Journal of Housing and the Built 
Environment, Vol. 8, No. 4, Netherlands, 1993. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Acioly Jr, Claudio. “Review Urban Revitalization Strategies in Rio de Janeiro: from urban Project to urban management approaches”, 
Río de Janeiro, Geoforum 32, 2001. 
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disadvantaged social sectors. The lack of adequate fiscal and regulatory instruments for land can lead to land 
informality, to over- or under-valuation of land, to disregard of plans, to bureaucracy and corruption, and so on. 
Financial instruments – such as subsidies, loans, property taxes – can be used for a variety of purposes. At one 
level, they can be used as a general source of income for the public sector. At a more particular level, they can be 
used to recover for the state some of the financial benefits enjoyed by private persons and firms and which result 
from investments made by the state. They can be used to stimulate various activities (by offering subsidies for, for 
example, housing improvements) and to discourage other activities (for example charging levies on the discharge 
of polluting substances). At another level, the government can decide to pursue its urban land management by 
taking more account of the prices of land and buildings. This means letting the price mechanism determine more 
how land and buildings are used. Alternatively, the government might want to determine prices by decree. 
Government bodies undertaking land management are concerned mainly about how land is used, rather than 
about who owns it. Nevertheless, it can be useful for land management that government bodies have 
instruments for land ownership. 29 These can include normal buying and selling, also rights of expropriation 
and confiscation, sometimes pre-emption rights.  
Good governance is an important element for a successful urban land management and for equitable land 
development. This is about setting up the government entities, determining their powers, and dividing institutional 
arrangements and capacities between government entities and other agencies at national, regional and municipal 
levels. The concept of urban governance encompasses the view that local authorities have to co-exist and 
collaborate with a much wider network of agencies and interest groups in the form of partnerships and other 
arrangements.30 City authorities must develop mechanisms to generate resources, and institutional and economic 
capacities. Understanding that these are never sufficient, they must join other stakeholders in partnerships and 
associations. The empowerment of the local authorities is a basic aspect in the coordination of community 
strategies and the actors’ interests and needs.  
The success of the chosen form and content of land management depends on the society. Urban land 
management includes public-private activities that function more efficiently when they take account of local 
attitudes and interests. And this happens only when the local levels representing the inhabitants are strong and 
have leadership, legal authority, institutional capacity, economic and financial resources, knowledge of their costs 
and benefits, and clearly organized information in registers. All these aspects require the active participation of 
the city dwellers.31 To enable a wide participation, it is necessary to strive for inclusiveness, especially for 
minorities and low income groups. The experience of participatory planning has been successfully applied in 
North American and Brazilian cities.  
Mechanisms to register, update and monitor land information are necessary. Accurate and up-to-date 
information about land is very important for the planning process, to identify the availability of land for 
development, for an adequate governance, for the fiscal and regulatory controls, and for the economic and 
financial studies. This requires property registers, land cadastres, and other types of information.  
The control and management of the information is a task primarily for the public authorities. Their knowledge 
about infrastructure facilities, streets, and sewerage, water and electricity networks, vacant land areas and so on, 
is essential for any land development project. The availability of information is one of the basic conditions for the 
                                                          
29 Serra, M. V. David E. Dowall, Diana Motta and Michael Donovan. UC Berkeley, IURD Working Paper Series, Institute of Urban and 
Regional Development, 2004. 
30 Basset Keith, Ron Griffiths and Ian Smith. “Testing Governance: Partnerships, planning and conflict in waterfront regeneration”. Urban 
Studies, vol. 39, No. 10, UK, Glasgow, 2002. 
31 Zetter, Roger and Hamza, Mohamed. Earthscan Ltd, 2004.  
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effective functioning of land markets, so that people can identify opportunities, make the right allocation choices, 
and evaluate prices. The more accurate the information is, the more efficiently land will be used.  
The development of social and economic surveys to monitor, study and evaluate urban land processes is 
essential for the design and application of the instruments and mechanisms described above. Reliable 
information about land and buildings is needed: about ownership, use, delimitation, transfers, and other legal and 
financial information. Information is needed also about the market actors, such as: who are the land users, the 
potential buyers, how do they react to the quality of infrastructure and services, how do they assess the 
environmental quality of land, what are the development demands for housing, commercial facilities, 
transportation, and other social needs. This type of research, often carried out by universities and research 
institutes, is very important to detect the malfunctioning and undesired effects derived from land use decisions, to 
evaluate the degree of desired market interventions, the presence of informal processes, the social tensions and 
conflicts around urban land and other aspects. 
The first step in evaluating land management instruments and mechanism is to measure whether they are 
effective in achieving the goals for which they were applied. Such monitoring can be carried out by private 
entities, specially hired to perform that task. But in countries with good records and organized cadastres and 
registers, these operations can be handled by governmental bodies at the different levels, national, provincial or 
municipal.  
Countries like the Netherlands, England and Sweden 32 and cities of the United States, for example, have digital 
systems to measure and evaluate the performance of land management. It is more accurate and secure to do it 
digitally than to keep hand-written documents and procedures where mistakes can often happen. It is also easier 
to evaluate and keep track of changes in this way. This monitoring needs to be as simple and automatic as 
possible. Key indicators, no more than ten - such as number of land parcels exchanged, land use changes, 
transaction values - are usually identified to provide a snapshot at the moment when technical staff and decision 
makers need the information. The evaluation can take place periodically, such as monthly, every three months, 
every semester.  
 
5. The structure of the argument in this book 
a) Land in Cuba could be used in way which would be more efficient. 
By this we mean that, from the same land, and with the same input of other factors of production, more of the 
same outputs could be produced, or different outputs which would be more highly valued. We concentrate on this 
aspect of urban land management, while recognising that land management can be used to achieve other goals 
too. However, this book cannot consider all aspects in the same depth, and we have chosen to apply an 
economic analysis. 
b) The inefficiency is caused partly by the prevailing rules and practices of land management. 
The way in which land is used is strongly influenced by the rules and practices about how it is allocated (for which 
purposes?) and to whom it is allocated (distributed between users). Here we take an institutional approach to the 
economic analysis, namely that ‘institutions matter’. 
c) If some of the rules and practices were changed in particular ways, land would be used more efficiently. 
                                                          
32 Land Law in Action. Stockholm, June, 1996. 
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It follows from (a) and (b) that, with different rules and practices, land would be used differently. By carefully 
selecting (and introducing) different rules and practices, land would be used more efficiently. 
d) Those changes could be introduced without harm to the social and political ideals to which Cuban 
society strives. 
The present rules and practices about how land is used have been chosen partly to achieve other goals than 
(economic) efficiency as described above. For example, to prevent (great) inequalities in society, and to inhibit a 
few persons or firms from acquiring too much power. When choosing new rules for greater efficiency, account 
has to be taken of those other aims. It is possible to devise new rules for greater efficiency which do not move 
society away from those other ideals. 
This argument is worked out in the following way: 
Chapter 2 - The theoretical approach: land as an economic resource 
Here we explain what we mean by ‘the efficiency with which land is used’ and by ‘increasing the efficiency with 
which a given area of land is used’. This we do as far as possible without reference to prices and the price 
mechanism, for such references could be seen as proposing a free market in land, and we are not proposing that. 
Using these ideas, we give examples of systematic inefficiency in the use of land in Cuba, caused by the land 
management there. With the concepts developed in this chapter, the consequences can be assessed of the 
current practices of urban land management (described in chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6) for the efficiency with which 
land is used. 
Chapter 3 - Rules and practices for urban land management in Cuba 
Here we describe the rules and how they are applied, and we discuss the effects on efficiency and on other social 
and political ideals. 
Chapter 4 - The rules and practices for valuing land and buildings in Cuba 
Here it is the formal rules and practices for valuing land and building in particular that are described, and their 
effects on the way in which land is used and allocated. 
Chapter 5 - La Permuta: the informal housing market 
The rules and practices described and analysed in chapters 3 and 4 have produced a situation where people 
cannot change their dwellings easily. In response to this, an informal market has arisen in which people can swop 
dwellings – la Permuta. In the course of time, the government has recognised the value of this informal market 
and facilitates it to some extent, but also regulates it. That is the subject of this chapter, also what that can teach 
us about the efficiency with which land is used. 
Chapter 6 - Econometric analysis of urban property transactions in Havana 
In this chapter, econometric analyses are carried out on two separate data bases. One is of state property 
valuations carried out when foreign businesses acquire a user right on land. The other is of the value of 
properties informally exchanged in la Permuta. Those analyses give insights into the factors that influence prices 
and values. In that way, we can get a better understanding of how land could be used more efficiently. 
Chapter 7 - Conclusions and recommendations for better management of urban land in Cuba 
From chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 we conclude in this chapter that the current rules and practices for land 
management in Cuba often result in land being used inefficiently. Moreover, those rules and practices do not 
13 
 
always result in the other social and political goals for land management being achieved. Based on the results of 
those analyses, we make recommendations for changes in the rules and practices, which would increase the 
efficiency with which land in Cuba is used, and which would not harm the realisation of other social and political 
goals (and which might even realise them better). Those changes concern mainly how the economic significance 
of land could better be taken into account.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE THEORETICAL APPROACH: LAND AS AN ECONOMIC RESOURCE 
 
1. Land as an economic resource 
Land is the support structure of all human progress, and its use and distribution have long term impacts on all 
activities. The demand for land is induced by the social demand for different commodities and services in specific 
locations.1 The resulting use of land - with the basic objective of satisfying the population’s wishes and demands - 
greatly influences the spatial organization of our cities.  
The characteristics of land which make it important and indispensable for society are: 
- Its extent; 
- Its location; 
- Its natural resources (important only for the primary industries). 
All these characteristics, in combination, influence the potential of a plot of land to be used as an economic 
resource. When land is used as an economic resource, this can be in various ways: 
a) Land is used for the productive resources which it contains, such as minerals, soil fertility. These 
resources are relevant when land is used for mining, for agriculture, etc. 
The natural resources of land are used to grow food or timber – agriculture and forestry - or to extract raw 
materials from above or underneath the ground – mining, quarries. The importance of this type of use varies from 
country to country depending on economic, social, geographical, legal and political conditions. For example, 
agriculture is very important for developing countries, where it is fundamental for its population’s existence.  
What is demanded from land in these cases are the natural resources themselves and the extent (area). The 
absolute location of the land is important, as it gives access to the natural resources (the land in some locations is 
more fertile than elsewhere, minerals can be found in some locations and not in others). The relative location – 
the location of production relative to the location of other activities – is not so important, as the produce can 
usually be transported fairly cheaply. This characteristic of land is usually not very important for urban land 
management. 
b) Land is used as a consumption good. People have their housing on land, people enjoy parks, people 
enjoy being in the countryside, etc. 
What is demanded from land as a consumer good is extent and location. In particular, people want land for their 
housing, and housing is one of the uses that consume large amounts of land. People want housing in certain 
locations and they want to live at a higher or a lower density, they might want a garden. People might be 
prepared to trade extent against location, for example choosing to live in the centre of the city for the locational 
                                                          
1 Urban land use and management in China. Final Report. Institute of Finance and Trade Economics, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, 1992. 
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advantages, even though that means living at a high density. Choices for location and quantity of land depend on 
aspects such as family needs for area and free space, distance and accessibility to work and services and so on.  
 
Example: In 1988 a Cuban family living in an excellent location in a central residential area of Havana – Vedado 
- decides to move to a peripheral municipality in order to get a larger individual house. They do this by 
exchanging their house for the house of another. The family parents who move to the periphery work far away 
from the new residence but this is not a problem as they have a private car and do not rely on public transport, 
transport costs are covered by their firms. The exchange takes place without any financial compensation 
because both parties are working out their needs; it is a perfect win-win situation. For one family the utility 
criterion was gaining additional area and a single family house, and for the other it was getting to a better 
location, closer to the city centre and services. 
The social housing produced by the Historian’s Office to relocate the inhabitants that live in slums in the Historic 
Centre provides new units with better conditions where the inhabitants can become owners of the new 
apartments, a possibility that they did not have before. This compensates for the loss of the advantages in the 
historic centre. The Office covers all the transaction and construction costs of the new housing, and gains very 
valuable land parcels with historical buildings that, once rehabilitated, will accommodate profitable uses. The 
results are efficient for both parties.  
 
c) Land as a necessary condition for the production of goods and services. Factories and offices stand on 
land, as do harbours, shops, hospitals, etc. 
Firms and other producers want land as extent and as location. The amount of land that they want for a given 
amount of production depends on the intensity with which they use that land, and that depends partly on the type 
of production (e.g. offices can use land more intensively than factories). And firms want certain locational 
qualities, as this influences their transport costs, the number of customers who visit them, etc. Certain types of 
production require more area than others, and the location chosen depends on the weight of other variables like 
transportation, environmental requirements and urban regulations. Some services can be produced intensively 
using a small amount of land, and these services prefer locations that bring them closer to the consumers, even if 
those locations cost more. 
d)  Land as a financial asset. 
This refers to using land as a source of income, directly or indirectly. It can be a direct source of income when the 
owner of the land (or of a right in land) can appropriate the income from the land, either recurrent (e.g. an annual 
ground rent) or capital (e.g. by selling the right). This is the right of usus fructus. It can be an indirect source when 
it is used as a capital input to a business venture (equity capital), as collateral for a loan for a business venture, 
and as collateral for a loan for consumption (e.g. to obtain a mortgage for buying a house, e.g. to buy a car). 2  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 De Soto, Hernando. The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else. New York, Basic Books, 
2000. 
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2. The concept of allocative efficiency 
The general concept of economic efficiency is that it is always measured as the ratio of output to input: the higher 
the ratio the more efficiency in the production process. The inputs are the scarce resources – land, transaction 
costs, construction costs, operational costs - and the outputs are the commodities and services produced. 3 
In most economic literature, value is measured in terms of money, which means that inputs and outputs have a 
price and that this price is used as a measure of the value which society derives from the inputs and outputs. 
Then, the efficiency is determined by the expression: value of output/value of input. This convention will be clear 
in the discussion below. However, it is our contention that allocative efficiency can often be measured without 
reference to prices, using only the physical quantity of the inputs and the outputs. We shall make this clearer 
later. 
The allocative efficiency refers to the efficiency resulting from the way in which resources are allocated. It 
implies the minimization of the real resources needed in order to maximize results. The concept requires a 
comparison of the amount of goods and services absorbed to produce a specific level of output.4 It can be difficult 
to apply this concept to urban land because of the heterogeneity of inputs and outputs.  
The urban production process involves various economic actors with different priorities and demands that 
continually interact. The decisions and choices they make and the methods they apply – policies, planning, laws, 
development projects - for the use and organization of the production factors, in public or private entrepreneurial 
efforts, determine more or less efficient outcomes with lasting economic effects.  
The economic efficiency with which a plot of urban land is used is thus strongly influenced by the choices about 
how it is to be developed: how it is to be allocated between alternative uses. In this allocation process, the land 
owner requires information about acquisition costs and previous planning,5 not only to evaluate the costs and 
opportunities of one choice over another (because the properties of land - its immobility and irreplaceability - 
mean that once it is occupied with one use, you cancel the possibility of another use); but also to take account of 
possible changes in the maintenance and operational costs. The choices made might take account only of the 
short term and only of the costs and benefits for the owner or user itself. Or they might take account of durability 
considerations, the social costs - gains and losses for other owners and users – the distributional effects, and the 
externalities. Those allocation choices might differ between different users: they will not be the same for a firm 
which wants to generate profits as for a family which is basically a consumer of space and services; and the 
interests and expectations are not the same for a public entity as for a private one. 
A related concept is spatial efficiency. This is the relationship between the extent of land used for production 
and the amount produced on it. Production usually requires the combination of land with the other production 
factors – capital and labour.6 By putting more capital and labour onto a certain area of land, more can be 
produced on that same land: the spatial efficiency has been raised. However, it might not always be commercially 
advantageous to choose a combination which gives a high spatial efficiency. Here the value of the location is 
crucial as, depending on the costs and type of production, the developer can decide between less extent in a 
highly demanded location or more extent in a less demanded location. 
                                                          
3 Needham, Barrie. Planning, Law and Economics. The rules we make for using land. Page 53. 
4 Prest A. R. and N.A. Barr. Public Finance in theory and Practice, UK, Economic Journal, sixth edition, 1979.  
5 Needham, Barrie. Planning, Law and Economics. The rules we make for using land. Transaction costs are usually divided into search of 
information costs, bargaining costs and enforcement costs. But there are others such as feasibility studies, search costs, planning 
permissions, presentation dossiers, monitoring (enforcement costs) page 59. 
6 Needham, Barrie, Erik Louw and Paul Metzemaker. “Land in the production process: the significance of land as a factor of production”. 
Inedit, 2010. 
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There is a third concept of efficiency in the land literature which is the technical efficiency. This is the capacity to 
organize the inputs in a way that the maximum feasible output is produced. It is related with managerial skills and 
knowledge of inputs and outputs, with the quality and the intelligent use of the information available, the 
availability of appropriate technologies and so on. 
Finally we find interesting references to a fourth concept of efficiency defined as organizational or institutional 
efficiency. This is linked to the performance of institutions and administrations and combines elements of goal 
accomplishment versus goal failure but also including the quality of the output which these entities produce for 
society – social efficiency. 
In this work, we concentrate on the allocative efficiency with which land use used. This concept can be applied to 
land in the separate types of use identified above, as follows.  
a) When land is used as a direct productive resource, (agriculture, mining, etc.).  
Maximum efficiency is attained when the greatest possible output is achieved from a given set of resources, or 
when a minimum input of resources produces a larger output. When applied to agriculture, it is often measured in 
terms of spatial efficiency, namely by the output or the net income attained per unit of area.7 
b) When land is used as a consumption good.  
This consumption can be both private and collective. Private is usually in the form of a house or a garden. The 
higher the satisfaction which the user gets from a particular plot of land, the higher is the efficiency with which that 
land is being used. One of the difficulties with measuring that satisfaction is that the satisfaction of the user might 
be at the cost of others, such as neighbours. Moreover, if satisfaction is measured solely in terms of willingness to 
pay, then it might appear that a rich person gets more satisfaction from using a particular plot than a poorer 
person, so the efficiency would be higher if the plot is used by a richer person, even though the poor person has 
as much (non-monetary) satisfaction from the plot as the rich person. 
The efficiency with which land as a collective consumer good (such as a park) is used depends on the number of 
satisfied consumers – outputs - related to the operational costs and costs for maintenance, for avoiding 
environmental nuisances, for replacing urban equipment, and so on. The output (satisfaction) can sometimes be 
recorded by measuring the value increment of surrounding properties. 
c) When land is used for the production of goods and services 
The amount of that production on a given extent of land (the ‘spatial efficiency’) depends on the input of other 
factors of production. Location will affect the decision about the combination of land with those other factors, 
                                                          
7 Bizimana, Nieuwoudt and Ferrer. “Farm size, land fragmentation and economic efficiency in Southern Rwanda”, Agrekon, Vol 43, no. 2, 
Official publication of the Agricultural Economics Association of South Africa (AEASA) , 2004. The proportions in which land and the other 
factors of production (labour and capital) combine in production to maximize the outputs can vary according to different factors. In the case 
of agriculture some of them are: Size of farm: It has to do with land availability or scarcity, with the scale of acquisition (larger or smaller) 
and also with the spatial organization of production. This can range from individual parcels, to small and medium size farms for family use, 
to agriculture enterprises and a larger scale of agro-industrial companies. 
Development costs: These are the input costs plus management, equipment and machinery, transportation and handling, information and 
supervision. The costs per unit produced decrease as fixed costs are spread over a greater output. 
Property and tenure rules: The definition of land rights and property issues is important for efficiency outputs. The possibility to sell land is 
an incentive to owners. The certainty over the future use of the land is very important. There are different types of property such as 
communal, private – individual landowners - or state owned. 
Farm employment: It has to do with demographic aspects as gender and age, with the education level and health conditions. It also 
depends on the technological issues. In countries where there are other sources of employment more attractive than agriculture, the 
incentives and salaries are very important factors.7 
Agricultural training and experience: Contributes to technical efficiency of the farm making the best use of available information, 
management skills and so on. The higher the level of training, the larger is the capacity to deal with larger and diversified farms. 
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because location affects either the costs of transporting the inputs, or the costs of transporting the outputs to the 
customers. If a plot of land in one location can produce more of a given product than a plot of equal size in 
another location, and if the input of all other factors of production is the same in both locations, then the plot in the 
first location is being used more efficiently than the plot in the second location. Further, the economic value of an 
additional unit of land to a plot in a particular location is the reduction in the cost of inputs of other factors of 
production for the same output, a reduction that is possible by substituting land for those other factors.8  
Decisions about location are very important, because once a location has been chosen, the consequences - the 
advantages and disadvantages derived from the land – last a long time.  
d) When land is used as a financial asset.  
If the owner of the land (or of a right in land) has the right to enjoy the income derived from that land, the link with 
allocative efficiency is easily made. For the owner has the incentive to use the land so that it produces something 
(it need not always be money or something which can be measured in terms of money) which he or she values. 
Moreover, there is the incentive to use the land to produce as much as possible of that valued commodity. In 
other words, there is the incentive to use the land efficiently. 
If the owner of the land has the right to use it as collateral, it is more difficult to apply the concept of efficiency. 
Nevertheless, if land can fulfil this function, it can contribute to economic growth, for it enables producers to 
generate or borrow money and in that way produce more (or sooner) than if they had not been able to borrow 
(taking into production productive resources which would otherwise be idle), or it enables consumers to borrow 
and in that way enjoy consumer satisfaction earlier. 
There is a particular application of this to urban land management. For some of the activities which fall under land 
management – such as changing a land-use plan or improving urban infrastructure – can increase the value of 
the land in that location. The owner of that land then has an asset with an increased value. But that increase has 
been caused not by the efforts of the land owner, but by a public authority: it is a positive external effect of the 
activities of that authority. If that authority will not pay the costs of an activity which gives benefits to (a few) 
others, then the activity is not undertaken, even if the output would be greater than the inputs (a missed 
opportunity). An activity which would make it possible to use land more efficiently is not taken. ‘Value capturing’ is 
when the public authority is empowered to tax some of that value increase. If this is not possible, it can stand in 
the way of using land more efficiently. 
e) Price as an indicator of economic efficiency 
In mainstream (non-Marxist) economic theory, economic efficiency is usually discussed in terms of prices. The 
reason is that measuring economic efficiency requires the comparison of the value of many different types of 
input with the value of (sometimes more than one type of) output: and money is a useful way of expressing the 
value of those various inputs and outputs in terms of one unit. However there can be legitimate objections to 
using market prices as a measure of the value of a good or service. For example, the market price might not take 
into account external effects, or it might be affected by imposed restrictions on supply (such as by monopolies) or 
by speculation, and it is certainly affected by the distribution of incomes in the society (prices would be different if 
that distribution were different)9. Some of those objections are particularly relevant in Cuba, where many goods 
and services are deliberately not supplied through the market (as a result of which there are no market prices) 
and where the distribution of incomes receives much political attention. 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 Harrison, A. Economics and Land Use Planning. Croom Helm, 1977. 
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Nevertheless, where there are market prices, these can give useful indications of economic efficiency, even in 
Cuba. In particular, if the price of a good or service increases purely because of changes in demand or supply 
(and not because of a decree or of new taxes or subsidies), this is probably a reliable indication that people value 
that good or service more highly. 
 3. Improvements to the efficiency with which land is used 
The concept of the allocative efficiency with which land is used is not easy to operationalize, for there can be a 
wide variety of inputs and also of outputs, often including external effects. Making that concept operational is 
even more difficult when we want to consider efficiency, so far as is possible, in physical units rather than in 
money terms. Fortunately for this study, we do not need to be able to measure the absolute efficiency with which 
a plot of land is used, for our concern is with changes in land use which lead to a change in efficiency, in 
particular to increases in efficiency. Moreover, if our concern is with changes in land use, the objections to using 
prices as indications of value (see above) are less. 
The economic effects of a change in land use are changes in one or more of the following: 
- output (for housing = change in consumer satisfaction; for goods and services = change in output) 
- input (change in resources for construction if intensity of use increases, change in travel costs if location 
changes) 
- external effects for others (e.g. more or less consumer satisfaction caused by change in neighbouring 
uses, e.g. more or less environmental nuisance caused by change in traffic or in discharges). Those 
external effects might be changes in either inputs or outputs. 
Allocative efficiency is the ratio of outputs to inputs. The economic effects are changes in outputs or inputs. So if 
those effects can be measured, the change in efficiency can be measured too: the measurement need not be in 
absolute terms, but in relative terms (e.g. an increase or a decrease). 
In theory, most of those economic effects can be measured in terms of physical units. But changes in consumer 
satisfaction cannot (although it can sometimes be deduced from household behaviour that a particular change 
has led to an increase in consumer satisfaction – see chapter 5). Changes in environmental nuisance would have 
to be measured by the input of physical units necessary to compensate for that. In practice, those economic 
effects are more easily measured in terms of money. 
We can identify four types of situation where a change might lead to land being used more efficiently. 
Situation I: the area of land for each use remains the same, the location also, but the intensity of use (for 
some of the uses) increases.  
(e.g. higher buildings) 
This would lead to higher economic efficiency if: 
 (the extra output)  
 >  
 (the extra capital input + any extra travel costs + any extra environmental nuisance caused by the 
intensity increase, e.g. higher buildings) 
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In this situation, the efficiency is improved if the outputs are increased, for example: producing an additional 
number of housing units or square meters of office space (extra outputs), with a higher value than the inputs 
(extra-inputs). See the above diagram. 
We give two real examples of this. In the first, the output (extra output) achieved from raising the use intensity 
shows an efficiency increase, in the second case an inefficient situation could be made more efficient. 
 
The first case is what was originally the Lonja del Comercio - Stock and Exchange building - in Old Havana, 
located in San Francisco Square – see Annex 4, photograph 3. The investment was made as a joint venture for 
leasing and operational purposes. At present, the use is primarily office space plus a few commercial spaces on 
the ground floor. The rehabilitation investment considered adding an extra floor on the top level in order to 
increase the renting area. This modification received the authorization of the Master Plan Office of the Historic 
Centre, which is the institution controlling land use, urban and building regulations. The joint partners achieved 
extra outputs with the inputs. 
With the extra floor, the building passed from 11 470 m2 to 12 500 m2. The office space for renting grew by 1050 
m2. The transaction included a nearby building for parking lots that generates extra income and reduces the 
negative environmental impact of the cars of the users that otherwise would have to park on the streets. For 
each office module of 40 m2 there are 2.7 lots for cars.  
The economic value per square metre generated by the new office area is larger (4 USD x m2 more than other 
floors) than the highest value obtained from the offices located on the second to the fifth floor in the same 
building, because this new office area has more exclusive views of the harbour, the colonial fortresses and the 
Historic centre and it has access to a terrace, that was obtained when the new construction had to retreat a few 
meters from the original façade to comply with the building regulations. The income generated by the extra office 
floor is over 150 000 USD per year.  
 
 
The second case is the building known as Manzana de Gómez – The Gómez Block- See Annex 4, photograph 
4. It is a large building located in one of the most important public spaces of the city – the Central Park. The use 
on the ground floor and mezzanines is commercial – shops and services – post office, bank and cafés. Upstairs 
there are four floors of office space. Excepting the ground floor that is totally occupied, more than 50% of the 
office space is closed for functional problems – lack of technical services, maintenance, fire and intruders’ 
security control, etc. The remaining spaces are occupied by technical schools of intermediate level that perform 
in very bad conditions. The income generated by the building is limited to the ground floor area.  
The limited use of this construction plus its deterioration have a very negative impact on the surrounding 
Extra Capital 
 Extra Travel Costs 
Extra environmental Nuisances 
 
 
Extra 
Output 
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commercial and hotel cluster. The operational costs may not have been raised, because the areas are used 
partially, but the opportunity costs of not putting its potential to better uses are immense. 
This building has been evaluated for different investment projects such as hotel – see Annex 9 - and for 
commercial and office space: the appraisal was over 1 million dollars in 2004. As in the previous case, the urban 
authorities allowed an extra level on the roof in order to increase the construction area and the use intensity. 
These feasibility studies 10 have proven that the rehabilitation of this building would produce relevant economic 
outputs. 
 
Situation II: in some locations, the area of land for some uses increases and for other uses decreases, 
the total area of land for each use remains the same, the intensity of use also. 
(e.g. replacing factories in the town centre with the new use - offices or retail - presently on the edge of 
the town, and putting the factories on the peripheral locations) 
This would lead to higher economic efficiency if: 
 (the net growth of production and/or consumer satisfaction – any extra construction costs) 
  > 
  (any extra travel costs + any extra environmental nuisance caused by the new locations) 
This could be case also if there was no net growth of output or consumer satisfaction, but net travel costs and/or 
environmental nuisance decreased because of the relocation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this situation, there is an increase in economic efficiency if the swapping of land use between two locations 
results in extra output giving more financial returns from a net growth of production, or an increase in the users’ 
satisfaction. This use change is beneficial for the consumers if the improved accessibility reduces their transport 
costs. 
 
To illustrate this situation we give the example of the Muelles San José – San José Docks - in the southern 
harbour area of Old Havana – see Annex 4, photographs 6 and 7. This rehabilitation project rescued an original 
wood and metal Belgian warehouse structure from the XIX century and used it to accommodate the handcraft 
                                                          
10 The Building assessment done in 2004 determined a building value over 5 000,000.0 USD and the land value 4 990,000.0 USD, so the 
aggregate value per square meter reached 906.76 USD. 
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market that was occupying a public park in front of the Catholic Seminary close to Cathedral Square in Old 
Havana.11  
The original storage function of the San José has been relocated as it generated serious functional and 
environmental problems and traffic congestion in the harbour avenue. This is part of a strategy to progressively 
move all these functions to another port in the country – Mariel - around 50 km from the urban centre. On the 
other hand, it was imperative to relocate the handcraft market that obstructed the public park and damaged its 
vegetation and urban equipment.  
In its new location the handcraft market generates outputs – even when taking account of the construction costs 
- from its commercial and service uses that surpass the effects of extra transportation costs and environmental 
nuisances that the new port location could cause. The strategy to relocate the port uses to the periphery tends to 
reduce the environmental nuisances. 
 
Situation III: in some locations, the area of land for some uses increases and for other uses decreases, 
this is not compensated in the whole land area, whereby the area of land for some uses increases in total 
and for other uses decreases in total, the intensity of use remains the same. 
(e.g. factories in some locations are replaced by housing/office and not rebuilt elsewhere) 
This would lead to higher economic efficiency if: 
 (the extra production and/or the extra consumer satisfaction in the locations which have got a new use – 
(the necessary construction costs + extra travel costs + environmental nuisance)) 
  >  
 (the loss of production in those locations + reduced travel costs for those displaced uses in those 
locations + reduced environmental nuisance caused by those displaced uses in those locations)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this situation there is efficiency increase if the results (extra output) after deducting the construction, 
transportation and environmental costs, have a higher value than the value of the cancelled productive use.  
                                                          
11 The feasibility analysis showed the potential financial results of Muelles San José could get a Net Present Value (NPV)=3,79,3671.0 and 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)=19.7 
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An example of this is the ancient cigar factory La Corona that stopped its production and offered the building for 
other functions.12 The building is solid and in good state of repair, located in one of the most important streets of 
Old Havana, in the sector called “the repartition of the Walls” as it was developed in the 1860s after the colonial 
walls were demolished. The cigar factory did not require relocation as many such factories have closed down for 
good, so there were no construction or relocation costs involved in this case. 
The investment project foresees an office use for this building that, if it goes as planned, will generate extra 
outputs because of its accessible location and generous floor areas, where the use intensity could be doubled 
thanks to the high ceilings that allow internal mezzanines. These outputs will surpass the value of the cancelled 
production. 
 
 
Situation IV: as for (III), but for those uses which lose land, this loss in output is compensated by higher 
use intensities. 
(e.g. factories in some locations are replaced by housing, and in other areas used by factories, the 
intensity of use is increased) 
This would lead to higher economic efficiency if: 
 (the extra production and/or the extra consumer satisfaction in the locations which have got a new use – 
(the necessary construction costs + extra travel costs + environmental nuisance)) 
  >  
 (the extra construction costs necessary to get the same output for those uses which have been 
displaced + extra travel costs in those locations with higher intensity + extra environmental nuisance in 
those same locations) 
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The case of the Manzana Sarrá – Sarrá Block – See Annex 4, photographs 1 and 2- in Old Havana illustrates 
this situation. During colonial times this block was mainly residential, and the private homes also housed the 
commercial uses and storage space. At the end of the XIX Century a Catalonian entrepreneur bought part of the 
land and buildings in the block, to establish a drugstore. He discovered that there was an underground source of 
very pure and good water which he could use for his medicine formulas, so his business started to grow rapidly. 
His family became very rich and its fortune was enlarged with real estate in other city areas like Vedado. For his 
production processes, he bought all the land and buildings in that block and many surrounding properties. After 
the revolution, the Sarrá family left the country and the properties passed to the Cuban government. The health 
ministry took over the medicine production that functioned until the 1990s. The Historian’s Office acquired the 
ownership and began the rehabilitation plans, proposing changing the uses to housing, commerce, offices, 
cultural spaces and museums, primary school and community services. The medicine production was 
assimilated by other existing firms, with better location for transportation and storage. 
The new land uses are creating extra outputs of different sorts: the families increased their satisfaction in terms 
of quality and area, they had the opportunity to stay in the historic centre; the new housing built in the former 
industrial buildings raised the residential density of the block. The new commercial and office spaces produce 
values higher than the former production of medicine that was technologically obsolete, and the new uses are 
non polluting, do not generate traffic congestion and avoid the environmental problems caused by working with 
chemical substances that went into the sewage network.  
 
 
A second example of situation IV concerns the Santo Domingo Convent building, where the First Havana 
University was founded in the XVIII century –see Annex 4, photograph 5. In the 1950s this became the chosen 
location for the helicopter terminal of Havana, a speculative business that demolished the historical convent and 
church of the Dominicans. In the 1990s the facility was transferred to the Historian’s Office after three decades 
of use by the Ministry of Education. For a short while, demolition of the concrete mall was considered, as this 
damaged the architectural heritage. However, the demolition costs - 5 million dollars - discouraged the investors. 
They decided that it was better to recycle the facilities that were in an excellent state of repair. In that way they 
produced a project to convert the building into exclusive offices and commercial spaces, leaving room over for 
two movie theatres, a gym and an art gallery. This coincided with the end of the real estate boom and the project 
was cancelled: but the construction had started and it was decided to bring back the original university use, 
opening a course for the study of heritage management.  
The area for the office project and the final university use is as follows: 
 Office building  University 
Uses Division of area (square meters) between uses 
Commercial 12 4 
Offices/classrooms 35 45 
Cultural 7 7 
26 
 
Parking 6 0 
Technical rooms 2 2 
Services 2 9 
TOTAL 100 100 
The office complex generated outputs (the revenues from renting floor area for commercial and office activities) 
which might exceed the extra construction costs, operational costs and extra environmental nuisances caused 
by the traffic congestion during office hours. 
The university, on the other hand, has outputs which have little direct financial value; they cannot be measured 
against the inputs. There is high social value because of the benefits from training professionals who will help 
rehabilitate the city. The environmental nuisance has been reduced, as the need for parking is limited, but if we 
consider that the parking space already existed, we must accept that it is a created capacity that is not being 
used. The negative issues are the high electricity and maintenance costs of a building that was completely 
covered with glass and designed for permanent air conditioning: these costs cannot be covered by an 
educational facility that works on a free basis. Perhaps the best solution would have been to mix the uses, 
having offices for rent, commerce on part of the ground floor, and controlled parking so that these uses could 
balance the expenses of the socially beneficial uses. 
 
 
4. Examples of systematic, inefficient use of land caused by the land management 
That there are problems with the way in which land is used in Cuba is obvious to any casual observer. In 
particular, large parts of Havana are very poorly maintained. The first shocking thing is the neglect of public land 
and existing property resources which represent around 70% of the metropolitan city area. The accumulated 
collective investment, that should increase land value, is in a ruinous state and in process of disappearing. There 
are city neighbourhoods where not only are the buildings in a very poor state of repair, but where also there are 
no longer street pavements, where street lighting is deficient, and where there are sewerage and drainage 
problems. These are deficiencies that cannot be solved by the households and individuals: they need attention 
from the public entities. Take the case of apartment buildings that are public property and that have not been 
maintained for 40 years: the accumulated disrepair has caused in many cases the need for relocation, permanent 
or, when there are hurricanes, temporary. The problem is not the scarcity of land; we could be very cynical, 
observing that there will be plenty of it to be used after the whole city has fallen down! However there is scarcity 
of everything that is placed on land: infrastructure, roads, housing, services, playing areas, sport facilities.  
Here we want to go beyond those superficial observations by describing types of cases where it is clear that land 
is being used inefficiently according to the definitions given in this chapter, and where it is clear that this is 
caused, or exacerbated, by the deficiencies in urban land management. This is so for land in all its different 
potentials: (1) as productive resource (not considered further here, as we concentrate on urban land), (2) as 
consumption good, (3) as location and area for the production of goods and services, and (4) as a financial asset.  
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Uses in the wrong location  
The uses located in the wrong places – see Annex 22, 24,25 and 26 - can be analysed by referring to the 
efficiency situation I, where on a certain land area at a certain location, the nature or the intensity of the uses are 
not the optimal ones in order to obtain efficient results. 
The cause of this inappropriate location of some urban functions lies in the disregard for land value in the city and 
is closely connected with the rules and practices for land planning and ownership that are explained in chapter 3.  
As a consequence of this, many city areas show an unbalanced distribution of services, commercial functions, 
and they lack qualified public spaces. Looking at situation I from the efficiency perspective we can see that, for 
example, if suburban housing areas located in the city periphery were to have a more intensive and diversified 
commercial and service network, that would make them more attractive. At present, to access these services the 
families need repeatedly to cover large distances to the city centres, or to incur extra costs to get the missing 
services by paying intermediaries that supply them closer to the site at higher costs. It has not been considered 
that creating good service levels in these neighbourhoods would not only satisfy the local residents, but would 
probably attract other customers too. These costs of missed opportunities have not been calculated in Havana. 
Another example of inappropriate location is the growing spatial disorganization in the city – see Annex 22, and 
Annex 26, photographs 5 and 6 - as a result of widespread informal land and building occupation, and of what is 
called the process of “ruralisation of the city”.13 This consists of a massive and unguided proliferation of kiosks, 
cafes, vendors’ tents, little shops and workshops that even occupy public areas, sidewalks, public corridors, and 
green areas of the city - see Annex 19, photograph 4 and Annex 30. This particular example can be solved by 
referring to the efficiency situation II, where these same functions with the same use intensity could occupy, 
together with industrial workshops or other temporary facilities, centrally located existing buildings that are empty. 
These uses could be relocated there, giving them more space than they had on the streets.  
The authorities are attempting to tackle this type of situation, that concerns small popular commerce, with urban 
regulations and new legal resolutions, but there are other cases that require improvement to the public uses. 
Take, for example, residential neighbourhoods where houses and buildings have been adapted to accommodate 
public offices and commercial clusters, without the provision of functional distribution and urban and infrastructure 
capacity for such uses. To improve this situation, according to efficiency situation II, we would need to increase 
some of the uses and decrease others by relocating some of the offices and commerce to commercial streets in 
the neighbourhood or to more central city areas, bringing households back to these traditional residential 
locations, which would also tackle the problem of the households that are occupying retail and commercial 
buildings. This would recuperate traditional commercial axes and office areas of the city, that have been 
abandoned or transformed into slums, and at the same time restore to their original use the apartments and 
individual houses much more suitable for permanent good quality housing.  
This type of problem is evident in Miramar neighbourhood in Playa Municipality in combination with the Galiano 
axis in Central Havana Municipality. Miramar, built as a high income residential neighbourhood with an 
infrastructure designed for that purpose, is subject to land use changes, with residences being converted into 
shops, firms and offices, and with part of the vacant land used for city-scale commercial centres, parking spaces 
and hotels with 400 to 500 rooms. In contrast, Galiano axis, the most famous commercial walkway of 1950s 
Havana, in the most central city area, is nearly crumbling, and the well known department stores, designed by the 
                                                          
13 Rigol, Isabel. “La Habana .Realidades y esperanzas”. IX Encuentro de Revitalización de Centros Históricos. México DF, octubre 18-20, 
2010. Cuban architects and urban planners like Mario Coyula and Isabel Rigol use this term to allude to the proliferation of constructions 
which are typical from the country side, farm homes, ranches that use thatch roofs, also to breeding animals and growing food in 
inadequate places, using building typologies which are not according to urban regulations and construction ordinances and so on. 
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best architects of the 50s and listed in the register of modern heritage, are empty or occupied by low quality 
merchandise or handcraft street vendors; the infrastructure of air conditioning, elevators, coffee shops and night 
lighting that complemented this areas is inactive, the social environment has deteriorated as well.  
Other problems derive from high demand urban functions being located in non central city municipalities, like the 
case of Playa Municipality. This accommodates city services – amusement park, beach clubs, airline offices, 
larger shopping malls, hotels, national aquarium, convention centres, national art schools, and exhibition pavilions 
– but there is no transportation between central and non-central areas, and Playa municipality is difficult to reach 
for a large part of the population. 
 The ineffective legal and financial instruments available to provincial and municipal authorities in order to 
manage land and buildings (described in chapters 3 and 5) make it difficult to realise the efficient location of small 
scale enterprises and services. This is particularly relevant given the new legal environment that encourages and 
widens the possibilities for self-employment. At present in Havana there is an increasing demand for licenses to 
start art and handcraft galleries, cafés and small restaurants. For lack of better alternatives, these are placed in 
individual homes. The local authorities are unable to control the violation of urban regulations when these uses 
are placed in dwellings or when, in order to bring the business closer to the street and away from the living areas, 
the users occupy the garden of the house or building.  
In the urge to diversify the economic sources of employment, the government authorities seem not to have 
considered the damages to formerly quiet residential streets where kids could play and neighbours could sit in 
their gardens, but no longer do so now that there are cars and trucks parking, and people talking and drinking 
until the late hours. As in the case of the public commercial investments mentioned above, these businesses 
could be placed on local commercial streets that have many empty premises for lease or rent, and where the 
state could levy charges for floor area and other infrastructure costs and taxes, without the need to spoil 
neighbourhood life.  
When locations are chosen for profitable developments (public, private, or public-private) associated with the 
knowledge industry, with tourism, or with real estate developments, there is little consideration of the possible 
externalities, or of the exclusion of some users for the benefit of others. For instance, the biotechnology cluster is 
a financially successful development. But the housing and services are provided next to the production and 
research centres, disconnected socially and physically from the existing urban layout and service networks, so 
employees are expected to work, live and shop in the same area, which is distant from the city’s commercial and 
cultural clusters. Another example is the real estate office complex of Monte Barreto in Playa Municipality, a joint 
venture to develop high standard offices and commercial galleries. The city planners proposed a location for this 
that would have preserved the natural areas by redeveloping the adjacent land plots where, besides some 
housing, there were also a lot of vacant plots. This would have increased the value of the surrounding blocks with 
a higher use intensity, with a more diversified location of offices, commerce and housing, and would have left a 
park for public use on the remaining land. Instead, a location was chosen on a large extent of vacant land that 
was formerly a natural park with environmental significance. 
In chapter 3 we explain the mechanisms, including expropriation, that reserve land and building locations for 
development by state entities, and how these mechanisms place public interests above the private. The 
underlying principle is socially fair, but it would not be contradicted by the introduction of more flexible options 
allowing property transfers between individuals and families, that do not have much freedom to choose where 
they live. Access to land and the ability to choose locations are rights which are very restricted and which are not 
available equally for all: individuals, state enterprises, agencies, central and local governments. This affects all 
efficiency situations as there are no motivations to use land and buildings optimally, either by increasing the 
intensity of the uses, by using no more than the necessary land extent, or by considering locational advantages. 
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In chapter 4 we explain the various rules for valuing land and buildings, and we see how these rules – because 
they pay little attention to differences in locational advantages - do not contribute to increasing the intensity of 
uses in locations where there are signs of higher land and building values. There are many examples of areas, 
like Havana’s waterfront and the Prado promenade, where on very valuable locations two storey buildings and 
vacant plots where buildings have collapsed: these locations could accommodate higher use intensities. 
According to situation I this would allow more outputs from the same land. But these potentials have not been 
activated in the last 20 years, despite feasibility and opportunity studies which have predicted the financial and 
economic benefits - see Annexes 27, 28 and 29. 
In chapter 4 we describe how the formal valuation methods do not take account of the effect of locational 
advantages on land prices, with the exception of foreign investments. But even then there are no mechanisms 
(such as accurate urban feasibility studies) for determining the extent of land required in relation to the quality of 
the location and its financial value. There is little consideration of how land-use intensity could be varied 
according to land location, precisely because land value is not properly considered.  
More generally, when the amount of land made available for a project is determined, little account is taken of the 
intensity with which the new production will use it. This is illustrated by how, during the 70s, many industrial lines 
coming from the socialist block - for example plastic shoe factories - were located in central city areas: the 
industrial development was a priority and the land was free. Today, most of these industrial facilities have been 
discontinued and are just empty buildings occupying valuable land: the buildings should be reconsidered for other 
uses, or dismantled so that the land can be put to commercial and residential uses - see Annex 25, photographs 
3, 4 and 5.This is an example of efficiency situation III. 
The wrong uses in the buildings 
In chapter 3, we explain the types and limits of property rights, and the rules for property acquisition and transfer, 
that affect the use and re-use of buildings publicly, public-privately and privately. From that analysis we conclude 
that those rules often cause buildings to be occupied by inappropriate or by sub-optimal uses. For example, the 
current framework does not allow municipal actors to decide whether empty ground floor building areas should be 
rented or leased to small businesses, commerce or workshops. This is a case of efficiency situation I: the 
buildings could be used more efficiently by just diversifying or changing the uses. In June 2011 this issue was put 
on the central agenda of the Cuban National Assembly and it is in its early stages of modification and application. 
Old Havana is one of the pilot areas to test the introduction of legal adjustments concerning changes in property 
rights, acquisition and transfer for housing and commerce, in order to diversify economic actors but with a 
necessary impact on the building uses.  
Another example, more applicable to efficiency situation II, is that the government sometimes authorizes 
buildings, originally made for commerce, movie theatres, corner bodegas, commercial ground floors and 
warehouses, to be used as temporary or permanent housing, because of the large unsolved demand for this use. 
The families that get these spaces use them intensively, but in a wrong way if we consider the type of 
architecture. The dwellers immediately adapt spaces for their needs without any previous consultation, altering 
the facades and window sizes, subdividing the inner spaces without regard for the building typology, opening 
windows in partition walls, constructing improvised bathrooms and kitchens, and other violations (however 
justified from the family’s point of view) - see Annex 22, photograph 2 and Annex 26, photograph 6.  
At the same time, there are in the city empty apartment buildings deteriorating or waiting for rehabilitation. It is 
unquestionable that there is a great need for more housing, but this should not be provided in buildings or land 
that could be better used (give a higher output) by the commercial and service sectors. This happens for two 
main reasons: first there is too much land and building that is in the hands of state institutions and that can be 
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made available for temporary use (that usually become permanent): second, the administratively allocated land 
and buildings are mismanaged, and unregulated land use changes are not seen or are not controlled. 
There is a large number of valuable buildings, former palaces, and stylish mansions that are assigned to public 
entities for social uses such as schools, clinics, administrative headquarters, research institutes, and other 
functions – see Annex 23. These buildings could be used and maintained in better ways. Under the current rules, 
public entities cannot pay for maintenance, and the result is very deteriorated buildings. There are two possible 
solutions: one is to relocate the social uses to modern buildings that require less maintenance, the other is to 
issue rules to enable the authorities to swap, lease, or transfer to others such properties so that they could be 
used better. 
Poor investments in land and buildings 
Timing is one of the headaches for investors in land and buildings, and bad timing can cause land to be used 
inefficiently. There are plenty of cases of investments where lack of construction capacity or lack of supplies 
results in big delays, increasing the project costs and not producing the expected outputs at the expected 
moment. This decreases the efficiency of the investment. For example, the Saratoga Palace hotel in Old Havana 
(a 96 room hotel) was a well-designed investment project that took six years to complete. Although the original 
budget was well set up, the bad construction timing increased the costs by more than 30%. Land is sometimes 
allocated and reserved for certain uses, but the investment is delayed or unfinished for many years, even for 
profitable businesses like hotel complexes. This freezes a good location that could be used for other purposes. 
This sort of land mismanagement compromises the present use of land and reduces present and future revenue 
opportunities - see Annex 15, photograph 3.  
There are some cases in Havana’s Historic Centre which provide evidence that investments in rehabilitating 
existing land and buildings, in order to create more social housing and more commercial and tourism facilities, 
produce larger revenues – better outcomes - when the investment objectives have been clear from the very 
beginning. In Old Havana, some developers have looked for the most suitable location according to the nature of 
the project, they have analysed the best use by looking for the most profitable alternative, they have considered 
the externalities, and they have tried to create positive social impacts. 
In contrast, there are cases when the investments have not been carefully designed or have been constantly 
changed, ending in projects that remain unfinished, are stopped or modified along the way, wasting all the efforts 
and resources, causing tremendous social and economic costs. There is one, out of many examples, in Old 
Havana that illustrates this. The former residence of the Marqués de Arcos is an XVIII Century colonial residence 
with high heritage values, located in the Square of the Cathedral, one of the most important public spaces in Old 
Havana. The restoration of the building started in the 1990s. The project was to be used for residential purposes 
respecting the original use of the building, and the conservation works on the façade proceeded: but the final use 
of the various spaces was not determined, being subject to a number of adjustments. Around 2002, the 
developers representing the Historian’s Office decided to change the use of the building to a more profitable one, 
including boutiques and art galleries on the ground floor, an enoteca to promote wine culture on the mezzanine, 
and high standard housing for rent on the top floor. More recently, in 2010, other technical adjustments have 
been made to the 2002 project, but the final use for the building is not yet definite. During all these years, human 
and financial resources spent on the building have been wasted and even some of the conservation works need 
to be redone, the heritage values have been affected by deterioration and abandonment, resulting in a highly 
inefficient investment project that had the right inputs but has failed to reach its outcome. 
In housing constructed by the government, the ratio of the inputs (provided by the government) to the outputs (of 
a low quality and given to the users below its value) is very poor. The best way to see that this is inefficient is by 
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studying the informal land and property markets that have sprung up in the city in the face of the failure of 
government policy for housing - see chapter 5. 
The public goods provided by the state have a poor quality of construction – use of cheap materials and poor 
execution, and poor infrastructure and equipment. There are exceptions to this, but in general terms the results 
are far from satisfactory and the durability is poor. 
An example of a bad investment decision that produces financial gains but very poor social and cultural outcomes 
is when state commercial companies use highly valuable vacant land plots “temporarily” to place kiosks and tents 
for commercial purposes, without considering a more serious investment or a more intensive combination of uses 
with more durable and higher quality constructions – see Annex24 photographs 1 and 7, and Annex 26, 
photographs 1, 3 and 4. These temporary facilities do not have to comply with the urban regulations and 
construction ordinances; moreover, they are welcomed by the authorities because with very little inputs they 
produce a lot of financial outputs. When we consider the external effects for others, we can raise many questions 
about social and economic issues: there are no improvements to the quality of the area or to the infrastructure, 
none of the financial gains are used to improve the site or its surroundings, these establishments do not improve 
the social quality of neighbourhoods and often have the opposite effect, they satisfy the immediate consumers but 
not the neighbours, and they cause tremendous environmental nuisance because they damage public areas, play 
loud music, and generate waste. 
 
5. Conclusions 
From the theoretical considerations and the study of the existing situation in Cuba we can conclude that, in order 
to improve the efficiency with which urban land is used, a form of urban land management is required that 
considers, for each plot of land, or for each urban zone: 
- for each possible use, what the outputs would be; 
- for each possible use, what the inputs necessary to produce those outputs would be. One of the inputs is 
the land itself. This must be acquired at a certain moment and for a certain price.  
- for each possible use, what the external effects would be. These will depend on the production / 
consumption process (which can change over time) and on the adjacent land uses and on the position of 
the location within the urban structure. 
A great complication is that the values of all of those variables can change over time, depending on matters such 
as changes in adjacent land uses and changes to the infrastructure. 
Making those considerations requires: 
- clear ideas about each of the possible uses, and what each would entail. This requires working out a 
 project plan for each possible use in that location. 
- information about the position of the location within the urban structure, and foreseeable changes to this. 
 A clear policy for the urban development will create certainty about this. 
- information about value / price for both inputs and outputs. Good records of land transactions can help to 
 provide this information. 
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- clear signals of success or failure. These signals are provided by close monitoring of the results of 
 implementing projects and adopting plans. 
- managerial knowledge of the technical city production process. This requires, in addition to all the above 
 points, the ability to manage planning and development processes and to co-ordinate all the actors 
 involved. 
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Chapter 3 
 
Rules and practices for urban land management in Cuba 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In Cuba, the state determines the general rules under which citizens and organisations may own and use 
real estate. These are rules about property rights and about the limitations - in compliance with aspects 
such as state security, environmental and heritage protection, economic development, social equity and 
human and civil rights – on exercising those rights. In doing this, the Cuban state is no different from other 
states: most states make such rules and enforce them when necessary. What is particular to Cuba is the 
content of those rules. In particular, the Cuban state has the monopoly to perform land development and 
management. There are public institutions to plan and deal with all of these aspects, and there are no 
recognised real estate markets in the country. 
 
Another important aspect is the utmost importance given to planning. But paradoxically, Cuban urban 
planners have not always been certain of what will be built and where. The main reason for this may be that, 
despite the numerous master plans which study and anticipate development trends, most of the decisions 
are taken ultimately by top officials, who envision the projects and establish the investment priorities 
according to the public interests or needs and the historical moment, irrespective of the plans. 
 
This chapter describes how things are done in the public sector, how the administration works, and under 
which legal framework. I look at the physical planning system and its importance for the location and 
implementation of land use, investment projects and housing programs; and at the legal procedures that 
include licenses for construction, demolition, habitat, heritage conservation and redevelopment. 
 
I analyze the difficulties faced by the Cuban planning and legal system with respect to land and urban 
development, in my attempt to understand the limits imposed by the government on land and urban 
development, and I explore to what extent those limits are to blame for the increasing irregularities in, and 
violations of, the formal procedures for land and property at all levels. 
 
I also introduce the public and personal rights concerning housing, buying and selling, permutes, donations 
and other tenure alternatives; and I clarify the public responsibilities, namely types of ownership, properties, 
property registers and so forth in order to expose the opportunities and accessibility of the system, but also 
its limitations. 
 
 
2. The Cuban administrative and planning system 
 
The first article of the Cuban Constitution defines the Cuban state as a Socialist State of workers, 
independent and sovereign, organized with all and for the good of all, as a unitary and democratic Republic, 
for the satisfaction of political freedoms, social justice, individual and collective well being and human 
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solidarity.1 The National Assembly of the Popular Power (parliament) is the legislative and elected organ, 
and is composed of deputies elected for five years by free, direct and secret vote. The State Council is the 
representative of the Assembly: it is elected every four years and it is authorized to adopt law decrees that 
can modify the laws passed by parliament. 
 
 
3.1 Coat of Arms of the Cuban Republic 
 
The authority of the public administration entities derives from the Constitution. The government powers are 
divided between three levels: national (Parliament), provincial (Provincial Administrative Councils) and 
municipal (Municipal Councils). At a more local level, there are organizations such as the District 
Representations, the Popular Councils 2 derived from the elected district representations, the Committees 
for the Defence of the Revolution (CDR’s), and the Women Federation Committees. These organizations 
allow the population to participate directly and indirectly in the different priorities proposed by the 
government. 
 
The central government agencies are the Council of Ministers and the Executive Committee. These dictate 
the decrees to regulate and guide the execution and implementation of the general laws and the ways to 
enact them. They also approve the prioritized and special development programs, and they revise and 
approve the yearly Plan of the Economy, which is then elaborated in detail by the Minister of Planning and 
Economy. 
 
Parallel to the elected Administration Councils at provincial and municipal levels, there are Sectoral 
Directorates and National Institutes as technical arms of the Ministries. This is a source of conflict in the 
setting of priorities and in the allocation and administration of resources. The reason is that these public 
                                                 
1 The Cuban Constitution was proclaimed on February 24, 1976 and reformed in July 1992. 
2 The Popular Councils are considered the government grassroots level. This definition is different from the Popular Power which 
refers to the government structure with legislative and executive bodies that respond to the National Assembly. The Popular Power 
has the Provincial and Municipal Assembly with legislative role. It is integrated by the elected district representatives. The executive 
body is the Provincial and Municipal Administrative Councils which deal with operational issues and are accountable to the 
legislative body. The Popular Councils, on the other hand, were created in the 90s as a grassroots government entity to deal with 
local issues in direct relation with the neighbourhood and community organizations mentioned in the text. 
35 
 
resources, instead of being distributed through the administration structure to the different levels, are in the 
hands of centralized programs with a sectoral perspective and therefore cannot target the population needs 
at the different scales. 
 
In the early 60s there was one leading institution to deal with economic, land and urban planning issues: the 
Central Planning Board, JUCEPLAN. This became responsible for the complex problems inherited from 
previous governments that had paid little attention to urban and rural imbalance and other serious social 
problems in the country. This institution afterwards became the Ministry of the Economy. 
 
In 1964 the National Institute of Physical Planning was officially created,3 to guide and organize the location 
of investments, balance the distribution of productive forces in the country, expand social and technical 
infrastructure to underdeveloped areas, and improve the living conditions of the population in general. When 
it was, initially, attached to the Construction Ministry, it acted more as an investment and project developer 
than as a planning entity. 
 
In the late 70s the Institutionalization period introduced structural changes which included the Popular 
Powers,4 with provincial and municipal bodies intended for a territorial administrative decentralization;5 the 
creation of a unique Central Planning System for the Economy, and a new political administrative division 
with 14 provinces, one special municipality 6 and 169 municipalities.7 Eight of the provinces were new, 
resulting from the fragmentation of the former Las Villas, Camaguey, Oriente and La Habana provinces. 
This division also eliminated the category of region, leaving the provinces and municipalities mentioned 
above. 8 
 
During that period the planning structures were reorganized into “Territorial Planning” and “Physical 
Planning”. The first was made the responsibility of the central government, and was linked to global, sectoral 
and entrepreneurial economic planning, in order to determine the location of economic investments at the 
different scales of the territory - national, provincial and municipal - and to oversee the rational use of 
resources in this process. The second was organized as Physical and Urban Planning Directorates attached 
to the Provincial Administrative Councils. These offices were envisioned as an interface between the 
territorial and the local level, to elaborate master plans in provinces and municipalities, compatible with the 
local needs, and to regulate the plan implementation at that level. 
 
                                                 
3 Baroni Bassoni, Sergio. Hacia una cultura del territorio. La Habana, GDIC, 2003. 
4 Malinowitz, Stanley. Popular Power? Municipal Enterprises and Local Government in Cuba. USA, Amherst  University. 2006. 
 In 1976 the Popular Power was designed to create new forms of direct and representative democracy in the governmental structure 
and to improve economic performance and satisfaction of the consumer needs through decentralization of much economic activity 
to the provincial and municipal levels. The antecedents of this structure were the JUCEIS, Boards of Coordination, Execution and 
Inspection created in 1961 replaced in 1966 by a system called Local Power for the administration, at the municipal level of services 
and small scale productions. 
5 Ibid. page 27. 
6 Until that moment there were only 6 provinces. There is a little island in the southern part of Cuba called “Island of Pine trees”, 
renamed after the Revolution as the “Island of Youth” that under this subdivision became Special Municipality not having population 
and area enough to be a province by itself. 
7 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 
8 Iñiguez Rojas, Luisa y Norma Montes Rodríguez “Espacio y Poblamiento”. en: Everleny Pérez, Omar. Cincuenta años de la 
Economía Cubana. La Habana, Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 2010.  
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Under this restructuring, the responsibilities of the Institute of Physical Planning were transferred to the 
Central Planning Board, JUCEPLAN, which became the leading institution for all territorial planning with the 
purpose described above, to oversee the national location of settlements, social and economic investment. 
Its tasks were making the decisions at macro level for the location of investments, infrastructure and social 
priority programs, for the protection of the environment 9 and natural resources, for the enlargement of road 
infrastructures, for industrial location, and for development of the system of settlements for the whole 
country, including the scale and outline of cities and towns and the development trends for each area. On 
the other hand, the Provincial Planning Directorates - as part of the Popular Power Provincial authorities - 
would be responsible for the conciliation of the local bodies with the top territorial authorities concerning 
urban plans at city level, for authorizing the land use, for prescribing regulations, and for specific urban 
projects. 
 
This institutional framework was expected to link economic and physical planning, and at the same time to 
guarantee the interaction among all planning levels and sectors. However, its role was not sufficiently clear. 
For in reality, the territorial level handled the organization and control of short term planning and prioritized 
investments, while the Provincial entities dealt with more general, medium and long term planning issues. 
According to Baroni,10 this phase lag became the essential problem that affected the efficiency of the Cuban 
Planning system, for the economic organization of the country was allowed to privilege the performance of 
sectoral bodies over the local entities. 
 
Another problem in the way of a more effective performance of the planning institutions at territorial level 
during the JUCEPLAN years was the disparities between the areas in terms of population, infrastructure 
requirements, productive potentials according to natural resources, and other aspects. This caused 
unbalanced development opportunities, and conflicts arose from the separation of areas that were 
historically and traditionally connected. 11 
 
Consequently, in the second half of the 80s, a reform was started which included a reorganization of 
physical planning structures. This was part of a wider process to correct negative trends at all state levels. 
At that moment, the authorities tried to reincorporate some of the principles that had succeeded in the 60s, 
to get rid of some of the trends of the 70s,12 to analyse the causes, and to propose solutions for the 
malfunctioning of the planning system and its consequences for cities, towns and neighbourhoods. 
 
The architect and urban planner Sergio Baroni 13 and the urban sociologist Carlos García Pleyán analyzed 
the causes and effects that created the need for the readjustment, but it is important to know that most of 
                                                 
9 Herrera, Jorge Luis. La regulación jurídica del urbanismo y de la ordenación del territorio en Cuba, Tesis de Doctorado en 
Derecho Público, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, España. 1996. 
 Law No. 81 of July 1997 for the Protection of the Environment and Rational Use of Natural Resources. Includes regulations linked 
with urban development such as the evaluation of environmental impacts and the environmental licence to proceed with any urban 
development. 
10 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 
11 Iñiguez Rojas, Luisa y Norma Montes Rodríguez “Espacio y Poblamiento”. Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 2010.  
12Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 1962 was called the Planning year. In one of his speeches at that time, Fidel stated “the importance 
of popular participation in the discussion and approval of plans”. In the 70s bureaucratic behaviours and economic errors led to 
schematic decisions that prioritized new urban developments and renewal of existing areas over urban rehabilitation and 
conservation of existing areas. There were massive developments of prefabricated buildings going on, while the built stock and 
existing infrastructure continue to deteriorate. 
13 Ibid. 
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these have remained unsolved. They identified the lack of attention for the practical implementation of 
territorial plans, the need for materials, technologies, techniques and regulations more adapted to the 
country’s needs, the lack of local involvement of the public institutions and popular participation in urban 
planning decisions, and the lack of integration between urban problems and the social and cultural needs of 
the inhabitants. The consequences were evident in the urgent housing needs (the housing was to a large 
extent provided formally and informally by self-construction efforts), in the deficient infrastructure and 
service networks, in the degradation of the built patrimony, mainly in the historical areas, and in the lack of 
urban culture and control. 
 
The weakness of the planning system lay in the separation between physical and economic plans and in the 
disparity between physical plans and investment projects prioritized by the top government. This is part of 
the tendency to sacrifice efficiency in the name of equity.14 This means that the aims of obtaining a fair and 
equal distribution of development between geographic regions and among the different economic sectors, 
and of maintaining full employment of labor and material resources, stable prices and high rates of 
investments 15 could not be compromised by efficiency arguments such as productivity or economic 
incentive. Therefore, even if plans were designed to increase economic efficiency and consumer satisfaction 
and supposedly to produce efficient outcomes by making the right combination of factors such as location, 
rational use of natural and material resources, in practice the social and economic priorities determined by 
the government were to achieve an equalitarian and sometimes utopic development which often implied 
investments much higher than planned or which undermined what the plans had envisioned. In the end, the 
general consensus is that these sectors have not been able to function efficiently, and that there is growing 
consumer dissatisfaction with regard to quality and accessibility.16   
 
The physical plans were not flexible enough to keep up with the proposed changes, and they lacked public 
visibility, not being submitted to social approval: they were left behind in their unreachable long term vision, 
while the real action was taken as a practical answer to short term problems, which is the customary way of 
doing things in Cuba. In addition, the zoning plan was used predominantly, but these plans were not worked 
out in detail through specific urban projects: insufficient attention was paid to existing cities and urban areas 
in contrast to the creation of new urban developments, and there was little implementation of what had been 
proposed by sectoral plans and other local programs.17 The actions taken under the sectoral plans often did 
                                                 
14 Iñiguez Rojas, Luisa y Norma Montes Rodríguez “Espacio y Poblamiento”. Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 2010. página 375. Sectors 
such as housing, health, education, sports, cultural activities, etc. are subsidized by the government because of their social 
importance and are not subject to the customary economic criteria applied to enterprises. If there was need of hospitals, schools, or 
basic services, these would be provided at no matter what cost for all country areas, not always considering the size and hierarchy 
of the town or city, the same type of project and infrastructure would be provided. 
15 Malinowitz Stanley. USA, 2006. 
16 Ibid. 
17 García Pleyán, Carlos. “Transformaciones y vicisitudes del desarrollo urbano sostenible en Cuba, Instituto de Planificación Física 
(IPF), La Habana, mayo del 2006. Our urban development plans suffered two great weaknesses. On the one hand, documents 
focused on defining the future model to be achieved, but not on the actions needed to accomplish it. On the other hand, the State, 
the sole recognized actor of urban transformation, played two contradictory roles: it was the investor /promoter and, at the same 
time, it reserved for itself the role of regulating and controlling the use of space. Throughout the 80s an internal reflection on the 
limitations intrinsic to such approaches grew among professionals … the major components of this national reflection may be 
summarized into five main axes: …the technicist approach to planning, the project of city parts vis-à-vis the urban planning of big 
functional spots … the concern with respect to rehabilitation and conservation of existing buildings… the acknowledgement of the 
obsolescence of the plan as document… the growing sensitivity for environmental preservation and for the strong aggressions 
suffered by both the rural environment and the urban milieu. sectoral plans and other government programs. 
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not match the vision for the coherence of the urban and territorial order,18 for even when social and 
economic priorities (i.e. sectoral policies) were pressing, the central authorities made decisions without the 
proper dialogue with the physical and urban planning authorities. 
 
Another problem of the planning structure was the lack of coordination with a wider legal framework. Even if 
plans are approved as law, they are not given authority to actually influence the political or institutional 
spheres, whose actions often go in another direction. Moreover, physical plans were not submitted to public 
consultation, except when they were presented to the provincial government assembly. This reduced the 
commitment to implementing them and the respect that both the administration institutions and the citizens 
should grant them. Another important problem was the limited influence of the municipal level, seen as an 
object of planning and not a planning actor.19 
 
A few good things resulted from the readjustment process: in the urban areas, the physical planning system 
was extended to the municipal level, introducing the DAUs 20 for land-use planning, for enforcing regulations 
through an efficient urban control. But these offices never enjoyed the necessary economic and 
administrative autonomy 21 to have a real say in the local development programs. The only exception where 
there is local autonomy is the City Historians Office in the municipality of Old Havana in the Cuban capital.22 
 
The Provincial authorities kept the same role after the restructuring, using the powers transferred directly 
from the central government. They authorize the investment in social services, the development of 
infrastructure projects, and they order the development and management of main infrastructure such as 
transport, water, gas, telephone and electricity. This entity is expected to coordinate and consult with the 
sectoral bodies (depending on the nature of the project), it is responsible for the strategic planning, for 
issuing the urban regulations, for approving the land-use plans developed by the different municipalities, for 
issuing building permits, and for consulting with other public agencies that issue the permits linked to land 
and building management, such as the environmental office, board of monuments, and security and fire 
protection. 
 
                                                 
18 Herrera, Jorge Luis. La regulación jurídica del urbanismo y de la ordenación del territorio en Cuba, Tesis de Doctorado en 
Derecho Público, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, España. 1996. 
 The lack of legal soundness of the physical planning system has produced two negative consequences: the null incidence of 
planning instruments on land use and their limited practical applicability. 
19 Ibid. 
20 DAU stands for Directorates of Architecture and Urbanism. 
21 Herrera, Jorge Luis. La regulación jurídica del urbanismo y de la ordenación del territorio en Cuba, Tesis de Doctorado en 
Derecho Público, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, España. 1996. The Law decree 21 of the Council of Ministries of February 
1978 established the Sets of regulations of the Physical Planning activity. The article 5 establishes that physical plans express the 
directives of social and economic plans in the physical and spatial dimension. The most important aspects of urbanism should be 
managed by the municipal levels, as the most legitimate urban order must be close to the needs of the people. 
22 Robainas, Barcia Ayleen. “Roaming Old Havana”. Lecture at Toronto Architecture Faculty, 1999. 
 The Historian’s Office has a network of hotels and shops managed by Habaguanex, a business company created in 1993 thanks to 
a Law decree passed by the State Council. Part of the profits have provided for the rehabilitation of several buildings that hold 
offices and housing rented by Fénix, a real state company. Financial revenues rendered by those firms support an extensive 
comprehensive plan with a social and cultural vocation that benefits the weakest sectors: children, the elderly and the disabled living 
in the historic center. It is within this context that several social works promoted by the Office of the Historian such as housing, a 
maternal home and one for the elderly, a center of rehabilitation of disabled children, primary and secondary schools, trade teaching 
workshops and non-pollutant industries are contributing to cut down the strong impact that housing decay causes on the inhabitants. 
Another part of the strategy developed by the Office of the Historian is linked to an extensive plan for the rescue and revitalization of 
public spaces like squares, avenues, parks and gardens.  
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In 1988, the Cuban president Fidel Castro created the Group for the Development of Havana, GDIC, which 
assembled a multidisciplinary team of urban planners, architects, sociologists, economists and other 
experts. This had the objective to develop a comprehensive strategy for the capital that would serve as a 
pioneer experience for other cities of the country, and that would contribute to transforming the living 
conditions of the population and improving the urban environment while preserving the urban and 
architectural values of the city.23 
 
This represented a change of policy for the Capital of Cuba compared with the 1960s approach, which had 
diminished its importance in order to favour the development of other cities and territories that had been 
prioritized for the location of investments, in order to decentralize the productive and service functions.24 
Despite this priority, Havana always remained as the centre with highest population of the country - 20%. 
And despite the urbanization accumulated in other areas, Havana was the largest concentration of 
opportunities and attractions for the population. The strategies for Havana developed by GDIC 25 went from 
promoting a wider popular participation to the improvement of infrastructure, transport and urban economy, 
but these lines were not fully implemented. 
 
The economic crisis of the 90s demonstrated even more the weaknesses of the development patterns that 
had not been solved through the rectification process, and forced the government to introduce investment 
mechanisms that weakened the equity approach propagated by the Revolution. However, the difficult 
situation led to the rescue of useful mechanisms applied in the 60s,26 such as the community workshops in 
the poorest neighbourhoods, and social and cultural traditions such as the traditional land plot repartitions 
and the neighbourhood scale. This helped to introduce concepts and mechanisms of sustainable 
development, local development, popular participation, and environmental protection. The Popular Councils 
were created to implement the strategies at the local level,27 they became the grassroots organization of the 
government locally, and the main interface between the population and the government. The 
Comprehensive Community Workshops appeared as an initiative promoted by GDIC.28 Although limited by 
administrative, financial and material issues, the efforts of these workshops have been among the most 
successful experiences of community participation, with very positive social impacts which include individual 
and family survival strategies.29 
 
                                                 
23 Estrategia. Grupo para el desarrollo integral de la Capital (GDIC), La Habana, Agosto 1988. Palabras de presentación de la 
primera Estrategia para la Ciudad de La Habana por la arquitecta Gina Rey. 
24 Iñiguez Rojas, Luisa y Norma Montes Rodríguez “Espacio y Poblamiento”. Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 2010.  
25 The GDIC made the first strategy for Havana city in 1988, then elaborated two more strategic plans, one in the 90s and the last 
one at the beginning of the 20st century. The last one was made in the first years of 2000. These strategies had a comprehensive 
and innovative vision but were limited in practice by administrative and economic shortcomings. 
26 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 
27 Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular de Ciudad de La Habana. Propuesta de organización de los Consejos Populares, La 
Habana, Septiembre 1990.They were approved by the National Assembly of the Popular Powers in September of 1990 in order to 
establish closer links among the district delegates and the inhabitants. The experience was preceded in 1987 by the creation of 
communal areas in the Marianao municipality of Havana, looking for decentralization alternatives to improve the local services, the 
attention to public and green areas and other community issues. The Popular Council Land subdivision was inspired in the historical 
parcelling of the city in neighbourhoods and repartitions. 
28 Oliveras, Rosa. Se hace camino al andar. Experiencias relevantes de los Talleres de Transformación Integral del Barrio. La 
Habana, Grupo Desarrollo Integral de la Capital (GDIC), 1997. 
29 Iñiguez Rojas, Luisa y Norma Montes Rodríguez “Espacio y Poblamiento”. Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 2010.   
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Also in the 90s, the NGO Habitat Cuba30 introduced the community architect with the task of enabling 
citizens to improve their shelter in a sustainable manner. The aspirations pointed towards a decentralized, 
participatory and efficient urban management, which connected the community to the planning and 
management issues and to the local government.31 
 
 
3. Land planning tools 
 
Plans, Schemes and master plans 
 
Since the Revolution in1959, physical planning has the task of supporting the new social and economic 
structure of the country. At the territorial scale, the main objective was to guide and organize the location of 
new investments,32 to foster a balance between the different provinces according to the administrative and 
political structure, to expand the social and technical infrastructures, and to develop the potential of each 
territory (such as the organization of agriculture and the re-organization of the sugar cane industry). The first 
agrarian laws are a good example of how the government intended the rural reform: large properties of land 
were expropriated to create new development zones in order to reorganize and develop the agrarian 
production.33 
 
The physical plans of the 60s had to consider a number of social and economic premises, but were mainly 
focused on developing macro projects with a horizon of 20 years. This meant deciding the territorial location 
of functions and activities for that timeframe, and in parallel providing a solution for the immediate problems. 
These plans had a “weak information basis and counted on even weaker technical qualifications of its 
designers”.34 They failed strategically because of their utopian vision on the territorial organization of 
functions and cities, not foreseeing the impact of and vulnerability to internal complexities and to external 
economic and social factors.35 This period was marked by a climate of social cohesion and extraordinary 
popular determination, but the planning was limited by the technical and methodological knowledge of 
young and inexperienced staff. They faced unprecedented and massive programs that idealized and 
simplified the development process, and they thought that they would be able to control the productive 
relationships, leading to social and economic rationality, and that they would be able to plan all the details, 
ignoring the nuances, contradictions and conflicts that are relevant for planning.36 
 
                                                 
30 “Habitat Cuba” NGO started to work in 1993 and in 94 was officially approved by the Ministry of Justice for a ten year period which 
could be extended. In 2001 the National Housing Institute closed it down. It was a society to develop Urban and Housing projects 
under the slogan: ...Collective action for sustainable shelter. Among its main contributions, this fostered the Community Architect 
Program, developed projects for sustainable construction with bamboo and soil, worked for the transformation of squatter 
settlements and slums, participated in capacity building of inhabitants and the community architects and in the completion of micro-
brigade buildings (unfinished after 15 years). This NGO also developed a Digital Documentation and information Center and held 
collaborations with other NGOs and international donors willing to contribute to the project implementation. 
31 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 
32 ibid 
33 Méndez Elier and Ma. del Carmen Lloret. “ Análisis Territorial del Desarrollo Humano en Cuba”. Virtual Library of Law, Economics 
and Social Sciences. 2010. 
34 Gonzáles Sedeño, Mario. “About Shemes, plans and master plans”. La Habana, GDIC, Newsletter, 1995. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 
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During the 70s, the planning was adjusted to the structural and institutional changes according to the new 
political administrative division37 of the country. As mentioned previously, in those years the government 
established a Unique Economic Plan, and it developed a Scheme for the Economic and Social Development 
to the year 2000. This included the spatial distribution of the population, the industrial development patterns, 
and the social and technical infrastructure requirements. This scheme also included the main issues of 
environmental protection and rational use of the natural resources. It incorporated sub-schemes for each of 
the14 provinces plus the special municipality Isla de la Juventud, and around 200 smaller proposals for 
settlements corresponding to all the main towns of each municipality. This planning effort was huge, with the 
intention to interconnect all the recently created administrative levels of the country, and it started to 
generate new networks and functional relations that were relevant for urban planning. 
 
The implementation of this plan did not achieve what was expected, as it had not anticipated the difficulties 
that were to follow. Its methodological basis, both when it was elaborated and when it was revised, 
maintained and reinforced the continuation of the “traditional behaviour” of the national economy 
characterized by a strong centralization, heavy capital investment and strong sectoral approach. 
 
The methodological and administrative failure of the development scheme led to the introduction of more 
operational master plans, which started from a more realistic analysis of the territory and a clearer definition 
of strategic objectives and lines of action. Unlike the previous plans, the new master plan would not be 
conceived merely as a technical, normative document but more as a practical instrument to help organize 
the five year and one year economic plans. 38 
 
The methodological approach of the master plan 1980-2000 included formulating the problems and needs of 
each territory and the proposed lines of action - the necessary technical studies and regulations - to comply 
with the investment plans. In this way it was expected to be more comprehensive and flexible, to shorten the 
gap between planning and management, to facilitate popular participation in its elaboration and approval, to 
consider the links with the investment proposals, with the availability of resources and with the particular 
characteristics of each area. 
 
This scenario aimed to bring the planning efforts of the Institute of Physical Planning closer to the Municipal 
and Provincial plans. In that, way local information would provide feedback to the master plan, giving the up-
to-date priorities and lines of action for each area. This required an interdisciplinary approach, with teams 
that included not only urban planners, but also sociologists, anthropologists, economists and other 
professionals. 
 
Zoning Tool 
 
Zoning is one of the most extensively used land management tools in Cuba at territorial and city level. A 
zoning plan should demarcate a city by ordinance into zones, and it should establish within each zone the 
regulations for land use, location of activities, bulk, height, alignment and shape of buildings. It should also 
determine the necessary road network. Zoning makes it possible to control, organize and structure urban 
                                                 
37 Until then Cuba had been subdivided in six provinces, it was changed to 14 provinces with 169 municipalities. 
38 Baroni, Sergio.GDIC. 2003. 
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growth, with the main aims of improving efficiency, of promoting agglomeration benefits, of specifying 
minimum health and safety requirements, and of avoiding the encroachment of incompatible uses. 
 
  3.2. Scheme of macro-functional distribution at city level for Havana39 
 
According to these principles, land can be allocated for the following main purposes: 
 
Land allocated for industrial purposes: The country has always granted utmost importance to the 
development of its industrial base.40 The policy followed the principle of placing new industrial investment in 
the less developed provinces and regions in order to de-concentrate and balance urban growth, but there 
were parallel trends for enlarging or remodelling existing facilities near the most developed cities, either in 
the periphery of those urban areas, or within them. Other interests tended to locate the new capacities near 
the capital city where there is more experienced labour force.41 In the last decade the trend has been to 
locate small and medium scale factories, technologically updated enterprises, and warehouses in small and 
medium size cities, in order to favour their development and to stop the internal migration of the labour force 
towards the larger settlements. This became particularly important in the face of the growing territorial 
differences caused by the economic crisis over the last 15 years.42 
 
Land allocated for social purposes: One of the roles of the administrations and planning authorities is to 
organize the system of settlements of towns and cities. Policies for the urban system include the land 
allocation for housing, health, education, basic services and other social programs.43 The urban population 
of Cuba is concentrated in nine major cities which have over 100 thousand inhabitants. One of the most 
important policies has been to limit the growth of the capital city, trying to give a larger role to medium and 
small urban settlements. Nevertheless, the economic crisis of the 90s showed the failure of this policy, as 
thousands of people migrated to the capital looking for more economic opportunities.  
 
Land for environmental purposes: This includes the preservation and development of natural reserves, 
coast lines and forests (as filters of the atmosphere and also reserves for wood production). It also protects 
the natural hydraulic resources.44 
                                                 
39Theoretical Scheme of the zoning included in the Havana’s Master Plan, including the functions of recreation, housing and work. 
The circled areas are the important sub-centres. The dotted area is the underground water reserves of Havana. 
40 Domínguez, Jorge; Omar Everleny y Lorena G. Barbería (edits.). La economía cubana a principios del siglo XXI, México, El 
Colegio de México, The David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 2007. Page 139. 
41 Miguel Alejandro. Aspectos Estructurales de la Economía Cubana. La Habana, Editorial Ciencias Sociales, 1994. 
Page 104. 
42 Ibid, page 166. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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Land allocated for economic purposes: This covers the leading economic activities in the last decades, such 
as tourism (that has demanded a great amount of land for hotels) and related services. It also includes real 
estate clusters for foreign enterprises and joint ventures, such as the free zones 45 and the development of 
commercial areas to capture foreign currency. The allocation of land for transport infrastructure - including 
roads and highways, ports and airports, the land for the construction of dams and aqueducts and for 
exploitation of mineral resources - is an important part of the strategy.46 
 
Land allocated for agricultural development: The Ministry of Agriculture manages the land dedicated to 
agriculture, which is around 40% of the territory.47 Most agricultural land is in the hands of the state in the 
form of state enterprises associated with farmers: these are the Basic Units of Cooperative Production, 
UBPC.48 The remaining agricultural land belongs privately to the farmers, either independent or associated 
in cooperatives. 
 
Land reserves: This includes areas that are neither used for agriculture nor for urban development but that 
could potentially be used for one of those purposes. Most of it lacks road and technical infrastructure, and 
therefore would cost a lot to be developed. The agricultural potential depends on the soil quality and on the 
distance to natural or artificial hydraulic resources. In the capital city there are central areas with former 
industrial land that could be considered as a potential for future developments. 
 
According to the land records in the Planning Directorate of Havana City, the gross zoning distribution of 
land use in 2004 is as follows: 
 
Types of zones Area (in 
hectares) 
% 
Housing 13 000 25,3 
Industry and warehouses 3 500 6,9 
Recreation, sports and green belt 8 580 16,7 
Transportation and facilities 2000 3,9 
Commercial, health and others 6 200 12,1 
Agricultural and other rural areas 18 019 35,1 
Total (Havana City)  100 
Note: 1he = 2,5 Acres 
 
Table 3.1. Havana City Zoning Distribution 
 
Even though the zoning principles are applied in Havana City, there are many cases where the original 
zoning plans have been changed. In practice, the zoning plans are in need of updating to conform to new 
                                                 
45 Domínguez, Jorge; Omar Everleny y Lorena G. Barbería (edits.). México, 2007. The free zones were created according to the law 
decree 165. The Wajay free zone with 21 hectares, 13000m2 of warehouses and 1000m2 of offices, Havana Berroa with 244 
hectares, 41 616 m2 of warehouses and 4200 m2 of offices and Mariel with 553 hectares, 7000m2 of warehouses and 540 m2 of 
office space. 
46 Ibid. Page 17.Those are after tourism and the family remittances, is the most important source of revenue. 
47 Figueras, Miguel Alejandro. La Habana, 1994, Page 53. 
48 Domínguez, Jorge; Omar Everleny y Lorena G. Barbería (edits.) México, 2007.Page 45. 
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strategies. The main factors that have limited the effectiveness of the zoning tool in Havana during the last 
20 years are: 
 
• Low implementation of urban plans for improving infrastructure and services in new areas, and 
failure to establish a polycentric solution. 
 
• Land for industrial projects has been supplied, but the majority of those projects have been located 
outside the zoned areas. Around 46 % were relocated within the metropolitan region outside 
Havana City, due to the lack of amenities in the designated industrial zones. 
 
• Modification of land allocation principles. The areas actually used for Warehouses and Support 
activities (not desirable in the city, because they require extensive land use and have low labour 
force density) were more than were zoned for these activities. 
 
• Disregard of the standards established by the Master Plan for the underground water reserve. This 
location was supposed to be protected from any sort of construction because the area is the 
biggest source of water for the city. Today, 750 hectares with this designation have been built 
upon. 
 
• Insufficient attention for the balance between certain urban functions such as housing, services, 
and basic infrastructure. 
 
All those problems are linked with the underestimation of the positive effects of zoning by the authorities, 
together with the overestimation by the technical staff; and with the lack of integration and collaboration in 
the process of planning, investing and controlling development. The problems also have to do with the lack 
of more flexible zoning tools, which would allow adjustments during implementation. The effects of a strong 
sectoral framework and the consequences of the strong central decision-making process left no room for a 
comprehensive territorial analysis in the implementation stages. 
 
As a result, the zoning plans were not fully implemented and were often modified. 
 
Strategic Planning Tool 
 
At the end of the 1980s and early 90s, the national government requested Havana City's authorities and 
institutions in charge of land development and land use to introduce a Strategic Planning tool. The idea 
came partly to overcome the limitations of the development schemes of the 70s and to improve the master 
plans adopted in the 80s. A planning method was introduced that could allow a short-medium term 
perspective and a new coordination process among city actors: reduce the imbalance of infrastructure and 
services, increase the effectiveness with which scarce resources are used, and improve the organizational 
and legislative structure of the decision-making process. 
 
A Strategic Planning tool, with mainly social, economic and environmental aims, requires an ensemble of 
selected actions in key areas and the inclusion of all actors. It also requires setting priorities, and planning 
and decision making that is responsive to these priorities. It should avoid the over-centralized decision-
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making, encourage guidance rather than restriction in planning, and provide a framework for local plans with 
a strategic platform and with economic support. 
 
    
 
3.3. Publication covers of the first Strategic Planning for Havana City developed in 1988, and the Economic and Social Development 
Strategy issued in 1996. Both documents were developed by GDIC, the Group for the Comprehensive Development of Havana City. 
 
The main task of Strategic Planning is to set the priority in infrastructure investment and to determine the 
areas where growth and change should occur, within a general context and with a clear mission. It should 
tackle the renewal, upgrading and identification of older areas worth preserving. 
 
Some of the above considerations have been applied to, and some important lessons have been learned 
from, using strategic planning in Havana. The difficulties with implementation made clear that a major 
problem was that the priorities for the City development are determined by the central government, based 
on national priorities and not necessarily on territorial conditions. For example, there was considerable 
emphasis on the creation of new massive housing on the periphery in spite of the failure of programs to 
repair and maintain the valuable existing stock. Another example is that the area chosen for the 
development of tourism facilities and the scientific pole was a traditionally residential area with infrastructure 
for that scale of urbanisation, which already shows many signs of over-saturation. The local planning 
agency is remote for the central government authorities, and the local government does not have the 
possibility of having its priorities adopted. 
 
Has land planning in Cuba been a successful tool for development? 
 
Planning in Cuba has been a continuous and partially successful instrument in territorial and urban 
development, which at times has been detached from its connection with economic and legal policies. 
Planning has been used to support central decision making, but it has never become a dynamic policy tool 
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for the government in the setting of priorities for development.49 It has been fundamentally a technical 
support rather than a regulatory and management mechanism to respond actively to  public demand. 
 
One of the drawbacks of land planning and management in Cuba is that, although land is a basic economic 
resource for the allocation and design of all activities, land-use planning has been seen as no more than a 
technical tool to provide physical space where industrial facilities, infrastructure, housing, tourism hotels, 
services and so on are to be placed. The authorities are blind to the financial and economic potential that 
land offers, benefits that are possible even when markets are absent, and even when land is not used for 
private benefit but for the whole of society and through state control. 
 
As a result of ignoring the economic and financial importance of land, the City’s administrative and planning 
agencies have often failed to ensure that attractive and valuable farmland is protected, and they have 
allowed inappropriate uses which obstruct future development opportunities. They have also failed to 
promote effective initiatives to build upon abandoned and poorly developed land in the city and to maintain 
and upgrade existing neighbourhoods and valuable urban areas. As in most countries, the Cuban people 
are willing to accept limitations on their rights in regard to land as long as land-use planning benefits all. But 
none of those benefits has been realised.  
 
The lack of success of land planning becomes even more remarkable if we take into account that the state 
controls most of the land in Cuba and determines how it should be used and by whom (see later in this 
chapter) allowing little participation by the local entities. That power could be used better if some of it were 
decentralised, such as to municipalities. The centrally initiated actions to promote urban and economic 
development should rely on the provincial and local institutional framework to make the right decisions. If 
these institutions are weak and sclerotic - like they are today - there will continue to be a huge inefficiency in 
urban land management and a wide gap between the central priorities and the local needs. 50 
 
We can summarize the most important drawbacks of the current land planning as follows: 
 
• Insufficient connections of the land planning framework to the land legal framework.51 
• Insufficient land planning instruments and insufficient institutional capacity to deal with land 
management. Very inefficient management of land provision and urban development.  
                                                 
49 Anteproyecto Ley del Suelo, el Ordenamiento Territorial y el Urbanismo. La Habana, Instituto de Planificación Física, octubre, 
1996. Document in author’s private collection. 
50 Bryan R. Roberts & Portes Alejandro. “Coping with the free market city. Collective action in six Latin American cities at the end of 
the Twentieth Century”. Latin American Research Review. Baltimore, USA, Volume 41, 2006, page 58. The authors explain how the 
free market reform marks a shift from the old urban political economy to a new one in which the local government, the market and 
the NGO’s become the providers of infrastructure and social services. This sort of action is not accepted by the Cuban authorities, 
but they have already acknowledged the serious problems of having weak institutions very dependent on the central government. 
This is noted in the difference between Cuban cities that do better than others because they have better governance, stronger 
institutions, well targeted planning and so on. The authors also stress the importance of not losing the scope of collective needs 
versus specific individual needs, and the need to reinforce the relations of the decentralized structures with the state. 
51 Anteproyecto Ley del Suelo, el Ordenamiento Territorial y el Urbanismo. Instituto de Planificación Física, octubre, 1996. Until 
1985 management and urban control were administratively outside of the physical planning system, in the Municipal Directorates of 
Urban Control. This explains the relative divorce between planning and implementation. However, it is a positive thing that these 
controls should be made at the municipality level, but these could have been more efficient and better organized with a connection 
with the planning instances, municipal, provincial and even national for certain issues. 
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• High centralization in planning agencies and little planning decentralization at the local level, with 
limited popular participation in the debate and decisions about urban issues. 
• Insufficient mechanisms for land and urban control, and weak articulation between government, 
administrative, sectoral, economic, and community based institutions. 
• The existing norms and regulations have not been updated to the present realities of the city and 
the country. 
• Weak relation between planning proposals and investment projects. 
• Growing urban indiscipline in the fulfilment of planned regulations both on the institutional 
environment and the population. 
• No recognition of the economic value of land. 
 
Among the consequences of those drawbacks are: 
 
• Loss of economic opportunities derived from land development, and lack of financial resources for 
land and urban development and for implementing social policies such as housing and 
fundamental social services and infrastructure. 
• Increasing weakness and lack of capacity in municipal and grassroots institutions. Apprehension 
and lack of motivation of the local authorities to assume challenges. 
• Little community participation in decisions of land planning in spite of growing popular concern 
about unsolved urban problems, manifested in the adoption of informal survival strategies, 
clientelism and lack of urban discipline, favouritism and corruption. 
• Excessive restrictions in the procedures and high transaction costs. 
• Stagnation of urban development, deterioration of city areas, buildings and infrastructure. 
 
 
4. Property ownership 
 
The State’s access to land 
 
In Cuba, the legislation gives the state unlimited access to land. For more than four decades, the state has 
retained property rights over land - including social housing - which guarantee it control over most of the 
land. Where private property stands in the way of prioritized projects, the state can acquire the land, 
compensating the owner either with another land parcel or financially. 
 
The legislation gives the state the right to develop all the land under its control and limits the use of 
land by other owners. The state has also the possibility to change land use of privately owned land 
for the general social purpose. In many countries, state institutions representing the collective rights and 
interests of society modify the exercise of property rights held by others.52 At the beginning of the revolution 
in Cuba, the state imposed new uses on existing land, that private owners found less attractive financially, 
but which were considered necessary to realise social priorities. Land nationalizations by the state were 
made for social interest mainly through expropriation, juridical or administrative, and in most cases included 
                                                 
52 Needham, Barrie. Planning, UK, 2006. Page 76. 
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an adequate compensation to the owner. When confiscations were made as a punitive action, owners did 
not receive any compensation. 53 
 
Another rule establishes that the state has the right to control land and buildings for social 
development: this is used to guarantee the location and equal distribution of basic services such as health 
and education, for all the population. In Cuba, the state did not have to acquire most of the land and 
buildings used in this way, because they had been abandoned by the Cuban Diaspora. In the land registers, 
the state is registered as the owner of the land and buildings. (For this purpose, the state developed a 
cartographic data base and expanded the planning institutional framework at the municipal level.) 
 
The last form of state land control is in order to reserve land for future developments and city growth. This is 
strongly addressed in the different master plans. It is called land protection for development and controls 
the land designation for parks, housing and green areas. 
 
The overall legal rules are determined by the Ministry of Justice, but the various laws and regulations are 
the responsibility of different central, provincial and local institutions. For example, the Ministry of Culture 
passes the laws and regulations for the protection of cultural heritage, there is a provincial culture 
directorate which deals with such issues at that level, and finally there is the municipal network of museum 
and culture offices. 
 
Government agencies that control land can be divided into three main categories (the division defines to a 
large extent what they can and cannot do with the land), and each has its own sort of powers over land: 
 
• Entities with a social role: These are health, education, communal services, culture and sports. The 
scope of their works is determined by subsidies. They are very dependent on an annual budget 
from the central government. These entities have very many national assets under its responsibility 
but are very limited in what they can do concerning land and buildings. They can perform certain 
maintenance works, but not major investments. 
• Entities with an economic role: This category includes enterprises and institutions with great 
relevance in the macroeconomic life of the country. It includes production entities, such as 
factories, construction companies, army enterprises, infrastructure monopolies such as electricity, 
telephone, water, sewerage, railways, etc. This group has very many national assets under its 
responsibility and it has some autonomy to decide what to do with the land and buildings assigned 
to it by the central government. These enterprises generally operate with the national currency, but 
there are combinations with the third group, and for certain projects they operate with hard 
currency. The revenues generated go for the most part to the central government account. 
• Entities with a revenue creating role: This includes the enterprises created or authorized by the 
government to generate hard currency that goes to the central government account, leaving a 
percentage for enterprise capitalization: that is specific financial resources that will allow entities to 
replace obsolete technology and / or acquire new equipment to ensure their operational capacity. 
These enterprises can assume the role and mechanisms of a private society or a capitalist 
                                                 
53 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. El régimen jurídico de la vivienda y demás bienes inmuebles en Cuba. Biblioteca Virtual de 
Derecho, Economia y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. 
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enterprise: that allows them to acquire equipment and new technology, independent of central state 
controls, and (under certain conditions) to import and export independently. They have the right to 
develop projects with land and buildings according to previous valuations and negotiations with the 
government. They can associate with foreign companies and other private investors previously 
approved by the top authorities. 
 
There are five central state institutions that control and regulate land and properties: 
 
• Ministry of Agriculture: Elaborates the rural cadastre and assigns land for rural development. 
• Ministry of Justice: Organizes the legal system of the country, its principles and policies. 
Establishes the possibilities for, and restrictions on, state institutions to control state assets, 
including the land and buildings assigned to them, and establishes the rights over land and 
buildings for public agencies and individuals. 
• Ministry of Planning and Economy: Elaborates the Annual Plan of the Economy following the 
directions and priorities of the Executive Council of Ministers. The Institute of Physical Planning 
makes the urban plan and issues the general policies and guidelines for territorial and urban 
development. This institute coordinates the Master Plans for the provinces in the whole country, 
reviews with the other planning agencies the urban regulations, the issuing of land-use permits and 
project approvals. All investment projects and the different sectors of the economy consult with it. 
• Ministry of Construction: Determines the construction ordinances, the norms for construction 
techniques and for materials. One branch is the National Housing Institute that determines the 
housing policies according to central government directions. It has a board of experts to advise 
technically and review important investment projects. 
• Ministry of Hydraulic Resources: Of recent creation, this ministry deals with the protection of land 
with water reserves and the allocation of hydraulic and sanitation infrastructure. 
 
Limits to the types and exercise of property rights 
 
Since the first year of the revolution, most land and buildings are owned by the state,54 and land and 
buildings in private ownership have been subject to many legal limitations. The laws governing property are 
not concentrated in one legislation but are dispersed between the Constitution, the Civil Code, and other 
legal documents: these together determine the policies for and the scope and character of property rights for 
entities and individuals. 
 
In its general dispositions, the Constitution states the fundamental principle defining property as: Socialism 
is the ruling economic system based on the socialist property of all the people over the production means 
and instruments and based on the suppression of the exploitation of men by men.55 
 
The Constitution states the main general policies to protect the environment, the natural resources and the 
land reserves. It forbids the transfer of property that belongs to the socialist state to other legal or natural 
                                                 
54 Anteproyecto Ley del Suelo, el Ordenamiento Territorial y el Urbanismo. La Habana,oOctubre, 1996. 
The first laws issued by the revolution affected the ruling system of private property. The Law 26 of 1959 against eviction, the Law 
135 of 1959 among others.  
55 Plebiscito Constitucional 2002.La Habana, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, enero de 2003.  
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persons, with the exception of cases that help the country’s development objectives without affecting its 
political, social and economic principles. 
 
The state recognises the public property 56 of the political and social mass organizations, the property of 
agrarian cooperatives, the private property of farmers and the personal property of individuals, and it makes 
rules for all of these (and see below for more details). It also establishes the rights of inheritance and allows 
the expropriation and confiscation for social benefit or for other reasons, with compensation for damages. 
 
In July 1992, the Cuban parliament approved a Law of Constitutional Reform.57 The Constitution was 
modified and approved by popular consensus.58 Articles 15 to 23 relate to property rights: state property, 
state administration rights, rural private property and association rights for rural landowners, personal 
property, organizations’ property, joint ventures, properties of societies and other economic associations. 
 
The limitations on the use of land and buildings are regulated by law and they answer to the public interest 
or to the need to avoid conflicts of interest among the private actors.  
 
Limits to protect the public interest: They have the objective of guaranteeing the preservation of a general 
social order, for example, urbanism, environmental protection, cultural heritage, and national security 
priorities. Some of the rules radically affect the exercise of property rights, such as compulsory 
expropriation.59 Another form is the confiscation or embargo: its application is a punitive action, transferring 
the property to the state without any pecuniary compensation to the owner. 
 
It is important to understand that the government considers that limits to personal property are necessary to 
maintain the social order and to allow the social and economic strategies of socialism, with impacts that are 
considered above the individual or personal strategies. 
 
Limits to protect private interests: They are intended to diminish or prevent the conflicts arising from the 
exercise of real rights among individuals, such as the conflicts between neighbours. 
 
Types of property that can be owned publicly and privately 
 
In Cuba there is both public and private property, whereby the latter is restricted in order to favour collective 
interests over individual ones. Both types of property are subject to legal limitations, in order to realise the 
harmonic development of collective interests through the actions of public institutions representing the 
                                                 
56 The public property is a synonym of state property. In Cuba there is a strong influence of the state over the whole of the civil 
society and mass organizations. This has also happened with trade unions movements and political activists that are very 
subservient to the state administration. 
57 Plebiscito Constitucional 2002.La Habana, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, enero de 2003.  
58 The modifications were intended to widen the representation of Cuban democratic entities so as to improve their structures and 
prerogatives at the different levels, to establish new methods for the parliamentary elections, to regulate the administration 
procedures at municipal level, to guarantee the rights and freedoms of Cuban and foreign citizens in the country, and other 
institutional aspects. 
59 which in the specialized literature also appears as extinguishing the property and not exactly limiting it, as it implies the removal of 
the property right in exchange for its legal value. 
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government. Outside these limitations, and conceptually, the owner of property has rights which are 
absolute, protected against outsiders, respected, opposable, and with rights of exclusion.60 
 
The Cuban system stresses the importance of state property as a means of exercising control over those 
fundamental assets and resources which are necessary for the development of society. The state 
represents the organized community.61 The concept of fundamental assets includes almost all land and 
buildings used for economic activities and services, from the most strategic to the minor services. 
The following assets are considered state or public property. They cannot be offered as guarantee or be 
mortgaged in any way unless the law authorizes it: 
 
• All land that is not owned by individual farmers or agrarian cooperatives, all underground 
resources, mines, marine natural resources, woods, wetlands, water sources and communication 
networks. 
• Sugar cane factories, industrial areas, transportation means, enterprises, banks, constructions and 
equipment nationalized and expropriated from imperialists, landowners and bourgeoisie. Also the 
factories, enterprises and other economic, social, cultural and sport installations built by the state 
and also the ones planned for future construction or acquisition. 
• All assets located on the territory of the Republic that do not belong to any legal or natural person. 
 
The Civil Code details other forms of property: 
 
• Property of the political, social and community organizations: 
All the assets granted to them for the fulfilment of their objectives. This can be buildings, 
transportation means and other equipment. These properties cannot be taxed or confiscated. 
 
• Property of the Agrarian Cooperatives: 
Its owners can possess, use and dispose of the assets such as: 
- Rural land for farming 
- Production instruments and means 
- Housing and other constructions 
- Cultural, recreational and other assets acquired and contributed by the cooperative 
members individually or collectively. 
 
The farm land owned by the cooperative can be sold only to the state or to other cooperatives, and 
it cannot be taxed or mortgaged. It can also be transferred to another owner with the approval of 
the state entities and according to the legal rules established for such cases. 
 
• Property of individual farmers: 
                                                 
60 Gálvez Anillo, Osmín. “Los procesos de anomia social en el enfoque jurídico de la propiedad individual. Consideraciones sobre la 
propiedad vivienda”. Tesis de Maestría, La Habana, Organización Nacional de Bufetes Colectivos, 2000. 
61Fernández, Marta, “Apuntes sobre la propiedad y los derechos reales en Cuba”, en: Colectivo de autores, Formación jurídica para 
los cuadros del estado, Parte 2, La Habana, Editorial Félix Varela, 2004. 
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This was regulated in one of the first laws of the revolution as part of the Agrarian Reform. It 
includes the property and assets that help increase the production of consumer goods from the 
agricultural areas and that contribute to the national economic development. The types of property 
considered are: 
- Privately owned rural land. 
- Buildings and installations, production instruments and other equipment. 
 
The small farmers that act as private entrepreneurs can sell their land to the state, or they can join 
with the agrarian cooperatives or state agriculture enterprises. They also have the possibility to sell 
their land, permute or pass the title to other small farmers. In all cases the state must give 
approval. In the case of sales, the state has the first right to acquire the land, paying a legal price. 
The small farmers cannot rent their land to others, make partnerships outside the established legal 
cooperatives, or use land as mortgage or take any legal act that implies taxes or concession of 
rights to other individuals. If the law is broken, the land as well as the production means, could be 
confiscated by the state. 
 
• Other forms of property considered by the law are: 
- Property of anonymous societies, foundations and associations 
- Property of Joint Ventures with national or international partners.62 
 
In these cases, the law has specific regulations and statutes including those in the Civil Code. 
 
• Personal property 
In Cuba the concept of personal property includes one house, the possibility of a second house on 
the beach or in the countryside, empty plots of land, and other valuable assets which require a 
property title. Personal property also includes the revenues and saving accounts derived from 
honest work, and other assets and objects necessary for the satisfaction of material and cultural 
needs. In the case of urban land, the owner may execute construction works, excavations, or grow 
agricultural products, always respecting the limitations expressed in the law, especially 
architectural and urban codes that limit construction height and boundaries, or environmental and 
heritage protection laws. 
 
The table below shows which type of property may be owned by which type of actor: 
 
The X on the table means that the property is legally recognized, registered and certified according to the 
law. The ‘limited’ condition refers to certain quantities authorized by the government, such as cars, trucks 
and second homes where the possession of only one is allowed. 
 
 
                                                 
62 Herrera, Jorge Luis. Barcelona, España. 1996. The Law of foreign investment was passed on September 1995 substituting the 
Law Decree No 50 of 1982 which allowed the Economic Association between Cuban and Foreign Companies. From the article 16 to 
the 18, this law includes aspects of real estate property and regulations for its use for tourism and other businesses. The article 35 
establishes that real estate enterprises can build, rehabilitate or remodel existing buildings or urbanize land for tourism purposes … 
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Table 3.2 Relation actors/ property 
 
The state institutions are directly responsible for, and have unlimited power over, the property assigned to 
them according to the law. The other actors are limited in the use and amount of property that they are 
allowed to control. 
 
Property acquisition and transfer 
 
The Civil Code regulates the acquisition and transmission of personal property owned by private persons, 
including individual farmers. The rights in the cases concerning land and buildings have the following forms: 
 
 Buying-selling 
 Donation 
 Inheritance, with or without testament- 
 Permute 
 Renting 
 Temporary use 
 Expropriation 
 Confiscation 
 Usufruct 
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Private persons are allowed to transfer ownership by buying-selling, permutes and donations. The following 
table summarizes the legal possibilities. 
 
Type of transfer → 
Type of property↓ 
Buying-
selling 
Permute Donation Testa- 
ment 
Expropriation Confiscation 
State land No Yes No No No No 
Private land Yes, but only 
to the state 
Yes Yes Yes Yes yes 
State buildings No yes No No No No 
State housing Yes yes yes No No No 
Private housing No, except 
to the state 
yes yes yes yes yes 
Rented housing No yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Rooms and 
accessories 
Yes yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cars and vehicles Yes (only cars 
from before 
1959) 
No (other 
assets) 
Yes 
(require 
special 
approval) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other personal 
property 
Yes yes Yes Yes No No 
 
Table 3.3 Relation transfers/property 
 
 
5. Some rights over land and buildings  
 
The right of buying & selling 
 
The price for this operation is established in the official regulations, and only when regulations do not 
establish such conditions may the parties negotiate and agree upon a price. The buying and selling of 
buildings becomes official through a public document validated by the fulfilment of certain legal 
requirements. 
 
This right is to sell privately owned vacant land plots among private persons but, as mentioned previously, is 
granted with different limitations: the parties have to demonstrate there is a legitimate need for the sale 
(usually for housing purposes), that there are no violations of urban regulations, the Municipal Housing 
Directorate can authorize or deny the exchange, and the state has the first choice to buy at which point the 
owner has no right to withdraw from the process (as we will explain further in the Housing Property section). 
 
Private land owners can sell vacant land plots to the state, but in these cases the required administrative 
approval is issued by the Provincial Housing Directorate and the National Housing Institute and not by the 
Municipality. State owned vacant land plots cannot be sold to private persons; these are given only as 
temporary or permanent surface rights (see section on the right of surface). 
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In the case of housing, the law declares that buying and selling is not possible between individuals. In all 
cases, the Municipal Housing Directorate that represents the state, acquires the property and then pays the 
legal price to the owner. The only person who has the right to buy is someone who has been living in the 
property for more than five years, which is the minimum period established to have legal rights. A buyer 
pays the legal price to the government as a monthly payment until it finally acquires the property. In this 
case, the role of the state agency is to act as intermediary in the buying/selling process, making sure that 
the prices are the ones established by the housing regulations. If the owner leaves the property for good 
and no one has the right to occupy it, then it immediately passes to the central housing stock for future 
distribution.63 
 
Housing produced by the state can be sold quite exceptionally to previously selected persons by 
establishing a buying-selling contract with the Popular Savings Bank. The property of the house is 
immediately transferred to the buyer who assumes a personal debt with the bank to pay the legal price in a 
series of payments. 
 
The right of inheritance with or without testament, property transmission and donations 
 
The state recognizes the right of inheritance with or without testament, of property transmission, and of 
donations of housing and other personal property. But in the case of housing property, those who inherit 
must live in the building, otherwise the state becomes the owner and the beneficiaries must pay the 
established amount. Farm land and facilities built on it can be inherited even if the beneficiaries are not 
living in it, but this is only for cases of rural property and there are certain exceptions stated by the law for 
cases of state interest. 
 
Private vacant land plots can be donated to private persons if they demonstrate the need to use it for 
housing purposes. Donations to the state are possible too.  
 
The right of surface and the right to build on rooftops cannot be donated or transferred to others, however, 
the construction placed on it can. Donations of building property (housing) are possible among private 
persons with the requisite that is among family relatives, or when the donation beneficiaries have been living 
in the house for more than ten years.  
 
The right of usufruct 
 
The state can grant this type of right over land under its control. It can also grant in usufruct other resources 
and buildings, such as production means, industrial or recreational facilities, vacant land, or other property 
according to the law. Land parcels can be granted in usufruct to natural or legal persons to build housing or 
other constructions – kiosks, garages, storing facilities - or to use for agriculture. However, if the land is 
                                                 
63 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Capítulo 7 “Sistema registral inmobiliario en Cuba. Antecedentes Legislativos”. Biblioteca Virtual de 
Derecho, Economia y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. 
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personal property, the owner is not legally allowed to give it in usufruct under any circumstances. That is, 
the only ‘lessor’ who may grant a usufruct right is the state. 
 
When the right of usufruct is given to natural persons who can enjoy it for life, there are more limits than 
when it is granted to public entities, because it can be annulled by the state in the same way it was granted. 
The usufruct can be granted over single spaces or rooms (generally in slums, see Annex 17) which do not 
have the space divisions normally found in housing - a bedroom, a living-dining room and a toilet. In such 
cases, the right is granted free and the state as lessor receives no payment. 
 
The state can revoke the right of usufruct enjoyed the natural or legal persons if the property is required for 
other more relevant public or social uses. The usufruct is not transferable according to the present law; it 
can be granted for 25 years and extended for another 25 years. The state also establishes obligations for 
the conservation and maintenance of the property, the obligation to use it for the authorised destination, and 
the state allows works, plantations or installations needed for its adequate use and conservation. Properties 
in usufruct are usually registered in records or internal registries of each particular entity.  
 
The state can grant this right to diplomatic missions or to other foreign institutions so that they can construct, 
or use existing buildings as well as other facilities, for embassies, consulates or their functionaries’ 
residences. Other international agencies and institutions can receive similar authorizations, for example to 
accommodate offices of foreign associations or joint ventures.64 
 
The right of usufruct is given for not more than 50 years. It can be extended for another 25 years if the 
owner makes the application before the lease term ends. These rights can be transferred unless a specific 
law says to the contrary. 
 
The right of usufruct expires under the following circumstances: 
• Extinction of the legal person that owns it; 
• Violation of the law or legal terms under which it was granted; 
• If the right is not exercised during the first two years after its concession, unless the law establishes 
a different term and; 
• If the buildings or facilities are destroyed, with the exception of their reconstruction or repairs in the 
term established or according to the legal sentence. 
 
After the term ends, the constructions and facilities will return to the original owner which is always the state. 
In the case of a joint venture or a holding with a foreign investor, there will be a financial compensation for 
the asset’s increased value. 
 
The right of surface 
 
The right of surface is the most extensive right in Cuba. It gives the right to have a building or to construct 
on land owned by the state and it gives the user the ownership of the building independently of who is the 
land owner.  
                                                 
64Supported with the law - Ley No 77- of Foreign Investment. 
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This right can be temporary or permanent and it has a different legal treatment depending on the type of 
user (private persons, juridical persons, foreign juridical persons, foreign investors) and type of activity 
(housing, firms, tourism, industrial activities, etc.). 
 
In the case of housing, the right can be granted in perpetuity, which means that there is little difference with 
full ownership except for the fact that the use cannot be changed or leased for a different purpose. The 
limitation of this right is that it can never be sold, segregated or passed to a third person, not even for 
housing; it can only return to the state The surface right cannot be granted by private  land owners 
(individuals and family). 
 
The municipal housing directorates are authorized to distribute vacant land plots owned by the government 
for housing construction with perpetual surface rights. The beneficiaries pay the legal price of the right to the 
municipal entity, and the users are obliged to start constructing within less than a year, or the concession 
can be revoked. There are exceptions and reductions to the payment for the right in cases where the land 
has natural accidents that make construction difficult (reduction of 50%) or when the constructions are 
through self-help (reduction of 30%). These rights cannot be transferred to relatives or family while the 
holder of the rights is alive, but it is possible to pass the rights through inheritance. 
 
The right of rooftops, specifically, is a permanent surface right allowed for housing construction. When it is 
revoked, the use of the roof returns to the owner. It is allowed only for private property dwellings and in the 
case of apartment buildings it requires the collective approval of neighbours. The right of rooftop can be total 
or partial over the roof surface, it cannot be sold, donated or permuted, but the persons who acquire it 
become owners of the construction they build on the roof and have the right to permute, pass in inheritance 
and donate it without the authorization of the ground floor occupants.  
 
In the case of foreign investors, the right of surface was allowed for 75 years, which has recently been 
extended to 99 years. This right cannot be used for mortgages, but the properties built on the surface can. 
 
The right of confiscation 
 
The state has the right of confiscation, which is the compulsory and definitive transmission of the private 
property to the state without any financial compensation in return. This is applied in cases of proven illegal 
buying and selling of properties, or in the case of definite migration out of the country. 
 
The right of expropriation 
 
The state has the right to expropriation, giving the state the right to get hold of private property for the public 
interest or social interest in exchange for its equivalent value. This can be granted only if a real and concrete 
need can be proven, and if there is no other way of performing the service. Property can be expropriated for 
public utility functions (such as administrative offices), for military functions, or in the social interest (to build 
schools, hospitals and similar uses). 
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The right to rent 
 
The law allows that state owned public spaces, not made for housing which are empty or abandoned, be 
rented to be used for housing. The tenants have a number of legal limitations, as they cannot change the 
space character or use it for purposes other than housing. However, the law also establishes that if these 
spaces are transformed into adequate housing, the state can change the legal terms and allow the tenants 
to become owners. 
 
Housing which is owned by the state is classified in two groups: housing for rent and housing given in 
usufruct (see the right of usufruct section). Housing for rent is divided into the stock used for permanent 
renting and the stock granted as basic assets. The landlord is always the state, represented by the 
Municipal Housing Directorate. The tenants pay a monthly allowance which is automatically retained from 
the salary by the bank. When the family income is very low and the payments are over 10% of this income, 
the Municipal Housing Directorate is authorized discretionally to lower the amount.  
 
The modality of permanent renting is quite ambiguous because is not well differentiated from ownership. 
Permanent tenants have the right to permute and can freely determine the occupants who continue to have 
certain rights of tenancy in case of death or migration. The main difference with ownership is that the 
dwelling must be permanently occupied (cannot be empty for more than 6 months) by the tenant or his 
relatives. 
 
The housing stock rented as basic assets is managed by enterprises, subsidized government entities, 
agricultural cooperatives, military units and research institutes, in order to secure their labour force. This 
means that their occupation is temporary and depends on the working links to the entity that owns the 
dwelling. Beneficiaries from this type of housing are privileged in the sense that they may have other 
housing properties at the same time. They can also, exceptionally, permute with private properties, but each 
party maintains the legal status of the dwelling. 
 
In the case of private landlords, renting may be only temporary and according to a fixed price in Cuban or 
convertible pesos. There are different limitations and obligations for each case, for example, renting to 
nationals in Cuban pesos is allowed for no more than two rooms, with or without toilet and other spaces in 
the dwelling. The rules for renting from before 1959 were abolished with the revolution, but this was 
reconsidered in 1997 because of the difficult housing and economic situation. At this moment it is allowed 
that owners and occupants of housing are allowed to rent to natural persons spaces of their dwellings for 
habitat or commercial activities.  
 
The right to rent is allowed also for foreign entities, but has to be authorized by the Council of Ministers as 
the existing legislation is not applicable to these cases. 
 
The right to use land and buildings as collateral for loans 
 
Collaterals are guarantees for loans, as a way to ensure repayment of the loan. Collaterals are essential to 
reduce lender’s risk. There are different types of collateral such as scroll accounts, a financial mechanism 
which implies opening a bank account where revenues are deposited, and credit payment agreements 
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which are automatically discounted. The net balance of this account can be transferred to the business 
operation account. In order to use land and buildings as collateral, the necessary rights and obligations have 
to be legally regulated, assessments conducted properly, and the commitments registered. Also it is 
necessary to determine the types of property that can be accepted as collateral. In the case of housing there 
is a heavy social dilemma, because any repayment failure will result in the loss of the property occupied by 
the family, creating a major social problem. 
 
The lending institutions, which at present in Cuba lend only to public entities, base loan decisions on 
business and client characteristics, including cash flow, operational debt capacity, historical financial results, 
collateral and character. Formal sector lenders have proven the usefulness of guarantors to motivate clients 
to repay loans. They have demonstrated the value of a business approach, and the importance of cost 
recovery in their lending operations. Finally, they have established the importance of external regulation to 
safeguard client savings and the institution itself. 
 
Land and buildings of individual property cannot be used as collateral for loans or credits, and the law 
specifically forbids the use of housing for lucrative purposes:65 this is penalized with the loss of property by 
confiscation. Article 20 of the Law of Urban Reform proclaimed in the 60s forbids the embargo of permanent 
housing, its use as collateral or guarantee, and also prohibits housing mortgages and property taxes. 
 
The lack of the above mechanisms have led to informal solutions, and there are examples in Cuba of the 
use of cars, art works and other personal valuable assets as collateral for loans in order to invest in housing 
or family businesses. We do not have much evidence of people using second housing or certain real estate 
rights as guarantee for loans. However, given the extent of informality it would not be impossible to find land 
and buildings used as collateral by informal businesses, despite the difficulties and risks to deal with such 
procedures. 
 
 
6. Housing property in Cuba 
 
The right to shelter appears in article 9 (c) of the Constitution, stating that the government will work to 
secure that every family has a comfortable house. The particular aspects of the law declare that housing is 
not a purely individual property, as the whole family is entitled to it. The Constitution recognizes the 
limitations of the housing production by the state when it says that the state works to accomplish the right to 
shelter, not saying that the state guarantees it. The other relevant document for housing acquisition and 
property is the General Housing Law and the various resolutions that modify its various articles. 
 
In Cuba, real estate property such as land and buildings connected with shelter is classified under 
personal property, probably to avoid the semantic similarity with market economies where land and 
buildings can be privately owned by other than natural persons.  
 
The General Housing Law was first published in 1985, after the Law 48 of 1984 was approved in the 
parliament.66 In those years the country aspired to increase the construction of new housing, expecting to 
                                                 
65 Ley de Reforma Urbana, La Habana, Cuba, 14 de octubre de 1960. 
66 Dávalos Fernández, Rodolfo. La nueva Ley General de la Vivienda. La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1990.  
60 
 
have solved the problem by the beginning of the new millennium. To that purpose, article 8 of the law 
established the micro-brigades as a popular participation mechanism to produce housing and other social 
constructions.67 There are other regulations and norms concerning housing, issued by the National Housing 
Institute and the planning authorities. It is evident that the legal responsibility for housing is divided among 
many state entities and that housing is regulated by many administrative procedures.68  
 
The tenure rights granted on formal housing can be buying, renting and usufruct. Buying from the state is 
possible when the owner was directly involved in the production of the house through self help or by a state 
housing program, and in that case the occupant gets the property of the house and gets the permanent 
surface rights. Renting housing produced by the state is possible; this stock is and managed by the 
Municipal Housing Directorates (who act as landlords) and the occupants are the tenants. This leaves little 
space for personal responsibility over property. Usufruct is applied when state housing belong to state 
entities and the units are given as basic assets, it does not require any payment from the occupant to the 
landlord (in this case the state entity) because this housing is produced to support a national priority or 
relevant economic sector. This alternative also leaves very little space for personal responsibility over 
property. 
 
The studies made at the beginning of the 1980s by the urban planning offices revealed that the amount of 
housing produced with self-help techniques largely outnumbered the amount produced by the state.69 The 
Law was modified in 1988 and the National Institute of Housing established the norms for self help 
construction and conservation activities that, instead of helping, considerably limited and marginalized that 
type of construction.70 In 2004 71 the Housing Law was again modified, to add new regulations concerning, 
among other issues, the property rights of families and individuals. 
 
The article 64 of the Housing Law refers to the use of housing and the satisfaction of housing needs. It also 
regulates the powers of the owner freely to determine who are the other occupants, and also his right to 
force them to leave. The other occupants can be related to the owner or not, and can be accepted as long 
as they are not illegal occupants. The article 65 clarifies the possibilities and limitations of the owner to 
transfer his powers to use the property to: 
• Ascendants and descendants 
• Wife and children born of that union in marriage, as long as she is responsible for them and has no 
other place of residence. 
• Mother with small children that have been living there for more than three years and have no other 
residence 
                                                 
67 Herrera, Jorge Luis. Barcelona, España. 1996. The houses produced by the micro-brigade are distributed to the workers in public 
assemblies. By agreement of the Ministries Council in May 1989 the micro-brigades would donate 40% of their production to the 
government stock. 
68 Ibid. 
69 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. At the beginning of the 80s a detailed analysis of the Population and Housing Survey of 1981 
revealed that the state had built, during the previous decade, a little over a third of the total amount of housing. 
70 Herrera, Jorge Luis. Barcelona, España, 1996.The self help regulations established the selection of families that would have to 
present a certificate in order to receive the construction license and the state credit to buy materials and land. Land is acquired 
according to article 17 where the municipal authorities can grant surface rights of vacant plots to individuals and families for the 
construction of their housing. Another part of that policy restricted the self help construction of new units because the production of 
materials could only cover the ones under construction process. The restrictions of these regulations are one of the main causes for 
the illegality and irregularities in housing production in the last years. 
71 See other details in the chapter 5: “La Permuta: an effective instrument for residential transactions in Cuba”. 
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• Elderly person in similar conditions to the above 
• Any other case that the authorities may find appropriate 
 
The temporary rules established by the Housing Law include regulations for occupants who were previously 
owners, family members who made expansions to the dwelling or contributed to its acquisition or repairs, 
among other possibilities. 
 
The first contradiction found in the possibilities for ownership is that the law supposedly grants the title of the 
dwelling to the family as a whole, but in practice it belongs to those who legitimately acquired the building, 
through state designation, through permute, or through a donation or testament. Therefore in truth the 
powers over the housing are given to the owner and co-owners and not to all family members. The 
constitution, of course, talks of the family conceptually, to reinforce the idea that it is the most important cell 
of the society, although this may literally contradict the article 65. 
 
Another contradiction emerges from the limitations and powers of the owner to evict undesired occupants. 
Serious conflicts may appear if, upon the refusal of undesired occupants to move out, the owner makes use 
of the mechanisms established in the Law, and enforced by the Municipal Housing Directorate: for then it 
appears that the sanctions are totally irrelevant, consisting only of a salary discount of 30% during three 
months and 50% if the undesired occupant continues to refuse to move. The way out is usually to enforce 
the eviction, something which only takes place in case of an anti-social situation between those involved: 
this is a very probable scenario after all polite and legal solutions have been exhausted. 
 
The third contradiction has to do with internal disputes, or other conflicts of interest arising from the use of 
the dwelling by different family generations, with different life styles, rhythms and interests. This situation is 
most common in Cuba because the housing shortage forces entire families to live in the same house or 
apartment, in most cases sharing very small living areas. The commonest solution is that the tenant (when 
this is not the owner) applies for a permuta, something that is possible even without the approval of the 
owner. The family will then have up to three permute options after which, if the discrepancies continue, the 
municipal authorities can proceed to a compulsory swap. 
 
The most controversial part of the law is the limitation (also imposed by the Civil Code and its special 
dispositions) that real estate property may not be sold to other private persons, only transferred, for example 
by inheritance and then only between family members or other individuals. The obligatory mediation of a 
state authority for any donation, permute, and buying or selling is part of this limitation.72 
 
The buying and selling of housing property is particularly confusing. In the Civil Code, article 334, it appears 
that the seller must pass the property to the buyer who will pay the legal price in money.73 The Law of 1985 
established the method to determine a legal price (see chapter 4 for more details), specifying that any 
speculation, enrichment or profit-making pretension, or any violation of the law would be punished by the 
                                                 
58The buying and selling, swapping and donations regulatory framework appears on the 3rd book of the Civil Code in the section 
From Obligations and Contracts. The rights of succession appear in the 4th book, this includes the inheritance, testament or without 
testament transfers. 
73 Any buying selling operation must take place through a state agency if it wants to be legal and it is the public agency which 
determines the price. For example in the case of housing, the state agencies are the Municipal Housing authorities and the 
Community architect. 
62 
 
confiscation of the dwelling. In practice, the price agreed might not be the same as the legal price, but the 
price agreed between the buyer and seller must appear in the contract before the notary: so the parties are 
compelled to lie. From 1987 onwards, the resolution No 59 of the National Institute of Housing established 
that the state has first call on all purchases and, given the housing shortage, it always does that. In the Law 
of 1985 there are a series of impositions that further limit the transactions.74 
 
In the case of donations, the process requires monitoring by the municipal housing authorities – DMV - as 
an essential requisite for the legal validity of the transfer. The participants in a donation are limited to 
relatives and to ex-husband or wives, if they have children in common and if the marriage lasted for more 
than two years. The donation can take place between not related individuals, but in such cases they need 
evidence that they lived in the same dwelling for more than ten years. The present legal rules limit the 
donation when the owner is a potential migrant leaving the country. In such cases, the other occupants not 
only have to prove that they have lived in the dwelling for more than ten years, but they must also pay the 
dwelling’s legal price to the government after the donor leaves the country. In the case of a large or very 
valuable property, the state can declare its interest in buying it in order to use it for a specific social or 
cultural use. In that case, the occupants will receive other dwelling offers. Donations, like permutes, are 
used to conceal other arrangements between persons, for example, old people who hire nurses or health 
trained persons to come and live with them until they die, the payment is that they can keep the dwelling 
property. As the only way to perform the “donation” is proving the 10 year period permanence, the 
documents are “created”. 
 
In the case of inheritance, the house can be transferred if it is already occupied by the individual who is to 
inherit the property. However, although the inheritance rights are acknowledged, any other occupants have 
the right to continue there, unless the person inheriting decides to sell the property to the government, in 
which case the occupants can buy it from the government for its legal price, paying a monthly amount. If the 
testament states that the property is divided among family members, in case of death or migration of those 
members their share will immediately go to the government. 
 
In the cases where the government confiscates a property and assigns it to a new owner, that person will 
make a new contract with the municipal authorities and pay the legal price to the bank in order to acquire 
ownership of the property. 
 
With the successive modifications to the housing regulations, the government intended to exclude market 
mechanisms as far as possible.75 But these efforts have had the opposite effect because the discretionary 
attitude of the administrative authorities, and the legal restrictions, have caused an informal residential 
market to proliferate (see chapter 5). The economic opening of the 1990s brought more confusion to the 
existing housing legal framework. This framework had been constructed around the assumption of 
centralisation and subsidies. Suddenly however, market instruments were applied to government 
investments, and the impacts on the Cuban society were evident, despite the official reflections that the new 
instruments were undesirable changes but necessary to deal with the crisis.76 The government clearly 
                                                 
74 In the Law of Urban Reform of 1960 and in the Housing Law of 1985. 
75 Milan, G. “Los procesos anómicos en la sociedad cubana actual”, 1997. 
76 See Chapter 5 “La Permuta: an effective instrument for residential transactions in Cuba”.  
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respected its own political and ideological principles, because as soon as the economic recovery started,77 
all the policies and development programs have returned to an even stronger centralization. 
 
Legal experts recognize that ownership of housing gives, in theory, the possibility to make decisions about 
the property. However in practical life these decisions face many restrictions which lead to actions that take 
place inside or outside the law. Whenever the law is not flexible or comprehensive enough, individuals 
simply break it. The norms and regulations limiting the owners’ possibilities are generating violations of the 
law and disruption to the public order, with some records of anti-social behaviour and crime.78 The informal 
processes with buying and selling, and financial transactions through the permuta, are evidence of these 
distortions, and they demonstrate how inhabitants and families work to solve their domestic problems 
outside the legal frameworks, running the risk of legal sanctions. 
 
The limitations imposed by the law on the exercise of the property rights over housing considerably limit the 
interests and benefits derived from ownership, to the point where there is almost no difference from being 
an owner or a usufruct user. Accepting the concepts and principles of the socialist society, there are no 
justifiable reasons for such property limitations as long as they do not affect the public or collective interests. 
 
The constant modifications to the laws, law decrees, resolutions, instructions, and other legal acts; the retro-
active character of some of the legal measures; the lack of clear limits and precision in the legal processes; 
the arbitrary institutional behaviour in the face of conflicts between individuals and enterprises in real estate; 
and economic issues; all these have created an environment of distrust, insecurity, lack of discipline and 
scepticism about the performance of state administration. 
 
 
7. Property registers 
 
The property registers are the public, legal, organized references, and the legal guarantee of the origin and 
current status of all real property, and they are invaluable instruments for social and historical research. 
They also allow transparency and credibility about the real estate property owned by public and private 
agents, and they protect the titles and real rights before legal claims. 
 
The property registers have the purpose to record publicly rights in real estate. For this purpose there are 
norms for the inscription, and norms for the publication of the contents. The registers are made for the public 
declaration, and to keep track, of the history of property transmission, cancelling of rights and other related 
circumstances, as a guarantee of legal security.79 
 
                                                 
77 García Pleyán, Carlos. “Transformaciones y vicisitudes del desarrollo urbano sostenible en Cuba, Instituto de Planificación Física 
(IPF), La Habana, mayo del 2006. The economic “recovery” of the country in the middle of the first decade of the 21st Century, 
mainly the trading and financial agreements with Venezuela and China, …, have allowed a recovery of resources and prior 
development paradigms, and have given way to a true process of re-centralization. 
78 Gálvez Anillo, Osmín. La Habana, Organización Nacional de Bufetes Colectivos, 2000.pag. 35. 
79 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, Economia y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. Capítulo 7 
“Sistema registral inmobiliario en Cuba. Antecedentes Legislativos”. 
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The property registers are subdivided in two sections: urban and rural. The urban contains the property of 
natural and legal persons, the state property assigned to public entities, and the cadastre information. The 
rural register contains in addition to the above the buildings owned by agricultural cooperatives. 80 
 
The information is kept in different books which are numbered and separated by sections that include each 
registration application with a number and date; the inscription of the titles and other related information; the 
applications for the certificates and notes that make the contents of the book public; the expropriations, 
confiscations and other judicial resolutions that affect the owners; the economic and financial control of the 
register; the control of information flow (inputs and outputs of administrative procedures); the inventory of 
the books of the register; an index by people and by properties in order to help to locate the information. 
There are additional books with tax payments and other documents which accompany the titles. 
 
The first property register of Cuba was established under Spanish Law, which was extended to the island in 
October 1893. After the triumph of the revolution, the Law of Urban Reform of 1960 eliminated the renting 
and sub-renting of urban properties, passed the property of absent owners to their actual occupants, 
eliminated the property taxes, and controlled the amount of rent that occupants should pay to the state. The 
government decided to eliminate the obligation to inscribe the new titles in the Property Registers.81 
Nevertheless, the authorities created a specialized section in the Property Register for those who wished to 
pay the legal price for their house according to the Law of Urban Reform.82 
 
In the case of rural properties granted to farmers according to the first and second laws of Agrarian Reform, 
the government created a special section within the property register, but that regulation was not carefully 
enforced and many titles were not duly inscribed.83 
 
The reference to property registers in the Civil Code is very general. In 1977, the Property Register was 
transferred to the Municipal Administration Entities, while the Ministry of Justice determined the processes 
which must be followed. In 1989, the Housing Property Register became part of the National Institute of 
Housing, although registrations stayed at the local level. In subsequent years the government has given 
powers to the Ministry of Justice to divide or merge the Property Registers and also to modify the 
procedures, but other ministries and sectors have also been authorized to create their own registers and 
inventories.  
 
The registers were officially reopened in 2003. In the last decade, the Ministry of Justice has passed a 
number of legislations concerning the reorganization and reinstatement of property registers. The 
Resolution No. 104 of 2000 established the organization and functions of registers for the administrative 
control over buildings, and the necessary documents for inscribing the state properties and issuing the titles. 
In 2001 a resolution was made jointly by the Institute of Physical Planning, the National Institute of Geodesic 
                                                 
80 Ibid. 
81 Herrera, Castillo Jorge Luis. Barcelona, España, 1996.The law of urban reform transferred the property of many buildings to new 
owners contributing to the disarticulation of the property register. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. The Law of Agrarian Reform of May 1959 expropriated all farms beyond the 30 land cavalries. The second Law of Agrarian 
Reform of October 1963 reduced the extension to 5 land cavalries, expropriating farms larger than that. In parallel both laws gave 
the land to the farmers in concept of small property, rent, or in partnership with the state, giving birth to the concept of small farmers. 
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Studies, and the Ministry of Justice to establish coordination between the Property registers and the 
cadastres, stating the basis for the ordered inscription of buildings.  
 
In 2001 another resolution established the norms for inscriptions and in March 2002 the norms for the 
inscription of titles and rights over personal assets. In September 2003 another resolution established the 
inscription of housing and vacant land plots in private ownership. In October 2005 a resolution established 
new procedures and norms, improving what had been established, including norms for the inscription of new 
dwellings built by the state or through self-help means. This last resolution was revoked by the Ministry of 
Justice, which established the norms and procedures for the organization and function of Property 
Registers. In 2002 and 2003, the National Institute of Housing dictated regulations for the work of Municipal 
Housing Directorates in relation to the property registers for state and private properties. These were 
revoked in 2009 by the same Institute in order to improve what had been issued.84 
 
The resulting situation is legally confusing and entangles a huge fragmentation of registers among many 
state institutions, where most of the registers are incomplete, not interconnected, and probably include 
mistakes and overlapping information. The genesis of the present disorder in property registers, inventories 
and controls, lies in the drastic and sudden suppression of the land and building property registers which 
existed before the revolution. At present, facing the urgent need for such records, we find that the past 
know-how has practically disappeared, the old records have been scattered among different city archives, 
and the new records must start from the very beginning, reconstructing whatever they find of former 
information. We have been able to identify a few of the present registers, but as authorities advance and 
gain practical experience, changes in the controlling authorities and mergers to concentrate and organize 
the information can be expected:85 
 
• The real estate property registry for foreign investments. Ministry of Finance. 
• The real estate property registry of Old Havana, Historic Centre. City Historians Office. 
• The control of vacant plots register.  
• The Basic assets (buildings of public institutions and enterprises), the housing property registry (on 
implementation process) and Mercantile registry. Ministry of Justice. 
• The heritage registry. Includes the protected and designated buildings. Colonial period and Modern 
Movement. Board of Monuments and Ministry of Culture. 
• The rural land registry. Ministry of Agriculture. 
• Control of land, macro and micro locations. Institute of Physical Planning 
• The permuta registers. Housing Municipal Directorates. 
 
In conclusion, between 1959 and 1989 there were many changes to the institutional framework for property 
registration, and this has hindered the regulation, consolidation and updating of the property inscriptions.86 
The main problems at the beginning of the 1990s were: 
 
                                                 
84 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, Economía y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. 
Capítulo 7 “Sistema registral inmobiliario en Cuba. Antecedentes Legislativos”. 
85 Herrera, Castillo Jorge Luis. Barcelona, España, 1996 . There are five property registers concerning urban land and buildings the 
real estate property, the vacant plots properties, the Basic assets (buildings of public institutions and enterprises), the land property 
and the Heritage property. 
86 Rivero, Orlando. La declaración del dominio inmobiliario, Tesis Doctoral, Universidad de la Habana, Cuba. 2002. 
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• Fragmentation between different administrative agencies and ministries 
• Diversity and inconsistency of norms and procedures 
• Titles without the necessary information 
• No updating of limits and boundaries of rural and urban properties 
• Continuing change in the powers and responsibilities of the register controller 
 
The economic reforms of the 1990s opened a new situation for property rights and property registers, as 
foreign companies demand information about the legal situation of properties – land, buildings, copyrights, 
and patents - before starting any negotiation. The Cuban government proceeded to update the registers, 
returning the operational procedures to the Ministry of Justice, starting with public properties and, at the end 
of 1998, including housing properties. 
 
This reunion under the Ministry of Justice of all aspects concerning the functioning and control of registers is 
in the process of developing a more comprehensive and systematic approach to the different sections of the 
register. One of the first steps has been to declare the obligatory inscription of all buildings and assets, 
starting with the ones owned by the Central Public Administration (OACE), through the creation of the 
Directorate of Mercantile and Patrimony property. In 2001 the Ministry of Justice issued the resolution 212, 
with a requirement to register real estate titles and other rights over real estate owned by the state. A few 
months later the resolution 39 of 2002 was issued to regulate the registration of personal property including 
real estate. Finally in 2003 both resolutions were merged to produce the 247 resolution, which regulates the 
inscription of buildings, titles and real rights in a unique Property Register. 
 
By 2006, three years after the 247 resolution, there had been little progress. There are many institutional 
difficulties in filling the gaps left by more than 4 decades of neglect. It is extremely difficult to reconstruct the 
history of the many state owners of buildings, and what is even more difficult, is reconstructing the credibility 
of an institution so diminished in its functions and responsibilities by the authorities, and creating the 
necessary professional and technical capacities. With personal and housing properties, the work shows 
even less progress.87 
 
At the present moment (2008) the updating of property registers is in the following situation: 
 
• Inclusion of all properties in the territorial cadastre. 
• Inclusion of cases of property transferred before a notary.  
• Inclusion of personal property if the individual or family presents all necessary titles. 
• Inclusion of all new construction. 
• Inclusion of all state property and joint ventures.  
 
The procedure of registration is voluntary; there is no legal obligation from the owners to perform this 
procedure. It is not intended for conflict resolution, in cases where families are disputing property shares, so 
the registration functionary only classifies and inscribes. The public and private documents to be included in 
the property register are the following: 
 
                                                 
87 From Havana’s 15 municipalities, only three have been able to start the updating of registers. 
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• Disposition declaring the nationalization and confiscation of assets in favour of the state. 
• Administrative resolutions to declare built patrimony as state property. 
• Copy of notary documents showing the authorization of the Ministries Council for the transmission 
of property to international economic associations. 
• Contracts and legal acts including the transmission of real estate property to natural or legal 
persons connected with joint ventures or other businesses with foreign participation. 
• Titles granted after the 1960 Urban Reform. 
• Public Documents authorized before notaries. 
• Legal resolutions recognizing real estate property. 
• Documents about land repartition for legal order, accountability and cadastres. 
• Contracts for buying and selling housing when underwritten by the Popular Saving Bank of Cuba. 
• Certificates issued by the land tenure register of the Municipal Housing Directorate. 
• Procedures that declare the owner’s legal incapability to manage his real estate property. 
• Administrative resolutions that recognize rights over real estate in favour of the government. 
• The certificates issued by the Property Registers of housing, land plots, and other real estate. 
• The notaries´ acts in cases of recuperation of the register track. 
• Administrative resolutions that declare real estate in favour of public entities, that authorize 
changes of land use, or that transfer the property to another state entity, or changes in the property 
type. 
 
The following real estate rights are also registered: 
 
• Tenure contracts important for the country’s economic development. 
• Rent contracts for state housing. 
• Legal documents of mortgages authorized by the Law decree No 214.88 
• Usufruct right concessions. 
• Perpetual usufruct concessions for social housing. 
• Rights to use roof tops for housing construction according to the General Housing Law. 
• Limits on use of the property in relation to the neighbours. 
• Usufruct of: 
- Government owned land and buildings 
- Rooms, accessories and other spaces used for dwelling purposes 
 
 
Steps in the registration procedure:89 
 
• Application: includes verification of legitimacy of the applicant 
                                                 
88 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, Economía y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. 
Capítulo 7 “Sistema registral inmobiliario en Cuba. Antecedentes Legislativos”.  
With the Law Decree No.214, of November 2000, the constitution of mortgages was authorized in Cuba for building properties by 
juridical entities and enterprises dedicated to Real Estate development with the objective to secure the fulfillment of their financial 
obligations. The first Cuban Mortgage Law dates from July 1893. 
89 Ibid. 
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• Presentation of necessary documents to be inscribed: checking against earlier documents and 
against registrations that contradict the application 
• Criterion: investigation and revision of documents for inscription 
• Inscription, revoking or suspension of the documents. 
• Publication of the results. 
 
Despite the recent efforts, there are many shortcomings in the up-dating of property registers: 
 
• The new regulatory context is not completely supported by legal instruments. The Mortgage Law 
from republican times is still legally binding and no other law has replaced it. 
• The information of the urban cadastre is not up to date. 
• There is a vast gap of 45 years in the property register. 
• The inscription of temporary uses in the register is very imprecise, contrary to the nature of a 
property register. 
• There are procedures that violate the legitimacy of property. It is not reasonable to issue a title and 
then deny its validity.90 
• It is necessary to rebuild the trust of government and people in the institution of the registers. 
• In the case of urban and rural land registers, the measurements and boundaries are not included, 
or in the best cases they are described, but are not updated. 
• Existing buildings that do not comply with the requirements imposed by the municipal physical 
planning and housing offices are not inscribed in the Housing Register. 
 
Improvement could be achieved by: 
 
• Abolish the administrative procedure for registering housing properties, leaving the process in the 
hands of legally competent professionals. 
• Reduce the special regulations 91 in the present registration procedures for state property. 
• Make irregularities with the real estate registrations a violation which is penalized by the law. 
• Improve the technological and professional levels of the cadastre and property register teams. 
 
 
8. Conclusions 
 
The Cuban revolution in 1959 completely reversed the existing legal structure of the country. Land and 
building property became one of the first targets of the revolutionary activities, with the declaration of 
socialist property and the first laws of Agrarian and Urban reform. The public administration also was 
gradually transformed in conformity with the political and economic changes. After the 1976 Constitution, the 
government adopted a top down model with organizations at national, provincial and municipal levels. From 
the very beginning, centralized planning became the most important instrument for economic and physical 
development. 
                                                 
90 This contradiction takes place when a building asset that belongs to a state institution is for example handed to one or a group of 
people as housing and in time that land use is reversed by another state institution that comes to control the building. 
91 The Special Regulations refer to those determined by public entities below ministry level. 
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The Cuban legal framework is fragmented between different documents (Constitution, Civil Code, 
Construction ordinances, Parliament law decrees) and also between the institutions of the public 
administration (Provincial and Municipal authorities, Ministry of Justice and other sectors and specialized 
institutes). This fragmentation creates an unconnected and bureaucratic situation which lacks credibility and 
transparency, producing distrust of the state mechanisms. 
 
The strong subordination of physical planning and economic planning to the operational decisions of the top 
authorities produces hasty variations in most programs and in their implementation priorities. This 
undermines the authority of urban and territorial planning, which has not been supported by a stable 
legislation for urban and territorial regulation. The Urban Planning mechanism is weak at municipal level, 
and local institutions have little power and participation in decision making. 
 
The strong government control over land and building properties has been an advantage in eliminating 
speculation and in developing social priorities in the whole country: the aim has been social equity. The 
government not only makes policies and rules as part of the territorial and sectoral planning but also gets 
involved in the details of local plans and projects as part of urban planning. This proceeding is very 
desirable if the planning is in tune with the needs at local level and if the projects are well chosen and ready 
to go. But it is very problematic when the authorities’ priority is different from that of the locality, because the 
latter usually know better what they need and are ready to implement that. This unsolved contradiction in 
Cuba leads to very inefficient management process. 
 
The issues concerning real estate and private property are becoming more important, in particular after the 
economic opening in the 1990’s that introduced new laws and regulations for joint ventures and the 
authorization of the hard currency, small businesses and rent. Housing property is particularly important as, 
despite many efforts, the government has not been able to remove the shortage. 
 
The return to strong centralization and special programmes of the central government reinforces the need 
for a legal framework that coordinates and articulates the different ramifications of law, protects the civil 
rights, and authenticates real and personal property.  
 
The rules and practices described in this chapter are all part of the practice of urban land management in 
Cuba. The final chapter will propose improvements to that practice. However, we must be selective: not all 
of the problems described in this chapter 3 can be tackled. The selection comes out of chapter 2. There we 
concentrate on the efficiency with which land is used and on how the rules for urban land management can 
affect that. In chapter 7 we describe how these rules affect the economic efficiency with which land is Cuba 
is used. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The rules and practices for valuing land and buildings in Cuba 
 
1. Introduction  
 
In Cuba, the government authorities set the priorities for the distribution of land and property, as we saw in 
the previous chapter. One might expect that those official development programs would take account of the 
value of land and buildings. But that is not so, although there is a growing awareness of its importance. 
When appraisals are made, they are usually for the housing sector and for negotiations with foreign entities. 
However, in the last decade (1995 – 2005) the issues concerning urban land planning, land allocation and 
land and property valuation have grown in complexity. There are many technical conflicts and legal gaps, 
with many overlapping processes and the approaches are not coherent. This chapter provides an insight 
into the way land and properties are valued in Cuba, and into how that affects, or does not affect, the way in 
which land is allocated. 
 
The history of the land valuation process in Cuba can be divided into four main periods. The first two cover 
the decades from 1959 to 1989, where market mechanisms were not considered and all land allocation was 
made through the government using planning instruments and regulations. The rules and policies were 
introduced by the Revolution. Political decisions were very influential, in many cases exceeding the role of 
other factors such as locational advantages, urban regulations, and social demand. The 90s are stressed as 
a turning point because in that decade, while certain sectors of the economy retained the prerogative of 
receiving grants of land according to their development needs, an alternative opened up. The government 
started to introduce market and valuation mechanisms in order to develop businesses with foreign firms, 
while still retaining control over land and building assets. In the negotiations with foreign capital, the 
decisions largely depend on financial considerations, and land becomes an important source of value. Most 
of the projects connected with foreign developers required new techniques for land and property valuation, 
different institutional frameworks, and key legal reforms. That third period goes from 1990 to 2001. The last 
period, from 2001 to the present covers the return to high centralization and the beginning of a transition 
that shows the authorities’ willingness to improve the country’s economic performance. We examine the 
character of each period, the valuation methods and the legal instruments applied, and we describe some of 
the technical conflicts and impacts. Our objective is to analyze the Cuban failures and achievements in this 
field.  
 
The housing sector requires a separate analysis, as the application of variables and mechanisms for land 
and building valuation is different for housing than for other sectors. Moreover, this sector has gone through 
various institutional and legal reforms in an attempt to improve its performance and to cope with the 
increasing number of informal transactions with housing land and properties in the last 15 years (see 
chapter 5). 
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2. The valuation of land (1959-1989) 
 
In 1959, the market1 for land was removed, as the government wanted to abolish land speculation and 
corruption in urban development, and as the Socialist State declared the social welfare perspective as a 
priority in all new developments.2 During those years, historical conflicts led to a quick radicalization of the 
revolutionary process. As a result, many transformations were executed and adjusted in a process of trial 
and error, in the middle of conflicts with the advocates of private property and real estate developers. These 
had benefited from the boom at the end of the 50s, when some land prices reached 100 pesos (equivalent 
to dollars) per square meter in the El Vedado neighbourhood in Havana,3 one of the most modern and 
cosmopolitan areas of the capital city.  
 
Private activities coexisted with this revolutionary principle until 1968,4 when the life of the country had come 
to depend totally on the new structures. From the very beginning of the Revolution, land became the target 
of drastic reforms, and was seen as an essential resource to fulfil major social changes and the innovative 
plans for housing, services and urban equipment.5 
 
This policy was feasible due to the fact that the Cuban government rapidly controlled the majority of land 
(70% of vacant land in Havana), thanks to new laws and regulations and to a new institutional framework 
designed according to the Revolution’s intentions. 6 An important moment was the official cancellation of 
ground rent with Law 691 of 1959, 7 which established a unique price of 4 pesos per square meter, whether 
it was urban or rural land. This step reduced the financial incentives for owning and using land and drove 
out all market signs produced by real estate and land speculation.  
 
During the 70s, after a decade faced with the reality of an arbitrary use of land,8 a group of professionals 
started working out a way to diversify the categories of land-use allocation, in order to achieve a more 
                                                 
1 If the land market is abolished, the market value becomes completely unimportant. The use value, however, gained importance as 
it was essential for the location of all new projects and ideas. 
2 Núnez Fernández, Ricardo. “Urban Land as a factor for social and economic inclusion. The Havana Experience. Research on 
urban land markets in Latin America”, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, 2000. 
3 Cuevas Toraya, Juan de las. 500 Años de Construcciones en Cuba. Chavín, Servicios Gráficos y Editoriales, S. L., Madrid, 
2001.In the area of El Vedado neighbourhood close to the corner of L street and 23rd Avenue, were registered the most competitive 
land prices between 1955 and 1957. Buildings such as the Havana Hilton, today Habana Libre, the Medical Retirement Pension, 
today Health Ministry, and the Ice-cream restaurant Coppelia, occupy important land plots on this location.  
4 The moment known as the “revolutionary offensive” marks the end of the most creative decade of the Cuban Revolution. The 
nostalgia for this decade is constantly evoked by the actors of that generation. 
5 The first departments of urban and territorial planning were created as early as 1960. The law 86 of February 1959 created the 
INAV – National Institute of Savings and Housing - in order to develop social housing programs in former private urbanizations 
already subdivided in land plots for selling purposes. The money confiscated to the lottery game was used to finance the housing 
construction. 
6 Segre, Roberto. La Vivienda en Cuba: República y Revolución, La Habana, Universidad de La Habana, 1985. The first laws 
proclaimed by the Revolution were very much related with land and housing. The Law No. 26 of January 1959 prohibited the 
eviction of families; the Law No. 135 of March 1959 lowered rents by 50%; the Law No. 691 fixed the price of four pesos per square 
meter, for all the land and the compulsory sale of vacant land to the government; the Law No. 892 of October 1960 complemented 
the previous one; and finally the Law of Urban Reform was issued in the same month and year. 
7 Oliveras, Rosa y Ricardo Núñez. “Habrá razón que guarde el equilibrio: reflexiones sobre la segregación urbana en la ciudad de 
La Habana. Políticas, instrumentos y resultados”. Revista Planificación Física, 2003. 
8 Perdomo, A. “Reforma al suelo urbano: aciertos, desaciertos y retos. La regulación del suelo en Cuba”, en: Seminario 
Internacional sobre Mercados del suelo. UNAM, México, 2002. 
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efficient implementation of new investments. The proposal, which included actions such as a tax system and 
an economic valuation method to compare location alternatives, 9 was never implemented, as the 
government was more oriented to eliminating of all memories of capitalism.  
 
In 1985, physical planners came up with a system of values/prices for urban land structured in seven 
categories, with a minimum land price of 8 pesos and a maximum of 33 pesos per square meter for urban 
areas. The seven categories were applied only to Havana city; four were applied to Santiago de Cuba, 
second city of the country, and three to the remaining urban settlements. 10 The price of rural land was fixed 
at 6 pesos per square meter.  
 
This second attempt to differentiate the value of urban locations, inspired by the wish to promote a more 
efficient land use, 11 found its only practical application in setting the price of the new dwellings built as part 
of the government’s housing program. In those years, that program was to build 120 thousand units, of 
which 25 thousand would be located in Havana. 12 
 
The 1985 regulation made little contribution to the way land was managed, because differential land prices 
were not considered to be relevant for the sectoral programs developed by the government. The demand for 
developable land was presented to the physical planners, who automatically granted it without posing any 
important obstacles. The possibility of taking advantage of the price categories in order to produce financial 
incentives was not important at that time, although it could have benefited the inhabitants, helped preserve 
more vacant land for the future, and favoured the reuse of land or its exchange between institutions 
according to the project aims 13 and program needs.  
 
Another limitation of this procedure was the lack of monitoring and updating of the information. There are no 
systematic records of changes in the urban context, in terms of the factors which were taken into account 
when establishing the seven categories, nor of the positive and negative consequences of decisions which 
altered land values (such as improvements to infrastructure and public services) or which led to important 
modifications of the city’s land use. In conclusion, there were no mechanisms to take account of 
macroeconomic processes in the city and how this could affect land allocation decisions. 
 
 
3.  Valuation of new housing 
 
In Cuba, the government is completely responsible for setting the housing policy and for determining (at 
least in general) its physical, economic and financial aspects. During the first three decades of the 
Revolution, most of the efforts went into the construction of new housing around the whole country, while 
most of the existing stock awaited long needed maintenance.  
 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
10 The minimum price of 8 pesos per square meter was set for all urban areas. This regulation was passed on July 1, 1985. 
11 The efficiency criteria is analyzed in chapter 2 dedicated to the theoretical research. 
12 Dávalos Fernández, Rodolfo. La nueva Ley General de la Vivienda. La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1990.  
13 Land-use planning aimed to achieve the best use according to the site characteristics and broad value location such as 
landscaping. 
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Land allocation for new housing is made through the planning institutions at provincial and municipal levels. 
The valuation of new housing is performed by the Municipal authorities and the technical officers of the 
Municipal Housing Directorates. In order to determine the price of a new dwelling, they consider two 
elements. The first is connected to physical attributes and social aspects of the location and is regulated by 
the National Institute of Physical Planning (IPF), which designates homogeneous areas according to the 
level of urban infrastructure and service provision. The second one, defined by the Ministry of Finance 
(MFP), determines the price, which varies with the size and the construction quality of the house. The price 
takes account of the average salary and of the construction and land costs according to the fixed prices 
established by the land categories. Where the price is less than the costs, a subsidy is made available for 
the government building entity, so that it can deal with the difference between the real costs and the price 
paid by the families.  
 
The planning authorities are responsible for the first element, that is for the analysis of the physical 
attributes of the land (spatial, functional and environmental variables) also for the quality of infrastructure, 
the provision of public services and other urban aspects. As part of the study of the 80s, they came up with 
seven homogeneous zones for Havana. Although the clusters were made according to discernible urban 
criteria, planners took little account of aspects such as:  
• Present and future land uses. 
• Site characteristics and land capacity for incorporating new developments.  
• Urban regulations and policies for the various zones.  
• Size and specific location of land plots as part of the urban fabric. 
• The detailed situation of the infrastructure, urban transportation and other public services.  
• The acceptance of the community (upon consultation), its preferences and reactions to the 
proposals.  
• Other positive and negative externalities from a project decision, such as green and parking areas, 
the generation of noise or air pollution, the neighbourhood reputation, etc.  
 
The second element (the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance and Prices) was connected with the 
financial aspects. According to the rules of the Ministry of Finance, there should be a relation between the 
maximum value of the housing unit (construction cost), the amount of land (floor area), and the average 
family income. Thus the maximum price of land was fixed at 33 pesos per square meter for the best urban 
location. The main criterion was equity of the families and not their financial capacity.14 
 
The following table shows the land value differentiation-categories developed in 1985: 
                                                 
14 In the course of this research we have not found any price elasticity studies about social housing or any other public service in 
Cuba. The indicators used to show the well being of the population are education, health, basic services, family income and life 
expectancy. However, in the case of family income the official records do not include other sources such as family remittances, 
informal economic activities and others. 
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Unit: Pesos per square meter of land. 
 
Table 4.1 Price Categories for land territories in the System of Settlements 
 
This system of land prices differentiated the housing value according to its location, within the boundaries 
established by the administration procedures and the size of the housing unit. It set the highest prices for 
the plots with best location, accessibility and infrastructure. Nevertheless, the following hypothetical case in 
Havana city illustrates how little the housing price (as established by the Municipal Housing Directorate and 
presented to the Cuban bank in the mortgage contract with the user) is affected by that differentiation in land 
prices. 
 
 
Value Category according to urban location 
VII IV I 
Housing construction Cost     (1) 25 000  25 000 25 000 
Floor area of the unit (m2)*    (2) 80 80 80 
Tariff according urban location  (3) 33 24 13 
Land value repercussion     (4=2*3)  2 640 1 920 1 040 
Total housing price              (5=4+1) 27 640 26 920  26 040  
* The floor area includes a percentage of the building common use areas and of the land occupied by the building.  
(all values in pesos) 
 
Table 4.2 Housing prices differentiated according to location 
 
The example shows that prices are far from reflecting the real locational advantages in terms of cost, 
opportunities and benefits. The best location in Havana city, in a highly central area, with access to 80% of 
transportation facilities and other city level services, is only 6,1% more expensive than a unit located in the 
periphery, practically on the border of the rural area. 
  
Moreover, the introduction of rigid prefabricated construction systems and inappropriate design criteria 
created extensive, anonymous, standardized housing projects that took little advantage of the land-use 
capacity 15 (that might have been able to assimilate larger densities and make better use of urban space) 
and which generated negative externalities in terms of transportation and environmental issues. The method 
for calculating the housing price neither incorporated the updated construction budgets nor took account of 
efficiency indicators such as the cost per square meter, the execution schedules, the price of construction 
                                                 
15 The current possibility offered by urban infrastructure.  
System of settlements Categories (homogeneous zones) 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Havana City 13 17 21 24 27 30 33 
Santiago de Cuba City 13 17 21 24    
Other provincial capitals 13 17 21     
Cities > 20 thousand inhabitants 10       
Other urban settlements 8       
Rural settlements 6       
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materials and the equipment.16 It was not considered important to measure the financial efficiency of the 
housing production system, nor to analyze the increase of value derived from the improvements made to 
urban infrastructure. Other legal costs or promotion strategies were not even considered.  
 
The housing boom of the late 80s provided for the first time the opportunity to study the total value of a 
dwelling including location (in central, intermediate or peripheral areas), the cost of the architectural project, 
and the building costs. The impact of urban location on the value of the dwelling17 was at that time, and 
continues to be, practically irrelevant, fixed by the division into location categories and the financial 
constraints established by the government authorities. 
 
 
4.  Valuation of existing housing from 1985 to the present 
 
The value of an existing house is determined differently. The official way of doing this creates very 
unattractive financial conditions for the exchange of existing stock, because the state is the first buyer and 
the prices paid are extremely low.18 This has been very significant for the existence of both formal and 
informal contexts, and for buying and selling operations, because the inflexibility of the formal context has 
stimulated the informal practice, and unofficial practices replace the role of the formal market in bringing 
supply and demand into contact.  
 
The valuation of the existing housing stock is performed by the Municipal authorities, the technical staff of 
the Housing directorates, and the community architects - see Annex 6. There are around 750 thousand 
existing units in Havana. The valuation of this stock is required in order to facilitate swaps (permutes), to 
clarify housing inheritance issues, to correct inaccuracies of former housing descriptions, to request permits 
for subdivision of interior spaces 19 and to legalize informal construction improvements. New units can be re-
valued five years after construction. 
 
The general calculation procedure uses the concepts of life use cycle and depreciation and is based on the 
reasonable price of the dwelling at the moment of appraisal, deducting the depreciation and other indicators 
of construction decline. The effects of maintenance and major repairs also affect the analysis, because 
these contribute to extending the life of the building, especially if there are structural upgrading and floor 
plan enlargements which improve the functional quality of the house interior. 
 
                                                 
16 Álvarez, Alicia. “Valoración de activos fijos en Cuba y las Normas Internacionales de contabilidad”, en: 6to Taller de Valoración 
de activos en Cuba, La Habana, CONAS S.A. 2003. We know that the real costs of housing construction per square meter are 
around the 600 pesos; however, the Cuban legislation establishes that citizens pay only $115.  
17 The budget value of the housing Project is determined according to the architectural plans and the list of materials and 
constructive activities to perform. In practice, this budget is almost always surpassed because of inefficient execution, delayed 
schedules and practice adjustments, however, these changes are not reflected in the evaluation of the investment once the building 
is finished. 
18 “Reglamento complementario a la Ley General de la Vivienda, No. 14 de 2006, en: Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, La 
Habana, enero, 2006. In the buying and selling of dwellings to the state, it is declared that the buying and selling operations are not 
allowed between individuals. In all cases the Municipal Direction of Housing is the institution that exercises the right to do this 
process representing the government, this institution acquires the property of the dwelling paying its legal price. 
19 The subdivisions are made after family members agree to divide the spaces of the house into smaller units and require a legal 
acknowledgement of this result. 
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The estimation of the building’s life use cycle depends on the appraiser’s opinion. Although the information 
about costs, depreciation factors and other criteria necessary to authenticate the appraisal appear in the 
International Accountability Norms, the final decision depends to a large extent on the subjective analysis of 
the appraiser.  
 
The Cuban housing authorities apply a national calculation method to determine the legal price 20 of the 
dwellings according to the General Law of Housing. The method takes as its starting point the basic price of 
the dwelling. This varies according to the size and quality and is determined according to national rules, 
which take account of the average government salary, and which do not consider willingness to pay. The 
actual value depends on other factors too: the resolution 18-2001 of the Ministry of Finance specifies the 
aspects (listed below) that must be taken into account when valuing housing and other assets:  
 
• Basic price of the dwelling. 
• Depreciation value. 
• Effects of geographical location and additional land in the house parcel.  
 
The basic price of the dwelling takes as its reference the following classification, which considers the 
quality of the construction materials and technologies. It is very important to have the use surface in square 
meters.  
 
Housing Classifications:   Price per square meter 
• Groups I and II    (215 to 180 Cuban pesos/m2) 
• Group III    (115 Cuban pesos/m2) 
• Group IV   (65 Cuban pesos/m2) 
• Group V    (48 Cuban pesos/m2) 
 
The buildings made with solid and long lasting construction materials, with predominantly concrete 
structures or other materials which are structurally and environmentally sound, belong to groups I and II. 
Groups III and IV include buildings with other construction systems or combinations of them that are less 
sound than I and II but with higher quality than V. The buildings which use less durable or low quality 
materials in foundations, floors and roofs such as wood, straw, cardboard or adobe belong to group V. The 
relation between the square meter price of a high standard residence (an apartment) in group I and a low 
quality dwelling in group V is only 4.48 times.  
 
The second step is to define the depreciation value according to the state of repair and the year of 
construction. The procedure looks at the separate construction components to focus on the causes of 
depreciation, and expresses this using a points system - see annex 3. The final point score is translated into 
the Technical State Depreciation Chart. 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The Executive Committee of the Board of Ministries agreed, in June 25, 1985, the methodology to obtain the legal price of 
housing. There are other joint resolutions of the National Institute of Housing and other entities of the Central State administration. 
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Building State of Repair Score
State of repair Categories
Excelent
Very Good
Good
Moderate
Bad
Very Bad
Expert Score 
X
299-200
199-100
99-0
Score Range
600-467
466-400
399-300
 
% of Depreciation % Depreciation by Age
% Selection % Selection
0 __ 0 __
3 __ 1 __
6 __ 2 __
9 __ 3 __
12 __ 4 __
15 __ 5 __
36-45 years
mas 45 years
Building Age
0-5 years
6-15 years
16-25 years
26-35 years
 
 
Table 4.3 Depreciation value according to the state of repair and the year of construction 
  
The arrow inserted in the chart indicates the depreciation rate (6%) in the case of a general score between 
399 and 300, indicating that the house is in good state of repair (Annex 5). The year of construction is very 
relevant and determines a specific percentage. In conclusion, the total depreciation value is obtained in the 
following way: 
 
Depreciation value = Basic price x [(% Depreciation by state of repair) + (% Depreciation by age)] 
Depreciated price of dwelling = Basic price – Depreciation value.  
 
According to this method, the price of a dwelling cannot be depreciated by more than 20% (15% for state of 
repair and 5% for age). This way of depreciating is not realistic, as some dwellings are is such a poor state 
of repair that their real value is much lower than this maximum depreciated price.  
 
The effects of geographical location and additional land have very precise calculation methods. The first - 
geographical location - is calculated according to geographical location rates (the homogeneous zones – 
see above) multiplied by the use surface of the dwelling. The location rate is obtained from the table below, 
where the values are classified according to the quality of urban services. The resulting value is added to 
the basic depreciated price.  
 
Table 4.4 Geographic Location Rates Categories 
 
System of settlements 
 
Geographic Location Rates Categories 
Unit: Cuban pesos x m2 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Havana City 7 11 15 18 21 24 27 
Santiago de Cuba City 7 11 15 18    
Other provinces’ capitals 4 7 15     
Cities > 20 thousand inhabitants 4 7      
Other urban zones 2       
State of Repair Classification Building Age Classification 
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The additional land fee is used to include the value of dwelling areas that are not considered as part of the 
use surface, such as gardens, inner courtyards, backyards, terraces, external surrounding corridors, etc. It 
is calculated in the following way: 
 
• Declared land =Construction area x 1.5 
• Additional land= Land plot area - (Construction area + Declared land) 
• Additional land fee = additional land rates x additional land. 
 
The additional land fee is obtained from the following chart: 
 
Table 4.5 Geographic Location for Additional Land Rates Categories 
 
The resulting value - the additional land fee - is added to the Basic depreciated price. In conclusion the final 
appraisal of a dwelling is made in the following manner: 
 
Housing 
Assessment
Basic Price
(Group tariff x 
Net Building 
Area)
=
Depreciation
(Building state of 
repair & Age)
Effect of Geographic 
Location
(according to rates)
+ +-
Effect of 
Additional Urban 
Land
 
4.1 Scheme of official housing assessment  
 
This method intends to simplify the appraisal by specifying rules, but there are elements that make it more 
complex. In particular, each building is different, and in many cases there are differences inside a single 
dwelling, with spaces in different state of repair that are classified in different groups. This happens when 
the dwelling was constructed progressively and using various materials. In the same building, it is possible 
to find very solid and durable areas, and others poorly executed. It is also possible to find that the family 
income allowed maintenance or improvements in the first rooms, but that the rest of the building is in bad 
shape. The valuation method has to take account of these circumstances, and the total value is obtained by 
adding the partial value calculations for each dwelling area. (See Annex 6: Official Case of Housing 
Assessment in Havana City). 
 
Although the calculation method has a very coherent philosophy, there are many distortions and 
contradictions when compared with the social and economical reality. When comparing the official 
appraisals with the values negotiated informally, it is evident that a big difference is caused by the low 
financial differentials used to distinguish between the housing groups (I to V). Secondly, while in the informal 
market the values are in constant change, in the official context they are fixed. They do not respond to 
System of settlements 
 
Additional Land Rates / Categories 
Unit: Cuban pesos x m2 of additional land 
I II III IV V VI VII 
Havana City 13 17 21 24 27 30 33 
Santiago de Cuba City 13 17 21 24    
Other provinces’ capitals 13 17 21     
Cities > 20 thousand inhabitants 10 13      
Other urban zones 8       
Rural settlements 6       
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changes in demand and they are not monitored or updated. In particular, they are low. This creates a 
considerable gap between the 48-215 pesos basic price per square meter used in the official calculations, 
and the values obtained from the state records of construction budgets, which are around the 600 pesos per 
square meter of use area. 21 
 
The real effect of macro and micro location also differs greatly from the official formulae. The indicators in 
the table do not reflect the real location advantages, the capacity and quality of infrastructure, the 
accessibility and integration with other city areas, and the environmental quality. Other housing attributes 
highly appreciated in informal transactions (see chapter 5) such as balconies, garages, open terraces, 
courtyards and gardens are also undervalued in the official valuation methods.  
 
The inflexibility of these procedures and the subjectivity of some of the judgments stimulate negotiations, 
where government representatives become key actors in the valuation process. They may be acting in good 
faith, but they can also be susceptible to manipulations and speculation, raising or lowering the values for 
the benefit of themselves or the owners involved. 
 
Official housing valuation of the existing stock in Cuba is far from reflecting the real determinants and 
dynamics in the demand for housing, and it does not reflect the financial and economic appraisals which 
residents make when considering functional, aesthetic and technical aspects of the buildings. The 
immediate context of the neighbourhood or even the big city, the distinctions derived from the property rights 
(ownership, rent, and usufruct) and other legal aspects are not properly taken into account. The question is, 
whether it is possible to go on ignoring reality and not wanting to see what is already there, or to make 
mechanisms more flexible in order to produce more reliable and useful methods and to obtain more 
transparent results based on realistic information.  
 
 
5. Valuation of land for foreign businesses for commercial uses: 1990 to the present 
 
The high officials in the government have always resisted authorizing agreements that concede ownership 
rights to the foreign partner. In fact, this has taken place in just a few cases, and since 2000 that possibility 
has been practically abolished, allowing only user rights and not property ownership. The valuations 
described below are, therefore, of those rights, normally for 50 years. Recently in 2011, leasing agreements 
are authorised for 99 years. 
 
Usually, there is a joint partnership (50/50 %) with a Cuban partner, which contributes the land, or the land 
and building, to the joint venture: in that way the state buys itself into the venture without paying any money. 
The foreign partner contributes the same amount, but in cash. For this, it is necessary to value the land (or 
land and buildings) contributed by the state. So the values registered in this database of formal transactions 
are not realized sales prices: they do not represent a direct payment of money from the foreign party to the 
Cuban party to recognize the value of the urban asset. There is no Document of Sale. Rather, the 
                                                 
21 Alvarez, Alicia. La Habana, CONAS S.A. 2003. The price used in formal valuations is 600 pesos per square meter, nevertheless, 
prices can be much higher if we consider that government price records are not updated, and also that most improvements to 
housing and self effort constructions buy materials and hire labor in the black market. 
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transaction is a financial contribution in cash, equal to the value of the surface right, to the social capital of 
the project, which once agreed upon, becomes a monetary contribution (equity) by the foreign partner. 
 
 
 
 
4.2. Joint venture social capital structure 
 
The first official experience with land valuation after the Revolution was with the tourism projects developed 
between 1989 and 1992.22 In 1991, the government commissioned experts from a section of the Vice 
Presidency of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministries to develop a tourism strategy in order to 
start negotiations with foreign partners. To that end, the government created a multidisciplinary technical 
commission, drawing on the Physical Institute of Planning, the Ministry of Economy, the Ministry of 
Construction and other top state institutions.  
 
The first agreements between the members of the commission were that land value should be a percentage 
– generally set between 8 and 15% - of the total investment value. The generalized character of this method 
soon caused many contradictions. The modus operandis had evident limitations; it was not based on a 
careful evaluation of market demand for the different project modalities (tourism, residential, industrial), and 
it ignored the relevance of certain land capacity aspects of the selected area. 23 
 
The commission of experts travelled to various countries of the Caribbean and Central America in order to 
update information about current land and building transactions and and future development plans, mostly in 
tourism projects. In 1992, the administration entities responsible for foreign investment put forward another 
method. This was a combination of reference prices 24 according to the type of project, and a coefficient 
named K3 25 for valuing the qualities of the land or the selected location.  
 
                                                 
22 “Decreto-Ley No. 50 Sobre asociación económica entre entidades cubanas y extranjeras", del 15 de febrero de 1982, en: La 
Habana, Gaceta Oficial de la República de Cuba, edición extraordinaria No. 16, 1982. 
23 At that initial moment, land for tourism projects was chosen considering the general zoning plans of the Physical Planning 
Institute, but these plans lacked detailed analysis of environmental and ecological suitability, of topography, of infrastructure and 
transportation availability, of the presence of natural or built heritage, of preferable uses, population densities and other aspects that 
affect land development capacity. 
24 Prices registered in different cities of the Caribbean and Central America.  
25 There was a K3 for industrial projects and a different one for tourism developments. 
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The K3 coefficient expressed the location advantages (relevant aspects of the location) according to the 
type of project. It had two basic limitations. First, it was too focused on tourism development. Second, each 
aspect scored a maximum of five points according to the expert´s subjective opinion and not according to a 
system of rules or indicators. Here we find the same limitation that affects the valuation of housing 
properties. Nevertheless, the land coefficient K3 was more comprehensive than the urban criteria developed 
in 1985 by the Physical Planning Institute (see earlier in this chapter), because it widened the scope of the 
analysis and included more aspects of land capacity. It is still used to determine land price for various 
investments - see Annex 7. 
 
This use of reference prices allowed profitability rates to be varied between the different developments, 
whether for tourism or for other real estate. Foreign investors reacted positively to this attempt, as they 
found it easier to compare with their own market information. It also provided a more logical way of 
reasoning, and it gave the possibility of obtaining a more realistic picture of infrastructure capacity and land 
attributes. 
 
Nevertheless, the application of the reference prices obtained from other countries had certain weaknesses. 
Other countries may have similar environmental conditions, similar urban fabrics, building typologies and 
construction materials, even related cultural and social backgrounds, but they definitely have different 
property systems, economic structures, planning and management methods, and government priorities. 
These create fundamental differences with the Cuban situation of tourism and real estate. 
 
Finally, in 1994 to achieve a more transparent and credible process of land valuation in order to cope with 
the growing number of businesses with foreign developers, the authorities decided to apply international 
valuation methods, adapting them as much as possible to the economic, political and social conditions of 
the country. 26 
 
The introduction in 1994 of those procedures was sudden and quite arbitrary. After a short period of very 
dynamic learning, the institutions involved had to test the procedures in real projects, to face the errors and 
the successes, and to take political decisions when that was required. At the beginning, it was not clear 
which institution would establish the guidelines and methodologies. Then, in 1994, the Directorate of 
Patrimony of the Ministry of Finance became the leading authority in those matters.  
 
The methods applied are the following: 
• Market Approach 
• Capitalization rate 
• Residual value 
• Replacement Cost 
 
                                                 
26 Vale Jacqueline. Tendencias actuales de la valuación inmobiliaria en Cuba. Tesis de Maestría en conservación y rehabilitación 
del patrimonio construido, Universidad Politécnica-CUJAE, Facultad de Arquitectura, La Habana, 2002. 
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The specific aspects of these calculation methods are widely covered in the existing literature; 27 therefore it 
is not necessary to discuss them as part of this research. For our present purpose, it is more relevant to go 
through their application to the Cuban reality. 
 
The Market Approach was not easily applicable to Cuba, as there are no official markets and no reliable 
information on transaction prices.28 Nevertheless, it was the closest procedure to what had been applied so 
far, using the regional price. It even applied the K3 coefficient to adjust the results according to the site 
characteristics.  
 
In time, cadastral information about negotiations became available, which included the financial transactions 
with foreign partners. This allowed proposed investments requiring land and buildings to be compared with 
similar successful transactions. This recording, however, was very limited, not providing enough information 
about location and other relevant variables. The appraisers started from a few facts, ignorant of the 
negotiation process, for they had no say in the decisions, which are usually made between high Cuban 
officials and international partners. This raises many questions about the reliability of the valuations, for the 
appraisers only partially trust the given information and they are not sure if it is up to date and if the 
comparisons are appropriate. 29 
 
Other valuation entities tried the Capitalization Rate method, based on the principle of anticipating at the 
present moment the rate of return or future income generation capacity. This financial and economic 
procedure is very transparent for the actors, but is seriously limited in the face of the diversity and 
discretional application of specific variables in the Cuban situation.  
 
The critical assumptions concern the expected rate of return of the business and the actualization rate 
(discount rate) applied. The first is given by developers according to the market segment, and there is 
influence from the commercialization criteria imposed by the Cuban authorities.30 The second aspect is very 
critical: given the lack of information about similar investments, the valuers tend to assume the interest rate 
on loans for similar projects.  
 
In parallel, other appraisers have tested the Residual Value, recognized in the literature as a technique 
derived from the market, capitalization and replacement methods. The land price is here obtained as a 
residual value once the investment costs, the operation costs, and the costs of public utilities have been 
subtracted from the expected gross revenues. The application of this method has prevailed over the others, 
because of its transparency and recognition among experts. It has also been used in parallel with the 
Market Approach to compare results. But just as with the Capitalization Rate, its application in Cuba suffers 
from the many distortions in the variables applied.  
 
The literature recognizes two modalities to calculate the Residual Value Method, the dynamic and the static. 
The key difference between them is that the dynamic one considers the change of money in time, so a 
                                                 
27 Borrero Ochoa, Oscar. Avalúos de inmuebles y garantías. Bogotá, Colombia, Biblioteca de la Construcción, 2000. This book is a 
recommended reference for Cuban appraisers. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Álvarez, Alicia. La Habana, CONAS S.A. 2003. 
30 Hotel projects only include in their profit analysis the income from renting rooms and other spaces. They do not include the profits 
from other collateral services. 
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discount rate is applied to the different variables to bring future value to the present (year zero), getting the 
real present value of money (revenues, operation cost, etc.).  
 
As applied in Cuba,31 the Residual Value method does not consider important aspects of land such as:  
• The physical characteristics of the land plot. 
• Functional, aesthetic and environmental quality of the site. 
• The effect of regulations: urban, ecological or other  
• Influence of macroeconomic aspects such as inflation and risk.  
 
The residual value method depends too much on economic variables: its results show similar land prices in 
city areas with different quality of infrastructure and different urban regulations. In some cases the outcome 
has been a negative land value, something impossible given the type of locations usually chosen for foreign 
investments, and in other cases, highly profitable projects give extremely high land prices that differ from 
other estimations obtained with other valuation methods in the same area.  
 
The Replacement Cost method has been applied to existing building stock. It is made by obtaining the 
building value according to certain physical attributes and its functional capacity, adding the cost of present 
day construction technology and materials, and including a depreciation effect.32  
 
In addition to the known limitations of this method, in Cuba there is another limitation as a result of the use 
of compulsory guidelines and regulations for calculating the construction budgets. These project variables 
are not periodically updated, even though prices and tariffs of construction materials and activities vary 
depending on the complexity of the building, architectural value, and year of construction. 
 
The gradual implementation of the various international valuation methods in Havana City over a decade 
has a big financial significance. The table below shows some of the results of land and building valuations 
obtained in the 1998-2003 period. From the 368 projects valued, 272 required the valuation of vacant land 
for new development, and in 96 cases the building improvements only were valued, excluding land area. 
   
Type of assets Buildings 
96 
Land plots 
    272 
Total 
368 
Value of assets 118.5 750.4 868.9 
 Unit: Millions USD.  
 Source: Patrimony Department at MFP, 2004 
 
Table 4.6 Land and building assessment 1998-2003 
 
                                                 
31 In Cuba, this method starts from discretionary variables, and many aspects are not integrated into the analysis due to the 
absence of the financial logics of any market structure. Sometimes the method is applied backwards, setting a land price first and 
finding the residual value inversely. 
32 Álvarez, Alicia. “Construcciones: Valor catastral vs valor de avalúo. Puntos de vista de un perito valuador”, en: 7th Taller de 
Valoración de Activos en Cuba. La Habana, CONAS S.A., Ministerio de Finanzas, 2004. 
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If we consider the prevailing type of projects, the most important is hotels, secondly industrial constructions 
and finally real estate for offices and apartments. These three represent more than 80% of the valuations. . 
Most valuations are concentrated in Havana city, as shown in Annex 8.  
 
All these transactions took place within a formal context where the parties involved are legal persons and all 
the arrangements are conceived according to precise legal and institutional frameworks. The whole process 
has been revised and approved by the National Directorate of Patrimony, the entity responsible for the final 
approval of the land and building values - see Annex 9: Real estate projects and valuations in Havana City. 
The land and building prices derived by these methods are considered the minimum for these investments. 
This means that during the negotiation, the price could be driven up or stay as first assessed.  
 
This process would be more dynamic and financially favourable for both parties if the Cuban appraisers 
were involved in the negotiation process from the beginning, and if they expanded their knowledge about 
land potentials and land markets. The country requires general valuation norms for methods and 
procedures: it should establish better guidelines, concepts, definitions and uniform techniques, in order to 
achieve a consistent valuation of tangible and intangible assets.33  
 
The government entities in Cuba have the power over two impressive monopolies. One is over almost all 
urban and vacant land (see chapter 3), and the second is over fixing the final land price for all 
developments. This latter is a very powerful instrument in the hands of the government. But there are 
serious risks that the changes made in the last few years will be wasted 34 if land valuation is seen only as a 
temporary escape valve for the crisis (1990-2004), if decision makers are not aware of the long term 
economic and financial benefits obtained from appropriate land management, and if their objective is not to 
develop lasting policies but to profitably close each particular negotiation.  
 
Despite all the problems, these transformations have motivated many urban actors to learn more about the 
economic possibilities and other development potentials of land. The efforts made by the Ministry of Finance 
to maintain a debate and to raise the professional level of its officials deserve to be highlighted. In the last 
10 years, there have been eight National Seminars on Land Valuation as well as technical meetings with 
foreign experts from Europe, Latin America and the US to discuss conceptual and practical aspects of land 
and asset valuation.35 These working sessions have made people aware of different international 
experiences, positive and negative, allowing the Cuban experts to appreciate the technical level, complexity 
of analysis, and juridical-legal framework of other practices. 
 
 
6. The institutional framework for land valuation: Entities and appraisers 
 
The land valuation activities which started in 1990 did not have the support of an institutional framework until 
1994, when the State Central Administration was restructured. All responsibilities were then transferred to 
                                                 
33 García Gómez, Antonio. “Consideraciones acerca de la valuación en Cuba”. Ponencia al 3er Taller Nacional de Avalúos. La 
Habana, INTERMAR S.A., 2003. 
34 This refers to the return to centralization since 2004, when the businesses and transactions with foreign companies which 
boomed during the 90s decreased and the government turned to a few partners such as China and Venezuela. 
35 Maceo Sagó, Dulce María. Relatoría del Taller Nacional de Valuación, La Habana Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios, Dirección de 
Patrimonio, 2006. 
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the Directorate of Patrimony of the Ministry of Finance and to the Department of Valuation of Activities, with 
the purpose of establishing guidelines, legal certificates and policies for land, building and other assets. 36 
 
In 1998, the Valuation Department issued the first regulations on asset valuation,37 while in parallel the 
Directorate of Patrimony supervised the process, widening the records of appraisals according to the No. 1 
Resolution of that year. In 2001, the Executive Council of Ministers passed the agreement 3944 authorizing 
the MFP38 to develop assessments, registers and financial evaluations in accordance with the International 
Economic Associations and with the other bodies in which the Cuban government participated, and also to 
issue as many technical arrangements as required to regulate and control the fulfilment of the law.39  
  
The Directorate of Patrimony gradually set up a management team with a department of valuation and two 
groups: Patrimony and Businesses. It also developed norms for the resolutions and instructions presented 
below. At present this Directorate is revising the 1998 and 2002 laws to connect them to the new economic 
and planning logic of the country.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the 1994-2004 period, the main Cuban entities authorized to make land and property valuations were: 
Intermar S.A, Conavana S.A., Rado and Associates S.A., Conás S.A., Bandec (Cuban Bank) and 
Emprosime - see Annex 9. Most of them are anonymous societies working within the government logic. The 
number of appraisers from 2000 to 2006 is listed below: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36 Álvarez, Alicia. La Habana, CONAS S.A. 2003. 
37 In Cuba tangible assets are defined by the Resolution No. 10 of 1997 of the Ministry of Finance. 
38 MFP is Ministry of Finance and Prices. 
39 Vale Jacqueline. Facultad de Arquitectura, La Habana, Cuba, 2002. 
 
 
Resolution No 1, 1998: The MFP will certify the minimum value of the state patrimony assessed by the 
authorized entities, to act as the Cuban contribution to the social capital of the joint venture, together 
with other assets and rights that may be considered necessary in the government interest. 
 
Instruction No 2, 1998: Incorporates the assessments certified by the Directorate of Patrimony into the 
accounting system of the Cuban government entities. 
 
Instruction 3, 1998: The Directorate of Patrimony must create and update the Register of expert 
appraisers and establish their working procedures. Each appraiser will be officially authorized and 
legally registered.  
 
Instruction No 4, 1998: Contains the Basic information about asset valuations and the procedure to 
present them to the Directorate of Patrimony. 
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Years Number of Experts Ministry
INTERMAR  
S.A
CONAVANA 
S.A
RADO y 
Asociados 
S.A
BANDEC CONAS S.A EMPROSIME Other Agencies
2000 146 4 46 16 8 58 6 8 0
2001 156 5 54 17 8 58 6 8 0
2002 126 5 48 12 7 50 4 0 0
2004 138 5 52 14 7 55 4 1 0
2006 116 4 41 18 4 42 4 0 3
List of Cuban Valuation Agencies
 
 
Table 4.7 List of Cuban Valuation Agencies 2000-2006 
 
The Register of Appraisers organizes the general procedure for applications, inscriptions, and approval of 
experts. Among its fundamental objectives, this office appoints and trains future valuers, organizes and 
implements the inscription of valuers, and delivers the legal authorization to operate. Additionally it updates 
the register files and renews the licenses.  
 
The Law of State Patrimony of 2002, chapter V establishes the following functions of the MFP: 
• Financial control of all assets and property rights concerning state patrimony. 
• Determine and control the user rights of state patrimony.  
• Establish links with other official records that inscribe assets and property rights. 
• Supervise and control the actions of all government entities and other institutions which have state 
patrimony. 
 
During the 1994 to 2004 period, the institutional and professional capacities were raised. However there are 
still many limitations: 
 
• Appraisers have not assimilated the dynamics and expectations required of development agents. 
They lack intuition or cannot use it. 
• The results of valuations are supported by mathematical financial models and are disconnected 
from important variables such as the physical and functional characteristics of the site or building, 
the infrastructure capacity, land-use conflicts, etc.  
• In theory, valuers should take account of the impacts of different property rights on financial value, 
but they lack the means to quantify them.  
• Appraisers recognize the effect of cultural and heritage values on the property value, but they 
cannot determine their financial size.40  
• There is incongruence between the initial information and the valuation criteria, with the result that 
the same building or land parcel can produce different values even using the same valuation 
method.  
• Appraisers are generally ignorant of the details of the negotiation process, therefore they do not 
capture elements that could be relevant to the final valuation results.  
• There is lack of systematic feedback between the institutions connected with urban planning and 
valuation; the appraisers therefore underestimate important aspects of urban development such as 
                                                 
40 BANDEC as appraisal entity is implementing- as an experimental study - the assessment of intangible elements connected with 
heritage buildings. 
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infrastructure availability and capacity, urban strategies and future projects, transportation issues, 
limiting their actions to determining the numerical coefficients.  
• The data records are not available to all appraisers, for they are not included and updated in a 
computer network.  
• There is no monitoring of land and building values, of the trends and of deviations between the 
planned and the implemented. There is no follow up of the effectiveness of the calculation 
methods, nor of connections between public and private actors. 
• The separation between the valuation of land and buildings as a financial asset (that is, for foreign 
commercial uses) from the formal methods for valuing housing and other individual property is the 
main cause of the distortions and unawareness about real estate values in the urban context.  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Land and building valuation in Cuba is closely connected with the public policy about how land and buildings 
should be allocated: for what uses and to whom. In Cuba, the land allocation process is centralized by the 
government institutions according to territorial policies and planning mechanisms and according to the 
development strategies throughout the country, and those government institutions determine the valuation 
techniques accordingly. We can distinguish four general stages: 
 
• 1959-1968  Major revolutionary reforms. Changes to the institutional structures and status of 
property, legal frameworks and land and building values. Cancellation of ground rents. Price is no 
longer the coordination mechanism. 
 
• 1968-1989 Consolidation of institutional frameworks. High centralization of resources and 
development projects. Land-use allocation through planning mechanisms. Absence of land price 
differentiation and rigid system for housing valuation. 
 
• 1989-2001 Beginning of the disintegration of the socialist block. Special Period declared as a 
result of the economic crisis. Opening to foreign investment. Authorization of hard currency 
circulation and new institutional and legal frameworks to deal with foreign investment. Dynamic 
learning process about land and building assessment. 
 
• 2001-2009 Return to economic and political centralization. Large support from countries like 
Venezuela and China for large scale social programs. Reduction of foreign investment. 
Adjustments to valuation practices. 
 
Opening the economy in the 90s introduced development possibilities with wide repercussion on politics, 
economic development and urban planning. The impacts served to awaken the minds and to install new 
practices for lasting changes, not easily reversed. One of the most innovative and complex issues has been 
the valuation of land and buildings as a financial asset. Various official methods to do that have been 
created and applied by government institutions. However, the restrictions on these methods when applied to 
privately owned land and buildings have stimulated a wide range of informal valuation methods (see chapter 
5).  
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In the last 15 years, the support of government institutions such as the Ministry of Finance and the 
recognized valuation agencies such as RADO & Associates, has been very important in incorporating 
advanced concepts and experiences into financial instruments and policies for land. 41 These efforts have 
involved different public actors, international and national experts, and the information was publicised 
among all interested entities linked to planning, housing, transportation and environmental aspects. This has 
been the first step towards acknowledging the need for a change. 
 
Since 2004, there has been a clear return to economic and political centralization. Political considerations 
are again ruling over the economy, as the central administration strengthens its role in the control of 
financial resources and state enterprises. These changes have adjusted land and building valuation and 
official transactions, as they modify the decisions taken during the 90s about real estate and tourism 
businesses. The main evidence of this is the elimination, merging or role change of the Cuban valuation 
agencies such as RADO and associates and CONAVANA which no longer make appraisals and are just 
dedicated to accounting consultancies and legal advisory. In spite of that, the present situation has 
overcome certain limitations of the preceding decades. The economic actors have acquired experience from 
the short period of opening to foreign investment, and there is a better understanding of the values and 
development potentials of the city. Professionals have accumulated experience in land valuation, in the 
organization of feasible projects, and they have learned how to choose appropriate partners for 
development.  
 
This book is concerned with the effects which the rules and practices for urban land have on the efficiency 
with which land is used. These effects - including the effects of the valuation methods – are described in 
chapter 7.  
                                                 
41 Since 1995 Cuban assessment entities are working in land policy capacity building with prestigious academic institutions and 
research centers such as the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy, LILP, and other Latin American and European Universities. 
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Chapter 5 
 
La Permuta: the informal housing market 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This chapter is about the permuta, which is a legal instrument created by the Cuban authorities to facilitate 
land and housing exchanges in the absence of an effective formal real estate market. People want housing 
which fits their needs, and they can, in theory, get it by renting or by buying. In chapter 3 we explain the 
limited possibilities for renting in Cuba. In particular, where the state municipal directorates act as the 
landlords, tenants cannot rent to third persons; and where individuals own the dwellings, they are allowed to 
rent certain spaces for accommodation and more recently (since 2011) also for commercial purposes. 
Buying housing is not allowed among private individuals, and it is possible to buy from the state only when 
the owner was directly involved in the production of the house through self-help or as beneficiary of a state 
housing program. It is not possible to buy a transferable and durable right to occupy housing.  
 
Moreover, few families can afford to buy, whether the sale be legal or illegal. There has been a tendency to 
buy, illegally, deteriorated rooms or accessories in the slums of central city areas where the collective 
conventions often escape government controls. An alternative is to buy, legally, spaces of a house – 
rooftops, garages, backyards – in order to build an extension that will be legally independent. But, as we 
shall see below, these actions are often taken in order to buy a way into a permuta exchange.  
 
In practice, the permuta has social and economic significance as being the escape valve for the people in 
their resistance to being standard people in standard housing, 1 as it reflects the increasing demand of 
families for more diversified dwelling options. It has proved to be very effective in incorporating hidden and 
informal valuations and transactions in housing, and monetary interests are increasingly appearing as an 
important feature. Over the last decades, the number of arrangements and agreements between the parties, 
and the complexity of the negotiations, has increased. The transactions within the permuta now even 
incorporate aspects that anticipate future value increments and other benefits and profits from the 
development of home based businesses, or aspects that anticipate positive impacts derived from public 
investments or new urban regulations. 
 
Cuba is not an exception in the issue of informality, but the heterogeneity of its forms and manifestations 
has not been sufficiently studied. The various social policies and efforts undertaken in Cuba since 1959 to 
produce equitable social progress have not inhibited the proliferation of mechanisms to cover the state 
failures in all spheres: in the production and access to consumer goods and services, in shelter, 
infrastructure, employment, health, education and transportation. There is not one sphere of social and 
economic development that is without some informal mechanisms. This chapter is about informal 
mechanisms in housing. 
 
                                                 
1 Pinson Daniel. Architecture et Modernité. Flammarion, 1996. page 83. The massive housing construction, democratic project, 
paradoxically tended to erase the modest population diversity and to increase the gap that separated this sector from other social 
groups.  
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Urban experts from Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru and other Latin American countries, have studied the 
logics and the different dimensions of informality, starting with a thorough critical analysis and the 
deconstruction of existing theories. These studies have mainly covered the fields of economics, sociology, 
and urban planning in the attempt to develop a more comprehensive discourse that may lead to the creation 
of more effective instruments and policies for social and urban development. There are also many relevant 
experiences dealing with land regularization and programs for the upgrading of informal settlements. 
 
It is important to underline that, although most informal contexts become detached from the existing rules or 
regulations, informality is not necessarily illegal. In this research, we mean by ‘informal’ the mechanisms 
and strategies used to perform property exchanges or to use properties in the absence of an official 
environment that would enable them. Here, these mechanisms include unregulated and unrecorded 
economic benefits and informal jobs which are not recognized professionally. As ‘illegal’ we consider the 
actions that, in order to carry out the informal processes, consciously contravene what is stipulated in the 
existing laws and regulations. The corruption of functionaries of administrative entities, the falsification of 
property documents, registers and titles are also illegal procedures. Policy makers often orient their efforts 
towards perfecting the legal contexts and tightening regulations, increasing the difficulty of informal actions. 
As a result, new informal mechanisms appear, evading the legal proceedings that get in the way of solving 
everyday problems. As long as the formal channels do not exist, the informal processes (whether or not they 
are illegal) will continue. With the Law modification of 2011 (see Annex 35) some of the informal aspects, 
such as financial compensations, now appear in the law and are taxed, so issues that were previously just 
informal now become illegal if they are “overlooked” or contravened. 
 
Iinformality is an answer to unreasonable, rigid legal frameworks that impose regulations which are 
detached from reality, and which are ineffective for most individuals. The legal rules enforce excessive 
official procedures, payments, permits and approvals that feed a bureaucracy whose officials often take 
advantage of the restrictions for their own benefit. In such cases, informality becomes the more effective 
solution, acting as an illegal process with legal means, where individuals have more success by violating the 
law than by following it. 
 
The relevance of economic analysis to understanding the internal dynamics of urban informality is widely 
recognized. The studies made of informal employment, such as street vendors, home based productions 
and small scale family businesses, and also the studies of informal expressions of shelter, that some urban 
economists define as a good social barometer, demonstrate the logics of markets.  
 
These previous works have demonstrated the importance of the systematic analysis of informal processes 
in order to deconstruct myths about their functional internal dynamics in comparison to the formal 
frameworks, and in order to show the complexity of informality as a heterogeneous phenomenon which 
connects many actors, variables and factors such as land and property, the inhabitants and their income 
levels, and the accessibility to services and infrastructure. These and other elements shape dynamic 
networks between individuals, families and neighbourhoods, based on cooperation and solidarity but also on 
market competitiveness and entrepreneurial efforts.  
 
The studies have clarified aspects of the inhabitants buying and selling different types of property, of 
residential mobility inside informal neighbourhoods and in the rest of the city, of self-help construction and 
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the provision of small scale services and businesses that complement the dwelling areas. All these 
reflections are indispensable references for the Cuban case, not only for the historical and cultural 
similarities where behaviours and mechanisms are surprisingly similar, but also for providing comprehensive 
and solid conceptual and methodological approaches. 
 
This research is one of the first attempts to study the problem of residential informality in Cuba, departing 
from serious conceptual contributions and experiences developed by urban economists and planners from 
Latin America, Europe and the United States. It makes a modest contribution to complement the existing 
studies about informality.  
 
The study of the permuta is very attractive for urban planners and economists. But the study is also difficult 
for various reasons: the permuta is very vulnerable to legal and institutional changes (see Annex 35 for the 
most recent changes), it has a dual (legal and illegal) connotation, it has a large capacity to mutate and 
camouflage in order to evade restrictions, and there are no trustworthy records of the informal transactions.  
 
 
2. From the market environment to la permuta 
 
The appropriation of space, this remnant of power that people have on the world, is one of the advantages of domestic 
culture and at the same time one of its essential motors. But the appropriation also leads the transition from the basic 
need of shelter to the pleasures it conveys. 
Daniel Pinson.2 
 
Before 1959, Cuba experienced serious distortions in urban development and infrastructure provision. The 
capital city absorbed most development initiatives, while other territories were poorly developed. The reason 
was that most of the investment projects depended upon political and financial interests, the wishes and 
preferences of the governing private and public powers that rarely targeted the needs of the poor. 3 
 
The triumph of the Revolution in 1959 brought new strategies for economic, social and cultural policies. 4 
The implementation of new concepts, methods and instruments with the intention to transform the urban 
structure 5 required a new institutional structure which should favor equity, and to reduce and gradually 
eliminate financial speculation from urban development (see chapter 1). 
 
                                                 
2 Ibid. 
3 Dávalos Fernández, Rodolfo. La nueva Ley General de la Vivienda. La Habana, Editorial de Ciencias Sociales, 1990.  
At the triumph of the Revolution 50 % of the Cuban population lived in precarious dwellings without electricity. Of the existing urban 
housing, 50% had no sanitary networks and the rents absorbed 75% of family income. The rural housing was very poor without the 
minimum dwelling conditions and only 3% was considered in good state of repair.  
4 Fornet, Ambrosio. “La década prodigiosa. Un testimonio personal”. Prólogo a la exhibición: Una Mirada a los sesenta: Antología 
cultural de una década, La Habana, 2005. There was, in that fascinating and subversive turmoil, a liberating impulse that we could 
define as the affirmative carnavalesque: the issue was not to put the world up side down but rather set straight the world that was 
wrong side up. 
5 Oliveras, Rosa y Ricardo Núñez. “Habrá razón que guarde el equilibrio: reflexiones sobre la segregación  urbana en la ciudad 
de La Habana. Políticas, instrumentos y resultados”. Revista Planificación Física –Cuba No 9, La Habana, 2005. 
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This new social project implemented laws and regulations to abolish land and real estate property markets. 6 
The institutional and operational framework for buying and selling land and housing properties, and for land 
rents and taxes in the real estate market, disappeared overnight. When the state declared itself the first 
purchaser, the whole situation changed drastically for landowners and developers, for the state wanted to 
reduce speculation by controlling prices, by avoiding the intermediaries, and by determining a fairer way to 
assign and redistribute the housing stock. In 1968 7 the government fixed the price of four pesos per square 
meter for all land, located in urban or rural areas 8 (see chapter 4). 
 
According to the Cuban Constitution, housing is a given right of every human being, and the government is 
the main actor responsible for its development, production and distribution. Here lies the main advantage - 
but also the main limitation - of the Cuban housing policy: in trying to provide shelter for the majority in a 
subsidized way, the authorities finally end by choosing for the majority and forcing everybody to live under 
the same standards.9 This affects the identity of people and their social diversity, and it creates discomfort 
and disagreement. If, on top of that, the authorities do not have the necessary resources to produce the 
services and infrastructure needed for housing areas, and if instead of improving housing quality they lower 
it in order to produce more, the situation becomes worse instead of better. 
 
Between 1959 and 1994, the government initiated almost all the housing programs as part of this subsidized 
and egalitarian vision. Only from 1994 until 2000, as part of the opening to the outside world to face the 
economic crisis, did it allow the construction and renting of medium and high standard apartments for 
foreigners settling on the island. At all other times, all investments in housing fell under the responsibility of 
the government. But the benefits derived from these developments have not been sufficient to meet the 
demand. In the case of housing in particular, the provision and maintenance have been below the demand 
for new units and the deterioration of the existing stock. It is not only that there is too little housing, but also 
that it is too uniform: people with needs and wishes different from the standard cannot find a house to suit 
them. Moreover, it is very difficult to get a different house through the formal channels, if those needs and 
wishes change. The need for a mechanism for property exchange led to the creation of la permuta.  
 
This instrument arose in order to facilitate the exchange of housing units among inhabitants or families, 
owners or usufruct occupants, with the authorities ensuring the legal control of the process through the 
participation of an urban agent. Among the main reasons to permute were the following: 
 
• Natural family growth, need for a larger home. 
• Improve distance to work, to central areas or to relatives. 
• Improve access to city level services. 
                                                 
6 The trilogy of housing laws established in the first years of the Revolution was: the law of rent low-cut, March of 1959, the law of 
vacant land plots in April, 1959, and the law of Urban Reform in 1960. These three legal instruments completely changed the 
traditional production mechanisms of urban space in Cuba. 
7 1967 and 1968 are years that mark an important change in the history of the Cuban revolution as the moment when all private 
property and small businesses were confiscated by the government. This has been strongly criticized and considered one of the 
biggest mistakes of the revolutionary process. 
8 Between the year 1956 and 1957 the records of land prices in Havana’s central areas were around 200 Cuban pesos, equivalent 
to dollars at that moment.  
9 Pinson, Daniel. Flammarion, 1996. When he talks about the political assumption of mass housing solutions created by the Modern 
Movement he says: Governments created poorer and lower standard than they foresaw. The Cuban government tried in the first 
years of the Revolution to produce a new type of habitat but this dream didn’t last and has ended in an increasing shortage and low 
quality production. 
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• Environmental concerns for health reasons or for recreational purposes. 
• Inability to maintain or repair the housing property.  
 
Practically all types of lodging qualify for a permute: privately owned homes, social housing produced and 
allocated through state agencies, self construction with government credit, and even self construction 
without government support in informal areas.10 The only cases excluded from la permuta are buildings 
listed as basic assets 11 controlled by enterprises and institutions, although this consideration has changed 
in the last decade. Other spaces and surfaces such as rooftops, garages, courtyards, back yards and 
gardens provide additional value in the informal aspects of the exchange.  
 
It is important to notice that financial incentives do not appear among the authorized reasons for housing 
exchange. It is evident that the official criteria do not recognise financial advantages derived from aspects 
such as property size, location, year of construction and quality, architectural design or potential rents. Yet 
there is evidence of hidden undeclared intentions of profit-making behind many apparently simple 
exchanges.  
  
 
3. Chronology of la permuta 
 
The legal regulation of the permuta has changed according to social and economic circumstances. This is 
evident in its legal treatment since its creation, namely in the General Housing Law of 1986, in its first 
modification of 1989, and in its second modification in 2003 (law decree 233). Yet despite all those 
compulsory legal procedures, the permuta is difficult to monitor as it uses multiple mechanisms in parallel 
with the legal processes. The arrangements and agreements between the parties are not transparent for all 
those involved, and there are no contracts or records of the negotiations. That is a risk for the families 
involved, and it is a challenge for this type of study, as it is difficult to obtain reliable data about a process 
recorded only in the minds of those involved. 
 
The way that the permuta takes place has changed. During the 70s and 80s, the process appeared to be 
more transparent and simple, nowadays it is very difficult to reach an agreement without the presence of an 
intermediary. We have identified four main periods with specific characteristics in the history of permuta 
operations: 
                                                 
10 The use of the term marginal neighbourhood is no longer used in Cuba, at least in the official literature, as informal 
neighbourhoods have the same basic services as those established for the whole city such as health, education and culture free of 
charge. They are not socially segregated areas because the inhabitants are integrated into society as workers, engineers, teachers, 
etc. However, from the physical and operational point of view they are very similar to other Latin American informal areas, buildings 
are poorly designed with low quality materials and they lack the necessary infrastructure such as sewerage, roads, parks, and 
water. 
11 Many buildings are controlled by ministries, enterprises or other sectors of economy. They often have empty rooms that they can 
give to their own workers if they don’t have a place to live, to be temporarily adapted for housing. These rooms remain under their 
control and if the beneficiaries change the place of work they have to return the basic asset.  
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5.1 Scheme of Permuta according to different periods 
 
The diagram above shows a first period when permutes essentially served to facilitate dwelling exchange 
with no other interest than to meet the families’ wishes better. There was little evidence of compensation 
during this period. The fact that the revolutionary laws had been recently passed, and the promises of a 
better society, brought out the best in people, and this probably restrained other sorts of arrangements. 
Moreover, between 1959 and 1972, some of the largest housing projects were finished, and the housing 
abandoned by the diaspora was redistributed. In that period, the distinguishing elements for a good permute 
were the property size and the number of bedrooms: to have telephone and gas were additional advantages 
for a good exchange.  
 
Nevertheless, things were not so uncomplicated and undemanding as they might appear. Since the first 
years of the Revolution, there was a demand among certain population sectors, namely those with a more 
urban culture, to live in specific city areas. The land-use plans for the former wealthiest neighborhoods were 
subject to special regulations. The designation of frozen zones in areas abruptly abandoned by their original 
owners is an example of this: the rich who emigrated left large residences surrounded by greenery with high 
environmental, urban and architectural quality. In these areas, permutes required special authorization and 
verification of the families’ characteristics, as most buildings were reserved for state interests, protocol 
houses, embassies and diplomatic residences. 
  
The second period corresponds to the 70s and 80s, decades marked by a new approach in social housing 
production with the boom of large scale standardized projects using prefabricated construction systems. At 
that time, the growing demand for housing led the government to create the social micro-brigades 12 as a 
participatory mechanism to produce more housing. 
 
Although the patterns of the first period persisted, it was common to find negotiations over compensation. 
Individuals unwilling to confess their wish for compensation simply showed resistance to accept the offers, 
waiting to hear more interesting proposals. At first, compensations were not significant and they took place 
                                                 
12 The Social Micro-brigades were promoted by the government as a way of social participation in housing construction. The designs 
and construction materials were provided by the state, but the brigade structure was formed by people from different backgrounds, 
who would receive the same salary for working in construction activities after a short training. 
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when families with less income preferred to lose comfort in exchange for money. Compensation with 
equipment and other valuable assets appeared as an alternative to money transactions. 
 
During this period, the preference for down town and high income areas became more evident. The 
residential areas built by the micro brigades were located in areas distant from most urban services and 
recreational areas, and were without transportation facilities. The buildings had low construction quality and 
unattractive urban environments.  
 
Inter-provincial permutes were also common, as the highest aspiration of many families was moving to the 
capital, even if this implied infringing the law. The permutero who plays the role of real estate agent 
gradually became an indispensable part of the permuta, appearing as the solution for more complex 
swapping, forming chains among five, ten and even more families.  
 
At the beginning of the 90s – the third period - with the economic crisis and the devaluation of the Cuban 
peso, the compensation for the perceived value difference between dwellings included assets and 
equipment rather than money. Private automobiles, color television sets, tape recorders, CD players and 
videocassette players were some of the desired artifacts. The situation changed in 1994 once the 
government legalized the use of the American dollar and the exchange of foreign currency, creating an 
unprecedented demand for compensation in hard currency.  
 
For the first time in the history of the Revolution, the precarious economic situation exacerbated the 
inequalities among population sectors, namely between those with dollars and those without. Many families, 
including the original owners of houses, started to leave their houses to the nouveau riche in exchange for 
hard currency. The revenue sources of the newly rich are family remittances from abroad, profits from small 
private businesses such as paladares and room renting, second salaries from foreign firms, and tips from 
the tourism sector.  
 
The exchange of dwellings in the “special period” 13 after the legalization of the dollar had both negative and 
positive impacts on the various city neighborhoods. On the one hand, the amount of maintenance 
undertaken by the newcomers produces positive externalities for the surroundings, except when the new 
dwellers have little architectural and urban culture, and transform and adapt the buildings without taking into 
account the aesthetic values. However, in the low- income areas that receive no benefit from well-off 
families and little attention from the state, the lack of maintenance and deterioration is evident, reinforcing 
the attitude of the inhabitants to neglect and abandon their dwellings.  
 
During this period, the amount of compensation and the fee of the agents were set as the result of crossed 
negotiations among the actors involved in the permuta. The process becomes complex because of the 
interplay of variables that influence the comparison between the dwellings. For example, the value is no 
longer equivalent to the building cost (replacement cost), and it starts to include other elements such as 
location and accessibility. The actors also gather intelligence and information not only from the informal 
context, but also from formal transactions in the national and international contexts. 
 
                                                 
13 Euphemism to name the economic crisis, which started in the 90s. 
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The last period, from 1994 to 2011, is the most sophisticated. Money has become the key variable for 
valuing properties involved in the permuta. The development of tourism and real estate projects, and the 
favorable entrepreneurial context created by the laws allowing foreign investment, spread information about 
the profitability of different city areas and about the performance of real estate markets in other countries. 
These references reach the Cubans through foreign businessmen, relatives abroad who are interested in 
helping their families to open a business in their home country, and Cubans who work in joint ventures and 
government enterprises in direct relation with foreign negotiations. 14 Other factors - in addition to the 
location, construction area and quality, accessibility, property size and neighborhood prestige - are taken 
into account. These include speculating with future value increments, anticipating benefits and profits from 
the development of home based businesses, or from public investments or new regulations in the area.  
 
It is interesting to see how the informal agents recognize and capture these potentials, while government 
institutions - evidently less motivated - stay indifferent and ignore them. Instead of figuring out ways to 
capture the value generated, both by public and private investment (even if the latter is informal), official 
Cuban institutions spend a lot of time and energy designing new strategies to tighten controls on the 
permuta. The permuteros are clever enough to identify new legal gaps to continue the informal trade with 
housing. Therefore the environment of the permuta in the last few years has become less transparent. 
 
 
4. The legal context of la permuta 
 
The permuta appears in the Cuban Civil Code, Law No. 59, Title V, Article 367. This sets the general rules 
for a contract in which the parties agree to exchange the ownership of one asset for another. The legal 
scope of this instrument is general and flexible enough to assimilate the changing circumstances in Cuba. 
Moreover, over the last decades, this instrument’s legal procedure has been modified many times to adapt it 
to the circumstances. The government response to the irregularities is very restrictive, never acknowledging 
the real causes and their consequences. These are addressed very superficially, not based on a real 
understanding of the problem and not therefore leading to its solution. 
 
The permanent monitoring by the government of the permuta is evident in the legal attention it has given to 
it: first, in the General Housing Law of 1985, later in the 1989 modifications, afterwards in the Law decree 
233 of 2003, and finally in the second modification of the General Law in 2004. In all cases the authorities 
have reacted with restrictive approaches, to limit the irregularities rather than find legal ways to recognize 
them. 
 
Four years after its publication, the 1989 law was modified in order to increase the municipal control 15, but 
this did not directly affect the permute. During the 90s, other regulations and legal procedures were issued 
                                                 
14 They can be State enterprises or joint ventures with foreigners.  
15 The main changes were: 
-Reinforcement of state control over housing issues at municipal level. 
-Cancellation of the owner’s right to evict other occupants. 
-Establishment that most sales must be in favor of the government and only exceptionally among private owners. 
-Authorization of renting of houses or parts of them.  
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and finally in 2003, with the Law Decree 233, came new changes with considerable impact on the 
procedures for permuting: 
 
• Modifications to renting conditions. 
• Prohibition of buy-sell operations among property owners. 
• Establishment that all sales must be in favor of the government according to a legal price. 
• Special regulations for the permuta. 
• Legal sanctions for profit-making and illegal housing transactions. 
 
This law decree is a reaction against the irregularities and illegalities identified during the 1990-2002 period, 
most of them hidden behind permuta operations. It is no coincidence that the number of irregularities 
increased during the 90s, which was the period of economic opening to foreign capital and the development 
of tourism and real estate businesses. Nor is it a coincidence that those restrictions have been applied 
again, now that high centralization policies have been introduced. 
 
In 2004, the General Housing Law was modified again, this time introducing important changes in 18 of its 
articles and adding another article. Important for the permuta is that this modification established punitive 
actions for violating housing regulations and for the development of profitable businesses through the 
permuta. The confirmation of lucrative activities with housing, administrative fraud, violation of procedures, 
falsification of documents and so forth are penalized with the government confiscating the dwelling.  
 
The powers granted to the local authorities by law include the authorization or rejection of the permuta, that 
the Municipal Directorates keep the files and legal documents for future inspection by the National Housing 
Institute, the participation of third parties is not allowed, a certificate to permute is issued when permutes 
take place in a municipality different from the one demanding the permute, and the Housing Provincial 
Director can exceptionally authorize permutes involving more than three households.  
 
In practice some of these procedures are a formality, as not all of them take place according to what is 
legally established. Functionaries act first as observers, later as penalizers because they continue to lack 
the planning and administrative capacities to really tackle the housing problems. In certain domains, 
municipal competences have been transferred to the ministerial level in the attempt to achieve better 
control, but this only widens the distance between the decision makers and the local actors, which is 
equivalent to speaking two different languages without an interpreter.  
 
There are other aspects which limit the right to permute, such as the minimum standards set of 10 square 
meters per person which means that a numerous family cannot permute to a very small dwelling, and the 
rule of a certain degree of homogeneity between the buildings for an authorized exchange. Cases where 
there are humanitarian concerns, property titles involving more than one owner, and buildings located in 
areas with special regulations, need additional approvals from local and national authorities.  
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Types of legally permitted permutas  
 
Notaries Permute: This is the building exchange where the occupants are property owners with documents 
to authenticate the ownership. The arrangements require the presence of a notary. These are mainly 
voluntary without conflicts among the permuters. 
 
Administrative Permute: This takes place when one of the involved dwellings is not personal property and 
the occupier is not the same as the owner. This is the most frequent process, as it involves housing owners, 
state usufruct and state rented dwellings. It is always handled through the Municipal Housing Directorate 
that issues the authorization. 
 
Compulsory Permute: This is a case where not all the owners approve the exchange. It is socially and 
psychologically more complex as it usually involves conflicts of interests and disagreements among family 
members. This type of process has two main aims: 
- Bring co-ownership to single ownership. This change could be demanded by either owner. 
- Allow the housing owner or tenant to separate from the other occupants that do not have the 
 same property rights. This type of permute has different combinations depending on the number of 
 occupants and their legal status. It is frequent among state housing tenants.  
 
Permutes are also classified according to the number of dwellings involved: 
 
- Bilateral: two dwellings involved. 
- Multilateral: More than two or three dwellings. 
 
 
The current regulations establish the reasons for refusing a permuta: 
 
• If it is used for money-making 
• If there are illegal subterfuges. 
• If it causes damages to any of the occupants. 
• If one of the occupants has been declared a permanent tenant by the Board of Illegalities. 
• If one or more occupants have the intention to abandon the country and there are no major 
reasons to approve the exchange. 
 
One of the most important steps in the legal procedure is the determination of the dwelling’s official price. 
This is usually registered in the property documents and it is valid for five years if the building has not been 
enlarged or significantly transformed. There is an official procedure for the dwelling’s appraisal (see chapter 
4): but there is no evidence that the official method influences in any way the informal price which is 
determined. 
 
Problems can arise when the authorities detect evident disproportions between the legal prices of the 
properties being exchanged. Such differences can be the result of differences in external variables such as 
location and urban qualities, and differences in building quality such as the state of repair and floor area. Big 
differences between the dwellings can make housing authorities consider that there are hidden interests, 
and they will disapprove the exchange, unless there are family reasons to justify it. 
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The permute is subject to extra restrictions in special city zones. In such cases the procedures are not the 
responsibility of the municipal level but transferred to the government entities responsible for the area. At 
present there are five such zones: 
 
• Heritage Conservation Zones. 
• Tourism Development Zones. 
• Controlled Zones. 
• Frozen Zones. 
• Special Zones. 
 
The first zone includes city centers and districts of cultural and historical relevance with heritage buildings 
and monuments, such as Old Havana, the waterfront, Chinatown, El Vedado and Miramar neighborhoods. 
These locations already have, or could receive in the future, national and international designations for 
heritage protection, that require special procedures for development and redevelopment, usually managed 
by a special agency or institution. 
 
Among the areas considered significant for tourism development may be the ones listed above, and others 
with special landscape and environmental qualities such as Old Havana, the beaches on Eastern Havana, 
and many other areas of environmental importance in the various provinces of the country. 
 
The controlled and frozen zones are specific urban areas within which there is strict control of the buildings 
and the inhabitants for national security reasons. These areas enclose the residences of Prime Ministers 
and the most important government functionaries, the diplomatic and protocol services, and they have 
special surveillance and circulation restrictions. 
 
The special zones are land reserves for future projects and other protected areas where constructions are 
not permitted, such as airport surroundings, military areas, scientific centers, city level parks, ecological 
reserves, and underground water reserves. These zones are subject to restrictions according to each case, 
and it is important to monitor their development to protect them from inappropriate uses and illegal 
settlements. 
 
The legal and institutional restrictions were opposed by many people, who filed complaints because the 
procedures considerably limited their options, were time consuming and complicated. The government 
finally decided to revise the whole process, and the authorities concluded that the main inconveniencies 
affecting the population were: 
 
• Obligation to accept the visits and interviews with the housing authorities. 
• Excessive bureaucracy and paper work with different institutions. Time consuming and expensive 
procedures that required traveling to different offices. 
• Lack of administrative professional capacity. Limited access to computer technology to improve 
the efficiency of the response.  
• Lack of updated registers and monitoring of the permuta cases.  
• Subjective and dogmatic procedures, vulnerable to misinterpretations.  
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• Unclear distinction between what is legal and what is not, what is right and what is wrong, what is 
politically correct and what is not. 
• Not all municipalities have the same number of applications; this depends on the population 
densities and other social and urban factors. This also affects the efficiency of procedures.  
 
In December 2005, the Cuban Parliament evaluated the new proposal for the permute. This was intended to 
find solutions to overcome the negative aspects previously described: to increase the institutional and 
technical level of housing staff, to speed the paper work, and to discourage illegalities.  
 
The last changes were ready for implementation at the beginning of 2006 and the official newspaper, 
Granma 16 published the following note - the population will find relief at the hour to permute. From 10 
documents, now they only need 7 and three of them will be taken care of by the Municipal Housing 
Directorates. The number of documents that the inhabitants will have to present will depend on the 
building’s characteristics and location. In all cases of administrative permute, the authorities will issue the 
Property Title and will give the necessary instructions for the inscription of the dwelling in the Property 
Register - see Annex 13. The note continued – the parliament recognizes the need for this change, as the 
presentation, analysis and approval periods were very prolonged, as for example the construction permit 
that took approximately 120 working days. 17 
 
In February 2006 the official newspaper ratified once more the above declarations, emphasizing that in all 
cases the inhabitants would have the additional benefit that the municipal authorities would assume free of 
cost the preparation of the report containing the description and the state of repair of the building, as well as 
the price determination. 
 
It is clear that a permuta can be legally recognized, but only under the established rules. Permutas which 
take place under other conditions are illegal. 
 
 
5. Information flows in la permuta 
 
In la permuta, information flows in different ways. Some of these channels have disappeared or have been 
replaced during the economic crisis of the 1990s, but the most effective remain. The following are the most 
recognized:  
 
• The informal permuta Trade Center.  
• The OPINA magazine. 
• Radio programs. 
• The web system of the Housing Provincial Directorate (SePermuta.com) 
• The e-mail and the internet  
• Posters and signs in public areas. 
 
                                                 
16 Granma is the official newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party. It is the most important daily paper of the nation and it reflects 
the political lines of the Cuban government. 
17 “Simplificarán trámites de vivienda para la población”. Periódico Granma, La Habana, Febrero 1 de 2006, pág. 2. 
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The permuta Trade Center takes place in a famous promenade of Old Havana known as the Paseo del 
Prado - see Annex 12. This public space is worthy of being incorporated into a vernacular theatre play! 
People interested in finding permuta possibilities spontaneously meet there with the permuteros, who are 
indispensable for property evaluation and for the organization of the permuta.  
 
This exchange meeting is one of the less sophisticated ways of starting a permuta. In fact what takes place 
there is only the tip of the iceberg of a much more complicated process. The situation there is nevertheless 
a good thermometer for measuring general prices and property values, and it is confusing for beginners 
who, in the first visit, usually require the help of an intermediary to really understand what goes on. 
Nowadays, the largest and most profitable operations take place according to other logics, and the 
negotiations are not carried out in public.  
 
The permutero has to be very versatile and a good communicator: many are women. Although their 
educational backgrounds and professional experience vary considerably, they need to have general 
knowledge about the city neighborhoods, the construction typologies, and building maintenance costs. It is 
very helpful if they have a general idea about public investment in the different city areas. All these 
requirements enable them to act as evaluation experts in real estate. There is evidence that a large number 
of these agents started by searching for offers to improve their own housing conditions. 
 
The Opina magazine became very popular during the 80s, because it had a section for advertising 
permutas classified into supply and demand. The advertisements appeared in little boxes which contained a 
description of the spatial and construction characteristics of the dwellings, as well as infrastructure and 
transportation advantages of the locations. Following the supply box came the demand, which included the 
desired dwelling characteristics, the preferred locations, and the need for highly appreciated utility services 
such as gas and telephone. This tabloid reached such popularity that it became an obligatory reference 
about the conditions of city areas, appreciated not only by people wanting to permute but by all the 
inhabitants. The classified advertisements could also include furniture, electrical equipment and other 
assets.  
 
The information registered in Opina gives evidence of the significant number of inhabitants wishing to 
permute from new development areas to the downtown and high-income residential areas. Although there 
are no references to values or compensations, the last lines usually include a short but very powerful 
sentence saying propositions heard. 
 
The Opina magazine disappeared in the late 80s, just before the economic crisis led to the drastic cut in the 
number and quality of publications. The reasons for interrupting such an effective source of information are 
not clear, and up to the present no other weekly or monthly publication has offered a similar service of 
facilitating housing exchange or providing documentary evidence about those exchanges. 
 
The radio programs have filled the gap left by the Opina. A few broadcasts in Havana city advertise the 
permuta following the same structure as the magazine. This is a good alternative but less effective than 
written announcements, because the programs devote only a few minutes to quickly reading out the 
information, and because they are usually not recorded. 
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In the last few years, the Provincial Housing Directorate have produced an electronic exchange mechanism, 
through which interested people pay a small sum of money to inscribe their wishes in the network. The 
Directorates have developed the WEB sites WWW/ hptt: Sepermuta.Com, revolico.com and others, to 
spread the information and at the same time to monitor the number of interested families. This alternative is 
not available to most families who do not have internet access, and there are not enough places that offer 
this.  
 
In parallel, many intermediaries have established electronic mails exclusively for permuta advertisement, 
where people can get access to housing offers and contacts with permuteros. However, this option is not 
completely reliable as it is updated according to individual interests, forcing people to check other 
information sources. 
 
Finally the information also appears in posters, stickers and flyers spread around central public spaces, 
bus stops, parks, corners and coffee shops. Many persons consider that this method is very effective for 
spreading information, even more than the radio programs. The information is much abbreviated, for 
example, “permute two per one in Vedado neighborhood or Miramar, call Mary to 555 345” , and with no 
attention for graphic design. 
 
Despite all these forms of spreading information, a high proportion of families and individuals frequently 
choose to hire the services of a permutero, as they would rather pay than undergo the bureaucracy of the 
process or lose personal privacy by giving names and phone numbers. 
 
  
6. The formal procedures 
 
The permuta legal framework has substantially changed over the last 15 years. This is evident in the 
changes made to the legal procedures and in the public responses to them. At present, the main actors are 
the municipal authorities, which include functionaries, technical staff – mainly engineers and architects - the 
community architect, the community organizations at local level, the lawyers and notaries, and last but not 
least the inhabitants, the fundamental actors in the process.  
 
In theory, the work of the municipal functionaries is very important, but in reality these people have no 
professional and financial motivation, they simply follow a routine, sometimes apathetic to the inhabitants’ 
problems, not because they are not sensitive to them, but that they realize the impossibility of giving an 
effective response.  
 
On the other hand, the community architect works very close to the people, trying to solve their housing 
problems in a less bureaucratic environment. The community architect provides the technical criteria for the 
construction appraisal and legal arrangements, usually cooperating with the family and taking over other 
procedures. In the last modifications of February 2006, the role of this actor was considerably limited, 
transferring part of the task to the passive and often inefficient municipal functionaries, who are probably 
unwilling to reach the same quantitative and qualitative results. 
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In this way, the permuta is losing an important actor. By limiting the scope of the community architect, more 
of the burden is transferred to the municipal staff, already overwhelmed with papers and controls, and they 
become technical and administrative supervisors of the process. Two situations may result from this. First, 
the decentralized actions of the community architects become centralized, therefore, less dynamic and 
flexible. Second, the informal negotiations and agreements that could take place between the inhabitants 
and the architects will not disappear, but will instead involve the state institution. This will gradually accept 
them, with positive effects (new experiences) and negative effects (irregularities, legal violations). 
 
The process starts when the individual or family interested fills in the permuta application in the Housing 
Municipal Directorate (DMV). This petition is a letter addressed to the housing authorities, and the individual 
explains the motivations to permute. To facilitate the procedure there is a form containing the essential 
information that the interested person has to deliver to the DMV, with 20 pesos in stamps in the case of 
ownership, and 10 pesos in the case of a tenant or usufruct occupant. The applicant must also confirm the 
last housing payment in the case of tenants. If the request involves dwellings from different municipalities, 
the dweller must also provide a certificate from the corresponding Housing Directorate. 
 
The second stage includes various actions that take place in parallel: 
 
• Housing investigation: The authorities check various aspects, such as the official register at the 
Housing Directorate, the type of property title, the spatial characteristics of the dwelling according 
to architectural codes and the state of repair, and the register of occupants in the Address 
Register of the CDR. 18 
 
• Housing appraisal: The owners can present a recent valuation (less than five years old). 
Otherwise the community architect or the designated municipal functionary makes a new 
appraisal to update the legal price. 
 
• Verification of Law Decree 217 (Internal Migration Control): If the dwellings involved are in 
municipalities with high population densities or outside Havana City, the authorities will check with 
the Identity Card Office and with the respective municipalities the number of occupants moving 
from one place to the other.  
 
• Verification of Special Zones: If one of the dwellings is located in one of the areas with special 
regulations, the municipal authorities have to consult the responsible entities for approval. 
 
• Authorization of state entities: If one of the dwellings is a Basic Asset 19 or Housing Lease 20, the 
occupants must present the approval of the dwelling owner. In such cases, the National Housing 
Institute will be responsible for the procedure.  
                                                 
18 Committees for the Defence of the Revolution. Is a community based political organization that looks after the security of the 
inhabitants and is vigilant of their actions as revolutionaries. The CDR board is selected from the oldest members of the community, 
among their functions they have to control the register of addresses and the number of occupants in every dwelling and mobilize the 
community in cases of war and disaster. They give support to all government campaigns for health, education, environmental 
surveillance, among other aspects. The CDR’s are the smallest nucleus at local level. 
19 Basic assets are the dwellings and other buildings under control of state institutions, which give them in temporary usufruct to its 
workers without housing. The occupants may receive the property title after 25 years. 
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If the verifications are positive, there is a third stage where the municipal board has a meeting to review the 
permuta demand and to decide if the papers are ready for the Housing Director.  
 
In the fourth stage, the Director produces the legal document approving or rejecting the permuta. There are 
four possibilities: 
 
• Approval of a Notaries Permute. 
• Approval of an Administrative Permute. 
• Approval of a Compulsory Permute. 
• Disapproval of the Permute. 
 
In the fifth stage, the dwellers - in the case of an administrative permute - will need a notary to deal with the 
legalities of the process. With the legal certificate, they go to the Property Register of the Ministry of Justice. 
The permute implementation – the actual exchange - can take place after legal registration, and after the 
final informal arrangements among the actors - see Annex 10.  
 
The table below gives the number of permutas in the different municipalities (the locations where the 
permuta originates) of Havana city from 2004 to 2006.  
                                                                                                                                                 
20 This case is similar to the Basic asset but in this case the dwellings are built and allocated by the institutions for their workers and 
they are not given in ownership. 
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Source: Legal Department, Provincial Housing Directorate, Provincial Administration Council of Havana city. 
 
Table 5.1 Permutas in Havana City per Municipality and year 
 
A few comments can be made about these statistics. First, the number of permutas does not reflect the 
number of dwellings involved, as a permute can range from a simple exchange of two dwellings to the 
multiple exchange (that according to the legislation of 2004 should not be more than three). The authorities 
estimate an average of 2.6 dwellings per permute: this means that every year around 15 thousand units 
would be involved. If we consider that the existing housing stock of Havana is over 650 thousand units, the 
estimated number of dwellings involved in permuta actions per year represents nearly 3 % of the total stock. 
 
Secondly, the numbers show that five municipalities have more than 50% of the permuta operations. Four of 
them are those with higher population densities and the biggest urban problems: some parts of these 
municipalities are under special regulations such as Old Havana and El Cerro. The fifth municipality is Plaza 
de la Revolución, which is among the best urban locations for its centrality, accessibility and functional 
facilities. 
 
 
 
 Swap Operations in Havana City 
Playa 249 352 223 824 59,507 
Plaza 878 410 273 1,561 53,615 
Información Ciudad de la Habana. 870 658 413 1,941 62,069 
Habana Vieja 600 516 255 1,371 31,509 
Regla 107 117 80 304 13,986 
Habana del Este 352 412 197 961 53,862 
Guanabacoa 230 242 147 619 34,785 
San Miguel del Padrón 235 215 129 579 49,002 
10 de Octubre 573 754 369 1,696 70,648 
Cerro 661 452 244 1,357 42,380 
Marianao 208 305 113 626 42,417 
La lisa 195 212 98 505 40,083 
Boyeros 244 244 171 659 38,011 
Arroyo Naranjo 236 267 108 611 62,585 
Cotorro 162 194 79 435 22,136 
Swap approval by Provincial Housing Direction 51 51 12 114 
TOTAL 5,851 5,401 2,911 14,163 676,595 
Years 
Existing Housing  
Stock (Marz/06) Municipalities 2004 2005 2006 (june) Total 
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7. The informal procedures  
 
As well as the formal processes which accompany the legal side of the permute (see above), there are often 
informal processes. These can have two functions: they serve to make the formal processes work better, 
and if the permuta is illegal, they nevertheless help it to take place. In Cuba there is general awareness that 
the permuta is a screen for operations that happen outside the established legal frameworks. Precisely this 
circumstance makes it so difficult to obtain information from the actors involved, who usually deny having 
knowledge about any illegal proceedings. An old proverb says there are none so blind as those who will not 
see. This is true in the case of Cuban institutions that either ignore, or opportunistically tolerate, these 
irregularities, not having at hand the right mechanisms to deal with them or the power to change things. The 
government reaction in most cases is more prohibition. 
 
Getting good information about the informal side of the permuta is not easy. It requires dealing with very 
fragmented and dispersed information and with a culture that erases the facts of every case, preserving only 
the logics and contacts that could be useful for the following operation. To penetrate the intringulis where 
the actors discuss and agree over financial aspects - values and prices – it is essential to contact them 
directly. For this research, this was done in three ways. 21 
 
• Identify key informers at the different stages of the process 
• Enter the informal market with an interesting offer and observe the possible reactions 
• Identify and follow up different cases to observe the process from beginning to end and to analyze 
the differences and regularities.  
 
During the research, the three ways proved very useful for collecting data and the opinions of the agents, 
from both formal and informal contexts. The key informers were located using family and friends, based on 
mutual trust and respect. They were most helpful in gathering the necessary information about financial 
arrangements and valuation mechanisms. 
 
Following and recording the history of permuta processes allowed us to elaborate both the formal and 
informal flows, and provided interesting case studies of the different stages described earlier in this chapter. 
The idea of actively offering housing in the market, using the properties of family and friends, was very 
useful for learning about the valuation, negotiation and price setting. 
 
Those three steps were supplemented by making contact with the formal permuta agents: municipal 
functionaries, architects and lawyers. But these contacts were very unproductive and almost discouraging. 
They were extremely cautious about providing any relevant information. The conversations developed 
around general topics, mainly about the social value of the service they provide to families and individuals, 
and the formal procedures applicable to all cases. Only after several meetings were we able to discuss 
important aspects of the permuta informal process, namely its financial scope and the ways in which values 
                                                 
21 It has not been easy to come up with the information for this research. The issue of informality is very vulnerable to punitive 
actions by government institutions, however, it is of academic interest to analyze and extract conclusions from this diverse 
processes taking place in our society. The analysis tries to respect the discretion demanded by the informers, and the data is 
summarized in tables and statistics that will not harm honest people who have been willing to collaborate with this investigation. 
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and compensations among the participants were determined. After many more meetings, we were finally 
able to obtain precise information about the informal mechanisms activated during the process. 
 
The actors in the informal process 
 
Various actors participate in permutas. Their roles are more or less crucial, depending on the strategy for 
accessing the residential market. At present, the most important are the families and individuals wishing to 
permute (the permutantes), the agents or permuta runners (the permuteros), and the legal advisor. These 
actors have different ways of exchanging information between themselves and with other actors, but in 
general the permutero is the central coordinator.  
 
• The permutantes: they are individuals or families who begin a permuta process driven by the 
need to change their housing situation. They can be owners, tenants or usufruct occupants of a 
government dwelling. In most cases, the responsibility lies with the head of the family (who is not 
necessarily the owner of the dwelling). 
 
To enter the permuta it is necessary to have at least one of the following, or the combination of them: 
 
• Financial resources (money). 
• A housing property. 
• A land property. 
 
The process is less complicated if from the very beginning the family or individual has tangible assets, that 
is, a room, one apartment in a building or an individual home. Due to the great limitations of the construction 
industry and infrastructure, it is better to have a building than land available for building. Most of the cases 
recorded involve transactions with building properties and in only a few cases is land acquired to build on 
later.  
 
In a permuta, money is always paid, not necessarily for something directly associated with the properties 
involved in the exchange. This is often a payment for ad hoc legal or illegal services necessary to avoid 
bureaucracy, to receive more information, to complete the necessary documents, to avoid technical 
obstacles, or even to shorten a queue. At certain moments, many formalities take place in parallel, formal 
activities overlapping with informal ones. During the overlapping, public functionaries interact with informal 
actors producing interesting negotiations for mutual benefit. 
 
• The permutero: This is an agent or runner hired by the permutante to manage the whole permuta 
process, from finding a housing according to his client’s preferences, to closing the permuta deal. 
In general, this actor is an expert in housing exchange and other aspects related to conditions in 
the city. Not all have the best market knowledge, hiring the best is more expensive and the best 
usually work in the most complex operations. Although they usually work alone – obviously to 
maximize the profits - they could decide to work in a team, if the operation were very complicated.  
 
The permuta agent or permutero needs to understand the objective – not always openly declared - of the 
transaction. He must also have a guarantee of the legal and financial solidity of the scheme, although this is 
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easily recognized after the permutero has gained experience. Knowledge of these variables, mainly the 
financial one, is an indispensable requirement for the permutero to close a good transaction and for his 
personal benefit.  
 
Consciously or not, the permuteros sometimes anticipate other factors which could give value to a house, 
for instance family intentions of developing home-based activities or of renting part of the property. Equally, 
if the family admits receiving remittances from other members abroad, it is sure to get better offers both in 
location and building quality, but it is probable that the permutero demand a higher percentage for his 
services. 
 
If during the negotiation, the participation of a foreigner or the financial help of friends living abroad becomes 
evident, the operation immediately becomes more costly. Foreigners are often willing to provide capital 
which will be repaid later with the profits from room renting. There are cases when foreigners even take the 
risk of buying a property, although this is forbidden: according to the existing regulations, foreigners may 
only rent property, and for that they need a residence permit. However, they can reach an agreement with a 
Cuban friend who in all legal procedures will appear as the property owner.  
 
To a permutero, good business is determined not only by the amount of money gained in an operation: 
although this is the main indicator of success. An operation can also provide knowledge about other 
properties, about the exchange circuits, and contacts with state institutions and within informal networks. 
Conscious of the vulnerability of the informal mechanisms, one of the most important aspects is the 
permanent updating of prices and business strategies. The most versatile and capable agents develop their 
own vision of the business and study the legal and financial contexts, looking for the cracks that will allow 
them to penetrate the legal world.  
 
If the permuta involves more than three dwellings, it is often necessary to subdivide it to make it legal. In 
such cases it is common that each family hire a permutero. These will have to negotiate and make alliances 
to achieve their common goal, but each will secure his profits individually, defending the decision space and 
sharing only part of the information.  
 
The process of reaching an agreement between the different families can be very complicated, as every 
party loses and wins something and there are conflicts of interest among them. Here the permuteros make 
the best of their abilities to reach an agreement, to satisfy individual and shared goals.  
 
• The legal advisor: This is usually a lawyer, hired by the permutero as part of his team, or by the 
permutante, if he wants to secure a second opinion so as to have a legal assessment about every 
step in parallel to the permutero actions. This actor is sometimes the brain of the operation, as he 
determines the strategic movements to avoid legal complications with the state institutions. It is 
also common to find such advisors in a double role as formal and informal actors if they work or 
used to work in the Housing Directorates, other state institutions connected with housing, or 
property registers.  
 
To have a good insight into the permuta actors it is important to understand their different strategies, and it 
is essential to consider the positive and negative aspect of the process. For example, the state functionaries 
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– whether they want it or not- learn about the transactions and compensations negotiated among the 
informal actors, and gradually get accustomed to an irregular way of doing things. Another issue is the 
formation of incipient elites that gain economic power by controlling certain clusters of residential use. At the 
other extreme, there are growing social differences between sectors of the population: all sectors have the 
same rights to better living standards, but some have no access to that, having neither the money nor the 
talent for this sort of business.  
 
La permuta informal process 
 
In general, the informal process starts earlier than the legal procedure, as the first step taken by an 
individual or family wishing to permute is to contact a permutero to handle the whole process. The 
contribution from the permutero depends on the type and complexity of the permuta.  
 
The simplest is an exchange between two dwellings without compensation. Here the permutero only helps 
to find the offers and will probably charge a flat rate, usually 200 CUC, for organizing the exchange. If there 
is need for a permuta chain including more than two dwellings, and if there are financial compensations, 
then the agent will charge a higher rate: a percentage of the final price or the equivalent in equipment, art, 
furniture, a car, a land parcel or an apartment. In most cases it is approximately 10 % of the dwelling price 
agreed with the client.  
 
The permutero usually wants to negotiate an additional payment of between 0.5 and 1% of the potential 
value with the other participant(s) in the negotiation, if they have not hired their own agent, increasing his 
earnings in a double value capture act. The client who contacted him first is probably unaware of this, which 
could be interpreted as lack of integrity, affecting the confidence and trust between client and agent.  
 
After the contact with the permutero comes the building appraisal according to the variables established in 
the informal residential sector and deviating from the comparative method previously mentioned (chapter 
4). The interviews with the key informers showed that, after the appraisal and the agreement on the buying-
selling, it becomes very difficult to lower the price, because the client has that revenue expectation. The 
determined value becomes an essential point of departure for the negotiations and the compensations 
between the parties. After the final price is agreed, it is almost impossible to lower or raise the value of the 
closed transaction.  
 
The third step is the presentation of offers to the client(s): this goes on until the parties reach an 
agreement. This is a very dynamic negotiation process, where the permutero activates all his contacts and 
the informal networks of information in order to close the transaction as soon as possible. The process 
usually requires different negotiation rounds, meetings with the different parties and their agents. The 
number of participants depends on the permuta chain set up by the permutero, who needs a coherent 
strategy to get the final approval for the legal part. 
 
After selection of the final offer, the process is linked into the formal mechanism, although the informal 
process has to continue during the presentation to the municipal authorities: the permutero provides legal 
assessment and speeds the paper work through the different stages in the formal process (see above). 
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If the operation is finally approved, the permutero and his client (usually the one who hired his services in 
the first place) proceed to close the deal in a way which depends on the type of agreement: 
• If the client is acquiring a better dwelling than he originally had, he will pay the value difference to 
the other party and move to that building. 
• If the client is giving away a better property in order to receive money, he will be paid the difference 
in value and move to that building. 
• The client will pay the agreed 10 % for the permutero’s services, or any value equivalent. 
• The permutero will demand from the other participants any other benefits negotiated informally 
within the informal process. This depends very much on the negotiation skills and the risks he is 
willing to take. 
 
The money compensations are paid in cash. In case the arrangement is to pay in equipment or the other 
assets mentioned before, these will be delivered to the new house or left in place if the person or family 
receiving them is moving to it. In the case of other types of property, for example a car, a free land plot or a 
second house in another area, the process will require other legal procedures to complete the deal, as that 
property must be reassigned - see Annex 11. 
 
 
8. Some informal mechanisms 
 
There is a variety of informal mechanisms activated through the permuta, and the choice depends on legal 
and economic factors. Some of these mechanisms have survived unchanged for a long time, while others 
have adopted different outer forms, keeping the essential objectives. Other mechanisms have completely 
disappeared after being detected and legally restrained by the housing authorities. 
 
The most important mechanisms identified during this research are listed below. It is important to distinguish 
between those which are designed to accomplish the housing transactions or give access to the preferred 
house, and those which are general mechanisms which can be activated during the process. 
 
The sputnik 22 
 
As mentioned previously, to start a permuta it is very important to own a building – an individual house, an 
apartment, a room - but due to the huge housing deficit, this is not always possible. However there is an 
informal strategy by which the individual wishing to permute provides evidence through the necessary legal 
documents that he is the owner of a property. This mechanism is called a sputnik and is nothing else than 
the presentation of a property title that corresponds to a virtual land or building, a ghost asset which exists 
only on paper. There are two versions of sputnik: 
 
Sputnik 1: This builds upon the information provided by the municipalities about buildings declared 
unfit for habitation. After this designation, these buildings are emptied and sealed while waiting for 
demolition. However, these constructions often have  enough sound structural elements to be 
considered as buildings and not ruins. This means that people could still inhabit them if they wished to 
                                                 
22 Russian artificial satellite launched in October 1957 that turned around the planet Earth 
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ignore the risk of dying under an imminent collapse. This is a good opportunity to make minimum 
repairs and fabricate the official ownership documents in order to demand an in situ inspection by the 
housing functionaries, so that they will change the designation from inhabitable to habitable. With the 
results of the technical inspection and the change of designation, the person can go to the bank and 
demand a purchase contract according to the articles 53 and 54 of the Law of Housing. With this 
contract, the individual returns to the Municipal Housing Directorate and inscribes the building in the 
Housing Register. This building can then be part of a permuta, rented or sold. 
 
Sputnik 2: After selecting the address of an empty land plot, the permutero – sometimes with the help 
of a housing functionary - assigns a postal number according to the territorial cadastre. Then, it is 
necessary to have a resolution stating that there is a dwelling located on the created address. This 
requires the help of a lawyer of the Housing Directorate or a notary. After acquiring the legal document, 
used to create false evidence, the interested person organizes a permuta to buy a real property. 
Although the permuta will reflect the exchange of two dwellings, only one really exists. 
 
These strategies are not applied any longer, as a result of various resolutions and control mechanisms. In 
the last 5 years, the housing authorities have organized inspections to detect irregularities with ownership 
and legal documents. The cases where they have detected Sputniks have been penalized, retracting the 
ownership and changing the occupants to the category of tenants, paying rent to the state. After the legal 
modifications of 2006, the penalizations have more drastic consequences, entailing state confiscation of the 
dwelling for other municipal uses. The evicted occupants will receive another dwelling but very modest and 
probably on the periphery. 
 
The black hole 
 
This mechanism is based on what is called the notary protocol registry holes, that give the opportunity to 
leave legal registers vacant so as to be filled in the future. This is a cover up mechanism that takes 
advantage of the daily registers that notaries make for different legal acts – such as permutes – and which 
refer to an original documentation preserved in a master register. The trick is to register as legal a document 
that is different from the original. In this way, it is possible to demonstrate the legality of an action in the 
past, in such a way that will allow dwellings with a solid legal status to be incorporated into the permuta 
transaction. The replacement of property titles, the presentation of the gift of a dwelling, or any other 
testimony in favor of specific individuals, are some of the recurring situations where this mechanism proves 
to be helpful. 
 
This modality is active and probably in process of perfection. The small legal modifications are difficult to 
trace, especially in the present condition of legal registers that are not even stored in computers. An alliance 
with the notary is the essential element, as that is the only person capable of entering the daily registers, 
knowing which registers have been modified and where are the holes that allow information to be entered. 
 
The acquisition for future selling 
 
This mechanism has two alternatives for achieving the final objective of getting the desired dwelling, and it 
has one or more stages. It appears as: 
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• A strategy of the agents, when they use the information which they manage for different clients 
in order to get benefit for themselves, basically to have access to better housing.  
 
• The acquisition of rooms, accessories, or dwellings, through donations, marriage 
arrangements or living together, as a bridge to the final objective, which is the desired home. 
This is a way to minimize the risks of permuta disapproval and to prevent the authorities from 
discovering a buying-selling intention. The interested parties go through the transitional stages 
in order to acquire a real asset, so as to legally obtain the permuta authorization and then 
move on to the organization of the informal process.  
 
Permuteros’ networks 
 
The most efficient and experienced permuteros with an aptitude for scheming and dealing, are integrated 
into information networks and are well connected with other agents and government functionaries. In this 
way, a large number of lawyers, architects, public functionaries and other staff of public institutions 
participate directly or indirectly in the informal mechanisms.  
 
The information networks are connected with information channels explained in a previous section, but only 
the general aspects are known publicly. The information is fragmented to avoid risks with the inspectors and 
other legal authorities. The most important aspects of the information are restricted to the client and the 
permutero. The permuteros with more financial autonomy and management capacity hire other runners to 
keep them updated about street rumors, radio programs and other offers that could enrich the permuta 
records.  
 
At present, the information networks are the only evidence of systematization and monitoring of the informal 
permuta. The network has the potential to become a well organized information system for structuring the 
interconnections between the wide range of combinations and interests which arise from the permuta 
process. 
 
The permuta chains 
 
This mechanism is very common, as it is difficult to find the right permuta in a simple exchange. The chains 
are financially very advantageous for the permutero, as the more complex situations are the most profitable, 
although they are also riskier and complicated, requiring the best skills.  
 
Even although government regulations have considerably limited the number of dwellings in one permuta, 
and although any exchange involving more than three dwellings requires special authorization of the 
Provincial Housing Director, there is evidence of new inventions to organize multiple exchanges. The more 
restrictive the institutional context gets, the more sophisticated the informal response. 
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From the interviews, there is evidence of the pride and prestige of certain permuteros who have successfully 
organized and implemented multiple permutas of more than 18 dwellings in just one operation 23. Under the 
new circumstances (restricted to three dwellings), they have been forced to subdivide the large operations 
into different stages, where permutas take place simultaneously in duos and trios, depending on the 
complexity of the exchange. After the first stage, the agents proceed to organize a second round of 
exchanges until the final movement is accomplished. This requires much organization and coherence on the 
part of the agents, who must generate a climate of security and self assurance among the different 
participants. In this mechanism, time is the most important variable, as the bureaucratic delays create 
uncertainty and could discourage the participants, who could even decide to abandon the permuta, thus 
dismantling the whole operation. 
 
 
9. Setting values and prices 
 
In the last years, many factors have contributed to increasing the price of buildings in the permuta: 
 
• The building might be located in one of the valuable city areas with a highly desired urban 
environment. There is a high demand for areas such as Miramar, the former Country Club, El 
Vedado and New Vedado neighborhoods. 24  
• The low quality and lack of diversity of the new housing (which increases the demand for existing 
housing). 
• The small amount of housing produced by the government and the difficulties of getting a new 
house outside this framework. 
• The growing housing demand in the face of the growing deficit and the quick deterioration of the 
existing stock. 
• The lack of public transport, which makes it difficult and expensive to live in the peripheral areas 
where most of the 70s and 80s housing complexes are, far from the center and from working and 
recreation areas. 
• The existence of only one mechanism, the permuta, to facilitate the housing exchange. 
• The increasing willingness of people to invest in order to obtain the desired home. 
• The growing interest of certain social sectors – those with higher incomes - to move to the best 
city areas. 
• The increase in the contribution demanded by the intermediaries and permuta agents for their 
services – often settled as a percentage of the transaction. 
• The improvement of buildings due to recent investments. The concept of a ‘shoppinesque’ 
dwelling means a house remodeled with materials and equipment sold in the dollar stores known 
as the shoppings. 25 
• The improvement of areas due to recent infrastructure investment. 
                                                 
23During the 80s appeared the comedy “La Permuta” which is a classic of the Cuban filming industry. It reflects a multiple permuta of 
more than 10 families, and it is a good reflection of the Cuban context during this decade.  
24 Cluster of hotels, office buildings, commerce, housing for foreigners located in certain city areas, mostly near the waterfront 
towards the west.  
25 La chopin is a Cuban term for the English word shopping – shopping malls or shopping centers. It is a direct allusion to the dollar 
shops that were open to the Cubans after the authorization of holding dollars where people can buy assets that are not available in 
the Cuban pesos stores or in the subsidized basic basket. 
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Any Cuban citizen can, grosso modo, estimate the location values in the city and, to a lesser extent, the 
values of individual properties. For instance, a room with bathroom in a building of compact typology located 
in a densely populated area with deteriorated built environment, such as Central Havana Municipality, costs 
around 3000 convertible pesos (CUC). A similar room, in a central residential neighborhood such as El 
Vedado, surrounded by public spaces and with good environmental conditions, would cost more than 6000 
CUC. An apartment between 80 and 100 m2 in a similar neighborhood would be between 20 thousand and 
30 thousand CUC. The same residence with gardens, garage, and big living spaces is between 100 and 
200 thousand CUC, as in addition to the construction area, there are additional architectural, urban and 
environmental values. 
 
The knowledge of the permutero about the value of properties is essential for determining and modifying the 
values of land, dwellings, or parts of the dwelling. To come up with the value of a property, the permutero 
also considers the advantage of having a client wanting to sell or exchange his property, and he will wisely 
use this opportunity to guide the actors into a profitable negotiation based on his experience of the informal 
residential market.  
  
The growing number and complexity of residential exchanges in the last three decades has helped to 
perfect a system to set the prices. The method applied is comparison with prices established in previous 
transactions with similar properties 26 (the comparative method, see chapter 4). The search for the most 
recent references, and those which are most similar to the permuta in process, is the way in which the 
property value is established. Adjusting the prices, after determining the approximate price range, depends 
on the influence of various factors, such as the clients’ payment capacity, their needs and aspirations, the 
legal feasibility of the operation, the tangible and intangible attributes of the housing offered, and the 
location in the city. 
 
The absence of systematic monitoring of these variables makes it difficult to predict the correct value. 
However, based on the surveys and interviews, it is possible to give an idea of the relation between the 
house prices in certain locations of Havana city.  
 
  Price per dwelling 
City neighborhoods Location Year 1995 Year 2000 Year 2006 
Panamerican Villa (apartment 
buildings) 
Periphery. East Havana. 
Waterfront area. 
5000.0 12000.0 16000.0 
Alamar (micro-brigade apartment 
buildings) 
Periphery. East Havana. 
Waterfront area. 
 6000.0 8000.0 
Central Havana (room and toilet) Central area. Compact 
typology. High density. 
1200.0 2300.0 3000.0 
El Vedado (80 m2 apartment) Central area. Residential 
neighborhood with good urban 
infrastructure. 
16 000.0 20 000.0 25 000.0 
 
Table 5.2 Informal Prices per dwelling according to Havana locations 
                                                 
26 A similar procedure is explained by Needham in his book Urban land and property markets in The Netherlands when he refers to 
the method to set housing prices in a market environment.  
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The table shows that in both central and peripheral areas of Havana, housing prices have been growing 
steadily in the last years. However, this general picture is not applicable to the whole neighborhood, as in 
certain areas prices may be decreasing. Among the causes of that decrease are the insertion of new 
buildings with negative urban impact – due to poor design, low construction quality, and increase of 
population densities - the vulnerability of certain waterfront sections to flooding during hurricane seasons, 
neighborhoods being surrounded by informal settlers, areas close to industrial or construction sites which 
generate noise, traffic and air pollution.  
 
Another set of important factors is the quality of the dwelling itself.  
 
Criteria       Effect on Price    
       +++    ++   + 
Construction typology                                                       X     
(Apartment, room, single home)  
Construction system                     X  
(prefabricated, traditional, masonry, wood) 
Construction year                                     X 
State of Repair                    X  
Construction area       X 
Additional land         X 
Architectural design quality       X 
Location         X 
Urban infrastructure      X 
Source: Interviews with permuta experts and community architects. 
+++   High effect 
++ Medium effect 
+ Low effect 
 
Table 5.3 Price effects according to dwelling characteristics 
 
Properties in the high-income areas, and even high quality buildings, can decrease in price because of 
technical obsolescence and lack of adequate infrastructure. For example, horizontal properties (flats) and 
large apartments in the 1950s high-rise buildings in Havana, that used to be examples of residential 
exclusiveness (vertical segregation) are depreciated by the lack of running water and out-of-order elevators, 
garbage chutes and other services. The 20 stories high buildings of the 70s (a sort of a vertical slum) 
assembled with prefabricated technologies from former socialist countries have serious problems with 
water, lighting in public areas and there are no spare parts to repair the elevators. Nobody in their right mind 
would permute to such buildings, even if the location is central, the architecture magnificent, and the views 
from the top floor breathtaking. 
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10. Conclusions 
 
The permuta as a way of exchanging housing is mainly a consequence of two sets of problems:  
 
One is the failure of the housing policies of the government, in its role of main producer, provider and 
manager: 
• Housing constructed without the necessary infrastructure 
• Over-dimensioned projects left unfinished 
• Lack of institutional and administrative capacity for organizing the construction and managing the 
completed housing 
• Poor coordination between national, provincial and local levels 
• Limited supply of construction materials versus high demand from all sectors 
• Excessive centralization in the allocation of financial and material resources. 
• Deficient financial and control systems during the investment process. 
• Poor monitoring of finished projects. 
• Very limited local autonomy. 
• Restrictive regulatory environments. 
 
The other is the government’s reluctance to accept certain realities of social and economic development: 
• Top-level authorities not well informed of what happens at the grassroots level, or they 
underestimate the forces of informality. 
• The government uses surveys to control and restrict rather than find solutions for the problems. 
• Ideological and political principles in favor of socialism do not take account of, or disapprove of, 
individual aspirations for a higher quality of life, a better home, and other domestic needs. 
• The housing production has concentrated on quantity and has paid too little attention to quality. 
• Projects do not answer to the diversity of population needs and tastes. 
 
The illegal scope of la permuta is a public secret. To understand and analyze this process, it is necessary to 
start with its formal side - the housing legal and institutional contexts - and from there to identify the niches 
where informality penetrates. The permuta has filled the gap left by the non-existent official residential 
market. It has allowed housing to be redistributed according to supply and demand. The actors involved 
have demonstrated a large capacity to develop instruments and strategies and have shown unsuspected 
abilities for developing complex negotiation and coordination processes, for monitoring the land and 
property values in the city, and for finding the breaches in the tight legal procedures. 
 
Operating in this informal sector is not without its costs. There are the transaction costs, both in terms of the 
fees paid to the permuteros and in terms of the time and effort expended by the permutantes. Whether 
those transaction costs are higher or lower than in the formal market for housing exchanges cannot be 
answered, as there is no formal market. The other type of cost is the risk that the illegality (which often, but 
not necessarily, accompanies the informal transaction) will be discovered. The legal sanctions are described 
in Annex 36. The considerations made by the parties – how they balance the costs and the benefits – are 
illustrated below. 
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5.2 Scheme of costs and benefits between informal and formal environments 
 
The informal operations concealed behind the permuta are in effect markets in land and housing, organized 
moreover less arbitrarily than the formal markets in Cuba. The informal operations have the characteristics 
of markets, such as financial mechanisms, negotiations, the selection of preferences, the distinction and 
valuation of variables such as location, distance, and accessibility, and the limits imposed by the income 
capacity of families. The permuta allows us to study the real payment capacity of the families and how they 
trade off costs and benefits, it allows economic variables to be compared with social and cultural aspects in 
the selection of the location, and it allows the importance of physical and construction variables in the 
selection of the dwelling to be valued. Permuta gives a picture of the variables that affect the value of 
different neighborhoods, and that picture can help rethink the housing development in our country. More of 
this analysis will be included in chapter 6. 
 
The permuta shows signs of market speculation, but the motives are nevertheless more social than 
financial, consisting of the wish for a better location, to shorten the distance to work, to increase the living 
area or the dwelling amenities. However, the situation is growing in complexity as the actors discover the 
economic advantages of larger negotiations, anticipating and capturing values, concealing opportune 
information, and exploiting financial advantages. There are some examples where the permuta actors move 
to large properties, anticipating possible rule changes and planning future sales or the development of 
profitable uses. 
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The government institutions should not continue to underestimate the relevance of these informal strategies. 
Under proper guidance, many useful lessons of the permuta practice could be introduced into the 
administrative procedures to make them more flexible, and could be used to improve the housing policies. 
Confronting the reality would require an important shift in the political and economic conception of housing 
and the recognition of negative trends in the segregation patterns in the city.  
 
We can express these conclusions using the terms and ideas introduced in chapter 2. Namely that the 
permuta allows existing housing to be used more efficiently than when that housing is allocated through the 
formal mechanisms. For efficiency is increased when consumption goods (in this case, housing) are re-
allocated in such a way that the satisfaction of the consumers increases. The fact that, under the permuta, 
all transactions are completely voluntary indicates that all the households involved get more satisfaction 
from their housing than before the permuta. In other words, the housing is being used more efficiently. In 
chapter 2 we said: there is an improvement if efficiency increases without harm to other social and political 
goals. In this case, the goal that might be harmed by the permuta is the wish to avoid social segregation 
between neighborhoods. We return to this point in the final chapter.   
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Chapter 6 
 
Econometric analysis of urban property transactions in Havana  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The research presented in this chapter allows me to corroborate and demonstrate my judgment about urban 
transactions in Havana with more credible and consistent information. It is one thing to observe a process, and 
another to test whether the thinking was accurate or not. The determination of the price per square meter of 
urban land and buildings, that is quite a routine in other places, is complex in the Cuban context where there is 
a strong central government presence, which combines arbitrary answers with very discretionary actions, and 
where there is very a restricted private environment. 
 
I decided to apply econometric analysis in order to go further than the traditional descriptive methods used in 
Cuba, so as to determine empirically the relevance of variables that intuitively appear relevant to the valuation 
process, for both the formal and the informal transactions. In this way I expect to discover the regularities and 
the distortions in the processes and to understand their various effects. 
 
I use multi-variate analyse to obtain mathematical models that enrich and support the analysis of the way 
property prices are determined in Havana: by extension it could be in Cuba 1. Unlike other cities and countries 
in the world that use econometric analysis to comprehend land and building markets, this is the first time this 
method has been applied in Cuba. 
 
My starting point is the expectation that, despite the differences between the public environment (state 
agencies, institutions and international firms) and the private environment (individuals), the price of an urban 
asset in the registered transactions is determined almost by the same logic for formal and informal 
mechanisms. The development of the two econometric models, one for the public and another for the private 
transactions, allows me to enrich the discussion about the ways of allocating land, about the benefits of a 
certain land use and to understand the similarities and differences between both mechanisms. 
 
This research is limited to Havana city for three main reasons: Havana is the largest and most complex area of 
the country in terms of social structure, population density, institutional framework, planning, regulations and 
urban diversity. It has the biggest records of real estate permutes (between 9 and 15 thousand units involved 
per year recorded in the Provincial Housing Directorate), the most reliable statistics of real estate valuations for 
projects with foreign investors (the records provided by the Ministry of Finance), and a diversity of financial 
sources.  
 
The access to up-to-date urban and financial information about land and housing has been one of the 
determining factors for this methodological choice, although we must acknowledge that for the permuta cases 
we have used only a small part of the record because the transaction data –values- is not in official records 
and was obtained through personal research. Having regard to that availability of information, I assumed that if 
                                                 
1 The regression analysis used here has many similarities with that used for hedonic price analyses/ But it is not precisely the same, as 
it includes some variables which might affect the price – like the valuation method applied , or the presence of an intermediary – which 
cannot be regarded as properties of the building which the buyer might value. 
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I could analyse and understand the creation of land and building value in a city of 2.1 million inhabitants with 
such a diversity of urban environments, infrastructure quality, building typologies, among other aspects, then I 
would be making a contribution which would be easy to replicate in other urban settlements in Cuba. 
 
2. Improving the understanding of price formation 
 
One of the principal weaknesses of existing research into the price, value and transactions of urban properties 
- land both undeveloped and developed - is the lack of systematic documentation and the predominance of 
qualitative information. This weakness limits the introduction of, and the improvement to, policy and policy 
mechanisms, and contributes to the lack of success at both local and international levels in producing more 
significant and probing studies on these topics. Even rarer are studies that apply an econometric analysis 2 to 
urban property transactions, even when the essential information for this type of analysis is available. 
“Econometrics is an analytical tool to compare different price theories as mathematical constructions” 3 and 
can be understood in this case as a way to explain and simulate, in a concrete and realistic manner, the reality 
of urban property transactions. The application of econometric models to the study of urban property markets 
improves the quality of studies in the field, by refining the relevant variables and promoting a better 
understanding of how human behavior and activity affect a city.  
 
There is a general belief that land and buildings, however different they are from each other, possess common 
elements that make them financially comparable. This statement is subject to debate, because of the diversity 
of locations, type of rights, and property attributes. Econometric modeling can take this diversity into account if 
sufficient data are available. Nevertheless, the literature recognizes that one of the biggest problems facing the 
development of the econometric model in the urban field is that there are many market transactions and 
processes that are not visible, 4 thus forcing a consideration of possible bias in selecting what information to 
use.  
 
When applying econometric models, it is important to obtain a “high” or “best fit” result. This implies requiring a 
squared error below a certain level, which signifies that the level of statistical significance between the 
dependent variable and the independent ones is acceptable. The statistical techniques are well-known and, 
with the advance of information technology, a number of econometric programs exist which can produce 
results rapidly. These programs apply diverse statistical tests to the information, and if the tests are satisfied, 
that provides credibility to the results. The success of econometric analysis depends to a great extent on the 
availability and quality of the information, be it quantitative or qualitative. If the necessary information is not 
available or not credible 5, the application of the model can be limited or suspended.  
 
To study urban property transactions in Havana, we have applied this instrument in order to identify the 
attributes that have the biggest influence on the price / value of urban properties in the city between 1994 and 
                                                 
2 Tintner, Gerard. Methodology of Mathematical Economics and Econometrics, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1968. 
Econometrics is the science that links the economic theory with mathematical and statistical analysis to understand the complexities of 
society. It has the objective to understand the interrelation and influence among variables, make predictions and develop empirical 
analysis based on statistical interference. It consists on the application of mathematical statistics to a set of data with the objective to 
provide empirical support to the models built with mathematical economics and to obtain numerical results.  
3 Roca Cladera, Josep. Los precios del suelo en el ámbito metropolitano, Barcelona, Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona, 1994. 
4 Needham, Barrie. “How the city of Amsterdam is using econometric modeling to value real estate”. UK, Journal of Property 
Assessment and Administration, 1998. Page 27 
5 Ibid. Page 29. 
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2007. In keeping with the peculiarities of the information and operational logic, two econometric models have 
been developed. One is for those transactions undertaken when evaluations were formal, understood as an 
assessment process controlled and mediated by state institutions (see chapter 4). The other model is for those 
exchanges registered in the permuta (swap operation), when informal mechanisms to arbitrate financial 
agreements are present (see chapter 5). These are the only two sets of Real Estate transactions in Cuba 
which reflect market processes. 
 
The Econometric Model  
 
The technique starts by defining a mathematical function which allows for consideration and measurement of 
the degree of correlation between explanatory variables and the dependent variable. In this case, the 
dependent variable is the transaction price of the property (land plus any building works) when this is traded. It 
is necessary to correct for the size of the property being transacted, so transaction price is divided by the area 
of the plot (that is, not taking account of the floorspace of the building on the plot). I did this because the 
potential value of the property is greatly influenced by plot size. 
 
These models estimate the particular effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable. The 
model comes from the following equation (expression):  
1
ln ki j ij ijV c b X u== + +∑  
 
Where Vi is the price of property (i) per m2 of plot, and the Xj are the k explanatory variables for this property, 
the b j are the coefficients associated with each explanatory variable in order to estimate the regression, c is 
the constant term, and u is the stochastic error term of the model. This is a linear regression model and, in 
order to estimate the coefficients, we applied the Ordinary Least Squares estimators (OLS). 
 
The dependent variable is transformed into a logarithm. (That is not done with the independent variables, as 
some of them are qualitative and some have values of zero or one.) As we used the logarithmic transformation 
on the dependent variable, the coefficients express the relative effect of each attribute on the price. So if, for 
example, the coefficient of the independent variable Xj is 0.02 (where Xj is a binary variable 0 or 1) this means 
that the presence of the attribute Xj will have a 2% effect on the dependent variable. The complexity of the 
model is better understood if the coefficients are seen as a “marginal contribution” which, when there is a 
change in the quantity of a specific attribute, produces an effect on the price of the transaction” 6.  
 
Expressing the coefficients as percentages allows international comparisons of the results. If the coefficients 
were interpreted in CUC (which is an unknown currency outside Cuba) or even in US dollars, the results would 
be subject to inflation, price levels and other particular aspects of the Cuban economy. It is for that reason very 
convenient to have the coefficients in percentages. 
 
There is a second reason for transforming the (dependent) variable into a logarithm. This reduces the variance 
of the series and helps to avoid problems with heteroscedasticity. With the logarithm it is easier to achieve 
homoscedasticity in the model residual. 
 
                                                 
6 Roca Cladera, Josep. Corporación Metropolitana de Barcelona, 1994. 
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The independent variables which are put into the model are described, and justified, in a following section. 
There it will be seen that we use many qualitative variables. Because the model can use only quantitative 
variables, the qualitative variables have to be translated into Dummy 7 variables. Here we used the Centered 
or Orthogonal Dummies 8 that according to the literature 9 allow a better estimation of the coefficient without 
affecting the estimation of the constant or interceptor.  
 
When using centered dummies, the coefficient has a particular meaning. This can be illustrated by the 
independent variable: presence or absence of an intermediary or agent. This is the easiest case because it is 
represented by only one dummy and not by a group of dummies. When there is an intermediary, the dummy is 
1 (existence of attribute) and without intermediary is 0 (absence of attribute). The estimated coefficient is 0.30 
and it is interpreted as a 30% increase in the average price of the transaction if there is an intermediary. We 
can see that the price increases because the result is positive, if it were negative the price would decrease.  
 
In the case of a group of centred dummies, or in the case of orthogonal dummies, the coefficients refer to the 
average price of the whole data set, because the most interesting aspect is the comparison between 
coefficients. This can be illustrated as follows, using the independent variable ‘year of transaction’. 
 
Years 1998 
(y98) 
1999 
(y99) 
2000 
(y00) 
2001 
(y01) 
2002 
(y02) 
Coefficient 0,26223 0,016806 -0,123036 -0,100379 -0,055621 
 
Table 6.1 Coefficients reference to the average price 1998-2002 
 
From the coefficients, we interpret that in 1998 certain events led to higher prices than the rest of the period, 
while in the year 2000 other events led to lower prices. In comparing the coefficients we observe the change of 
prices as follows: in 1999 the prices fell with respect to 1998 by 24.5% (0.26223-0.016806). In 2000 there is 
another decrease in respect to previous years ( -0.123030<0.016806< 0.26223). However, in 2001 the prices 
go up, in this case by 2.3% with respect to the previous year and in 2002 they keep an ascending trend of 
4.4% with respect to the previous year. 
 
The general rule in the application of Dummy models is the following: if a qualitative variable has m categories, 
then m-1 dichotomy variables must be introduced”. 10 Dummy orthogonals are assigned -1 to the category that 
is excluded. 11  
In keeping with this, the basic equation would become:  
                                                 
7 Gujarati, Damodar. Econometría. McGraw-Hill Edition, 2004. It is not absolutely essential that Dummy variables take 0 and 1 value. 
The numeric pair (0,1) could be transformed as a linear-numeric pair according to the formula Z= a+bD. pag 368. 
8 Orthogonal Dummies provide a better estimation of the coefficient without affecting the estimation of the constant or interceptor. 
9 Doan, T. A. Rats Version 5 User’s Guide, Evanston, Illinois, Estima, 2000. Enders, W. Applied Econometric Time Series” Wiley Series 
in Probability and Mathematical Statistics, USA, John Wiley & Sons, 1995. Gujarati, Damodar. Econometría. McGraw-Hill Edition, 2004. 
10 Ibid. 
11 The Dummy Orthogonal follows the Dummy logic, it means to assign 0 or 1 value to the m-1 category. So in this short example: Land 
Use has 4 categories Hotel, Residential, Office, and Industrial. So Dummy always determines 3 categories (exclude Industrial), but the 
way in which the missing category =industrial is referred to is as follows: 
Hotel,     Residential,    Office 
  -1              -1                   -1 
In the traditional Dummy (no orthogonal) the value assigned will be:  
Hotel,     Residential,    Office 
   0               0                   0 
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Ln Vi = (b2X1i + b3X2i + b4X3i + b5X4i)+ (b5X6i + b6X7i+ b7X8i + b8X9i) +… + c 
 
Where the variable Xi has four possible values (x1i, x2i, x3i, x4i) which can be represented by three Centered 
Dummies (b2, b3, b4) whereby:  
If (X1i=0 , X2i=1, X3i=0) then = b3 
If (X1i=1 , X2i=0, X3i=0) then = b2 
If (X1i=0 , X2i=0, X3i=1) then = b4 
If (X1i=-1 , X2i=-1, X3i=-1 ) then = b5=-( b2+b3+b4) 
 
We illustrate this with the land-use variable (Us) in the Formal Transaction model: 
Land Uses Hotel Industrial Residential Office Other Uses 
Variables 
(n=5) 
Us1 Us2 Us3 Us4 Us5 
Coefficient 
(n=4) 
b2 b3 b4 b5 b6 
(this coefficient 
is expressed in 
terms of the 
other 
coefficients) 
 
Table 6.2 Land use variables in the formal transaction model 
 
If (Us1=0 , Us2=1, Us3=0, Us4=0) then = b3 
If (Us1=1 , Us2=0, Us3=0, Us4=0) then = b2 
If (Us1=0 , Us2=0, Us3=1, Us4=0) then = b4 
If (Us1=0 , Us2=0, Us3=0, Us4=1) then = b5 
If (Us1=-1 , Us2=-1, Us3=-1, Us4=0 ) then = b6=-( b2+b3+b4+b5) 
 
Taking into account the various groups of dummies, it is essential to make an overall test of significance with 
each group to determine the relevance of including that group in the equation, that is to say, to deduce the 
explanatory weight of each group on the dependent variable. Additionally, this test will examine the effect that 
each variable produces within each group. The level of influence will be reflected in each estimated coefficient 
(refers to the “t test” that appears in Annexes 14 table 1.1 and graphic 1.2) 
 
The model, when tested and calibrated using observed data, includes a conventional procedure, such as the 
Null Hypothesis, that the coefficients of each variable in the regression model are equal to zero. The 
application tests whether the coefficient of at least one independent variable is statistically different from zero. 
 
In texts about econometric models applied to the price or value of real estate in the 1980’s, it is said that the 
coefficient of determination (R2) should lie between a range of 0.6 and 0.8 (see Butler 1982). In the 1990’s, 
other studies by Rothenberg 12 raise the issue of finding R2 values which are higher than 70 %. To obtain the 
                                                 
12 Rotherberg J., Glaster, G., Butler, R., and Pitkin, J. The maze of urban housing markets: theory, evidence and policy. Chicago, USA, 
University of Chicago Press, 1991. 
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R2 or an adjusted R2, one must add, test and adjust additional analyses and criteria before and during the run 
of the model. One must monitor also for the assumption of statistical errors such as normality, and 
homoskedasticity.  
 
With these two econometric models (the formal and informal) we try to replicate, as closely as possible, the 
pattern of value formation of the urban land in Havana City. By including a number of independent variables, 
the models attempt to account for the complexity of the process.  
 
It should be understood that, when using this method of prediction, any simulation will determine a value which 
lies within a statistically significant range of property prices, subject to the values determined in the explanatory 
variables. To raise its effectiveness as a mechanism of prediction (that is, to reduce the statistically significant 
range within which the value lies, which means that the prediction has been made more precise), it may be 
necessary to introduce new variables.  
 
 
3. Transaction Information database: peculiarities and data preparation 
 
When preparing the data for the econometric model, the initial information must satisfy two conditions. The first 
one is practical, and it has to do with the availability of data: this must be analytically documented and 
verifiably objective. The second condition has to do with the relevance of the information. Data have been 
chosen which are assumed to be relevant, after analyzing existing literature about price theory and models 
developed by other experts in this area. It is based also upon my knowledge of the public framework and of the 
type of property right, the type of real estate, various urban factors, and upon my experience of the negotiation 
logics for more than a decade. This logic takes account of such things as financial capacity, frameworks and 
type of property right, the nature of the project, the type of real estate, a knowledge of urban growth factors, 
location and its corresponding status, level of services available, urban accessibility, and so on. Work with 
econometric models demonstrates that increasing the number of independent variables will raise the 
explanatory capacity. But such efforts cost time and money. The R2 is increased by adding more variables, but 
the improvement in R2 is less the more variables are added. 
 
When obtaining information for this study, two sources were indispensable: government agencies and 
individuals.13 For the maximum accuracy of this information, the errors possibly made during observation must 
be as small as possible, the measuring criteria must be suitable, selective bias must be avoided, and any type 
of predominance in compiling information, restrictions on confidence etc. must be allowed for.  
 
In the use of econometric and statistical models, it is recognized that “the research results will only be as good 
as the quality of information used”.14 Hence the need to provide a matrix of homogenized data for each urban 
property, for only in this way can one obtain conclusions based on strong statistical criteria. One must be 
stringent about the quality of the information that is put into the model. If the data are not credible, or are 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
13 There are at least five key sources in general: the government agencies, the international agencies, the private organizations, the 
NGO´s and the individuals. 
14 Damodar N. Gujarati. McGraw-Hill Edition, 2004. 
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distorted or incoherent, the model results will be calibrated incorrectly. All inputs should be confirmed and 
verified through diverse sources.  
 
Another key aspect regarding the quality of the information and its management during the model preparation 
is that the functional attributes, socio-economic context, legal situation etc. are measured or observed at 
around the same time as the transaction takes place.  
 
Preparing the Data  
 
The model is applied to two types of transaction. One is the appraisal carried out of state projects with foreign 
capital investment for new investment initiatives (chapter 4), the other is transactions between families or 
individuals through the permute mechanism (swap operation – chapter 5). So, two registers of land 
transactions were constructed. The first is when Cuban companies using public land and buildings are 
involved in a business relation with foreign enterprises or investment: those transactions are considered as 
official (formal transactions) and cover a period 1998-2002, because earlier appraisals in the 1990s were 
dispersed among different entities and had no official records at the Finance Ministry. The second is of the 
permuta process (informal transactions) between 1994 and 2006 15, where housing or land is exchanged 
between families or individuals, and ad-hoc financial agreements are reached with the frequent assistance of 
an informal “permuta” expert.  
 
For this study, appraisals for social housing have been excluded, given that the current appraisal mechanism 
for this housing sector contains so many discretionary and arbitrary elements. The theory behind the 
econometric model assumes a certain logic between actors when negotiating (see above), a logic which is 
absent when social housing is appraised.  
 
During the period 1994 - 2006, two important changes took place:  
• The monetary duality, introducing the convertible peso and the US dollar, was authorized for both 
business and household transactions.  
• The opening to foreign investment (but with institutional gaps regarding property rights). This started 
between 1989 and 1993, but became significant with the economic and institutional reforms between 
1994 and 2000. The opening of the economy was accompanied, until 1997, by major changes in 
formal rules for land and building assessment methods and in a new legal and institutional framework 
16 (and see chapter 3). 
 
During the study period, the exchange rate of National currency to the Convertible Peso (USD to CUC) varied 
a little, as shown in the following table:  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 In the case of permuta operations, although the researcher possesses information dating from the 1970’s, the majority of data 
compiled comes from the period 1994 – 2006.  
16 Domínguez, Jorge; Omar Everleny y Lorena G. Barbería (edits.). La economía cubana a principios del siglo XXI, México,  El  Colegio 
de México, The David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University, 2007. 
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Year 
Hard currency Cuban Peso 
 (National Currency)  
1995 1 usd 35 
1996 1 usd 18 
1997 1 usd 22 
1998 1 usd 25 
1999 1 usd 22 
2000 1 usd 22 
2001 1 usd 26 
2002 1 usd 25 
2003 1 usd 24 
2004 1 cuc 25 
2005 1 cuc 25 
2006 1 cuc 25 
2007 1 cuc 24 
Usd: American dollar 
Cuc: Cuban convertible peso 
 
Table 6.3 Exchage Rate by Year 
 
In the period 1995-2007, the value of money both increased and decreased: 
-11.5
-4.9
1.9
2.9
-2.9 -2.3
-1.4
7.3
-3.8
2.9
3.7
5.7
2.8
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
 
Source: Economic Report of the Central Bank of Cuba and ONE data. 
Graph 6.1 Consumer price index  
(Variation percentage with respect to the previous year) 
 
For these reasons (changes in exchange rates and inflation), we have not assumed that the money value was 
constant. We have taken account of this in the following way. The Property Price Data (Pr/m2) in the Formal 
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and Informal databases were not corrected to a specific base year or subjected to any other financial 
adjustment. Instead, the year of the valuation is included as an independent variable. 
 
 4. Modeling the formal Transactions 
 
The values registered in this database of formal transactions are not realized sales prices: these values do not 
represent a direct payment of money from the foreign party to the Cuban party to recognize the value of the 
urban asset. There is no Document of Sale. Rather, the transaction is a contribution, equal to the value of the 
surface right, to the social capital of the project, which once agreed upon, becomes a monetary contribution 
(equity) by the foreign partner. Usually, there is a joint partnership (50/50 %) with a Cuban partner, which 
contributes the same amount to the project. (See chapter 4, diagram with joint venture structure.) 
 
This contribution to the business deal, in the form of land or real estate, requires that the real estate is 
appraised by a process, the final approval of which is in the hands of the Directorate of Heritage of the Ministry 
of Finances and Pricing (MFP). Although teams of Cuban expert appraisers conduct appraisals for each case, 
sometimes applying different internationally recognized methodologies, the MFP is the final authority with the 
power to check, approve, and register the appraisals, and to grant the corresponding certificates.17  
 
This research examined the MFP appraisal data base. Out of 500 in the whole of Cuba, 272 were in the City of 
Havana. From those 272, 178 were extracted for econometric analysis, eliminating those properties that were 
duplicated or appraised more than once in the same year.18  
 
The following information on each appraisal or transaction was available:  
Variable Description 
No. Of Certificate DVA-C Number of Certificate of MFP Appraisal  
Petitioner Cuban State Entity  
Body Central Administration Body (Ministry of the Petitioner) 
Province Province where the valued asset is located  
Municipality Municipality where the valued asset is located  
Location of the goods appraised  Address of Real Estate or Land Parcel  
Area (m2) Total Area of land 
Estimated Value (USD) Value of the Land or the Installations  
Price per m2  Price of the land, construction or real estate per m2 of land 
Right granted Duration of Right to Use by the Joint Enterprise in Years (leasing 
term) 
Appraisal Body  Appraisal Body who conducted the Appraisal  
Number of the Report  Number of the Report given to the File at the Directorate of 
Heritage  
Method of Calculation Used  Type of international Appraisal Method Used in the Appraisal  
New property Use Proposed use of land or buildings 
Table 6.4 Official Appraisal Available Information Components 
                                                 
17 The Formal Transactions during 1998-2004 were recorded by the Cuban Ministry of Finance and published in 2004 by the Patrimony 
Direction. 
18 When one property was valued more than once in the same year, only one valuation was included in the analysis. 
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It was decided to order and filter the official database because the quality of the initial information, which 
included different types of data (qualitative and quantitative), was affecting the mathematical calculation. The 
data were also rearranged to avoid duplications, to verify the calculations of both addition and division, and to 
eliminate the variables that – it is expected - do not make a substantial contribution (such as the name of the 
Cuban body requesting the appraisal, the number of the report, or the name of the petitioner). The new 
database is thus organized in the following way:  
 
Variable Description 
RNID Identification number in the Data Base 
Year Year of Appraisal 
Muncipality 19 Municipality where the valued asset is located  
Address  Address of Real Estate or Land Parcel 
Area (m2) Total Area of land 
Value of the Land (1) Appraised Value of the Land  
Value of Buildings (2) Appraised Value of Existing Constructions  
Total Value Sum of (1) + (2) 
Price / m2 of Total Goods  Price per square meter of land 
Right granted Duration of Right to Use by the Joint Enterprise in 
Years (leasing term) 
Appraisal Body  Appraisal Body who conducted the Appraisal  
Method of Calculation Used  Type of international Appraisal Method Used in the 
Appraisal 
Asset Use Proposed use of land or installations with the new 
investment 
 
Table 6.5 Official Appraisal Selected Information Components 
 
The total value is the value of the urban good (value of the land plus the value of the building); this value 
allows us to arrive at the price per m2 of the total transaction. 
 
With this new data base, the information - dependent and independent variables with a respective opening for 
the dummies - was ready to feed into the econometric model.  
The variables formulated for the model are:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19 Note that ‘location’ is measured by municipality. Often with this kind of analysis, location is measured by distance to the Central 
Business district. But Havana is not a conventional mono-centric city, partly because the government has not wanted the best facilities 
to be concentrated in one place. 
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Dependent Variable DEFINITION 
 
Pr / M2 
 
Pr/m2  Price per square meter 
Independent Variable Dummy DEFINITION 
 
 
Year (4) 
Base 2002 
Year 1998 Appraisals Registered in 1998  
Year 1999 Appraisals Registered in 1999 
Year 2000 Appraisals Registered in 2000 
Year 2001 Appraisals Registered in 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
Municipality (15) 
Base: Cotorro 
 
 
M1 Playa 
M2 Plaza 
M3 Centro Habana 
M4 Habana Vieja 
M5 Regla 
M6 Habana Este 
M7 Guanabacoa 
M8 San Miguel 
M9 10 de Octubre 
M10 Cerro 
M11 Marianao 
M12 Lisa 
M13 Boyeros 
M14 A. naranjo 
 
Right Granted / Leasing 
term 
Base: over 51 years 
D1  0-10 years 
D2  11-20 years 
D3  21-30 year 
D4  31-50 years 
 
Method of Calculation (5) 
Base: Replacement Cost 
Md1 Comparative Market 
Md2 Dynamic Residual 
Md3 Static Residual 
Md4 Capitalization Rent 
 
Use (5) 
Base: Other Uses 
Us1 Hotel 
Us2 Industrial 
Us3 Residential Real Estate 
Us4 Office Real Estate 
 
Table 6.6 Dummy variables for the formal transactions model 
 
There could be endogeneity between the independent variables, for example between ‘method of calculation’ 
and ‘use’. This is investigated in Annex 37 and found to be not the case. There could also be endogeneity in 
the sense of feedback between the dependent and the independent variables. This too is investigated in 
Annex 37, where it is found to be no problem. In that same annex, there is a test of autocorrelation between 
the independent variables: that too is found to be no problem. 
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By way of illustration, the next table (partially shown) indicates the effects on the dependent variable of a 
dichotomous model or Dummy, in this case presenting the variable Right Granted / Leasing term (D) and 
Method of Calculation (Md). The first transaction reached 740,5 Pr/m2, in which the Right Granted / Leasing 
term covers a period of 30 years (= D3) and the Method of Calculation applied was Dynamic Residual (=Md2). 
Price per 
square meter D1i D2i D3i D4i Md1 Md2 Md3 Md4
740.5
0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
174.0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
143.1
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
236.3
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
55.0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
404.3
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
105.0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
19.6
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
45.4
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
129.0
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
66.4
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
134.4
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
210.1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
310.4
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
585.4
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
2,030.8
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
263.7
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0
480.6
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
84.4
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
200.0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
323.0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
233.4
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
215.8
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  
 
Table 6.7 Example to illustrate the effects on the dependent variable of a dichotomous model or Dummy for formal transactions 
 
5. Modeling the informal Transactions 
 
In the case of the Permuta Database, the sources are diverse and are the result of interviews, exchanges with 
families and friends, and participation in potential deals regarding property to be inherited from relatives. The 
information has been compiled from all these sources. None of the municipal or provincial housing institutions 
compiled information about the financial aspects of the agreements, because those latter essentially take 
place illegally and informally.  
 
The database contains 152 property values related to 62 swop operations. For each case (property 
exchanged), the following information was available:  
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Variable Description 
RN Code Identification Number in the Database  
Year of Exchange  Year of the Exchange 
Municipality 20 Municipality where the Permuta asset is located  
Address Address of the property or parcel  
Constructed Area (m2) Building Area (m2) 
Total Area of Property (m2) Total Housing Area (land and building)  
Property  Type of Property: House, Apartment, Room, Roof etc.  
State of Construction  State of Construction (Good, Regular, Bad) 
Existence of an Intermediary Participation of a Permutero or Corredor / swap expert 
Type of exchange Simple (1x1) or Multiple (more than 3 assets) 
Operation Conducted or Proposed  If the operation was conducted or in proposition  
Compensation in Moneda Nacional (1) Payment in Moneda Nacional 
Compensation in CUC (2) Payment in Convertible Currency  
Compensation in Goods (3) Payment in Goods (TV, CVR, Furniture, Auto) 
Total Value Sum of (1) + (2) + (3) 
Price / M2 of Total Property Total Value per m2 of Land  
Declared Motive  Principle legal reason for claiming need for Permutar 
 
Table 6.8 Permuta Appraisal Available Information Components 
 
Next is presented the structure of the Informal Transactions Database, using the Dummy criteria:  
 
Dependent Variable DEFINITION 
 
Pr / M2 
Pr / m2 
Total Value of Housing per square metre of land 
Independent Variables Dummy DEFINITION 
 
 
Year  
Base: 2005 
Year 1995 Exchanges in 1995 
Year 1996 Exchanges in 1996 
Year 1997 Exchanges in 1997 
Year 1998 Exchanges in 1998 
Year 1999 Exchanges in 1999 
Year 2000 Exchanges in 2000 
Year 2001 Exchanges in 2001 
Year 2002 Exchanges in 2002 
Year 2003 Exchanges in 2003 
Year 2004 Exchanges in 2004 
 
 
Mp1 Playa 
Mp2 Plaza 
Mp3 Centro Habana 
                                                 
20 Note that ‘location’ is measured by municipality. Often with this kind of analysis, location is measured by distance to the Central 
Business district. But Havana is not a conventional mono-centric city, partly because the government has not wanted the best facilities 
to be concentrated in one place. 
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Municipality  
Base: Cotorro 
 
 
Mp4 Habana Vieja 
Mp5 Regla 
Mp6 Habana Este 
Mp7 Guanabacoa 
Mp8 San Miguel 
Mp9 10 de Octubre 
Mp10 Cerro 
Mp11 Marianao 
Mp12 Lisa 
Mp13 Boyeros 
Mp14 A. naranjo 
 
State of Construction  
Base: Very Critical 
Et1 Good 
Et2 Regular 
Et3 Bad 
 
Type of Property 
Base: Others 
b1 House 
b2 Apartment 
b3 Duplex 
b4 Single Room 
 
Intermediary 
Base: There is no 
Intermediary  
Pt1 Participation of an intermediary (permutero) 
 
Table 6.9 Dummy variables for the informal transactions model 
 
There could be autocorrelation within the independent variables. This is investigated in Annex 37 and found 
not to be the case. 
 
By way of illustration, the following table (partially shown) indicates the effect on the dependent variable of a 
dichotomous model or Dummy, in this case the variables Year (Y) and Type of property (b). In this case the 
first transaction recorded a value of 156,9 per sq.m., in year 1995 (= y95), and the Type of property was a 
Duplex House (= b3).  
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Precio CUC/ 
m2 y1995 y1996 y1997 y1998 y1999 y2000 y2001 y2002 y2003 y2004 y2005 b1i b21 b31 b41
156.9 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
220.6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
136.4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
235.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
145.2 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
138.9 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 1 0 0
277.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
235.3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
166.7 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
206.9 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
134.6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
209.0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
150.0 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -1 0 1 0 0  
 
Table 6.10 Example to illustrate the effects on the dependent variable of a dichotomous model or Dummy for informal transactions 
 
 
6. Results of the Econometric Model: formal transactions 
 
Here we describe the statistical results obtained for each of the two models. In order to assess those results, 
each has been checked to see if all the OLS assumptions were met - normality in the residuals and constant 
variance in the residual (homoskedasticity). As we are working with cross-section data it is not necessary to 
check autocorrelation in the residual. 21  
 
First the features of the model are shown and then the statistical results (explanation) between the 
independent and dependent variables. 
 
Model Validation. 
 
One can see the model in use in Annex 14 Table No. 1.1; it demonstrates compliance with the criteria of 
normality (see Annex 14 Graphic 1.2) and of heteroskedacity. Regarding compliance with normality, a dummy 
variable was included, specifically for observation 40 (an outlier), because of an atypically high valued 
transaction. Following this adjustment, the model parameters behaved satisfactorily.  
 
The homoskedacity (constant variance) test for the Model uses White's test, which is a test of the null 
hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity against heteroskedasticity 
 
  
                                                 
21 The correlation in the residual occurs more often in Time Series models rather than in the Transversal ones (Cross-section data). In 
the case of Transversal database, the observations recorded were randomly selected for a specific moment in time, so usually there 
are no reasons to expect that variables be related. In real terms it means that the residual value of one observation does not affected 
the residual value of another observation.     
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Table 6.11 White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
     
     
F-statistic 2.415012   Probability 0.000212 
Obs*R-squared 61.88539   Probability 0.001177 
     
     
Heteroskedasticity is not rejected, which means that homoskedacity is rejected up to 5 %. So some 
parameters that were deemed significant are, in reality, not, in which case an estimation is required for the 
variance corrected for the heteroskedacity. For this reason, we choose the robust standard errors option to 
correct the standard errors (Heteroskedasticity Consistent Covariance - White: see Annex 14, Table 3). 
 
The Model shows a significant result with regard to the adjusted R2 result, which exceeds 70 % (see table 
below). With an adjusted R2 of 70% it is evident that independent variables included in the model can explain 
most of the variation in the dependent variable. That is to say, such elements can explain the difference in 
price appraisals conducted on buildings and lands in Havana. 30% depends on factors that the model does not 
or could not capture. The following table presents the behavior of estimations found in the model. 
 
     
     R-squared 0.760684     Mean dependent var 5.315025 
Adjusted R-squared 0.711844     S.D. dependent var 1.123542 
S.E. of regression 0.603119     Akaike info criterion 1.983559 
Sum squared resid 53.47163     Schwarz criterion 2.537690 
Log likelihood -145.5368     F-statistic 15.57502 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.810590     Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Table 6.12 Behavior of estimations in the formal model 
 
An important criterion is the probability of the F test. In this case, the value indicates that the model is valid, or 
at least that the independent variables can explain the dependent one.  
 
Next, we demonstrate how the model fits with respect to the real behavior of the residual statistics test. The 
prices estimated by the model (grey line) are very similar to the real prices or transaction value of every 
appraisal conducted for projects with foreign investors (black line). Graphically this relationship can be 
observed in the following way: 
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Graph 6.2 Formal model fitting compared to real behavior  
 
Each case analyzed (1 – 178 on the XC-axis) has a position on the Y-Axis and it is possible to conclude that 
the model is statistically satisfactory and can be used to explain behavior and to predict future appraisals. 
 
The significant explanatory variables 
 
The effect that each variable produces within each category, or the relevance of each Dummy, is measured by 
the performance of F probability: the result is acceptable if the probability lies below the 5% or 10% 
significance. The results obtained are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
138 
 
Years: 
 
C(2)=C(3)=C(4)=C(5)=02 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: FORMALTESISSINHETERO  
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 1.276145 (4, 147)   0.2820 
 
Conclusion: The year of the transaction – and therefore changes in the value of money - has little significant 
effect on price 
 
Municipalities: 
 
C(6)=C(7)=C(8)=C(9)=C(10)=C(11)=C(12)=C(13)=C(14)=C(15)=C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: FORMALTESISSINHETERO  
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 11.40413 (13, 147)   0.0000 
 
Conclusion: Municipalities do affect price formation (below 5%) 
 
Surface Rights /Right Granted: 
 
C(19)=C(20)=C(21)=C(22)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: FORMALTESISSINHETERO  
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 3.097025 (4, 147)   0.0175 
 
Conclusion: Rights granted do affect price formation (below 5%) 
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Method of Calculation: 
 
C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: FORMALTESISSINHETERO  
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 2.124926 (4, 147)   0.0806 
 
Conclusion: method of calculation does affect price formation (below 10%). In this case the analysis can be 
refined by using the “T” Test included in the annexes 1.1 in which the methods of Evaluation 3 (Static residual) 
and 4 (Capitalization Rent) obtained a suitable degree of probability. 
 
Proposed Use: 
 
C(27)=C(28)=C(29)=C(30)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: FORMALTESISSINHETERO  
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 2.983777 (4, 147)   0.0210 
 
Conclusion: Proposed use does affect price formation (below 5%) 
 
Next, we show the relationships between the dependent variable and the various independent variables, 
structured as Dummies according to the previous analysis. For each analyzed variable, we discuss whether 
the results are consistent with what might be expected (are the results credible?).  
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Variable: Municipalities (M) presents information about the effect of the location (municipality) on appraised 
value. The results show the following: 
 
Municipality Variables Coefficient 
Playa  M1 0.684111 
Plaza M2 0.995038 
Centro Habana M3 0.928306 
Habana Vieja M4 0.733805 
Regla M5 -0.033576 
Habana Este M6 -0.985539 
Guanabacoa M7 -0.582355 
San Miguel M8 0.106112 
Cerro M10 0.019098 
Marianao M11 1.056371 
Lisa M12 -0.571997 
Boyeros M13 -0.803020 
A. Naranjo M14 -0.083782 
Cotorro M15 -1.46257 
 
Table 6.13 Effect of location on formal appraised value  
 
In the model, the main positive influence on prices comes from the municipalities of Plaza, Centro Havana, 
Havana Vieja, Playa and Marianao. The opposite effect (reduction) is seen in the municipalities of Habana del 
Este, Boyeros, Guanabacoa and la Lisa, in this order. Note that the municipality 10 de Octubre (M9) does not 
have indicators in the table because no appraisals were registered for this area. The municipality which 
reduces urban property values most is Cotorro.  
 
The effect of most municipalities meets the expectations: there is a positive effect from those municipalities 
with high urban and functional centrality and good accessibility, namely Central and Old Havana, as well as 
others where the proven urban and architectural quality makes them highly desirable like Plaza and Playa. The 
peripheral municipalities confirm the tendency to reduce value, which was to be expected. One unexpected 
result is the strong positive effect of the municipality of Marianao (M11) on prices, a situation that may be 
explained by the fact that this is a large municipality with many neighborhoods, some but not all with a very 
good level of urban infrastructure. In order to understand this better, the study should be refined.  
 
Variable: Surface Rights (D), this variable represents the effect that the duration of the surface rights has on 
the value of urban properties.  
 
Surface Rights Rights 
0-10 years 
Rights 
11-20 
Rights 
21-30 
Rights 
31-50 
Rights 
51-200 
 
Coefficient -0.543067 0.073616 
 
0.175025 
 
0.433343 
 
-0.138917 
 
Table 6.14 Effect that the duration of the surface rights has on the value of urban properties 
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The duration of granted Surface Rights has an important effect on real estate prices in Havana. For example, 
when rights are granted between 31 – 50 years, there is a 43% increase with respect to the average; rights 
between 21 – 30 years result in a 17% increase. A granted surface right of less than 10 years reduces the 
appraisal value by 54%. This also is the case of granted surface rights of more than 51 years; but this would 
not be expected, because one would assume that the longer the duration, the greater the price. 
 
With this variable, the model turned out more or less as expected. The fact that the longer the usufruct rights, 
the higher the investor valued the land or building, matches perfectly with the interviews made with the 
investors: these expressed their willingness to pay more if they had the possibility of full ownership. The 
tendency is however contradicted in the cases where the property rights are over the 51 years: this may be 
explained by the way in which negotiations are carried out. The determination of the price is not always the 
final stage. For example, after the price has been determined, based (partly) on the duration of the surface 
right, that duration can be renegotiated without it affecting the agreed price.. 
    
Variable: Method of Appraisal (MT), represents the influence of the method of calculating prices used by 
appraisal institutions in Cuba. The results provided by the model are:  
 
Method of  
Calculation 
Comparative 
Market 
Residual  
Dynamic 
Residual  
Static 
Capitalization  
Rent 
Replacement 
Cost 
Coefficient 0.159857 0.128719 
 
0.556060 
 
-0.712915 
 
-0,131721 
 
Table 6.15 Effect of the method of calculating prices used by appraisal entities 
 
In this variable, the model shows that three valuation methods raise the price: the price rise is highest with the 
Residual Static, second with the Comparative Market and finally with the Residual Dynamic, with coefficients 
of 55.0, 15.6 and 12.8% respectively. On the other hand, the application of the Capitalization Rent and 
Replacement Cost methods decreases land and building values by -71% -13% respectively.  
 
The model results show that the residual method (Dynamic and Static) produced the most advantageous 
results for the Cuban state. This is consistent with the fact that it is the method most often applied, that it is 
preferred by the Cuban authorities and foreign parties for its transparency, and that it allows the price to be 
determined in the absence of an official real estate market.  
 
The comparative method also has a positive effect on prices, for two main reasons. First it is often chosen by 
the valuation entities who collect records of land and building valuations approved for new projects. This is 
useful for new negotiations that depart least from these previous examples of realised prices. Additionally, on 
various occasions, the valuers have taken as a starting point regional prices (that is, prices in this region of 
Latin America) for comparable uses, and the investors have accepted the fact that in Havana real estate prices 
will increase in the future because of the competitive advantages of the city in the region.  
 
The capitalization rent method has a negative effect when applied to the valuation of real estate. The reason is 
that Cuban valuers are not always capable of dealing appropriately with financial issues. Also, the expected 
rate of return of the business and the actualization rate (discount rate) might be used incorrectly, because 
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discretional commercialization criteria are imposed by the Cuban Financial Ministry authorities, and because 
the lack of information about similar investments means that assumptions have to be made about the interest 
rate on loans for similar projects.  
 
Variable: Proposed Use (U), this variable indicates the authorized urban use of the land (with or without 
buildings) on which foreign capital investment takes place. The model registers the following results: 
 
Proposed Use Hotel Industrial Residential 
Real Estate 
Office Real 
Estate 
Other 
 
Coefficient -0.390153 
 
-0.140748 -0.250692 
 
0.063549 
 
0,718044 
 
 
Table 6.16 Effect of the authorized urban land use on the value of the urban property 
 
It would appear from this that land use proposed for hotels, residential areas and industrial uses, in that order, 
diminishes the value of the property (with respect to the average). In particular, the result for the proposed 
Hotel uses contradicts the appraisals by experts, as this land use has always been considered a major source 
of revenue. Office real estate shows a positive influence on the value of land (+ 6%), and ‘other uses’ 
(warehouses, educational facilities, agricultural uses and so on) have a large positive effect on the price. 
 
In this case, the model results contradict totally the initial expectations that the commercial uses, such as 
found in Central Business District, would generate high land values. The results show that the land use is not 
having the expected effects on land value. It would appear that there are important distortions in the way that 
land use is incorporated in the formal transactions. In the future, if adequately articulated, this variable should 
play an important role in land valuation in Havana.  
  
 
7. Results of the Econometric Model: informal Transactions / Permutas 
 
Model Validation 
 
The model can be referred to in the Annex 14 Table 2.1, and it should be acknowledged that to obtain these 
results it was necessary to make various adjustments, since the normality and heteroskedacity criteria were 
not fulfilled in the first round.  
 
Table 6.17 White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 1.779223     Probability 0.014646 
Obs*R-squared 47.86422     Probability 0.027116 
 
To correct the heteroskedacity, two dummy variables were introduced, specifically in observations 104 and 
131, because the transaction prices in these cases were much lower than expected (an outlier). After that 
intervention, the heteroskedasticity test gave satisfactory results, in so far as the homoskedacity was not 
rejected at 5%. The tests, after interventions (outlier), are presented in the following:  
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White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 1.210532     Probability 0.227292 
Obs*R-squared 38.44331     Probability 0.236539 
See Annex 14, Table 4 
 
The Normality of the Permuta model showed a suitable behavior, as it was not rejected at 5% probability. The 
adjusted R2 is fairly high at 0.60. This is considered satisfactory in these types of studies, as was explained at 
the beginning of the paper.  
 
R-squared 0.690027     Mean dependent var 5.174817 
Adjusted R-squared 0.603340     S.D. dependent var 0.682253 
S.E. of regression 0.429690     Akaike info criterion 1.342666 
Sum squared resid 21.78672     Schwarz criterion 2.019060 
Log likelihood -68.04259     F-statistic 7.959956 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.957236     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
Table 6.18 Behavior of estimations in the informal model 
 
The F Test indicates that the model is valid, or at least confirms that the independent variables explain the 
dependent one.  
 
With adjusted R2 at 0.60, we know that the independent variables included in the model explain 60 % of the 
variance in the dependent variable. There is 40 % that depends on factors and information not gathered in the 
model, or that is not explicable because of irregular behavior. 
 
The prices estimated by the model (grey line) are close to the observed prices (black line). Graphically, we can 
observe this fit in the following manner:  
144 
 
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
25 50 75 100 125 150
Residual Actual Fit ted
 
Graph 6.3 Informal model fitting compared to real behavior  
 
 
All 152 cases (placed along the X-axis) were analyzed (plotted along the Y-Axis) and it is possible to conclude 
that the model is statistically satisfactory and can be used to explain behavior and predict future appraisals 
(within certain statistical limits). 
 
 
The significant explanatory variables 
 
The effect that each variable produces within each category, or the relevance of each Dummy, is measured by 
the performance of F probability, where the results are acceptable if the probability lies below the 5% or 10% 
significance. The obtained results are as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
145 
 
Years: 
 
C(21)=C(22)=C(23)=C(24)=C(25)=C(26)=C(27)=C(28)=C(29)=C(30)=C(31)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: EQ02   
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 6.755064 (11, 118)   0.0000 
 
Conclusion: Years do affect price formation (below 5%) 
 
Municipalities: 
 
C(9)=C(10)=C(11)=C(12)=C(13)=C(14)=C(15)=C(16)=C(17)=C(18)=C(19)=C(20)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: EQ02   
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 2.732500 (12, 118)   0.0027 
 
Conclusion: Municipalities do affect price formation (below 5%) 
 
Type of Property: 
 
C(2)=C(3)=C(4)=C(5)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: EQ02   
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 1.096946 (4, 118)   0.3614 
 
Conclusion: The Type of Property does not affect price formation (above 5%), it has too little significant effects 
on price 
This is a surprising result, because, according to the opinions of intermediaries, one of the main aims of 
families who want to swop is to get a house (detached or semi-detached) or an apartment. 
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State of Construction: 
 
C(6)=C(7)=C(8)=0 
 
Wald Test:   
Equation: EQ02   
    
    Test Statistic Value   df     Probability 
        F-statistic 0.572980 (3, 118)   0.6339 
 
Conclusion: State of Construction does not affect price formation  
 
This too is a surprising result. But it could be caused by the fact that people know that the general state of 
construction of the existing housing stock is moderate or bad, so they always expect to get a property that will 
require much repairing. 
 
Intermediary:  
 
In the case of this Dummy variable, the F test will match with T-test results of the Permuta Estimated 
Transactions Model, because this variable has only one size, namely present/absent. The probability result 
was 0.0000. This means that the variable does explain price formation (below 5%) - see Annex 14 No 2.1. The 
intermediary definitely influences the price formation. He/she contributes relevant information about current 
and future property values, proposes alternative property exchanges for a specific swap transaction, and finds 
the legal gaps to fit the transaction arrangements in order to reassure families/people that the properties will be 
exchanged. In addition, his/her fee is strongly connected with the value of the property, so the intermediary will 
try as much as possible to increase the value of the land and buildings. 
 
We can now look at the information that the model offers regarding the effect of each independent variable on 
the dependent variable and whether this is consistent with expectations.  
 
Variable: Year of Operation (Y), gives us the effect that the year has on the price or value of the transaction. 
Here are the results of the coefficients.  
   
 Year Co-efficient 
Y1 1995 -0.083970 
Y2 1996 -0.395101 
Y3 1997 -1.158990 
Y4 1998 0.046711 
Y5 1999 -0.028733 
Y6 2000 -0.000393 
Y7 2001 0.088677 
Y8 2002 -0.060419 
Y9 2003 0.617836 
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Y10 2004 0.034413 
Y11 2005 0.293423 
Y12 2006 0,64655 
 
Table 6.19 Effect that the year has on the price or value of the informal transaction 
 
One can see that the years 2003 to 2006 raise prices. The most significant are years 2003 and 2006, which 
show a rise in prices (with respect to the average) of 61% and 64 % respectively.  
 
According to the expectations, there would be a reduction of real estate prices in the permute operations 
during the hardest years of the crisis (special period) 1995-2000, because of the diminished financial capacity 
of Cuban families. The model records this. In the years post 2000, we expected a gradual increase in real 
estate prices caused by economic improvements. The model shows this too. Between 1997 and 2002, the 
government introduced new legal and regulatory instruments to control the permute operations. This affected 
prices, which were stable (2001) or declined (2002). In 2003 there was a change, with the introduction of new 
regulations and the ability of the permute mechanisms to adapt or evade the imposed regulations (see chapter 
5): the model shows a big price rise in that year. 
 
Variable: Municipalities (M), reflects the effect of the municipal location of the permuta. The model results 
are :  
Municipality  Coefficient 
Playa  M1 0.143428 
Plaza M2 0.124813 
Centro Habana M3 -0.235674 
Habana Vieja M4 -0.143693 
Regla M5 0.262135 
Habana Este M6 -0.163547 
Guanabacoa M7 0.835206 
San Miguel M8 0.410270 
10 Octubre M9 -0.072859 
Cerro M10 -0.251998 
Lisa M12 0.347744 
Boyeros M13 -0.595611 
Cotorro M15 -0,660214 
 
Table 6.20 Effect of the municipal location of the permuta 
 
It should be pointed out that two of the municipalities were not included because there were no transactions 
recorded in the Date Base. These are M11 (Marianao) and M14 (Arroyo Naranjo).  
 
The municipalities with the biggest positive effect on prices are: Guanabacoa, San Miguel and la Lisa, all on 
the periphery. Playa and Plaza also show positive effects with 14% and 12% respectively, but these effects are 
smaller than in the three peripheral municipalities previously mentioned. The municipalities with a value 
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reduction are Cotorro and Boyeros, with an influence of 66% and 59% respectively. Other municipalities such 
as Centro Habana, Cerro, Habana del Este y Habana Vieja also reduce the value, but less.  
 
The model results are in general plausible and match the experts’ opinions about the higher prices in the 
municipalities of Plaza and Playa, as well as the lower prices in the central municipalities of Centro Habana, 
Cerro and Habana Vieja that, despite their good urban accessibility, have very deteriorated building stocks and 
are therefore not very suitable for permuta operations. The price reduction in the case of the municipality 
Habana del Este may be explained by the deficient transportation, the lack of services, and the small 
functional diversity, although the building stock is in good state of repair. A deeper analysis is required of the 
municipalities of Guanabacoa, San Miguel and La Lisa, where the prices are higher than the rest, despite the 
lack of centrality and the not so good urban services. The high prices could be the result of attractive internal 
micro areas that may have better services than elsewhere in the municipality. It is also possible that people 
wanting to permute have not followed the usual practice – registering in the desired municipality – but have 
registered in the municipality which they want to leave, as this might speed up the procedures. 
 
Variable: Intermediary (PT) represents the presence of a middleman in the analyzed transactions, with a 
coefficient of 0.377496 and a resulting rise in price of 37.7%.  
 
 
8. Comparing the outcomes of the two models 
 
The empirical results obtained with these two models show that most of the analyzed variables are statistically 
significant and influence the price per m2 (Pr/m2). With these observed results, one can be assured that in 
both models, the dependent variable can be (largely) explained as a function of the combined presence and 
absence of diverse attributes of independent variables, most of which are qualitative. It is plausible that most of 
these variables apply to both models, or at least that the variables of one model should not be ruled out for the 
other, since all the variables can affect the value of urban land and buildings.  
 
In order to compare the outcomes of the models, we need to distinguish between the explanatory variables 
which occur in both models, and the explanatory variables which are specific to each model 
 
The variables that occur in both models are municipalities and year of transaction. One can compare the 
effect of these by looking, for each variable, at the Positive (+) or Negative (-) Signs and at the size of the 
effect : 
 
High   ***    more than 60 % 
Moderate **       between 30% and less than 60% 
Low  *    less than 30% 
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 Effect on the Independent 
Variable 
Municipality Formal 
Transactions 
Informal / 
Permuta 
Playa +  *** +  * 
Plaza +  *** +  * 
Centro Habana +  *** -   * 
Habana Vieja +  *** -   * 
Regla -   * +  * 
Habana Este -  *** -  * 
Guanabacoa -  ** + *** 
San Miguel +   * +  ** 
10 Octubre  -   * 
Cerro +    * -   * 
Marianao + ***  
Lisa -   ** +  ** 
Boyeros -  *** -  ** 
A. Naranjo -    *  
Cotorro -  *** -  *** 
 
Table 6.21 Compared Municipality effects on the independent variable in both models 
 
The fact that we are dealing with only one city (all the municipalities share some of the characteristics of that 
city) means that municipalities with positive values in both models are the ones with the biggest influence on 
land and building values. Nine of the fifteen municipalities have this positive effect, to a greater or lesser 
degree, but the positive effect in one municipality does not always apply to both the formal and the informal 
transactions. A possible reason is that the informal transactions concern housing, and the formal more 
commercial uses. Despite the importance granted to the municipality variable in the statistical models, it is 
necessary to consider that the actual political and administrative division dates from 1976 and was not made 
according to urban, functional or socio-cultural logics, so one municipality can contain both attractive and 
unattractive locations.. We expect that the 106 repartitions that form the traditional city neighborhoods may 
have a bigger influence on value than the division into municipalities. To increase the statistical accuracy and 
the explanation potential of the model, the municipality variable should be replaced by a variable that 
articulates better the similarities and differences between city neighborhoods: municipalities should be 
replaced by homogenous micro districts.  
 
In the same way, we can analyze the Variable of Years for both models. The year variable is very relevant in 
the informal model as it reflects macroeconomic and political trends which directly affect the actions of Cuban 
households. 
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Years 
Effect on the Independent Variable 
Formal  
Transactions 
 
Informal / 
Permuta 
1995  -     * 
1996  -    ** 
1997  -    *** 
1998 +    ** +     * 
1999 +     * -     * 
2000 -     * -     * 
2001 -     * +    * 
2002 -     * -     * 
2003  +    *** 
2004  +     * 
2005  +    ** 
2006  +    ** 
 
Table 6.22 Compared Year effects on the independent variable in both models 
 
Even although the variable ‘years’ was not statistically significant for the Formal Transaction Model, it is 
interesting to compare the year performance between both Models. The downturn of real estate investments 
with foreign partners after 2002 means that there is comparable information for only five years: for those 5 
years the effects are different between the two models.  
 
For the formal transactions, it might be expected that the year-variable had a positive effect during the worst 
recession years between1994 and 2000, because Real Estate became a fresh and positive economic initiative 
launched by the Government, an initiative that foreign investors at the time perceived as the beginning of a 
major economic and property reform. However, there are no data until 1998, and between 1998 and 2002 
there was not always a positive trend. In the informal sector of the permutes, on the contrary, there was a price 
reduction during these years due to the economic crisis in which family revenues were oriented to basic needs. 
After 2001, the year variable shows a trend to higher prices in the informal market. 
 
Other explanatory variables are either exclusive to one model (e.g. method of calculation) or occur in both 
models but in a different way. Variables considered independent and pertinent to both models are: 
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Variables Formal Transaction 
Model  
Informal Transaction 
Model 
Method of Calculation Applicable Not applicable 
Type of Right Applicable 
(Years of Usufruct) 
Applicable 
(Different type of 
property right) 
Use Applicable Applicable 
Type of Property Applicable in 
residential cases 
Applicable 
State of Construction Applicable  Applicable 
 
Table 6.23 Variables considered independent and pertinent to both models 
 
 
9. Conclusions 
 
A first conclusion is that in both cases the models are statistically robust and stable. So we can conclude that 
the way in which urban property is appraised (formal model) and exchanged (informal model) is systematic, 
and in general does not contradict urban economic theory on price formation. This can be concluded even 
though, in the case of the formal transactions, the actors are limited or, in the case of the informal transaction, 
the information is less than perfect. Analysis of this latter process is quite unique, as the references to such 
processes are usually superficial and not demonstrated. The results of this analysis help us to understand the 
mechanisms which have arisen among the population who face the restrictions on buying, selling or 
transferring properties - the property swapping process among households.  
 
Moreover, in spite of the fact that in land and property transactions in Cuba, the state entities and various local 
institutions are always involved (they regulate foreign investment and authorize permutes), both models 
indicate that there are in effect land and property markets, in which factors such as accessibility, neighborhood 
prestige and infrastructure conditions affect supply and demand and therefore prices.  
 
Where there are differences between the two models, these may be caused by the different logics which arise 
between involved actors, assessment criteria, and the socio-economic peculiarities at the moment of the 
transaction. In short, the effect of the particular variables depends on the specific formal or informal 
environment. A good example of these different logics is the changes in the policy of the Cuban government in 
the face of the economic downturns: first the opening of the 90s then, a few years later, the hasty decision to 
reverse the opening when new links with Venezuela and China brought improvements. All these changes were 
accompanied by institutional re-accommodation. The informal context on the other hand is very sensitive to 
changes in the legal aspects of the housing policy and monetary policies (as one of the financial sources is 
remittances), but is also sensitive to the overall economic changes. 
 
These models could be improved. This can be done by including other indicators which one might expect to be 
relevant to urban property price formation: the access to commercial activities both formal and informal, 
the distance to city center and to transportation hubs; the presence of urban parks or green belts; the 
population density, the environmental contamination index; the safety or danger indicators. The grouping of 
urban areas according to functionality, accessibility and quality of infrastructure into ‘Homogeneous Micro 
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Districts’ might explain better some of the effects of location. Information technology, in particular Geographic 
Information System (GIS), could be used to incorporate these aforementioned variables, giving a visual 
demonstration of their distribution and incidence on land price/value across the urban matrix. 
 
The significance of the findings from the models (even in their present imperfect form) for our argument about 
urban land management and the efficiency of land use is the following. We argued in chapter 5 that the 
allocation of housing by the permuta results in the existing housing being used more efficiently (it gives more 
consumer satisfaction). We have seen in the present chapter that those permuta transactions follow an 
identifiable logic: there is a structure in the housing and locational characteristics that the households value: 
we can draw conclusions about the characteristics which households value. 
 
The econometric analysis demonstrates that the valuations for the formal transactions also show regularities, 
but it is more difficult to draw conclusions. For those valuations are not the result of market processes – 
demanders and suppliers interacting freely – but of the application of standard valuation methods, with the 
outcomes adjusted by negotiations between representatives of the Cuban state and foreign businesses. 
Where the econometric analysis finds regularities, this might signify no more than that the state valuers have 
applied the methods correctly (e.g. the significance of the surface rights granted). However, the finding that the 
variable ‘municipality’ is significant probably indicates more than that, namely that the foreign businesses 
(demanders) value different locations differently. Indications about the efficiency with which the foreign 
businesses use land can probably be drawn from the finding that prices in some municipalities are 
systematically different from in other municipalities: the foreign businesses produce more from a square metre 
of land in those high value municipalities than elsewhere. The finding that proposed use is significant was to 
be expected, but not in the form that is found. That seems to indicate that the valuers were not using the 
method correctly. And the finding that the valuation method has a significant effect casts doubt on the 
correctness of the methods or their application.  
 
These findings can be put into practice in the following ways. As we argued in chapter 2, the price of land and 
buildings is an indicator (although it must be interpreted with caution) of the economic efficiency with which 
land is used. Then, if we can deduce from the econometric model that land use ‘L1’ increases in price by being 
near to facility ‘F3’ but land use ‘L2’ does not, we can conclude that land where facility ‘F3’ is located would be 
used more efficiently by locating ‘L1’ nearby but not ‘L2’. Similarly, if we can deduce from the model that 
households value certain municipalities more than others, and if we know why, then it would increase the 
efficiency with which land is used if the missing qualities in the less valued municipalities were to be provided. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and recommendations for better management of urban land in Cuba 
 
1. Introduction  
In the course of this research we have described and analyzed the problems and consequences connected with 
the sub-optimal use of land and buildings in Cuba, specifically in Havana. Some of the consequences we have 
mentioned are very visible in the urban space: the poor state of repair of many buildings, the precarious condition 
and obsolescence of infrastructure and urban equipment -see Annexes 15 and 16-, the increasing number of 
informal housing constructions, the inappropriate location of urban functions, and the inadequate uses often given 
to valuable buildings. There are other problems that are less evident and tangible: the deterioration in the 
provision of the necessary amount and quality of housing and public services –see Annexes 17 and 18-, and the 
emergence of social and spatial inequalities. And then there are the causes, and the political effects, of those 
problems just mentioned: the lack of institutional effectiveness, the proliferation of informality and corruption in the 
performance of public and private sectors, the loss of public confidence in the government structures, including a 
lack of organization, coordination and transparency in the administrative procedures concerning land and 
buildings.  
The first chapter explained how the mechanisms for urban land management in Cuba have been chosen to 
achieve the provision of urban functions and how equity aspects were prioritized over economic efficiency. We 
also explained the gradual breakdown of this approach, fair in concept, but hindered in practice by the 
ineffectiveness of various political, legal, economic and institutional factors. This starting point helped us to 
choose The Problem for this research as: how could land management be changed so as to increase the 
economic efficiency with which land is used?  
Part of chapter 1 explains the concept and relevance of land management and the existing allocation 
mechanisms, namely through the prevailing role of planning and institutions, through the market and through the 
combinations of both. In this respect we clearly state our preference for an environment where land-use planning, 
a legal and a fiscal framework, financial instruments and appropriate governance can be used to implement land 
management by interacting with markets in land and real estate. 
In chapter 2, we focus on the various potentials of urban land as an economic resource: as a consumption good, 
as area to locate constructions for the production of goods and services, and as a financial asset. These 
categories are then linked to the efficiency concepts – allocative, spatial, technical and institutional - to prepare us 
conceptually for our proposals for improving the economic efficiency with which land is used.  
Our starting point is the concept of economic efficiency, measured in some sense of ratio of output to input. 
Efficiency in the production process increases if the value of the outcomes increases more than the value of the 
inputs. This allocative efficiency concept is central to our work, and other efficiency approaches such as the 
institutional, organizational and technical are directly or indirectly included in our analysis of the elements that 
integrate and affect the inputs and the outputs.1  
                                                          
1 Buitelaar, Edwin. “A Transaction-cost Analysis of the Land Development Process”. Urban Studies, Vol 41.  No 13, UK, Glasgow, 
December, 2004. Allocative efficiency and process efficiency cannot be completely separated, more transaction costs lead to a greater 
input and hence to a reduced allocative efficiency. 
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We give examples in chapter 2 of cases where land and building resources are not optimally allocated. We 
expect that some of these problems could be tackled or removed by improving the land management 
mechanisms. To this end, more attention should be paid to the economic value of land. We argue that if some of 
the rules and practices were changed in particular ways, land would be used more efficiently without harming the 
social and political ideas which are valued by the Cuban society. 
If the effects of applying new mechanisms can be measured and compared, then the change in efficiency can be 
measured too: the measurement need not be in absolute terms, but in relative terms. In chapter 2 we identify the 
areas and situations where changes can lead to more efficient outcomes. The economic effects of a change in 
land use are changes in one or more of the following: 
- Output (attainment of the expected goals, and improvement in the provision of different functions, for 
example housing = change in consumer satisfaction and in goods and services = change in output) 
- input (changes in the kind, diversity, amount and organization of resources spent to produce the output) 
- external effects for others (positive or negative impacts not directly connected to the chosen and 
expected goals e.g. more or less consumer satisfaction caused by change in neighbouring uses, e.g. 
more or less environmental nuisance caused by change in traffic or in discharges). Those external 
effects might be changes in either inputs or outputs. 
In chapter 2 we identified four types of situations where a change might lead to land being used more efficiently: 
 Situation I: the area of land for each use remains the same, the location also, but the intensity of use (for 
some of the uses) increases. In this situation, the efficiency is improved if the desired outputs are increased, for 
example: producing an additional number of housing units or square meters of office space (extra outputs), with a 
higher value than the inputs (extra inputs). 
Situation II: in some locations, the area of land for some uses increases and for other uses decreases, 
the total area of land for each use remains the same, the intensity of use also. There is an increase in 
economic efficiency if the swapping of land use between two locations results in extra output, or an increase in 
the users’ satisfaction, or less inputs caused, for example, by reduced transport costs. 
Situation III: in some locations, the area of land for some uses increases and for other uses decreases, 
this is not compensated in the whole land area, whereby the area of land for some uses increases in total 
and for other uses decreases in total, the intensity of use remains the same. In this situation there is 
efficiency increase if the results (extra output) after deducting the resource costs, construction, transportation and 
environmental costs, have a higher value than the value of the cancelled productive use. 
Situation IV: as for (III), but for those uses which lose land, this loss in output is compensated by higher 
use intensities. Here efficiency follows the logic of situation III, but the intensity of use is increased. 
In chapter 2 for each of these situations we provide real examples that illustrate the actual possibilities of raising 
efficiency – obtaining more outputs - by changes in the inputs.  
The function of this last chapter is twofold. First, we apply explicitly the concept of allocative efficiency to the 
current land management in Cuba, as described and analysed in the chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6. We conclude that 
certain rules and practices of that land management result in land being used inefficiently. Second, and based on 
the outcome of those analyses, we propose changes to the rules and practices which would increase the 
efficiency with which land in Cuba is used, and which would not harm the realisation of other social and political 
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goals: and which might even realise them better. Those changes concern mainly how the economic significance 
of land could better be taken into account.  
 
2. How the rules and practices affect the efficiency with which land is used 
In this section, we analyse systematically the various types of rules and their effects, building upon the chapters 
3, 4, 5 and 6.  
a) Rules and practices about allocating land 
The previous chapters have made clear how great the role of the Cuban government is in the allocation of land 
for public investments, housing, and services. In chapter 3 we explained how planning is the instrument for 
coordinating urban development, and how the land-use plans come out of the planning process. We said also 
that these plans failed to take account of the economic efficiency of land use, because they attached little 
importance to land value (in contrast to decisions made about foreign businesses, see chapter 4). Land allocation 
in Cuba has been required to take account of land valuations, but this has been limited, has only a small effect, 
and is sometimes discretional.  
Part of the problem derives from a poor connection of land-use plans – national, provincial, and local - to the 
design of policies and investments. In chapter 3 we saw also how, although in theory land allocation between the 
different functions is established by zoning, in practice the short and medium term decisions are coordinated not 
through the planning mechanisms but through sectoral mechanisms. This sort of practice leads to an unbalanced 
provision of urban functions, to unequal distribution of land and building resources, and to a lack of cohesion in 
the production of space, where government investments mingle with informal solutions of the inhabitants.  
The various ministries and sectors of the economy allocate land and building resources, which have been granted 
to them by the central government for their investment plans, without considering the needs of municipalities, 
provinces or cities. This predominantly sectoral behaviour has not posed big obstacles for planning schemes at 
national level, given the large scale of those plans, but has made it difficult for provincial and municipal planning 
to work for the present or future local needs. In the case of housing programs, for example, nothing has been 
done to diversify the types of housing built, in order to provide housing options for different income levels. The 
proliferation of informal settlements with improvised infrastructure, on vacant land and also on land plots where 
buildings have collapsed or are being demolished in central city areas, shows that insufficient attention is given to 
land supply for specific local housing needs. As we have seen in chapter 5, there has been an increase in the 
number of people taking their own, personal and informal solutions by applying for a permuta option. 
The land-use development plans are not balanced across the city in such a way as to answer to the interests of 
the neighbourhoods. Instead, there is an emphasis on development plans for tourism and office developments, 
which are concentrated in the better-off areas of the city, while the most deteriorated areas are awaiting attention. 
There are many cases of polluting industrial functions which would be better located outside the city, but which 
have nevertheless been located in city areas that could be better used for housing or other social services. It is 
also evident that land-use plans are not matched with financial budgets. The resources are not allocated to the 
areas where planning indicates that there are shortages of housing, of infrastructure, or of services, or where 
there are other identified problems. And when the interventions in infrastructure and public areas are made, they 
are not implemented in a co-ordinated way in order to diminish financial and social costs and nuisances. 
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Government and public entities with an investment plan are, according to the law, obliged to follow the land use 
plans and to contract the services of a state project enterprise to obtain the technical documentation which is 
required for obtaining certificates, construction licenses and permits. But when land-use decisions are made by 
government, public or private entities, these often take place outside land-use plans, lack the necessary technical 
documents, and do not fulfil what is established by the legal framework. There are no solid institutional 
mechanisms to check if what is planned and approved is actually implemented. This provokes contradictions and 
conflicts during the process and makes monitoring difficult. Nevertheless, it has not been a big concern for the 
government, because that latter plays the threefold role of land owner, land planner, and land developer.  
Private persons, on the other hand, must go to the Municipal Investment Directorate for similar procedures before 
being able to apply for licenses and permits. This requirement is often unobserved, which has led to an increasing 
number of land and building developments that partially or totally violate the law and evade government controls, 
not complying with the necessary planning and building permissions, or using non-orthodox alternatives to get 
passed. A consequence of not having a contract with the investment or technical agency is that the clients have 
no the right to complain or to demand restitution when services or solutions turn out to be wrong or are rejected 
by the entities that grant the permissions and construction licenses. 2  
In 2001 the Council of Ministers issued a Decree to reduce the contraventions in land use and urban 
development, mainly for housing issues. The aim was to tackle the dispersion of regulatory powers, and to 
improve control over the irregularities in the use of land and buildings by natural and legal persons.3 This Decree 
includes sanctions, such as demolition of constructions, confiscation of construction means and resources, 
confiscation of buildings, and revoking the issued licenses. A similar decree enables fines to be charged. There is 
also a mechanism to legalize informal housing if the irregularity is that owners do not have all the necessary 
documents. There are many more legal rules that have gone through many adjustments in the last decade. They 
are not clear to most persons, and the content of the resolutions is more directed towards prohibition than 
enabling, not contributing to more efficient housing management.  
b) Rules and practices about rights and obligations 
In Cuba, the state has ample rights over land and buildings: and those rights impose limits and imply obligations 
on others – the citizens – to respect those rights. The opposite – the citizen has rights over land and buildings 
and the state has the obligation to respect those rights – is much less strong. The legal obligations on the Cuban 
state regarding land and buildings are in many cases overlooked, partly because controls are very weak.  
In chapter 3, we described the fragmentation and dispersion of the legal rules concerning land and building -
property acquisition, usufruct and ownership. Some of the rights and obligations are set down in the Civil Code, 
some in the Municipal Urban Regulations, others in the Decrees issued by the National Institute of Housing, 
others are issued by the Council of Ministers, and others by the Ministry of Justice. This situation is confusing, 
makes land management more complex and difficult to assess, and diminishes the trust of the people in the legal 
framework. Part of the problem is the absence of one land authority, from national to local level, that could 
integrate all of these issues, from which the design of land management procedures could be derived, and which 
would give to all stakeholders (whether government, non- government or private) technical guidance and 
consultation on land issues. 
                                                          
2 There are many cases of this, for example the infrastructure connections or repairs that individuals and families assume at their own cost 
without proper technical guidance or even without asking for permissions, or the private improvements made by the state repair brigades to 
public water, gas or electricity infrastructure that are paid informally whereby there are no possibilities to reclaim for bad executions. 
3 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. El régimen jurídico de la vivienda y demás bienes inmuebles en Cuba. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, 
Economia y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. 
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As we explained in chapter 3, the limits to the rights over property are made to protect the public interest - norms 
for the protection of the environment, the urban regulations, and cultural heritage protection - and to protect 
private interests – relations between neighbours, servitudes, party walls, openings, rights to light and views. 
Among the limits to the rights of owners are, for example, the prohibition on using underground land (it belongs to 
the state), restrictions imposed for the protection of natural resources and the environment, and the obligation to 
allow the passage of electrical and communications networks. Such limitations are not obstacles to land 
management efficiency: on the contrary, they facilitate it. However, other rules and practices produce inefficiency. 
Expropriation 
The state has the right to expropriate; this means it can acquire compulsorily private property required for the 
public or social interest, in exchange for its equivalent value. In Cuba, the compensation is way below the real 
property value: the obligation on the state to compensate the owner properly is weak. There is a positive side to 
this, because the use that will be provided by the state on that land is in the social interest and will benefit a large 
population, and there are two negative sides. The first is the dissatisfaction and frustration of the expropriated 
who are not allowed to exercise their rights of ownership, and the second is the low valuation by the state of the 
properties.  
Confiscation 
The state has the right of confiscation, which is the compulsory and definite taking of private property without any 
compensation. This is applied in cases of proven illegal buying and selling of properties, or in the case of definite 
emigration. The issue of emigrations is delicate, as the majority of families or persons who leave the country 
would like their family, relatives or friends remaining in the country to be able to take over the homes and 
properties left behind. Confiscations have become a perverse mechanism through which the government can get 
hold of properties for nothing. Inhabitants react to this by permuting their good properties and moving into smaller 
and more dilapidated ones, getting money in exchange that they can take when they leave the country. So when 
they leave, the property left with the government has the least possible value. The procedures for doing this are 
explained in chapter 5 for permutas. But the potential migrants have to conceal their intentions in order to get the 
permuta authorized. So they move sometimes years before they migrate, which obliges them to live with their 
families in very poor conditions for quite a long time, while at the same time there is always the risk of the 
authorities finding out. 
Usufruct 
The right of usufruct, described in chapter 3, is possible for legal and natural persons, who can enjoy it for life 
without becoming owners of the property. As we stated in chapter 3, the state is the only agency which can grant 
this right and which can annul it in the same way it granted it. Some effects of the way in which this right is used 
are described below. 
The usufruct given to natural persons is mainly for housing and can be granted to use single spaces or rooms – 
generally in slums - which are not self-contained living spaces. This right has been extensively applied and it 
poses problems for a more efficient land and building management because it diminishes the responsibility of the 
lessee –public entities or individuals- to maintain and preserve, or to invest in improvements. The state as lessor 
receives no benefits – taxes or rents - and has in any case no resources to improve these buildings. The users – 
lessees - do not recognize the value of properties given for free and that can be taken from them at a moment’s 
notice, and therefore do not feel responsible for, or involved in, the dilapidation of this stock. The number of land 
and building properties granted in usufruct is considerable: for example in Old Havana, 45% of the population live 
in slums where rooms are given in usufruct - see Annex 17. 
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When usufruct rights are granted to national entities, they – as lessees - tend to treat the land and property more 
responsibly. This is because they want to use the property in the furtherance of their public tasks. This type of 
organization has, in this way, many properties under its control exempted from fiscal obligations. For example, 
the Ministry of Culture occupies a number of buildings and houses given in usufruct for different purposes - 
culture houses, art galleries, offices, museums and so on. The same applies to the Ministry of Education, for 
schools, offices, school support services; to the Ministry of Health; and to other administrative entities and 
government enterprises for the various functions they perform.  
The national entities as lessees are limited in their decision making about strategies to maintain or up-keep the 
properties assigned to them, because the coordination of resources and investments for these purposes is 
determined by the centralized and sectoral rules. In the case of land use changes, it can happen that not all of 
these facilities are fully and permanently used, and sometimes some of the spaces are given for other public or 
private temporary uses, for example to workers of that entity that have no place to live, or for a workshop or 
storage, or in the case of vacant land, for a garden or agricultural products.  
The right of usufruct can in all cases be revoked by the state if the property is required for other public or social 
uses. The usufruct is not transferable and cannot be taxed. The state (as lessor) can impose obligations to 
conserve and maintain the property, to use it for only for the authorised destination, and it can allow works, 
plantations in open areas, or installations needed for its adequate use and conservation. As far as we have been 
able to discover, the rules applicable to public entities (as lessees) with respect to changes of uses, and about 
penalties if the lessees let the property deteriorate, are not set down in law, but such matters could be settled in 
contracts between the state and the entity, giving certainty to both parties.  
Municipalities are more limited as lessees of usufruct properties than ministries or provincial entities. 
Municipalities must be authorized by higher powers, and usually they have fewer properties under their custody 
under usufruct rights. They could manage more property, leasing or renting it, and thus getting income for 
municipal purposes. But usufruct rights over property granted to a lessee do not allow that. 
Giving state property in usufruct to allow others to use it privately, for housing or small productive activities, is 
covered by the law, and it is a power that could be positive as it helps to solve real problems of the inhabitants. 
But granting usufructs for that purpose should not be done without legal justification, nor without the requirement 
that the necessary land or building use permits be obtained.  
As a consequence of the way in which usufruct rights are used in practice, we can find a family living in a movie-
theatre lobby or in a garage of a public office, and even in the technical room of a monumental fountain. Once 
these temporary uses are granted, mainly for housing given the existing shortage, it is difficult to move the 
occupants who usually stay for good. The government could, but does not, evict them, in a mixture of state 
paternalistic and social protection. If they were evicted, the local authorities must find them a temporary place to 
stay, and would be obliged to put them on the list of social housing aspirants. Or the municipality can legalize the 
use of housing in those spaces.  
Many buildings granted under usufruct rights to state entities are empty without any use or with a very poor one, 
for the lessee gets the space free and has no incentive to use it efficiently. Many such buildings have been closed 
for years, suffering deterioration and being vandalized. Sometimes, the authorities have transformed them into 
housing (as we explained in the previous section about ‘wrong uses’), because of the housing shortage. For 
these cases, the Housing Law allows state-owned buildings and spaces, not made for housing, to be rented for 
housing purposes, establishing rights and obligations for the users, the renting prices, and the terms under which 
the contracts can be ended. There are many cases where, after adequate transformations, the housing 
directorate has legally authorized the change of land use to housing, and has issued the property as a dwelling. 
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This rule is not intended for an efficient management of land and buildings, it is more a way out of the present 
housing shortage. It is better to convert public buildings into housing than to leave them empty: it is socially more 
efficient, but it is not the best solution for the functioning of the city. 
The poor way in which public entities use land and buildings encourages private persons to behave in the same 
way towards state and private properties. People feel free, for example, to accommodate a dwelling in the empty 
swimming pool of a former hotel,4 to annex the vacant plot next to their house or building by putting a fence or 
wall around it, without even asking who the owner is (people assume it is social property) and to use it to plant 
vegetables, raise animals, or build a garage for the car. People feel free to construct an extension on the lateral 
corridor that separates properties, where urban regulations forbid such constructions because of ventilation, 
lighting and privacy requirements.5 Such behaviour is aggravated by the limited legal possibilities offered by the 
law for collectively acquiring and sharing common property in partnerships and cooperatives, domestic 
enterprises, community workshops and other mechanisms. Such legal rules would help to improve the 
management of land and buildings in these situations. In terms of efficiency, the relation input/output is very poor 
because the satisfaction of individuals who irresponsibly use land or buildings is made at the cost of others in 
terms of environmental nuisances, and the practice affects the value and coherence of the street and surrounding 
properties in terms of urban and architectural quality.  
Right of surface 
The right of surface, mentioned in chapter 3, is different from usufruct because it gives ownership of what stands 
on the land.  
There are limitations on the use of the surface right: the land use cannot be changed, and selling the land or 
building is prohibited, so that owners cannot use properties to get financial benefits. In reality, people sell and buy 
such land and buildings in the informal market, they diversify the uses of their buildings to accommodate the new 
economic activities allowed by the government, and they definitely use their property for financial gain. This illegal 
use of the surface right allows a more efficient use of land than if the law were to be observed. There is a growing 
awareness about this, and these legal issues are now being reviewed. 
 
The municipal housing directorates can give perpetual surface rights on vacant land plots, owned by the state, for 
housing construction. The municipal authorities deal with the concession and the regulatory framework. The 
beneficiaries pay the legal price, and they are obliged to start constructing within less than a year, or the 
concession can be revoked. These rights cannot be transferred to relatives or family while they are alive, but it is 
possible to pass the rights to the descendants through inheritance. These procedures affect land management 
efficiency, because they are taken without regard for land-use plans or for land valuation mechanisms, and we 
often find that very well located and valuable land plots are given in perpetual use to a single family to build a one 
storey modest dwelling where there could be a five storey apartment building with ground floor commerce and 
parking space.  
 
                                                          
4 Buscándote Habana –Finding Havana-. Cuban independent movie (documentary) filmed by Alina Rodriguez Abreu in 2006 about the 
problems of immigrants that come to Havana City from the easternmost provinces. 
5 As a personal anecdote we have recollection of a family that not so long ago moved to our neighborhood which is an urbanization of the 
1950s with a network of main streets and secondary ones for service and parking entrances. This new comers, probably unaware of the 
urban layout parameters of the area, decided to put a fence to the empty piece of land next to their home that turned out to be the service 
street, and solidly incorporated this area of around 200 square meters to their private property. For ten years they used this area of public 
domain, namely a street, for private uses of the family, they even planted trees on it and built a cistern for water, until a new investment of 
social housing was located on the vacant land plot next to it and the planning authorities, measuring the property, realized that the next 
door inhabitants had completely eaten up the secondary street area. The family removed the fence and returned the land and said they 
were sorry because they didn’t know this was for public use, and that was the end of the story. 
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Private owners of houses and apartments can give surface rights to other persons to build or expand dwellings on 
the area of their building, mainly rooftops, or yards. This right is not allowed for state property granted in usufruct, 
but this violation often takes place without being controlled; there is a very nice vernacular home that sits on the 
roof of the original Stock Building of Havana, in Old Havana Municipality, which is a state office building - see 
Annex 21.  
Full ownership 
Full ownership of land or buildings in heritage areas can be transferred only to the state, which has the right of 
acquisition and in certain cases of expropriation. This is relevant for efficiency, at least in the case of Old Havana, 
(and it could be replicated in other areas), because the Municipality in coordination with the City Historians Office 
devises a more efficient management of the building stock under its responsibility and a smoother functioning of 
the different neighbourhood services and infrastructure. In Old Havana, the planning is more linked with 
investment plans and there is a less dependent relationship with the provincial and national levels. Executively 
and methodologically, it has actually worked the other way around, because the case of Old Havana has proved 
useful for new projects and experiences concerning local development.  
Right to rent 
The right that private persons – as private landlords – may rent their property to others has so many limitations 
and obligations under Cuban law that it discourages many persons from offering their properties for rent. Among 
the limitations we find that rental agreements in Cuban pesos are not approved for persons who live in Cuba 
temporarily or who are permanent residents abroad, rental agreements are denied to those considered immoral 
or that have penal records, to those that have committed housing illegalities or violations, to those who, if they 
were to rent part of their property, would live in overcrowded conditions or have less than 10 square meters per 
person. People who rent in Cuban pesos cannot rent also in convertible pesos and vice versa. Some of the 
obligations on the landlords are to give inspectors free access to the dwelling and show them all the documents 
concerning the tenancy inscription, not to rent for less than 24 hours, not to allow illegal activities or conduct by 
the tenants, and in such cases to call the police, to inform the authorities if they wish to travel abroad for more 
than three months or if there are intentions of permanently leaving the country, not to hire workers to help in 
activities related to the tenancy, and to follow all the established legal procedures –taxes, registration, customs, 
etc.- when these are required, and to attend all meetings called by the Municipal Housing Directorate.6 
Another aspect of rental agreements, where rights and obligations with land and buildings are unclear or not 
enforced, concerns maintenance responsibilities. These could be shared between private and public actors and 
regulated legally, but the limited property rights and benefits in the case of private actors and state housing 
tenants, and the limited motivation and control in the case of public entities, have not encouraged this. The result, 
aggravated by the permanent unavailability of construction resources and the limited financial resources available 
for the public sector, is the poor maintenance of buildings and infrastructure in Havana. 
For housing rented from the government, there are no rules to require or motivate landlord or tenant to upkeep 
the buildings and apartments. Under a different law for tax and property rights, owners and occupants might 
cooperate or come together in order to undertake repairs, as happens with homes privately owned. The present 
inflexible rules are limiting the lifetime of a consumer good – housing - that is very scarce in Havana.  
 
                                                          
6 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, Economía y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011. Capitulo 8. 
Arrendamiento de viviendas de propiedad personal. Pag. 79. 
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c) Rules and practices about investments in land and buildings 
In Cuba, an investment is defined as a decision about the use of financial, human, material and information 
resources to obtain social and economic benefits, or to increase, improve or maintain the generation of profits. 
Every year, the Cuban government entities at the different scales discuss their investments and apply for the 
necessary public financing, using as a main source national budget or public bank credits. These investments are 
programmed in the proposal for the plan for the following year, where they are classified in various categories: for 
social and economic purposes, for territorial development purposes, for productive enterprises, for foreign 
investments, for social infrastructure, for productive infrastructure, and for other national development strategies.  
The category of social and economic projects follows an investment logic which is different from the one applied 
to productive enterprises. The first is subject to an evaluation of social and economic performance, while the 
second is subject to an evaluation of financial profitability. The social and economic projects in Cuba are 
expected to use resources satisfactorily, but it is not demanded of them that they be financially efficient. This 
explains in part why, when land is allocated for these purposes, no account is taken of land value, nor of 
alternative uses of that land which might be more efficient, nor of alternative locations for those activities. 
An investment project is divided into different phases: preparation or pre-investment, implementation, operation 
and finally evaluation. The pre-investment phase is the most important for land use, because it includes the 
conceptualization of the investment, the definition of the use (in what to invest?), the feasibility studies, the 
financial availability (how much to invest?), the analysis of opportunity costs, the design of the outputs and other 
strategic objectives. This phase also includes the elaboration of architectural and engineering designs and other 
technical studies. These are used by the physical planning entities to determine the amount and location of the 
land (where to invest?), and to determine the urban regulations and construction indexes which establish 
development rights. The physical planning entities then provide the information about the access to infrastructure 
networks such as gas, electricity, water, sewerage, telephone, and the requirements concerning the environment, 
defence and fire protection. 
Although land is a crucial input for investments, in Cuba it is not treated as a separate input, except in the case of 
foreign negotiations, where it is given legal and financial relevance. In the case of state developments, land 
allocation is taken for granted, and land ownership is usually not an obstacle (for it can, if necessary, be solved by 
applying the expropriation mechanism mentioned in chapter 3). Therefore, land acquisition and land and building 
transactions are not an obstacle for an investment. This is evident in the investment budget structure, which is 
formed by three expenditure items: construction and assembling, equipments, and others: land is not included. 
The authorities, in their role of developers, do not really understand or acknowledge the opportunities created by 
the land improvements derived from the investment, nor do they consider the possibility of obtaining more outputs 
with the same land input (allocative efficiency), nor of selecting the location according to the type of project 
(spatial efficiency). Moreover, the benefits and beneficiaries of the urban improvements caused by the 
investments are not identified, let alone required to contribute. 
The framework provided by the government for foreign investments is different. In that framework, land and 
buildings are financially and legally very relevant, as they form the Cuban contribution to the investment capital, 
and they are valued accordingly (see chapter 4). In these cases, investors – which is the term used in Cuba for 
the entity that represents the state in the form of a developer, or for the entity representing the joint venture - pay 
more attention to land and buildings in terms of location (where to invest?), and in terms of the use (in what to 
invest?). The investment decisions are adjusted through negotiations about who will invest?, and the how much 
will be invested? As we established in chapter 4 and 6, if discretional decisions influence the valuation results, 
this can affect the possibilities of obtaining an efficient use of land. 
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In the informal land and building markets, the considerations regarding the inputs and outputs are established 
clearly from the beginning, and once the decision for the investment is made, how to carry on in an efficient way 
becomes the main issue.  
When private households want to invest in their own housing, the rules and practices limit the possibilities to 
achieve a more autonomous local development. The present rules do not consider the possibility of making joint 
ventures between the communities and the local public entities, or of creating development associations with 
capital participation. The usual form of investment is to use the right to build through self-effort, where inhabitants 
acquire the usufruct or surface rights on land and get the necessary licenses to start construction. Most of the 
construction materials are obtained informally, as the official markets cannot supply to meet the demand. 
d) Rules and practices which affect transaction costs 
In chapters 3, 4 and 5 we described the most important rules and mechanisms for using and transferring land and 
buildings in Cuba, and how they are affected by inefficient administrative processes, by requirements to obtain 
information that is fragmented among different institutions, and by excessive time taken to issue the decisions. 
These three aspects considerably increase the transaction costs, especially high for joint ventures with foreign 
partners, and for individuals and families.  
Land-use authorizations and building permits take a long time and are complicated. Many agencies and entities 
granting permits make an income from issuing licenses, 7 so the costs of maintaining the bureaucracy are borne 
by the customers. Making the plans, feasibility studies, and presentation dossiers costs time and money too. The 
fact that different government entities issue the permits, the licenses, and the regulations about land and 
buildings, results in high transaction costs, confusion and mismanagement. 
For example, in the case of the permuta the households describe the administrative process as stressing, 
tormenting, and excessively difficult. Official formalities have to be passed by many different entities and can 
sometimes take longer than a year, and there are delays because documents and applications are sometimes 
rejected because of omitted data, typing errors, or other reasons. Another problem is that permits and other 
applications such as land uses and heritage consultations are valid for one year only, so if other processes are 
delayed, the documents may become outdated and it will be required to start all over again. The financial cost of 
the official information is not high, the inhabitants have to buy stamps for any administrative process: each 
certificate costs around 20 and 30 Cuban pesos. However, the time, travelling expenses, and the opportunity 
costs of time that is wasted in trying to get a document are really high. Other high costs might come in order to 
speed the process if people hire the services of intermediaries, or bribe the authorities.  
For state institutions and enterprises, the procedures can cost more, according to the type of project. However, 
the costs are expected and are covered by state budgets or enterprise budgets. For some special cases the 
licenses may even be free. The data below show the different government entities that issue the licenses and 
permits which are compulsory for starting any state project, including joint ventures. It was obtained from a public 
investor. We enquired how the cost of a license is determined: it seems that it is calculated based on the 
construction area or the investment construction budget. To these costs we should add additional costs for the 
production and blueprinting of the Investment Programs that must be handed for approval to each of these 
entities.  
• Physical Planning micro-locations – land-use license - can take six months or more. This entity also 
issues the Construction licenses, which can take from 2 to 4 months. The costs, depending on the 
                                                          
7 Many valuation agencies that made an income by supplying the information for land transactions had to close down after the decline of 
the investment boom of the 90s in Havana. 
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construction area, can be from 500 to 6400 or more Cuban currency. For example an investment for an 
educational facility for 300 students composed of four buildings four storeys high is 3000 Cuban 
currency.8 
• The Sanitation License issued by the Direction of Hygiene and Epidemiology takes from 2 to 3 weeks 
and is free of cost. 
• The Environmental Agency – CITMA: license takes about 1 month. For a university campus with various 
faculty buildings – for example, the University of Informatic Sciences - it can cost around 3000 
convertible pesos. 
• The Fire Safety License – APCI: this includes the review and approval of all technical requirements and 
has two stages. The review costs around 200 convertible pesos, and the certified project costs 500 
convertible pesos. It takes around 3 weeks. 
• The Protection and Security License – ACERPROT- takes around 3 months and for a large project can 
be more than 2000 convertible pesos. The investors can hire the services of a technical consultancy to 
take care of the project from its early stages, and this agency will take care of the process of certifying 
the project. 
• The Military Defense License is necessary because the Armed Forces require special water reserves 
and deposits in case of natural disasters or wars. It takes from 3 to 4 weeks. The investors first receive a 
list of requirements, the Regional Military Section has to approve these requirements, and finally the 
project is certified by the Regional Military Section. If the investment is over one million dollars, the 
certification is issued by the Armed Forces Ministry. 
• The Provincial Heritage Board approval, which is only for investments located in heritage areas or in 
isolated designated buildings, spaces and monuments, can take around 1 month and is free of cost. 
In the case of housing, three documents are demanded:  
 
• The construction license, which is a compulsory technical and administrative document required before 
starting construction of new housing, for enlargements and remodeling, for subdivisions or unifications, 
or for emergency actions which require structure changes. 
 
• The construction authorization, which is a technical document to allow installing or constructing water 
tanks on rooftops, and for car-porches, cisterns, fences, light covers and painting. 
 
• The certificate of Habitat, which is a technical administrative document that certifies the completion of 
works and that the dwelling fulfils all the necessary aspects and includes the necessary services such as 
electricity, water supply, sewerage and drainage. 
 
e) Rules and practices about land and building valuation 
In chapter 3 we described the planning and property rules and how they are used, how this is limited by the 
government unawareness of the land value potentials, and how this reduces the possibilities of making 
improvements in urban areas.  
                                                          
8 Government investments rely on budgets which are integrated by the two established currencies, the Cuban Pesos –CUP- and the 
Cuban Convertible –CUC-. Some of the licenses are paid in CUPs and others in CUCs. Government investments do not apply the 1 to 24 
exchange rate between the CUC and the CUP that is only for individual/domestic exchange. In the cases of joint ventures with foreign 
parties all licenses are in convertible pesos. 
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Chapter 4 described the disregard for land and building value in Cuba, and the partial introduction of valuation 
practices when the financial value of land became relevant for government development purposes after the 
1990s. In chapter 5 we demonstrated the need for recognition and incorporation of values, by analyzing the 
mechanisms when land and buildings are exchanged informally. Local private actors have developed an 
understanding about the value of properties and about the location advantages.9 In chapter 6 we compared the 
formal and informal valuations, corroborating the importance of valuation mechanisms and, most importantly, 
showing that land and property values can be statistically quantified and monitored.  
Valuation of land and buildings is legally required for all land and building transactions, but the procedures to be 
followed vary according to the type of investment, and they are performed by different state entities. For example, 
the physical planning entities establish categories of values/prices used for social projects like housing. But those 
values/prices do not take account of differences in the location advantages, nor of other important aspects such 
as the value derived from urban improvements, nor of future land value increments caused by exercising the 
development rights authorized by the plan; and the values are not updated. In chapter 4 we analysed how the two 
elements used to value land for housing – identifying homogeneous areas according to services and 
infrastructure, and taking account of the average income of the households in the country - are not connected 
with the values and prices that are used in reality, because most families have other sources of income that are 
not declared, or have self-employment alternatives that are declared and taxed but are not considered in the 
calculation of the values.  
Land for foreign businesses is valued differently, as we presented in chapter 4, using international valuation 
methods performed by specialized appraisal entities. When applying these methods, various technical problems 
are met, caused by the unavailability of land information, of price references, and of forecasts about land and 
building demand.  
The inconsistency, and sometimes the absence, of rules and practices for determining the value of land and 
buildings became clear in chapters 4 and 5. The valuation practices have not been applied in the same way  by 
all public and private actors. There are important differences between the established practices for social and 
private housing valuation and the practices for government joint ventures. These latter appraisals are made at the 
demand of the Ministries Council and the Central Bank of Cuba. As a result there is not a unique consistent set of 
rules and mechanisms which would allow properties to be assessed as collateral.10  
 
In this respect we stress the limitation of land being treated as a by-product of investments (namely as a leasing 
agreement) and not as a permanent essential input for social and economic development. We return to this later 
in this chapter.  
 
f) Rules and practices about land as a financial asset 
 
In Cuba there is the continuous shortage of financial resources for development. One of the reasons for this is, 
clearly, that Cuba is not a rich country: there is a genuine scarcity of resources. However, we argued in chapter 2 
                                                          
9 There are interesting cases of appraisals of roof tops that are sold or leased as surface to build a new property, something that often 
requires a previous investment on the dwelling to reinforce and give maintenance to the existing structure on the ground floor before being 
able to negotiate the roof. Other property areas such as back yards and garages are highly valued by families for their potential in sales 
transactions or sharing property rights. 
10There is a practical example of a bonus operation to obtain international loans where the value of buildings was used as part of the 
guarantees for the loans. In this case a loan given by the Standard Bank. Seven buildings were appraised to support this bonus operation 
for the use of hotels applying a valuation method. This sort of mechanism has been exceptionally used by the government to attract fresh 
capital and demonstrate that Cuba offers opportunities and legal security for investments. 
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that those resources could be used more efficiently if there were different rules and practices about using land 
and buildings as financial assets. Better rules in this respect require also better rules for valuing properties (see 
above).  
 
For joint ventures it is already possible to use land as contribution to the capital. Land and buildings – housing, 
industrial facilities, commercial spaces, and buildings of any other nature - can be a contribution to these 
international associations. However, the rights acquired by the joint venture are not always strong enough to be 
used as a financial asset. The joint ventures can have rights as owners of usufruct and surface, and can lease or 
rent buildings for offices or housing uses. The foreign investors do not feel secure about the surface rights 
because, as we mentioned earlier, they can be revoked by the state at the end of the leasing agreement.11 
 
The rules are different for Cuban nationals. The Cuban laws strictly forbid that personal land and building 
properties become lucrative mechanisms for enrichment or exploitation. To this purpose, the authorities have 
tried to avoid illegalities and speculation with land and buildings, particularly for housing. The Law of Urban 
Reform, established in the 1960s stipulates in its article 29 the prohibition of confiscation in cases of bank or 
credit debts secured on housing.12 
 
The use of mortgages is allowed but very limited, and is allowed only to Cuban state entities and is subject to 
higher level government approval – Ministry of Councils. The constructions placed on land can be mortgaged, but 
there is no possibility to mortgage the surface rights. At present is not possible to mortgage housing, not even 
when there is private ownership of the land and buildings.  
 
There are no possibilities for value capturing, neither by property taxes nor by levies on value increase caused by 
planning or infrastructural works. Property taxes were prohibited by the Law of Urban Reform in the 1960’s. 
Raising financial resources through land taxes at the local level could improve economic and urban efficiency, as 
it could become a way to solve the long lasting Cuban dilemma of the municipalities not having resources to 
provide an acceptable level of social services and infrastructure to meet the consumer satisfaction.13 This would 
also increase citizen participation and involvement in a more efficient city development, as citizens will demand 
better outcomes if they contribute to the inputs. Land taxes also require a more efficient institutional 
interconnection and integration among planning, legal agencies and financial entities, locally and nationally. 
 
Nevertheless, the country’s new economic scenario is slowly but gradually incorporating the potential benefits 
where the land owner is entitled to the ‘usus fructus’, the fruits of the land. This is evident in the recently 
authorized14 state leasing of square meters to small scale entrepreneurs in public areas, and in the families that 
rent corridors and living rooms for the development of various commercial and service activities. This is a step 
forward. But it is a very short sighted and narrow minded step, as we have explained in the wrong land uses and 
wrong building uses sections in chapter 2. The reason is that more financial efficiency could be obtained from a 
                                                          
11 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, Economia y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011.Capítulo 8. 
12 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique. Biblioteca Virtual de Derecho, Economia y Ciencias Sociales. Eumed. Net. 2011Legal principles for urban 
buildings of personal property, pag. 82 and 83.  
13 Malinowitz, Stanley. Popular Power? Municipal Enterprises and Local Government in Cuba. Amherst University, USA, 2006. 
14 Reuters. November 29, 2010. Cuba authorizes the commercial renting of spaces. Havana, Cuba. The renting of living rooms, gardens, 
rooftops and even swimming pools to facilitate the development of small private businesses has been authorized by the Cuban 
government. This flexibilization of the real estate sector responds to a state support to the location of restaurants, barbershops, and other 
small businesses recently authorized to compensate for the adjustment in the state employment sector. For example, a ground floor 
corridor can be rented to place a coffee shop, a bedroom to locate a beauty parlor, a photographic studio, a sewing workshop, etc. The 
owners of the spaces will have to pay taxes on the revenues obtained from renting. Looking forward to ameliorate the 500 thousand 
dwelling deficit in the island, the government also authorized the renting of rooms and dwellings among Cubans. 
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better planned and organized strategy to recuperate and renovate the commercial city areas and buildings that 
were designed and constructed for these purposes.  
 
g) Rules and practices about providing information relevant to how land could be used 
Any government aspiring to conduct land management effectively (whatever the objective of that land 
management) must have quick and easy access to reliable information about land and buildings.15 If one of the 
aims of the land management is to increase the efficiency with which land is used (the focus of this book), there is 
a particular need for information about the prices and values of land inputs and outputs. This information is vital to 
private persons and organisations too, if they want to make the best use of their own land. Research has 
revealed, for cities elsewhere, the considerable amount of time spent on getting permits and licenses and the 
time spent in negotiations.16 This shows how the lack of clear rules and information interferes with, and deforms 
the relations between, the authorities and developers, agents, clients, and other actors in the land management 
process. 
In Cuba, the cadastral information about land parcelling and land tenure - basic information for land management 
– is inadequate and not systematically up-dated. The information is not made available, and there are almost no 
records of land transactions, values and prices resulting from negotiations, which could be used as experience for 
other negotiations. In Chapter 3 we explained the present situation with property registers, and we described and 
analyzed the way in which they are organized, concluding that in their absence it is not possible to develop 
statistics and indicators or to get information which would help in real estate negotiations. This is worsened by the 
institutional incompetence in such processes, and the lack of public access to and trust in this information. Land 
registration is being reconsidered, but for many decades there were no surveys or investigations, no issuing of 
tenancy or property titles, and no recording of changes to property rights. It is obvious that the very many 
changes to the formal registers are evidence of improvisation and cause confusion among public and private 
actors. The registers are still not well organized, and the issuing of different legal resolutions since 1998, almost 
every year, with the new ones trying to improve the older ones, is evidence that not enough time has been spent 
on thinking and establishing a coherent strategy. There are ongoing important changes, but they are still in their 
early implementation stages. 
In order to see the contents of the (formal) real estate registers, you have to demonstrate that you have a 
legitimate interest in the contents. This interest must be communicated to the registration officer or public 
functionary in charge, that will then inform whether the request is accepted or denied. The Cuban property 
registers can make, if necessary and according to the law, information public through certificates, legal notes and 
by direct exhibition of the books, but this rarely happens in practice.  
When considering investment in land and buildings – in the conception phase and particularly in the evaluation 
and planning phases – information about inputs and outputs is required. Often this information is derived from 
indicators. The information that is required includes land and building values and prices, the number of 
transactions per year, the construction costs per sq. meter, the comparable values in different city areas. Such 
information could help the local authorities to improve their land-use plans and the way in which land is managed. 
But the information is not available systematically. 
                                                          
15 Dowall, David E. and Giles Clark. “A framework for reforming Urban Land Policies in Developing Countries”, Urban Management 
Program, IHS, The Netherlands. 
16 Merife Magno and Ballesteros. PhD, Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, The Netherlands, 2000. 
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For example, when making reservations for housing in a land-use plan – in which locations? and how much land? 
– one needs information about the requirements for built and unbuilt space, distance and accessibility to work, 
infrastructure level and services. This information can be derived from research into informal transactions in land 
and buildings (see chapters 5 and 6). Moreover, there is an informal register of value/prices as part of the 
transaction process in the informal housing market (see chapter 5).17 But no use is made of this in the official 
management process for housing allocation, because the informal land and building transactions are not 
formalized or surveyed. As a result, all this popular knowledge and experience in land and building decisions, and 
the financial benefits derived from them, is located and used outside the government.  
One of the ways to avoid repeating mistakes and to replicate the positive cases is to monitor and publish signals 
of failure and success, to make economic analyses of land, and to issue indicators which measure the social and 
economic performance of land management. Follow-up surveys also would be useful, to measure the overall 
accomplishment of the planning process, the land uses, the adequacy of the legal framework, and the integral 
performance of investment projects. This kind of information is hardly collected in Cuba. 
The availability of such information would increase the management capacity of the institutions and actors that 
participate in planning, negotiation, and land management implementation – urban planners, economists, 
attorneys, surveyors, and register officials. It would help them to face land and urban challenges brought about by 
changes in development trends – as could happen in Havana if the city were to face rapid urban development 
after 50 years of stagnation! 
 
3. Changes in the rules and practices which would increase the efficiency with which land is used 
We have demonstrated that many of the existing rules and practices lead to land being used in ways which are 
not economically efficient. It follows that changing those rules and practices in particular ways could increase that 
efficiency. It is not possible here to work out possible changes in sufficient detail so as to be able to say, with 
confidence, that they would if implemented lead to the desired improvements.  Nor is it possible to investigate 
how possible changes would interact with each other.  Instead we limit ourselves to indicating the principles which 
the changes should incorporate, in order to increase the efficiency with which land is used. In order to show how 
those might be worked out in practice, we give in Annex 34 examples of how they might be elaborated. 
a) Rules and practices about allocating land 
Better use of existing rules 
 
The problem is not always in the rules themselves, but in the deficient ways these are implemented: they are not 
always observed, or enforced. With the same rules, the existing practices could be improved.  
 
Decisions that are made by the sectors, should be better coordinated - through physical planning - with the 
priorities and needs of each territory (province, city, municipality). If this were done, then land use plans would be 
one of the instruments for achieving a more efficient location of investments at the different government levels 
and for the public and private sectors. 
 
Such land-use plans should consider the differences– natural, cultural, social and economic - between the 
territories, because not all territories have the same development potential, as determined by the availability of 
                                                          
17 This situation is worse due to the double currency existing in Cuba.  
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natural resources, the population, and the area for urbanization.  The same applies to the differences between 
municipalities.  
 
Concerted urban strategies and large urban projects 
 
Concerted urban strategies and large urban projects can be used to connect profitable projects with social 
projects. The profitable projects can be joint ventures with foreign capital, public-private partnerships, or private 
investments, and it should be agreed that there will be economic or social benefits for the community or area 
where the project is made, for example in the improvement of infrastructure, urban equipment, services, and 
housing. 
Land readjustment and land repartitioning 
 
These mechanisms could give local councils the capacity to reach collective agreements about modifying the 
urbanization parameters, changing land uses, and merging small land plots in order to locate larger projects. 
Partial and Special plans 
This instrument can be used to develop detailed urban plans, subdivided in stages according to investment 
schedules, functional areas and investment components. The plans include a detailed definition of land and 
building uses, physical indicators, infrastructure levels, and types of interventions in the buildings and spaces. 
They also set down the relations, scales and proportions between public and private spaces. Public 
administrations can use this instrument to establish public-private partnerships in order to obtain urbanized land 
in exchange for the finance or execution of urbanization works. Partial plans consider the distribution of charges 
and benefits. 
b) Rules and practices about rights and obligations 
First it is necessary to make an overview of all the existing regulations and rules exercised by the concerned 
entities, and to evaluate them and their effectiveness. In particular, attention should be given to the fact that the 
citizens have many obligations and limited rights, while the state entities have ample rights and some of their 
obligations are unclear. This does not encourage efficient use of land and buildings. 
Particular attention should be given to the rules governing private persons who want to rent housing to others, for 
those rules greatly discourage the supply of this type of housing. 
Land leasing too should be considered. Now it is allowed only exceptionally. With more flexible regulations it 
would allow revenues to be generated from agreements between government and private stakeholders – national 
or international - based on contracts that transfer the government’s use rights. The lease would be sold to the 
highest bidder: this would help to find the most efficient investors. 
 
If the rules for apartments (condominiums) were revised, this could encourage the private or co-operative 
provision of such housing. And time-sharing rules could encourage the private provision of tourist and vacation 
accommodation. 
 
c) Rules and practices about investments in land and buildings 
 
The first requirement would be to make investment plans which are based on a feasibility analysis taking account 
of the financial, material and human capacities, and linked to the territorial plans. Further, all investments - 
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whether social, economic,spatial, or productive, and including foreign investments  - should follow the same logic 
about their economic and financial performance. All of them should attempt to be economically, socially and 
financially efficient, from the design stage. In particular, if the government actor is obliged to pay for land as part 
of the investment, it will be concerned about the value and other attributes of the land, and it will consider 
alternative locations for the particular investment.  
It should also be possible to use investments as a source of financial opportunities (and see ‘land as a financial 
asset’ below).  
 
d) Rules and transactions which affect transaction costs 
 
The smaller the transaction costs, the more smooth and efficient the development process. Transaction costs can 
be reduced by clear and quick procedures. 
 
e) Rules and practices about land and building valuation 
 
The methods and procedures for valuing land and building should be the same for all land and buildings,whether 
they are investments by state entities or by citizens and associations. For housing in particular, valuation should 
start from the real financial conditions for the exchange of existing stock. Even if the state is the first buyer, prices 
should be set according to the market references. This implies the incorporation and comparison of formal and 
informal valuation parameters in land and building transactions.Valuation methods to be used by appraisers 
should be systematised and obligatory, and the competence of the appraisers should be improved.  
f) Rules and practices aboutland as a financial asset 
 
Land and building mortgages 
 
Owners of land and buildings should be able to mobilize loans backed by the value of their properties. This would 
require connections with the Cuban banks and with the property valuation agencies. Among the procedures that 
would need to be introduced are for inscribing the properties, issuing the titles, and supervising the performance 
of local registers.  
Activate the financial potential caused by changes in plans and policies 
 
Changes in the content of plans and policies - such as land and building use, density and intensity – can increase 
the value of land and buildings. In such cases, that increase could with appropriate instruments be ‘captured’ by 
the state. 
Property taxes 
 
This possibility was abolished with the Urban Reform of the 1960s and ever since has not been reconsidered or 
developed by the Cuban government. However, taxation based on site value can improve the efficiency with 
which land is used. 
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g) Rules and practices about providing information relevant to how land could be used 
Property registers 
Complete, reliable and up-to-date property registers give security to existing owners of property rights and 
facilitate transactions in those rights.  
GIS and other Land Information Systems can provide information which helps public and private actors to make 
investment decisions which connect better to the wishes of suppliers and demanders of land and buildings. 
 
 
4. Maintaining the social aims set by the government  
In spite of the recent political changes in Cuba, with a cautious but deep restructuring of the administration and 
the economy in order to achieve more efficiency, the Cuban government is persevering in its basic political 
principles about the planned control of the fundamental resources – including land - and of economic decisions, 
with a sectoral influence and a top-down approach. The main objective of these principles is to protect the social 
achievements of the Revolution, even though up to the present, some of the social goals have not been entirely 
met and - what is worse - some have begun to recede. The need for better land management and for increasing 
the economic efficiency with which land is used need not endanger those social goals, and might even be used to 
pursue them 
It is important to change the idea that land and the financial value of land and other assets are, because they 
incorporate capitalist elements, obstacles to the development of government social policies, However, we 
recognise that some possible changes in land management could generate perverse effects, such as spatial and 
social exclusion, unwelcome concentrations of power over land and buildings, favouring investment interests of 
powerful interests and pressure groups, environmental damage, and other issues. In order to guard against this, 
policies and strategies are required that set clear principles and social goals to go in parallel with the proposed 
changes in land management. 
The principle remains that land management is a state function, where the various state agencies have the legal 
power, given by the constitutional law, to plan, guide and implement rural and urban land repartition, redistribution 
of property, forms of tenures and land development. This principle should guarantee the social aims of equity and 
of avoiding segregation by location, it should guarantee the access to housing, services and good infrastructure 
for all income sectors. Moreover, improving the efficiency with which land is used can be used to contribute to a 
more sustainable and economically diversified land development, distributed in a balanced way throughout the 
country. 
State planning - and not the market - will continue to be the fundamental instrument for economic, social and 
urban development.18 This includes land development at the different scales: national, provincial and municipal. 
But in order to do that efficiently, the real sources of priority setting must be spatial planning, with investment and 
implementation strategies followed by continuous monitoring to check that the social aims and economic goals 
are being met.  
Below, we consider briefly some of the social goals and their connections with land management. 
 
                                                          
18 Anteproyecto Ley del Suelo, el Ordenamiento Territorial y el Urbanismo. Instituto de Planificación Física, octubre, 1996. 
171 
 
Housing  
Housing policy is one of the areas that requires particular attention because, despite the government efforts, it 
has been very ineffective both in production and distribution in the last five decades. The residential standards of 
the Cuban citizens have deteriorated rather than improved. This has been recognised, and since 2010 the 
country has started to reorganize the National Institute of Housing, as the ruling institute for housing policy. These 
changes include functions, frameworks, and qualitative and quantitative adjustments to the legal regime – see 
Annex 34. But much more is necessary. It is our contention that changing urban land management in ways like 
those suggested here will help to improve the residential standards of the Cuban citizens.  
Housing segregation 
One of the social aims of the Cuban government is to provide equal access to urban services for all citizens, and 
also to avoid segregation by location, by lack of access to housing, services and infrastructure. That is a fair 
principle, and very difficult to accomplish in the Cuban conditions. Nevertheless the problems can be diminished 
through adequate zoning, and through land-use plans that balance the provision of housing, services and 
infrastructure. There should also be mechanisms for surveying and guiding housing transactions in order to 
prevent housing speculation, for raising the quality of the housing production, for allocating resources and 
developing investments for the rehabilitation of the degraded urban areas, and for formalizing and upgrading 
informal settlements including housing, public areas, infrastructure and services. 
The possible effects of the permuta for housing segregation deserve special attention. The interplay of housing 
informality and urban segregation is of growing importance in Cuba, in the light of the wish of the government – 
sincere but difficult to achieve in practice - to promote socially homogeneous 19 and safe cities, with culturally 
heterogeneous population coexisting in all neighborhoods. The crisis of the 90s widened the differences within 
the society. The sectors with more economic possibilities developed a social perspective different from that of 
others with lower quality of life.20 The wealthiest sectors have access to better housing and hard currency, while 
the poor adopt survival mechanisms, diversifying their sources of income and their forms of shelter, as concisely 
put in the Cuban phrase – estar en la lucha. 21 
 
The official vision of segregation stresses its geographical dimension, but this phenomenon requires a more 
comprehensive analysis where the spatial separation is just part of the problem. There is a complex interrelation 
with other economic, social and cultural variables 22 and there are new social actors with different interests and 
values that differ from the state paradigms.23 The increasing differences are eroding life styles and values, 
resulting in the informal and marginal behavior of citizens, the growing desire of young people to abandon the 
country, the unhappiness, the violence and alcohol abuse, and the indifferent attitude towards morality and other 
principles of the Cuban society. 
 
The permuta acts as a mechanism for redistributing housing, and its dynamic processes create a complex social 
and economic map of urban micro-areas that resemble the dunes more than the mountains,24 as there is no 
                                                          
19 This homogeneity is the social equality to which the Cuban Socialism aspires. 
20 The inequality derived from the different family income, from family remittances, better salaries from foreign companies, tourism or 
individual businesses, is a reality. This economic advantage allows benefits that are out of the reach of the other Cuban workers, who 
cannot afford to buy in the dollar stores, pay for better transport, or have access to services such as restaurants and certain recreational 
options.  
21 Means to be in the fight. The fight to solve the problems of daily life. 
22 Cuban sociologists, economists and historians have in various studies analyzed problems such as social marginality, the evolution of 
slums, urban segregation, informality, and other problems.  
23 Malinowitz, Stanley. Page 167. Ameherst, USA, 2006.  
24 Sposati, Aldaiza. Espacio y Debate. Page 89, jun-jul 2004. 
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unique physical expression for this situation. At present, the housing patterns are changing, and this constant 
mobility reflects a social discomfort expressed in the informal strategies to relocate in the city according to income 
level and social aspirations.  
Many housing functionaries believe the permuta is a perverse mechanism, and they are unhappy about the 
increasing segregation to which it can lead. But they should realize that the informality is a spontaneous reaction 
to the housing problems in Cuba. The manifestations of urban segregation are a consequence of an uncontrolled 
market, imperfect and informal, but in the end with the positive and negative connotations of any market. If the 
consequences are undesired, it is better to structure the market rather than prohibit it. 
Protection for weaker members of the society 
There must be clear rights and obligations for the protection of the low income population and other vulnerable 
sectors like the elderly and the disabled. The aim is to avoid eviction from degraded areas that are undergoing 
renovation or rehabilitation, and to guarantee housing and urban equipment which are accessible to the disabled.  
Balanced and equitable distribution throughout the country 
Land management is indispensable for providing a balanced and equitable development of land and buildings, 
mainly housing and social services, throughout the whole country. This can be achieved as part of an appropriate 
territorial planning and priority setting for investment in good quality urbanization and infrastructure, according to 
the size and population needs of each territory. This should be performed by the local governments establishing a 
less dependent relationship with the central authorities.25 
Protecting the national heritage 
Among the first Constitutional articles is preserving and protecting the heritage areas as part of the cultural 
identity of the country, preferring conservation and rehabilitation to demolition and redevelopment. Given the 
advanced state of disrepair of the Cuban cities, especially in their valuable areas, this government goal requires 
(following the successful decentralized experience of Old Havana), improving the role of the municipality, giving it 
the powers and capacity to manage land and buildings and to participate in the benefits. The social aim should be 
integrated into this policy by considering the necessity for neighbourhood and slum improvement.  
Protecting the natural environment 
Land management can contribute to the government goal to protect the environment and maintain an ecologically 
responsible situation. Land management can be used to eliminate polluting industrial uses, to solve infrastructure 
problems such as sewerage and drainage that cause river and harbour pollution, to favour transportation means 
that do not contaminate the air, and to protect and create land reserves for future development. 
Popular participation 
This important government goal should include a wider participation at the local level – municipalities and 
communities - in land and building planning and management. Participation is now limited to expressing problems 
and concerns about housing, service provision, infrastructure and so on, while at the same time inhabitants have 
been applying their own solutions for a long time and in different ways. This could be improved by allowing new 
                                                          
25 Malinowitz, Stanley. Ameherst, USA, 2006. 
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local initiatives, more access to land and building resources, introduction of new forms of collective property, and 
development of better skills of organization, accountability, and management.26 
 
5. Final Remarks 
We chose Havana as the main object of this research, for it is in the Cuban metropolitan territory that the most 
important economic, political and cultural functions are concentrated. In the capital city, the organizational 
processes, the government decision making, the conciliation among institutions and actors, the concentration of 
economic activities, the social dynamics, and other interdependencies, are particularly complex, and there is a 
large variety of land use, infrastructure, and housing problems that can be improved through better land 
management.  
Despite the improvement of the economy in the last years when compared to the 90s, the present situation of the 
country is far from satisfactory. 27 As a result, Cuba is undergoing a transition which includes deep 
transformations and a fundamental economic, institutional and legal reform. Land management can play a much 
more active role in this process.28 
The present slow dynamics of land and urban development in Cuba give a good opportunity to ponder and plan 
for the coming changes. It is a good moment to analyze what has happened in the last fifty years, and to clarify 
and understand the causes and effects of good and bad decisions made with land and buildings. Everybody can 
see that Cuba is already in a transition, with its development model moving towards a more decentralized and 
diversified administration. It is certain that this change of economic dynamics will have impacts on land and urban 
development, and we need to anticipate and plan for these. The outcomes of this research then become 
important not only as a contribution to improving land management under the present circumstances, but also to 
preparing the city for the future changes. 
Many economic experts consider that, despite the American embargo, the nation is in a similar or even better 
condition than it was in the 1980s to improve its development strategies and investment opportunities. It has 
negotiated a stable supply of oil from Venezuela, favourable soft credits from China, and an increased economic 
and trade platform with ALBA 29 countries. There are good expectations for the value of some of the Cuban 
products - such as nickel, fruits, bio-pharmacology and the knowledge industry - in international markets. The 
tourism industry is performing acceptably even during the current recession. Nevertheless the pace of 
transformations does not show a coherent or stable pattern with clear strategic directions. 
From 2001 to 2008, investment by foreign firms was considerably reduced. Many small and medium foreign 
companies stopped their operations. The government reconsidered encouraging foreign investors when tourism 
stagnated, but many former partners have lost confidence in Cuba, as the government is the only decision maker 
and it changes the rules constantly. The Economic and Social Guidelines approved in 2011 by the national 
government list the critical aspects of the current situation, and offer new possibilities for the country’s 
development. These include the necessity to improve public rules, promote better economic development and 
increase efficiency, allow a new institutional and legal framework to ensure room for a diversity of economic and 
social actors and to strengthen the role of the local level.  
                                                          
26 Ibid. 
27 Carranza, Julio; Luis Gutiérrez y Pedro Monreal. Cuba: La reestructuración de la economía. Una propuesta para el debate. Fundación 
Friedrich Eber. Oficina para el Caribe, Caracas, Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1997. 
28 Land Law in action. Stockholm. June, 1996. 
29 ALBA: Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas. Integrated by 9 countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Dominica, Honduras, 
Ecuador, Saint Vincent and the Granadines and Antigua y Barbuda. 
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It would not be difficult to imagine a hypothetical future for Cuba, a country with considerable natural and rural 
resources and very valuable urban settlements which are recognised worldwide. A future in which, in parallel with 
social policies to protect and benefit the vulnerable sectors of the population, other realities are recognized and 
assumed, thus allowing a more diverse and coherent social, economic and urban development, whereby the last 
is the physical expression of the first two. But that beautiful picture will not be possible without consistent 
strategies for using and managing land in ways which are economically efficient. Land is one of the resources 
that offer a wide range of possibilities for economic development, and it is time to include it in Cuban policy and in 
its development agenda. 
Knowing that there are no easy answers for the complex social problems of the developing world, and 
recognizing that neither the market paradigm nor the state monopoly has the key to magical solutions, our 
proposals select what we consider the best of both worlds. Our starting point is the Cuban institutional reality, but 
also we listen and monitor the heartbeat of society, because as long as governments are inefficient and blind to 
the real needs of the citizens, these citizens will develop their own informal strategies, with social costs that are 
not yet foreseen. 
The pace of Havana’s transformation has increased and in the last years, despite the deterioration and 
stagnation, the city remains an eclectic environment of innovation and invention, where changes are the result not 
only of the official state programs but also of the less visible but nonetheless significant local actions of its 
inhabitants. These latter are an important factor bringing about the changes, and they could be replicated in other 
cities. This positive situation is however dangerous for the coherence of land and building development, if the 
government does not introduce the necessary regulatory and fiscal actions to organize the changes, and does not 
give municipalities the necessary autonomy, resources and capacities to deal with that process.  
The new agenda must then favour the city’s articulation with the external world, with the international circuits of 
capital flows, and with the new technological advances. The authorities must envision the development of new 
valuable areas and the preservation of existing ones as part of the global world and for the future. But a careful 
internal look is just as important. Land resources - both land and buildings - must become a priority and be 
reconsidered in their full significance and importance.30 Havana and the other Cuban cities are not fully prepared 
for a scenario where planning and institutional performance interact with market forces, and sometimes events 
expected in the long term can suddenly become short term. There is great danger that if we do not have a well 
considered and well prepared land management, we will not be in a good position to develop our city, generate 
efficiency, and support development programs.    
                                                          
30 Hirsh, Werner Z. Urban Economic Analysis. New York, McGraw-Hill Inc., 1973. Because internal and external forces interact with each 
other, the more powerful frameworks are those that incorporate both perspectives. These mix-perspective frameworks seek not only to 
include both internal and external forces as causes of change but additionally try to include interactions among local resources, local 
income, local demand and local production as change-fostering factors. 
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ANNEX 1 
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ASSOCIATION’S TRENDS IN CUBA (PERIOD 1993-2005) 
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 Source: Investment Promotion Centre. Cuban Ministry of Foreign Investment. (MINVEC) 
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ANNEX 2 
 LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CUBA (1990-2011) AND THE MAIN 
WORLD EVENTS 
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ANNEX 3 
CUBA AND ITS PROVINCES 
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HAVANA’S MUNICIPALITIES 
 
AERIAL VIEW OF HAVANA’S METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
Source: Phototeque of the Direction of Projects of the City Historians Office.   
 
191 
 
 
ANNEX 4 
STUDY CASES TO ILLUSTRATE LAND AND BUILDING EFFICIENCY 
 
1. La Reunión Drugstore is part of The Manzana Sarrá Project. 
 Photograph from A singular Experience. Appraisals of the Integral Management Model of Old Havana, World 
 Heritage Site. 
 This case shows appropriate land use, no advantageous results in the output/input relation but is relevant in the 
 heritage and social recuperation. 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The Manzana Sarrá Project. 
 Photograph from A singular Experience. Appraisals of the Integral Management Model of Old Havana, World 
 Heritage Site. 
 Block with colonial buildings that were internally connected for an industrial use. The new land uses provide very 
 beneficial output/input relation. 
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3. The Lonja del Comercio –Stock Exchange building- Is a joint-venture for a Real Estate Office Complex. The new 
land use provides very beneficial output/input relation. 
  Photograph courtesy of Designer Pedro Luis Díaz. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. The Manzana de Gómez building. Occupies a relevant location but has the wrong land uses. Poor output/input 
relation. 
 Photograph Archives of Project Direction of the Office of the City Historian of Havana. 
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5. The Santo Domingo building. Change to cultural and educational use. The output/input relation is not beneficial 
however it has relevant social and cultural impacts for the city. 
  Photograph Archives of Project Direction of the Office of the City Historian of Havana. 
 
 
  6. The San José Docks. 
 
7. The San José Docks. Industrial warehouse transformed into a handcraft open market –commercial use- and 
services. Beneficial output/input relation. 
 Photographs Arch. Ayleen Robainas Barcia.   
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ANNEX 5 
 
DETERMINATION OF THE TECHNICAL SITUATION OF BUILDINGS (MARKS GRANTED) 
 
Part or Element of Building Status Technical Status / Evaluation 
Rank 
  Good Fair Bad 
1. Walls, columns, supports  180-90 86-60 59-0 
2. Roof, floors, stairs  180-90 86-60 59-0 
3. Wall covers  60-30 29-20 19-0 
4. Floor covers  30-15 14-11 10-0 
5. Roof Impermeability  36-18 17-12 11-0 
6. Hydraulic installation  12-6 5-3 2-0 
7. Sanitary installation  24-12 11-9 8-0 
8. Electrical installation  18-9 8-6 5-0 
9. Doors, Windows  42-21 20-14 13-0 
10. Outside wall paint  6-4 3-2 1-0 
11. Inside wall paint  6-4 3-2 1-0 
12. Paint of doors, windows  6-4 3-2 1-0 
13. Total     
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 ANNEX 6 
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 A real case of an Official Housing Assessment 
The form includes the location –address-, the general characteristics of the dwelling, the legal 
documents presented, the dwelling areas per space and finally the price calculation. 
 
PAC CIUDAD DE LA HABANA HOJA DE DESCRIPCION DE LA No. Orden: 7
DIRECCION PROVINCIAL DE LA VIVIENDA Y PRECIO LEGAL No.Cliente: II-29
VIVIENDA Fecha: 1/11/2007
Municipio: Centro Habana
I.- LOCALIZACION GEOGRAFICA DE LA VIVIENDA
CALLE, AVE., CARRETERA, CAMINO NUMERO APTO. PISO ENTRECALLES
Hospital 179 BAJOS bajos vapor principe
REPARTO, BARRIO, POBLADO, CASERIO, FINCA. MUNICIPIO PROVINCIA
cayo hueso CENTRO HABANA CIUDAD  HABANA
II.- CARACTERISTICAS GENERALES DE LA VIVIENDA AÑO CO.
CASA DE PLANTAS APARTAMENTO EN : AÑO CO. 1958
1 ( x )  2 (  ) MAS DE 2 (  ) EDIFICIO ( x ) PASAJE (  ) AZOTEA (  ) OTROS (  ) GRUPO III
TIPOLOGIA CONST. PAREDES PISOS TECHOS
Hormigón Armado Ladrillos GRANITO Hormigón Armado
III.- DOCUMENTO LEGAL
TIPO
DESCRIPCION DE LA VIVIENDA (Segun documento legal)
Sala-comedor, cocina,  dos dormitorios, dos baños.
DESCRIPCION DE LA VIVIENDA (Fisica)
Sala-comedor, cocina, dos dormitorios con closet, dos baños,hall,  patio de servicio parcialmente cubierto
IV.- AREA FISICA DE LA VIVIENDA ( CIFRAS CON UN DECIMAL )
LARGO ANCHO AREA LARGO ANCHO AREA
M M M² M M M²
Sala-comedor 6,00 3,70 22,2
Cocina 2,20 2,10 4,6
Dormitorio 1 3,80 3,40 12,9
Dormitorio 2 3,80 3,40 12,9
Closet 1,2 3,55 0,60 2,1
Baño 1 2,10 1,55 3,3
Baño 2 2,10 1,10 2,3
Hall 2,15 1,00 2,2 0,00
patio de servicio 1,70 1,40 2,4 AREA SUPERFICIE UTIL (M²) 64,885
0,00 AREA CONSTRUIDA EN PLANTA (M²)
64,89 AREA TOTAL DE TERRENO (M²)
V.- CALCULO DEL PRECIO LEGAL
1.- PRECIO BASICO = PRECIO POR M² X SUPERFICIE UTIL $ 115,00 64,885 7461,78
2.- AÑOS DE CONST.= AÑO ACTUAL - AÑO CONST. 2004 1958 46
3.- DEPREC.REAL = DEP.X EST.TECN. + DEP. X EDAD 0,3
4.- DEPREC.X AÑOS = AÑOS DE CONST. X TASA DE DEPREC. 0,00
5.- VALOR DE DEPREC.= PRECIO BASICO X DEPREC.(3 o 4) 7.461,78 0,3 2.238,53
6.- PRECIO DEPREC.= PRECIO BASICO - VALOR DE DEPREC. 7.461,78 2.238,53 5.223,24
7.- RECARGO X UBIC. GEOGRAF. = TASA REC.X SUP.UTIL 24 64,885 1.557,24
8.- TERRENO TRIBUTARIO = AREA CONSTRUIDA X 1.5
9.- TERR.ADIC.= AREA TERR.- ( AREA CONST.+ TERR.TRIB)
10.- RECARGO.X TERR. ADIC.= TASA REC.X TERR. ADIC.
11.- PRECIO DE LA VIV. = PRECIO DEPREC.(6) + REC.(7+10) 5.223,24 1.557,24 6.780,48
LOCALES LOCALES 
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ANNEX 7 
K3 COEFFICIENT CALCULATION 
 
Land Quality Coefficient  (K3)
 
I.- Land Characteristics. 
 
 I.1.- Physical & Environmental. 
 
  A.- Natural Landscape   C.- Soil Resistance 
 
 
  B.- Natural Drainage   D.- Environmental Quality 
 
    E.- Landscape Quality 
 
 I.2.- Vacant Developable Land. 
 
 
II.- Infrastructure. 
 
II.1.- Road Network   II.4.- Water Supply System 
 
II.2.- Train Network   II.5.- Sewerage and Treatment Plants 
 
II.3.- Wet Land Areas   II.6.- Electric Network 
 
  II.7.- Communications Network 
 
 
III.- Regional Factors. 
 
 III.1.- Regional Accessibility: 
 
  A.- Highways   C.- Port 
 
  B.- Train   D.- Airport 
 
 
 III.2.- Labor Force Peculiarities and Urban Settlement Capacity.  
  
 III.3.- Nearby Attractions 
 
 III.4.- Potential Densities 
 
 III.5.- Type of settlement according to General Urban System.  
  
ANNEX 8 
LAND AND BUILDING ASSESSMENT DISTRIBUTION IN CUBA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. de Avila
12%
Holguín
11%
La Habana
7%
Matanzas 
7%
Restantes
15%
C. Habana
48%
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ANNEX 9    
EXAMPLE OF REAL ESTATE VALUATIONS AND PROJECTS IN HAVANA CITY 
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ANNEX 10   
DIAGRAM OF PERMUTA FORMAL PROCESS ACTORS AND FUNCTION FLOWS 
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ANNEX 11 
 DIAGRAM OF PERMUTA INFORMAL PROCESS ACTORS AND FUNCTION FLOWS 
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ANNEX 13 
ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN BOHEMIA JOURNAL ON JANUARY 2006 DESCRIBING THE PERMUTA FORMAL 
AND INFORMAL MECHANISMS 
Article “I hate you, my love” appeared in Bohemia magazine on January 2006, explaining the troubles of families going 
through the permuta process. The authorities interviewed explained the improvements proposed to the permuta rules in 
order to facilitate procedures. 
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ANNEX 14 
FORMAL AND INFORMAL TRANSACTIONS ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
1.1 Table of the Formal Transactions Estimated Model 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 01/23/08   Time: 22:00   
Sample (adjusted): 1 178   
Included observations: 178 after adjustments  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 5.305829 0.165498 32.05978 0.0000 
Y98 0.262230 0.152381 1.720879 0.0874 
Y99 0.016806 0.102569 0.163848 0.8701 
Y00 -0.123036 0.094343 -1.304130 0.1942 
Y01 -0.100379 0.142474 -0.704546 0.4822 
M1 0.684111 0.134954 5.069209 0.0000 
M2 0.995038 0.169040 5.886406 0.0000 
M3 0.928306 0.285324 3.253513 0.0014 
M4 0.733805 0.248115 2.957515 0.0036 
M5 -0.033576 0.294498 -0.114011 0.9094 
M6 -0.985539 0.191603 -5.143656 0.0000 
M7 -0.582355 0.276291 -2.107758 0.0367 
M8 0.106112 0.422757 0.251000 0.8022 
M10 0.019098 0.301144 0.063419 0.9495 
M11 1.056371 0.589723 1.791299 0.0753 
M12 -0.571997 0.226776 -2.522299 0.0127 
M13 -0.803020 0.286901 -2.798943 0.0058 
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M14 -0.083782 0.262120 -0.319634 0.7497 
DR1 -0.543067 0.152051 -3.571613 0.0005 
DR2 0.073616 0.155266 0.474131 0.6361 
DR3 0.175025 0.168576 1.038256 0.3009 
DR4 0.433343 0.173522 2.497342 0.0136 
MT1 0.159857 0.119422 1.338588 0.1828 
MT2 0.128719 0.136107 0.945719 0.3458 
MT3 0.556060 0.274898 2.022792 0.0449 
MT4 -0.712915 0.223917 -3.183830 0.0018 
U1 -0.390153 0.183071 -2.131152 0.0347 
U2 -0.140748 0.172168 -0.817501 0.4150 
U3 -0.250692 0.212866 -1.177698 0.2408 
U4 0.063549 0.207455 0.306328 0.7598 
D40 -6.845353 0.719419 -9.515120 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.760684     Mean dependent var 5.315025 
Adjusted R-squared 0.711844     S.D. dependent var 1.123542 
S.E. of regression 0.603119     Akaike info criterion 1.983559 
Sum squared resid 53.47163     Schwarz criterion 2.537690 
Log likelihood -145.5368     F-statistic 15.57502 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.810590     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
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1.2  Graphic: Normality Model Test of the Formal Transactions 
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Series: Residuals
Sample 1 178
Observations 178
Mean       1.04e-15
Median   0.069262
Maximum  1.715096
Minimum -1.719510
Std. Dev.   0.549636
Skewness  -0.179912
Kurtosis   3.569591
Jarque-Bera  3.366480
Probability  0.185771
 
 
2.1 Table of the Informal/Permuta Estimated Transactions Model 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PR) 
Method: Least Squares 
Date: 12/01/07   Time: 19:56 
Sample(adjusted): 1 152 
Included observations: 152 after adjusting endpoints 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C 4.700445 0.149190 31.50653 0.0000 
B1 0.014311 0.111694 0.128127 0.8983 
B2 0.077643 0.101896 0.761984 0.4476 
B3 0.158572 0.167740 0.945344 0.3464 
B4 -0.421042 0.229871 -1.831641 0.0695 
E1 0.113561 0.103183 1.100586 0.2733 
E2 0.014440 0.112466 0.128391 0.8981 
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E3 -0.050922 0.187731 -0.271249 0.7867 
M1 0.143428 0.124526 1.151796 0.2517 
M2 0.124813 0.092072 1.355600 0.1778 
M3 -0.235674 0.139577 -1.688482 0.0940 
M4 -0.143693 0.210997 -0.681017 0.4972 
M5 0.262135 0.262391 0.999023 0.3198 
M6 -0.163547 0.143818 -1.137186 0.2578 
M7 0.835206 0.434512 1.922169 0.0570 
M8 0.410270 0.419726 0.977471 0.3303 
M9 -0.072859 0.152865 -0.476625 0.6345 
M10 -0.251998 0.222570 -1.132220 0.2598 
M12 0.347744 0.321707 1.080933 0.2819 
M13 -0.595611 0.196402 -3.032614 0.0030 
Y1 -0.083970 0.136178 -0.616622 0.5387 
Y2 -0.395101 0.199316 -1.982283 0.0498 
Y3 -1.158990 0.318351 -3.640601 0.0004 
Y4 0.046711 0.227200 0.205593 0.8375 
Y5 -0.028733 0.162424 -0.176903 0.8599 
Y6 -0.000393 0.113837 -0.003451 0.9973 
Y7 0.088677 0.149807 0.591943 0.5550 
Y8 -0.060419 0.220852 -0.273571 0.7849 
Y9 0.617836 0.148535 4.159543 0.0001 
Y10 0.034413 0.125846 0.273452 0.7850 
Y11 0.293423 0.106918 2.744383 0.0070 
AO104 -3.001950 0.518703 -5.787412 0.0000 
AO131 -1.800135 0.460558 -3.908599 0.0002 
PT 0.377496 0.088820 4.250097 0.0000 
R-squared 0.690027     Mean dependent var 5.174817 
209 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.603340     S.D. dependent var 0.682253 
S.E. of regresión 0.429690     Akaike info criterion 1.342666 
Sum squared resid 21.78672     Schwarz criterion 2.019060 
Log likelihood -68.04259     F-statistic 7.959956 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.957236     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
 
 
2.2 Graphic: Normality Model Test of the Permuta  
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3. Estimation for the variance correct for the heteroskedacity: formal model 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PR)   
Method: Least Squares   
Date: 07/21/08   Time: 12:45   
Sample (adjusted): 1 178   
Included observations: 178 after adjustments  
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
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C 5.305829 0.166376 31.89064 0.0000 
Y98 0.262230 0.139974 1.873422 0.0630 
Y99 0.016806 0.095895 0.175250 0.8611 
Y00 -0.123036 0.099575 -1.235615 0.2186 
Y01 -0.100379 0.203658 -0.492882 0.6228 
M1 0.684111 0.153197 4.465556 0.0000 
M2 0.995038 0.218962 4.544332 0.0000 
M3 0.928306 0.282163 3.289963 0.0013 
M4 0.733805 0.349871 2.097359 0.0377 
M5 -0.033576 0.438894 -0.076501 0.9391 
M6 -0.985539 0.230752 -4.270987 0.0000 
M7 -0.582355 0.234604 -2.482291 0.0142 
M8 0.106112 0.268031 0.395893 0.6928 
M10 0.019098 0.352602 0.054164 0.9569 
M11 1.056371 0.258127 4.092444 0.0001 
M12 -0.571997 0.315022 -1.815736 0.0714 
M13 -0.803020 0.327799 -2.449736 0.0155 
M14 -0.083782 0.316398 -0.264800 0.7915 
DR1 -0.543067 0.205672 -2.640452 0.0092 
DR2 0.073616 0.200389 0.367368 0.7139 
DR3 0.175025 0.180124 0.971692 0.3328 
DR4 0.433343 0.169960 2.549683 0.0118 
MT1 0.159857 0.128112 1.247788 0.2141 
MT2 0.128719 0.141403 0.910299 0.3642 
MT3 0.556060 0.248970 2.233441 0.0270 
MT4 -0.712915 0.290912 -2.450616 0.0154 
U1 -0.390153 0.177209 -2.201652 0.0292 
U2 -0.140748 0.198265 -0.709895 0.4789 
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U3 -0.250692 0.194546 -1.288604 0.1996 
U4 0.063549 0.216683 0.293281 0.7697 
D40 -6.845353 0.428613 -15.97093 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.760684     Mean dependent var 5.315025 
Adjusted R-squared 0.711844     S.D. dependent var 1.123542 
S.E. of regression 0.603119     Akaike info criterion 1.983559 
Sum squared resid 53.47163     Schwarz criterion 2.537690 
Log likelihood -145.5368     F-statistic 15.57502 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.810590     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
           
 
4. Informal Transaction  
White Heteroskedasticity Test: 
F-statistic 1.210532     Probability 0.227292 
Obs*R-squared 38.44331     Probability 0.236539 
 
Homoskedacity is not rejected up to 5 % 
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ANNEX 27 
DISREGARD FOR LAND POTENTIALS 
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ANNEX 34 
CHANGES IN THE RULES AND PRACTICES WHICH WOULD INCREASE THE EFFICIENCY WITH 
WHICH LAND IS USED 
a)  Rules and practices about allocating land 
Better use of existing rules 
 
It is possible to improve the land allocation in Cuba by using the existing rules for land-use planning more 
effectively (these rules are described in chapter 3). We say this because the problem is not always in the rules 
themselves, but in the deficient ways these are implemented: they are not enforced or not observed, either 
because the rules are ignored or not sufficiently known. With the same rules, we could improve the existing 
practices.  
 
In land-use planning at territorial level (nation-wide scale), decisions are usually made by collaboration between 
physical planning at national level and the sectoral entities (ministries). So it is important to improve the 
coordination mechanisms between the economic entities – economic interests of each of the provinces and 
municipalities - and the national land development schemes. These latter show the allocation of land resources 
for the different investments at that scale, including infrastructure, industrial developments, and the programs for 
new urbanizations and enlargements as part of the system of settlements. It is crucial that decisions, that so far 
have been made by the sectors, be better coordinated - through physical planning - with the priorities and needs 
of each territory (province, city, municipality). 
 
If this were done, then land use plans would be one of the instruments for achieving a more efficient location of 
investments at the different levels and for the public and private sectors, and not the other way around. What 
usually happens is that investments are decided, which then require the planning authorities to issue the license 
and micro-location requirements. This type of behavior must be replaced by a more horizontal communication if 
we aspire to plan and use land and buildings more efficiently. 
 
It is essential that such plans consider the differences between the territories – natural, cultural, social and 
economic - because not all territories have the same development potential, as determined by the availability of 
natural resources, the population, and the area for urbanization. Land-use planning, if taken into account at the 
stage of investment conception, can contribute to a more sustainable development (as it is established in the 
Cuban polices) and can balance the development opportunities by fostering territorial cooperation and by linking 
and exchanging potentials.1 
 
As 75% of the national population is located in urban areas, and in Havana’s case almost 100%,2 urban land use 
plans and land allocation must be an important issue in overall investment development plans, giving utmost 
importance to the provision and completion of infrastructure: roads, electricity, water supply, sewerage, drainage 
and telephone.  
 
The same should be done with the provincial subdivisions into municipalities. In the same province, we can find 
great heterogeneity between the municipalities in terms of physical patterns, population, and traditions: all of 
these need to be considered in planning decisions. Moreover, land-use planning can propose inter-municipal 
                                                          
1 Iñiguez Rojas, Luisa y Norma Montes Rodríguez “Espacio y Poblamiento” en: Everleny Pérez, Omar. Cincuenta años de la Economía 
Cubana, 2010.  Página 363-405. 
2 Ibid. 
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strategies for a more efficient use of resources. Even inside the largest municipalities we can find considerable 
differences between Popular Councils.  
 
Local land-use planning and community based planning are important for achieving a more efficient use and 
allocation of land and building resources. At the city level, strategic planning needs to be re-incorporated and 
extended to all Cuban cities. This can act as an intermediate planning instrument for medium and short term 
purposes between the territorial and the local planning. The strategy made for Havana City needs to be updated 
and could serve as experience for other provinces that so far have none.  
 
The use of the strategic planning tool can help guide and establish the main development objectives, making full 
use of policies and instruments for land management. The actual burden given to the provincial planning 
authorities – supervision, issuing of licenses and permits for the design of urban areas and infrastructures - could 
be partly transferred to municipal entities, which are, at present, only dealing with housing and community 
services. This would help concentrate the provincial strategic efforts onto planning for city level and towards 
strengthening the articulation and coordination with the economic sectors and the participation with other entities 
in the elaboration of city level investment plans, thus preventing imbalance in the location of the different 
investments, whereby some municipalities get more attention than others. We base this proposal to transfer more 
responsibilities and decision making to municipalities – which for that purpose would require a redesign of 
institutional, legal and financial frameworks equivalent to the law decrees 143 and 283 -3 on some of the good 
experiences of Old Havana, where a better control of land use and building resources has been achieved, and 
(unlike what customarily happens in other municipalities) important functions and economic activities have 
remained under local management. 
 
Some of the strategies should go in this direction, thinking about the city development, and about the possibilities 
of creating better municipal interconnections, where the strong ones back the weak ones. The provincial planning 
should be flexible in transferring responsibilities that could be decentralized to the municipalities, such as 
housing, community services, and neighborhood level urban projects. It is important for the success of all these 
strategies that they are given the political support of the provincial authorities. 
 
Other ways in which existing practices could be improved would be to require that municipalities incorporate and 
monitor land and building use regulations, with attention for land uses, use intensities, functional sectors, and 
mapping land and building values, and that they introduce more effective controls if the regulations have not been 
met, and update the regulations when necessary.  
 
If we consider the extended informality in housing production and in the use of public infrastructure, then we can 
see that there is a problem in the implementation of these regulations if they are not accompanied by coordinated 
action with the legal entities for formalizing and registering land and building property. Otherwise it would be hard 
for inhabitants to comply with the regulations, and it would make difficult the work of inspectors, who are 
constantly under pressure from the inhabitants in order to protect their informal uses and constructions.  
 
New urban regulations 
 
The municipalities should complete and update their urban regulations in such a way that they respond to the 
local characteristics and needs. There are already successful examples which are paving the way for 
improvements in municipal urban regulations, such as the updated and recently published books that contain the 
                                                          
3 The Municipality of Old Havana and specifically the City Historians Office management process is legally supported by the Law Decree 
143 of 1993, recently updated with more prerogatives with the Law Decree 283 of 2011. 
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urban regulations and building codes for Vedado, Old Havana and Malecon.4 
 
These examples have enjoyed technical and financial support – international cooperation, financing, and national 
and international teams of consultants - which is not usually available for municipalities, and they can serve as 
best practices for other city neighborhoods, as they make information more comprehensible for the public, by 
using graphic information and charts. The new methods also include information about building typologies and 
heritage protection grades. And, most importantly, they emphasize the importance of land use by including urban 
intensity maps, showing the preferable location for the uses, and combining the various functional sectors in 
mixed land use areas.5 
 
This new methodology for urban regulations includes consultation procedures for land and building uses, how to 
carry out rehabilitation, renovation or new construction, and the requirement to take account of the parameters 
established for use intensity and location. First they check whether the land or building use is acceptable, and 
then they check the possibilities for use intensity according to the plans and charts. The starting point for these 
intensities is the heritage protection grade, as the most valuable buildings and areas are usually proposed for 
restoration or rehabilitation. This could limit the introduction of certain uses, but these could be handled as 
exceptional cases. 
 
The regulations include a section about contraventions to the regulations, including penalties up to 10 000 Cuban 
pesos, and expropriation. There is another section that covers the procedures for appeal in cases where 
inspectors have not fulfilled their duties correctly. The new regulations include also the requirement that they can 
be updated every five years, with possibilities of earlier adjustments if required because of policy changes or 
strategic adjustments. It is also clear that they derogate the existing regulations from the 1970s in the case of 
Vedado, and the regulations introduced in 1998 for the case of Old Havana. 
 
The main limitation of these new regulations lies in the weak link with financial and fiscal instruments. But this can 
be introduced as the next step of the process. 
 
There are other desirable practices found in planning processes in some other countries but that are not present 
in Cuba, and maybe are not feasible in the short term. However, we think that it is important to consider them in 
order to  understand them better. If circumstances allow, they could be incorporated, not replicating them exactly 
but in their essential elements, in order to develop better land and building management and more efficient 
investments. We list them below. 
 
Concerted urban strategies and large urban projects 
  
Concerted urban strategies and large urban projects can be used to connect profitable projects with social 
projects. The profitable projects can be agreed by joint ventures with foreign capital, by public-private 
partnerships, or by private investments, and part of the agreement must result in economic or social benefits for 
the community or area where the project is made, for example in the improvement of infrastructure, urban 
equipment, services, and housing. When negotiating this, it is important to use the urban plan as the coordination 
instrument that provides the development vision and determines the land use, the intensities and other 
                                                          
4 The methodology followed in the elaboration of these regulations is inspired in the Smart Code of the New Urbanism Movement 
elaborated by Andres Duany and Elisabeth Plater Zyberk which is a very practical and graphic instrument for urbanization design. 
5 Regulaciones Urbanísticas Ciudad de La Habana. Centro Histórico de La Habana Vieja, 2009. 
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parameters. Preparing, approving and implementing such strategies and projects require large forward 
investments to prepare the infrastructure (and possibly provision of housing, if this has to be relocated). These 
strategies and projects can generate considerable economic outputs and positive effects in upgrading 
deteriorated areas, but they require also a careful study of urban values and historical stratification, and checking 
for negative externalities, for example on the residents that are relocated, on cultural issues, and on the 
environment.  
Planning for urban homogeneous areas – spatial, social, economic and cultural diversity 
 
When making land-use plans, it is desirable to have a better insight into the various characteristics of the 
municipalities and their neighbourhood composition (popular councils). For the different areas have different 
spatial characteristics and different needs for services and infrastructure provision. Using this information, the 
plans could advise about a more integrated and balanced allocation of resources for existing and new 
development projects, better considering what is existing and what is missing and required. In this way planners 
could check whether physical indices and urban regulations meet these criteria, considering costs and benefits, 
and compensation mechanisms for the weakest areas.  
At the moment, municipalities and popular councils are delimited according to mainly administrative and political 
considerations, or according to fundamental economic interests. We consider that other aspects - such as 
historical evolution, spatial patterns, land uses, infrastructure quality, size and shape of land plots, urban and 
building typologies, construction densities, and building values - should be taken into account in these 
delimitations. There are economic, social and cultural factors also that should be included in the delimitation 
process, because when providing the adequate allocation of land and building resources to every area it is 
important not to undermine the social and cultural diversity of neighbourhoods.  
To illustrate this we have the example of the Jesus Maria Popular Council in Old Havana, one of the oldest 
neighbourhoods of this municipality, with a distinct history and a very rooted identity. However, this area is not 
part of the designation of World Heritage, and the Master Plan for the Historic Centre has left it outside its 
perimeter (except for the blocks with higher land and building value and best development potentials). This 
deprives this Popular Council of better development opportunities, and gives it fewer powers than the popular 
councils inside the perimeter of heritage protection.6 
Land readjustment and land repartitioning 
 
The introduction of these mechanisms could give local councils the capacity to reach collective agreements about 
modifying the urbanization parameters, and in that way change land uses and/or merge small land plots in order 
to locate larger projects. The updated urban regulations for Old Havana, Vedado and Malecon introduce this 
power for the first time, in order to merge very small land plots that are empty and to create a medium size plot. 
But its application at a larger scale has not yet been put into practice.  
This mechanism creates development opportunities that did not exist previously, and its gradual inclusion in the 
regulations would help to remove obstacles of outdated land uses. These powers require that property and user 
rights are treated flexibly, as it produces a spatial and functional redesign of land plots. That allows new uses, 
higher densities, and improvements to the development feasibility, by generating economies of scale and a good 
investment environment. This instrument can significantly increase land values, but needs to be carefully 
evaluated before application in heritage city areas prioritized for conservation.  
Partial and Special plans 
                                                          
6 Robainas Barcia, Ayleen, 2010. 
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This instrument has been made available to Cuban urban planning entities to plan the transformation and use of 
specific city areas or urban locations directly linked with a specific investment program. Such plans have been 
made, for example, for the revitalization of the colonial square Plaza del Cristo and for the reuse of Old Havana’s 
Harbour.7 This instrument is used to develop detailed urban plans, subdivided in stages according to investment 
schedules, functional areas, and investment components. The plans include a detailed definition of land and 
building uses, physical indicators, infrastructure levels, and types of interventions in the buildings and spaces. 
They also foresee the relations, scales and proportions between public and private spaces. Public administrations 
can use this instrument to establish public-private partnerships in order to obtain urbanized land in exchange for 
the finance or execution of urbanization works. Partial plans consider the distribution of charges and benefits. 
However, this instrument has not yet achieved results in practice: as far as we know, the partial and special plans 
that have been made have not reached the implementation stage, for reasons that go from legal to financial.  
b)  Rules and practices about rights and obligations 
Among the first efforts to improve the rights and obligations on land and buildings should be compiling, revising 
and classifying all the existing regulations and rules by the concerned entities, in order to discover which 
regulations and rules are working and which are outdated, and to verify to what extent these rules really respond 
to reality and actually help to manage land and building resources.  
In this research we have identified some of the gaps in the existing rules, mainly that the citizens have many 
obligations and limited rights, while the state entities have ample rights and some of their obligations are unclear. 
This situation affects the efficiency with which land and buildings are used, and we believe it could be improved 
by finally issuing the Land Law, encouraging the articulated and horizontal involvement of planning regulations 
with a more effective guidance and supervision of the legal entities over the public and the private, and 
introducing a more flexible environment in the use and ownership of land and buildings.  
Land lease  
 
Land leasing is possible in Cuba but it has been allowed only very exceptionally. In the case of land it could be 
quite similar to the temporary surface rights allowed for housing, because retains the state as the landowner and 
leases the development and use rights to other urban private or non-public actors. It could become a very 
important mechanism, due to the high proportion of land and buildings owned by the government. Then it would 
go further than current practice (land leasing to foreign investors).8 With more flexible regulations it would allow 
revenues to be generated from agreements between government and private stakeholders – national or 
international - based on contracts that transfer the government’s property use rights. The lease would be sold to 
the highest bidder: this would help to find the most efficient investors.  
 
Land leasing could help to achieve the following: 
• Retain the public share of land value increments  
• Facilitate urban development and redevelopment 
• Management of urban growth 
• Reserve land for public purposes 
                                                          
7 Regulaciones Urbanísticas Ciudad de La Habana. El Vedado. Municipio Plaza de la Revolución, 2007. página 100.  
8 “Decreto  Ley 283, 2011. This Decree expands the initial Law Decree made in 1993 for the management of the Historic Centre of 
Havana, includes references to the leasing and renting of spaces for self employment activities. 
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• Stabilize land and housing prices 
 
Leasing of buildings and spaces for industrial and commercial purposes should be considered in order to facilitate 
a more efficient location and relocation of the self employment options that are at present being diversified.  
 
Land Ownership and Tenure  
The Cuban Law is extended in the treatment of land and real estate: in this research we consider only the 
aspects concerning the rights and obligations that we think affect the efficiency with which land is used.  
Private persons who own land plots and have property documents to prove it, should be allowed to transfer, 
donate or sell their property to other natural persons or to the state at an adequate price. They should also be 
allowed to permute their land with other private persons or with the state.  
Purchasing land surface rights should be allowed among private individuals, under sale, lease or rent 
agreements. At present the permuta – transfer of property where one building is exchanged for another - is used 
most of the times to conceal a transfer of property where price is involved, therefore a buying selling operation is 
taking place.  
The possibility of giving surface rights on rooftops of residential buildings should be subject to an inspection of the 
state of repair of buildings. There are examples in the city of modern and sound new apartments built on top of 
very ruined 1920s and even older buildings from XVIII and XIX centuries. This is a very inefficient approach, both 
technically and economically. 
The right of usufruct for housing should not be as expanded, as it does not help the improvement of the building 
stock in urban areas. The gradual transformation of these slums into habitable places should be accompanied by 
changes in tenure and financial mechanisms to recoup the investments. 
It is very clear that the options of self-construction have been the best quantity solution – though not the best in 
terms of quality - for housing problems. However, confiscation and demolition of housing that contravenes the law 
are hard on people after years of effort, and promote corruption.  
The rights of expropriation and confiscation which the state has are necessary, but should be revised. 
Expropriation because the compensation paid is very low. And confiscation because it is perverse (it is used as a 
way to take housing), it is discretional (if all buying and selling or corruption cases linked with illegalities were 
really detected and prosecuted, the authorities would have to confiscate half the city), and is distressing for the 
families and relatives of those who migrate.  
Another area that requires much improvement is the management of buildings assigned to public entities. We 
suggest eliminating the concept of basic asset, and propose using contracts that give the real estate its adequate 
treatment and value. For when people occupy housing that is classified as a basic asset, they do not feel 
responsible for it or secure in it. And for the government, these are investments that are never recovered, nor 
paid for by users (who are like tenants that do not pay rent), nor by the enterprises that manage these assets. 
The permuta mechanism could be simplified and released of part of its informal connotations by opening up other 
channels for property exchange and acquisition. For example, buying and selling of housing properties among 
building owners could be allowed, given the fact that these surface rights are given in perpetuity, as could the 
transfer of surface rights between private owners. 
The land and building ownership appears in the Constitution as personal property, together with personal assets 
and saving accounts. We think it is necessary to differentiate personal property (individual assets) from real 
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estate property (land and buildings), specifying which types of actors (individuals or families and also legal 
persons) may own what. Also to introduce a new actor, namely the collective property owner (cooperative) for 
urban areas (rural cooperatives already exist under the property of agrarian cooperatives, see chapter 3) which 
could manage properties on behalf of all the occupants.9  
Introduce more flexible mechanisms for having more than one property. The law limits this unnecessarily. For 
example, an owner that receives another property has to transfer the other property to the state, and will receive, 
like in the cases of expropriation, only the artificially low legal price for it. We see no reason to prohibit a person 
from owning more than one property as long as it has been legally acquired.  
Any abandoned or empty land or building is immediately transferred to state property, so most properties illegally 
occupied are usually already state property. Illegal occupancy is not recognized as a form of acquisition by the 
Cuban legislation, although it is very common. The illegal occupant has no rights over the property at all, unless 
the status is formalised. It is desirable to formalize illegal occupancy in Cuba, as there are many informal 
settlements and illegal occupations. 
Renting 
The renting possibilities are very limited by the law. The following rules are being reconsidered.10 Why is it 
prohibited to be a tenant of dwellings whose owners are not residing in the country temporarily or permanently? 
Why is the renting housing stock owned by the government managed as basic asset or state assigned? Why can 
whole dwellings be rented only to Cuban residents and only for Cuban pesos? Why must owners demonstrate 
they will not worsen their own living conditions in order to rent to others? Why cannot Cuban owners rent to firm 
representatives or to foreign entities (who are allowed to rent only within the government stock)? Why is it not 
possible to rent dwellings that have been expanded (the owners must wait three years after legalization of the 
expansion)? Why is it that owners who have been criticised in their working places for lack of ethics and bad 
conduct cannot rent? Why can people with police records not rent? There are too many detailed limitations on the 
act of renting, both on the lessor and the lessee. 
General remarks about rights and obligations 
All actors, whether state, non-state or private, should have to comply with the rules for property and tenure rights 
and obligations. The principle of prioritizing the public benefit over the private one should remain, but the balance 
needs to be shifted towards private interests. In particular, there should be a fairer game in the expropriation and 
confiscation mechanisms, in renting, and in acquisition and transmission of property.  
The procedures for acquisition and transmission of property should be made more simple and flexible. This could 
include the following: 
• Introduction of the right to buy and sell landed property rights in urban areas, supported by the legal and 
regulatory context – the existing regulations do not allow these actions so their inclusion requires drastic 
modifications. These transactions should be negotiated between the parties, and the agreed value 
should be registered by a notary and incorporated in the municipal registers. This would allow a 
regulated market to work, and the informal processes regarding the buying, transferring and selling of 
land and buildings to be gradually formalised.  
                                                          
9 Ibid. There are necessary procedures for the change in the land law, these include the transferring of property rights, the formation of 
new property and the changes in the land uses. There should be coordination mechanism among these modalities when necessary.  
10 Since 2010 different legal adjustments – law decree 275 of September 2010 and resolution 305 of October 2010 - are establishing more 
flexible regulations for renting of dwellings and other dwelling spaces for housing or other commercial activities. These changes are still 
incipient and very limited as they don’t include leasing or renting of commercial ground floors and other public spaces to private individuals 
for self employment options.  
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• Make building use rights transferable. This right is allowed by the law for transferring the rights to use 
rooftops or parts of rooftops, but only for extensions or construction of new dwellings. This right is not 
allowed for state property, but this limitation is often violated. The same happens with the uses, because 
many inhabitants would like to use rooftops for uses other than housing. This right could be given in 
usufruct, paying the price agreed between the negotiating parties. 
 
• Introduce the possibility (now prohibited) of land permutes (besides building permutes) between private 
actors and between public and private actors 
 
• Allow private owners to transfer property rights more flexibly, through donations, inheritance and 
testament. Such mechanisms exist in Cuba, but they are very limited. 
•  Enlarge the possibilities for public and private actors to hold temporary tenancies (or to grant temporary 
tenancies) on land and property for the production of services and goods. For example free land plots of 
state property that can be granted in free usufruct and also rented for different temporary uses. These 
cases are common but they usually take place without the necessary approvals and controls.  
 
There are various rules and practices connected with ownership and tenure rights that are not a big problem in 
the present Cuban reality but could become one in the future. Therefore we consider them below. In all cases, it 
would be necessary to adapt the rules and mechanisms to the Cuban circumstances.  
 
Land and building mortgages 
 
In November 2000, the Mortgage Law was reinstated into the Cuban legislation for legal persons professionally 
involved in real estate development, so they can fulfill their financial obligations. Until then, although the mortgage 
law existed it was not recognized. However, this mechanism is not available for natural persons. This should be 
changed, as it would allow land and building owners to mobilize loans backed by the value of their properties. 
This would require connections with the Cuban banks and with the property valuation agencies. 
We propose ratifying the Mortgage Law of 1965 and its subsequent modifications. This Law gives legal support to 
property registers for land and building, organizes the register books, and regulates the recognition of registration 
officials. Among the procedures that must be introduced are to inscribe the properties, issue the titles, and 
supervise the performance of local registers. In addition, this Law should give more opportunity to land and 
building owners to mobilize loans backed by the value of their properties (see: land as a financial asset). It should 
regulate the interfaces between the Cuban banking system and the property valuation methodologies.  
Ownership and lease of land and buildings 
Introduce the possibility that natural persons lease land and properties from other natural or legal persons, and 
also that they may lease land and buildings that they own to third stakeholders. The extent of these rights should 
be limited to avoid monopolization of land and building resources (concentration of property).  
 
Time sharing and multiple property 
 
This is a modality where the owner makes an investment, pays a predetermined amount once a year, and 
secures a vacation or temporary residence, taking turns in the use of the shared facility that can also be 
transferred, sub-rented or sold. It is not covered by the Cuban legislation. Its inclusion could favour the 
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development of tourism and real estate businesses with foreign parties. This modality offers other legal 
possibilities of multiple usufruct, multiple renting and society clubs.11 
 
Time sharing and multiple property arrangements offer advantageous investments possibilities because the 
parties do not have to acquire or pay for the entire property or investment in the building, reducing the costs and 
adjusting it to their real needs and purposes. This could be a good option for expansion of private second homes 
allowed by the law, and it could be extended to many tourism facilities which are only partially used or vacant for 
large periods of time for lack of resources for maintenance and improvements. 
 
In the multiple property arrangement, the buyer also acquires and shares the assets in the building, such as 
furniture, equipment and other linked services.  
 
Horizontal Property  
 
This Law decree was introduced in Cuba 12 in September 1952 and although it is obsolete has not been 
completely eliminated, as many of the former owners maintained their properties after the Revolution and many 
buildings retain this condition. It could be reintroduced as it allows good investment opportunities, with fewer 
financial risks (the apartments are presold during the project stages) and a more efficient use of land in valuable 
urban locations. At the same time, this law is the best Cuban antecedent for the creation of new housing 
cooperatives.  
 
The horizontal property regime establishes norms that regulate the relations among the different owners of the 
apartments and dwellings which are integrated into one community. These norms are clearly established and 
concern the financial contributions, obligations, rights, limitations and duties of the members with respect to the 
individual and collective use of spaces – stairs, elevators, garages, gardens, chutes - and public connections.13 A 
Board of Owners is created and yearly renovated to supervise the fulfillment of what is established by the norms. 
When the norms require modifications to the property, these are consulted and submitted to all members of the 
community of building owners and require unanimous approval. Among its responsibilities, the Board designs and 
approves the investment plan with foreseeable expenditures and profits. 
 
The horizontal property modality has economic, social and juridical advantages, it is a solution to establish 
individual and collective rights; it limits the rights and obligations over building assets; it economizes in terms of 
transaction and administration costs; it is a legal solution to regulate and organize housing problems and 
minimize conflicts; and it provide access to good quality housing, in good locations without consuming large 
amounts of land. 
 
c) Rules and practices about investments in land and buildings 
 
There is a big gap between what is required for an investment – the requirements are not perfect but are quite 
organized and logical - and the practices, which are continually modified and distorted. There is a saying among 
people that plans are made just for one reason, not to be fulfilled. This is the starting point of most of our 
investment problems: the plans are rarely followed and the improvisation that follows sometimes leads to 
disaster. So the first thing to improve would be the requirement to make investment plans which are based on a 
feasibility analysis, taking account of the financial, material and human capacities, and linked to the territorial 
plans.  
                                                          
11 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique, 2011. 
12 Ley-Decreto No.407, de fecha 16 de septiembre de 1952, de Propiedad Horizontal de Cuba. 
13 Fernández Martínez, Martha, 2003. 
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It is imperative that investments in land and buildings are coordinated with the provincial authorities and the 
municipalities, which evaluate and balance the resource allocation among them, even if the investments respond 
to a sectoral priority. It is time to notice that there are unidentified development potentials in the Cuban provinces 
and municipalities, and there are endogenous resources which could be better integrated into the national and 
sectoral policies and strategies.  
Further, all investments - whether social, economic, territorial and productive, including foreign investments -14 
should follow the same logic about their economic and financial performance. All of them should attempt to be 
economically, socially and financially efficient, from the design stage. This will oblige the government, when 
making investment decisions, to seriously consider the weights of the various inputs. For example, if the 
government actor is obliged to pay for land as part of the investment, it will be concerned about the value and 
other attributes of the land, and it will consider alternative locations according to their types of activities.  
More attention should be given to the desired outputs, and once the investment is finished it should be evaluated 
on its performance and financial recovery.  
The Cuban government could also introduce the necessary rules and practices for using investments as a source 
of financial opportunities (and see ‘land as a financial asset’). There could be many ways of doing this:  
 
• Creating public-private partnerships, or co-ventures between investors and local entities and with other 
public entities, for investments in land and building. 
• In connection with land-use regulations and economic plans, introduce revenue generating land and 
building uses such as offices, commerce and tourism. Exceptional properties with heritage value could 
be reserved for exclusive uses, but less significant sites and buildings could be leased for such 
commercial uses under agreements with city or municipal actors, local associations, and private families 
who were owners of land and buildings from before the revolution. 
• Introduce property related strategies – like the ones proposed in the section of land ownership - to 
favour the gradual regeneration of neighbourhoods, municipalities and cities. 
• Introduce more creative and innovative ways of financing and co-financing the improvement of housing 
and community facilities, such as housing associations and cooperatives, formalization of informal 
mechanisms. 
• Facilitate the access to financial sources – credits, loans, mortgages, micro-loans, grants - for the 
adequate development and management of land and buildings. 
• Develop attractive opportunities for the private sector, accompanied by agreements that part of the 
resources be used for the development of infrastructure, and that there are land and buildings for social 
and economic development.  
• Use land and buildings as resources to raise the necessary capital to start businesses and enterprises 
for national, provincial, and also local or community based projects. This could be done in connection 
with the location of small private entrepreneurial activities, where people pay government entities for the 
square meters they occupy in public spaces, or to the families that rent out part of their properties.  
 
d) Rules and transactions which affect transaction costs 
 
The smaller the transaction costs, the more smooth and efficient the development process.15 The following could 
be done to reduce transaction costs associated with land and buildings: 
 
                                                          
14 See investment division in Rules and practices about investments in land and buildings, page 153. 
15 Buitelaar, Edwin, 2004. 
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• Identify and categorize all the necessary transaction costs. 
• Reduce the amount of time spent on getting permits and licenses and on negotiations, and establish 
time frames for the approval procedures of administrative entities.16  
• Facilitate public access to information about the institutional procedures and about information costs 
when transacting land and buildings. 
• Allow the creation of agencies specialized in providing these services to public and private stakeholders, 
and the creation of semi-public, non-public organizations and cooperatives to facilitate the negotiations 
and the closure of property transactions.  
• Establish consultancy procedures to clarify uncertainties, so that rules are fulfilled and that 
misinterpretations and violations of the documents issued by regulation entities are minimised. 
• Improve the human and technical capacity participating in these procedures. 
• Create horizontal alliances where expectations, flexibility, and information flows are facilitated among 
actors. 
• Develop indicators to measure the institutional performance and information flows, and the costs 
associated with them. 
 
 e)  Rules and practices about land and building valuation 
 
The present mechanisms for land valuations are very limited and have not worked well, as we have seen in 
chapter 4. We see the effects in most of the Cuban investment projects, and in chapter 3 we have shown the 
effects on planning practices also. 
The methods and procedures for valuing land and building should be the same for all land and buildings, whether 
for investments by state entities or for citizens and associations. The difference between the (market) valuation of 
land and buildings for joint ventures and private investments, and the non-market valuation for social projects like 
housing, is the main cause of the distortions and unawareness about real estate values in cities.  
For housing in particular, valuation should start from the real financial conditions for the exchange of existing 
stock. Even if the state is the first buyer, prices should be set according to the market references. This implies the 
incorporation and comparison of formal and informal valuation parameters in land and building transactions. The 
legal price of the dwellings must start from market references and inhabitants willingness to pay. 
Valuation methods to be used by appraisers should be systematised and obligatory. The valuations should take 
account of important variables such as the physical and functional characteristics of the site or building, the 
infrastructure capacity, land-use conflicts. Establish procedures and updated indicators to calculate the rents 
according to variables such as property depreciation, maintenance costs, management fees, property interests, 
taxes and land values.17  
It is important that there are structural connections between the urban planning institutions that establish land-use 
regulations and those institutions connected with land and building valuation. The reason is that land-use 
regulations – such as the land-use intensity categories that are being introduced into the urban regulations, but 
also infrastructural, heritage, environmental and social parameters - can affect values. Another reason is to avoid 
planning reducing the financial potential of a specific investment.  
                                                          
16 Merife Magno and Ballesteros, 2000. Different cities have come up with very useful indicators to show the % of time spent on getting 
permits and licenses and the % of time spent in negotiations.16 They prove to what extent the lack of clear rules and information interferes 
and deforms the relations between the authorities and developers, agents and clients and in general among the actors that take part in the 
land management process. 
17 Ibid. Op cit. page 302. 
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The above leads to consider changing the actors that  perform the valuations. At present we have the informal - 
Permuta - intermediaries. And we have three types of formal valuers: 1) The Municipal Housing Directorates and 
the community architects (which must improve their technical skills so they learn to value land and buildings using 
the same international methods); 2) the Finance Ministry appraisers, and 3) other state government agencies and 
consultancies created during the 90s, such as RADO and associates and CONAS. 
f)  Rules and practices about land as a financial asset 
 
Activate the financial potential caused by changes in plans and policies 
 
Value Capture is one of the ways to achieve this: it refers to the process by which part or all land value 
increments attributed to the “socially created” value is recouped in order to recover the costs of infrastructure 
associated with a project. There are different ways to do this: through taxes, fees, and changes in the regulatory 
urban instruments.18 These instruments are mainly for three purposes: to get more taxes, to help control land 
use, and to finance infrastructure, services and public spaces. 
 
The instruments for value capture can correct for inadequate or illegal appropriation of land value derived from 
collective investment efforts: the benefits are economically and socially redistributed instead of staying in the 
hands of specific land or building owners. The only example that we have found in Cuba is part of the 
Rehabilitation Program of Old Havana, where a Contribution to Rehabilitation instrument has been introduced: 
this has worked with good results. It consists of taking 3% of the gross revenue (in CUC) of the commercial 
entities that gain benefits from rehabilitation and tourism dynamics in the area, and 5% of the gross revenue (in 
CUP) of commercial activities. This contribution generates funds to cover maintenance costs of around 9 million 
Cuban convertible pesos per year. 
Changes in the content of plans and policies - such as land and building use, density and intensity – can increase 
the value of land and buildings. In such cases, that increase could with appropriate instruments be ‘captured’ by 
the state. The new urban regulations for Vedado, Malecon and Old Havana (see above) are already introducing 
some of these aspects. A land-use plan can increase financial potentials by: 
• Land use changes 
• Merging or fusing land plots 
• Increasing building heights 
• Increasing densities 
• Higher construction volumes 
• Transfer of land development rights 
 
 Some of the possibilities for capturing the future value increase in advance are: 
• Land auctions: the bidders take account of the value increase caused by the planning changes, or of the 
possible value increase if the plan were to be changed. 
• Selling Building Certificate Potentials: these are related to the value increase caused by increasing the 
construction area, or the land plot occupancy, or both.  
• Transfer of construction and development rights: This is a legal swap or transfer of development rights 
or of construction volume from one area to another. This gives property owners or developers the 
possibility to treat development potential as a good that can be sold or traded, allowing the transfer of 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
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density between land that may be under different ownership.19 In economic terms, this mechanism is an 
exchange of added differential rents as a complement of land rights.  
 
Property taxes 
 
This possibility was abolished with the Urban Reform of the 1960s, and ever since has not been reconsidered or 
developed by the Cuban government. The imbalance between family income and property value and the 
government preference for other sources of revenue, have prevented the adoption of these taxes. It requires 
good property valuation and registration, both of which are lacking in Cuba.20  
Taxation based on site value has the following advantages for the efficiency with which land is used: 
• Discourages land speculation 
• Encourages land development 
• Encourages people and entities to put their land to its best use 
• Since the value of land will vary according to the services and infrastructure provided, the rate is 
indirectly a payment for services and benefits received. 
 
g) Rules and practices about providing information relevant to how land could be used 
Property registers 
The Cuban government has been immersed in a process of reorganizing its legal system, and specifically the 
enterprise and property registers, since 1998.21 The first steps have focused on the material and human capacity 
for the creation of the various registration offices, supervised by the Ministry of Justice, and resolutions have been 
issued to back the Law Decree No. 185 of 1998 that reincorporates the real estate registration that had been 
interrupted for a long time. There are very important decisions concerning the rules about private land and 
building ownership that will contribute to create a more secure land and building tenure for current land occupants 
and users, but these are not yet established or known by the public. 
The publicity is very important for the effects of registries in real estate transactions. The government must 
contribute to create the awareness about the importance of registration. However there are limits to the 
information that can be made public, and there are implications for those who violate legal security.  
Urban consult about land use and building projects 
 
The urban consult is a procedure (with a variety of different forms) for including people’s wishes in planning, 
decision making, and implementation. In this way, individuals and families who own and use land and buildings 
can actually become an internal force of urban development, participating from the planning to implementation in 
housing production, infrastructure development, and maintenance.  
In order to make this work, the citizens should be able to find out about, and to discuss, the urban regulations and 
other land and building issues, by using existing opportunities like the Community Workshops of the Popular 
                                                          
19 Bernstein, Janis D, 1994. 
20 In order to facilitate the introduction of property taxes in Cuba in the short term, we could assume that electricity bills are a reliable 
source of information – public or private - that could be used to estimate the potential value of properties (in Havana over 80% of the 
existing buildings have electricity and meters). Electricity bills show the consumer’s expenditure capacity and indirectly reflect other 
important issues such as property size, equipment use and family income status.  
21 Rodríguez, Gustavo Enrique, 2011.  
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Councils. We could learn from successful experiences like the Practical and Easy Guides for the citizen applied in 
Brazil, 22 or Public Consultation Agencies.  
Some of the existing mechanisms could be adapted. For example, the community architect, whose task it is to 
enable citizens to improve their shelter in a sustainable manner, could be more efficient if, instead of being a 
government entity, it could become a self-financed non-government agency where people could hire professional 
services for housing, for small technical projects for firms, and for managing constructions, also for legal and 
regulatory issues. This would be a move towards a more decentralized, participatory and efficient urban 
management, which connects the community to the planning and management issues and to the performance of 
the local government.23 
GIS and Land Information System 
 
Registers are not an end in themselves; they are management tools, work in progress. It is necessary to set them 
up and use them as part of a systematic process of monitoring and updating, whereby data about land and 
buildings are continuously supplied to the records.  
The best way to do this is by developing a land information system which connects with property registers and 
urban planning, urban regulations, building codes, land uses, land cadastres, building typologies, urban data 
about building numbers and streets, public spaces, heritage buildings and monuments, land value maps, 
infrastructure network connections and service availability, risk maps. With this instrument, a snapshot of the 
existing situation could be easily published and distributed at any required time. 
The data provided by a land information system could also be used for analysing land market demands, and as a 
trustworthy source of information about land and building value, for adequate appraisals and transactions.  
 
Land Observatory 
A ‘land observatory’ could follow up and monitor the performance of developments in urban areas, where there 
are redevelopment strategies that could produce higher land values in the short term as a result of improving the 
area’s functional, aesthetical and environmental quality. The observatory allows keeping track of changes in value 
and in residential and commercial preferences.  
Publishing statistics of land management 
 
Publishing this sort of information would contribute to the knowledge of actor and citizens about urban 
developments, and this would improve the transparency and accountability required from public agencies. For 
example, making information available about the number of licenses granted to urban stakeholders in connection 
with the urban plan helps decision-making about future urban development and to reduce uncertainties. It 
provides agents and agencies with information to clarify development strategies, to reduce uncertainty, and to 
make comparative studies and research about past, present and future developments. 
                                                          
22 Guía Fácil,  2002. 
23 Baroni, Sergio. GDIC, 2003. 
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ANNEX 35 
RECENT CHANGES TO THE LEGISLATION 
 
 
 
Since completing this research the Cuban government has made some changes to the rules for land and property 
–Law decree # 288 of 2011- intended to remove some prohibitions and to introduce more flexible procedures in 
housing property transmission. Although this research has been unable to take full account of those changes, I 
will comment on these changes and on why I consider they are not yet significant for land and property 
management. 
 
The changes address the right of heirs to the property without having to live in it, buying and selling between 
natural legal persons without state intervention, the right of migrants to sell or permute before leaving the country, 
the transmission to family and relatives not residing in the property in cases of migration, and the changes reduce 
administrative constraints to the procedures. In the case of the permuta, the law eliminates the requirement of 
proportional exchanges that limited the size of the exchanged properties, the required authorizations when 
properties are located in different municipalities, and it increases the possible beneficiaries for donations. 
 
Despite these improvements, the Law modification still ignores some of the issues indispensable for a better land 
management. First, it does not include land, just buildings. Selling vacant land plots among natural legal persons 
is not possible, among other unnecessary restrictions. The limits to the number of properties a person or family 
can own remain the same. The first article establishes that Cubans residing in the country and foreigners who are 
permanent residents can legitimately own one house in the city and another one for vacation purposes. In all 
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other cases, no person can own more housing properties. In this area, the main change is recognizing foreigners 
who are permanent residents as natural persons.  
 
Natural persons wishing to permute or sell no longer need to go to the municipal directorate: now it is sufficient to 
go to a public notary within the municipality to obtain a legal document that will legitimize them as owners. This 
will require previous inscription in the municipal property registers. Municipalities are already creating spaces and 
jobs to cover both activities – the registration and the notary document. Although this may eventually become an 
advantage, part of the housing municipality burden has been suddenly transferred to the legal system that is now 
overloaded with the demand for the legal documents. The same thing is happening with property registration, now 
established as a previous requirement for the notarial process. Long lines, complaints and nuisances are some of 
the present consequences of changing the procedures before the conditions have been created.  
 
Eliminating the municipality as an intermediary in the procedures has lasted only a few months. The Institute of 
Physical Planning has recently passed an instruction – number 6 of 2011 - with a procedure establishing that all 
individuals that wish to permute, sell, or donate must have a certificate from the municipality that proves that there 
is no violation of urban regulations, and that the property can be inscribed in the register. This is supposed to stop 
irregularities such as placing iron bars in balconies and windows, changing architectural codes, transforming the 
facades, adding inadequate constructions on rooftops. Where these violations exist –more than 110 000 have 
been recorded by the inspectors- the inhabitants cannot inscribe or update their property title. This is a very 
restrictive procedure, in fact, tighter than what existed before, as most of these violations have been there for 
years and even if illegal, represent a considerable investment made by families in order to improve their living 
conditions. Itwould have been more positive to allow them to inscribe, and then give them time to reverse the 
transformations, also to help them know about the possible solutions. The present way of doing things only 
contributes to more informality and distress.  
 
The Law modification authorizes compensation among permuters, a situation that had been informally going on 
for several decades. Now the amount of the compensation is reflected in the legal document issued by the notary 
and paid through the Cuban Bank once the permuters declare, under oath, the legality of their financial sources. 
These changes are necessary, but given the peculiarities of the Cuban economic and financial context, some 
informality – which will become an illegality - can be expected from a large number of inhabitants who do not put 
their money in the bank and have no legal way to prove how they obtained it. Another constraint will arise when 
some of those wishing to buy or sell may want to receive the cash in foreign currency, something more difficult 
with the Cuban bank as an intermediary, as the transactions must take place in convertible or Cuban pesos, not 
in Euros or Dollars. 
 
In the case of buying-selling transactions, the buyer will have to declare, under oath, that he has no other housing 
property as permanent residence, and he will have to prove the legitimacy of the financial sources to be 
deposited at the Bank. On the other hand, the seller will previously have paid the property transmission fee – 
newly established with the law - and will present the inscription of the property in the municipality register. 
The buying-selling operation can be annulled if the state authorities prove that some of the residents are left 
unprotected or have been evicted by the selling owner. 
 
The third article is about the transmission of housing rights in cases of death or migration of the owners. The 
changes in this part of the law are mainly recognizing issues that were resolved informally, for example housing 
occupants for more than five years acquire legal rights even if they are not inheriting. In such cases the state will 
acquire the property and then transfer it legally to the occupants. If persons who inherit a property do not wish to 
keep it, the state will buy it and pay the owners the legal price. According to the previous law, the state 
confiscated all houses of families that left the country, and the occupants –close family and relatives- had to pay 
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the legal price to the government in order to obtain the property. In the modification, they do not need to pay for 
the property. 
 
The new law adds a third section to Chapter 5 of the Housing Law that regulates the legal aspects of housing, in 
order to introduce a tax on the transmission –donations, permutes and buying-selling- and inheritance of housing 
real estate, and it introduces new concepts and procedures for housing valuation. In the case of permutes, 
individuals will pay 4% of the updated housing value. In the case of permutes with compensations –most of the 
cases as we have explained in this research- the tax will be 4% of the updated housing value plus the 
contribution. 
 
In our opinion, some of these changes are necessary but there are still too many regulations that, in trying to 
formalize the existing informality, are introducing new barriers to the process. This will cause more informality and 
moreover generate illegality, because now many more aspects are included in the law and penalized in cases of 
contravention. With respect to housing property located in special areas, the law remains unchanged, and the 
modification explicitly states that permutes in these areas are subject to additional approvals and controls by 
higher authorities: national or provincial. 
 
In summary most of these changes are introducing new barriers or maintaining previous limitations in the 
process. I repeat the key ones: 
• The new regulation does not solve the gaps and lack of definitions regarding public and private rules.  
• Many alternatives handled by the informal networks such buying and selling of roofs, garages or 
backyards are not explicit in the new law. So those areas will continue in an informal way. 
• The changes have not seriously addressed the huge gap between the legal prices and the market 
prices. There are no signs about the intention to use indicators from the informal market about property 
assessment. The legal prices therefore do not yet represent the current housing value. 
• The legal and penal implications of contravening the oaths regarding the financial sources have not 
been established, and it is quite evident that Cuban individuals and families do not trust the Cuban Bank 
System. 
• There is too little institutional capacity to deal with the new procedures. The lack of capable staff, 
equipment, management skills and efficient mechanisms is creating huge bottlenecks as well as 
potential corruption in the Notary offices, Banks and Housing Directorates. 
• There is not a loan system to support this specific process. Some changes are being announced 
regarding transformations to the Cuban credit system, but they mainly aim to support new family 
businesses (not public sector) carrying out housing repairs and agricultural activities. 
• Discretional decisions are still present in the new legal environment due to the exclusion of properties 
that do not comply with the approved technical criteria setup by local authorities, and there is no clarity 
concerning who are the unprotected or evicted persons that can potentially affect or reverse any selling 
and buying process. 
• There are too many limitations on housing property located in special areas, because the law remains 
unchanged, and the modification explicitly states that selling and buying as well as permutes in these 
areas are subject to additional approvals and controls by higher authorities:national or provincial. 
• The law is not retroactive, so all cases of buying and selling that already exist cannot become legal at 
present. 
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ANNEX 36 
LEGAL SANCTIONS FOR NOT FOLLOWING THE RULES 
 
When households decide to enter into a permuta negotiation or a property transaction, they do so in order to 
improve their housing situation –more consumer satisfaction, higher economic efficiency. However they need to 
take into account the possible risks of doing that. The risks go from losing their rights as owners or tenants, to 
fines of different amounts according to contraventions in case of illegal procedures, to the confiscation of the 
property and relocation of the family in another area. More recently, legal mechanisms are being used to force 
families that made urban violations reverse them, as a requisite to inscribe their properties. 
 
The Law Decree no. 171 about renting houses, rooms and other spaces, and the articles updated with the Law 
Decree No. 275 of 2010,establishe the renting possibilities for housing owners to rent for accommodation and 
commercial purposesdwellings, rooms with or without toilet and other spaces which are part of their homes. In 
order to rent, owners must first register the property in the municipal housing directorate. These inscriptions are 
compulsory, and they penalized when are not updated or overlooked with fines from 200 to 600 Cuban pesos. 
Individuals or families who do not register, and who rent dwellings, rooms or spaces in an area not authorized by 
the legislation, will be penalized with 600 Cuban pesos and the authorities invalidate the renting contract. 
 
The renting contracts with foreigners who are permanent residents in Cuba have to be in convertible pesos or the 
equivalent in Cuban pesos. Contravening the renting permit –for national residents, for permanent residents in 
Cuba or for tourists- is penalized with fines of 1500 convertible pesos or its equivalent in Cuban pesos plus 
invalidation of the renting contract.Owners who rent to foreigners are obliged to inform the Immigration 
Directorate and provide all the identification data of the tenant and any accompanying persons. The contravention 
of this procedure is penalized with fines of 1000 convertible pesos or its equivalent in Cuban pesos plus other 
penal responsibilities not specified in the legal text.  
 
Housing owners who rent to a legal person, foreign firm, or its representative will pay a fine of 2000 convertible 
pesos or its equivalent in Cuban pesos plus invalidation of the contract. Those who rent additional spaces not 
included in the registration are penalized with 1500 Cuban pesos plus the invalidation of the contract. 
Housing owners, who create nuisance to neighbours, violate the norms of social conviviality or affect the moral 
and good behaviour of the community can be penalized with 1000 Cuban pesos. The lodger or lessee causing 
the nuisance is also penalized with 1800 pesos.Housing owners who have a renting contract cannot perform 
other self-employment options: if they do, they can be penalized with 800 Cuban pesos.When there are delays in 
paying the fines –more than 80 days- the inspectors can double the amount.Housing owners who repeatedly 
contravene what has been established by the law can, in addition to paying a fine, have their property 
confiscated. The confiscation resolution is issued by the Provincial Housing Director. 
 
The Finance Ministry is the authorized entity to establish the taxes for these activities,and they vary according to 
the area. The income derived from these taxes will be used for maintenance, repairs and construction of social 
housing. 
 
When owners involved in permute or property transactions are accused of corruption, prostitution, proxenetism, 
or other unauthorized activities, their property can be confiscated or they lose their rights and are subject to the 
government authority decisions. 
 
Informal and formal actors participating in the permuta and property buying and selling face in addition the 
following risks: 
• Speculation of reduced economic significance 
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• Illicit economic activities 
• Usurpation of legal capacity against administration and jurisdiction 
• Subtraction or damage of objects or documents of official source  
• Violation of legal stamps 
• Non fulfilment of penalizations for contraventions 
• Illegal occupation and use of buildings and spaces 
• Forgery of certificates and legal documents 
• Illegal registration 
• Actions against property rights 
 
Among the most common contraventions connected with the permuta and housing transactions are the internal 
migrations from different provinces to Havana. Individuals or families from other territories who settle in the capital 
without the necessary authorization must pay 300 cuban pesos and return to their place of residence. If they are 
not inscribed in the identity offices, the fine is 200 pesos and they must return to their place of residence, the 
same fine is when people who are authorized temporarily stay longer without the necessary inscriptions.A 
housing owner who permanently lodges residents from other territories without the necessary permits and 
inscriptions is punished with 500 Cuban pesos. In cases of very densely populated municipalities – Habana Vieja, 
Cerro, Centro Habana and 10 de Octubre- they must pay 1000 Cuban pesos. 
 
The enforcement of procedures can be in three ways. The first is administrative/ legal, mainly carried out by 
municipal and provincial inspectors who apply the penalizations according to the housing and urban regulations. 
The second is fiscal, with inspectors who supervise and control the fulfilment of fiscal duties and taxes. The third 
is supervised by the Ministry of the Interior Provincial Offices that control the population registers and immigration 
problems. Appeals are possible in all cases.In the cases of unauthorized internal migrations, the contraventions 
are imposed by the municipal inspectors of the Housing Directorate, the inspectors of the Identity and Population 
Registers, and also by the National Revolutionary Police Force (PNR). 
 
Despite the existence of these mechanisms, there are many problems with the effectiveness of the controls due 
to corruption andthe informal and illegal behaviour of individuals and institutions.  
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ANNEX 37 
 
TESTING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE ECONOMETRIC MODELS  
 
1. Endogeneity between ‘method of calculation’ and ‘use’ (formal model) 
 
To investigate this, we assume there is a potential endogeneity effect,  and we analyze its presence by running the 
models without the method of valuation variable, and we compare the behavior. 
 
 
Original model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
original
C 5,305,829 0.166376 3,189,064 0.0000
Y98 0.262230 0.139974 1,873,422 0.0630
Y99 0.016806 0.095895 0.175250 0.8611
Y00 -0.123036 0.099575 -1,235,615 0.2186
Y01 -0.100379 0.203658 -0.492882 0.6228
M1 0.684111 0.153197 4,465,556 0.0000
M2 0.995038 0.218962 4,544,332 0.0000
M3 0.928306 0.282163 3,289,963 0.0013
M4 0.733805 0.349871 2,097,359 0.0377
M5 -0.033576 0.438894 -0.076501 0.9391
M6 -0.985539 0.230752 -4,270,987 0.0000
M7 -0.582355 0.234604 -2,482,291 0.0142
M8 0.106112 0.268031 0.395893 0.6928
M10 0.019098 0.352602 0.054164 0.9569
M11 1,056,371 0.258127 4,092,444 0.0001
M12 -0.571997 0.315022 -1,815,736 0.0714
M13 -0.803020 0.327799 -2,449,736 0.0155
M14 -0.083782 0.316398 -0.264800 0.7915
DR1 -0.543067 0.205672 -2,640,452 0.0092
DR2 0.073616 0.200389 0.367368 0.7139
DR3 0.175025 0.180124 0.971692 0.3328
DR4 0.433343 0.169960 2,549,683 0.0118
MT1 0.159857 0.128112 1,247,788 0.2141
MT2 0.128719 0.141403 0.910299 0.3642
MT3 0.556060 0.248970 2,233,441 0.0270
MT4 -0.712915 0.290912 -2,450,616 0.0154
U1 -0.390153 0.177209 -2,201,652 0.0292
U2 -0.140748 0.198265 -0.709895 0.4789
U3 -0.250692 0.194546 -1,288,604 0.1996
U4 0.063549 0.216683 0.293281 0.7697
D40 -6,845,353 0.428613 -1,597,093 0.0000
R-squared 0.760684
    Mean 
dependent 
var 5,315,025j  
squared 0.711844
     
dependent 1,123,542
S.E. of 
regression 0.603119
    Akaike 
info criterion 1,983,559
Sum 
squared 
resid 5,347,163
    Schwarz 
criterion 2,537,690
Log 
likelihood -1,455,368     F-statistic 1,557,502
Durbin-
Watson stat 1,810,590
    Prob(F-
statistic) 0.000000  
Modified Model (without Valuation Method) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
original
C 5,314,133 0.148426 3,580,321 0.0000
Y98 0.187396 0.125229 1,496,436 0.1366
Y99 0.051247 0.094647 0.541459 0.5890
Y00 -0.064038 0.099940 -0.640765 0.5226
Y01 -0.058876 0.198594 -0.296466 0.7673
M1 0.618343 0.148836 4,154,528 0.0001
M2 0.915613 0.222612 4,113,043 0.0001
M3 0.950814 0.322469 2,948,544 0.0037
M4 0.776278 0.385510 2,013,640 0.0458
M5 0.051019 0.383873 0.132907 0.8944
M6 -1,166,635 0.227668 -5,124,286 0.0000
M7 -0.615875 0.225540 -2,730,671 0.0071
M8 -0.004714 0.208441 -0.022613 0.9820
M10 0.033194 0.369477 0.089840 0.9285
M11 1,049,275 0.242227 4,331,782 0.0000
M12 -0.460333 0.347844 -1,323,391 0.1877
M13 -0.668126 0.352413 -1,895,864 0.0599
M14 -0.152003 0.272466 -0.557880 0.5778
DR1 -0.451366 0.205968 -2,191,436 0.0300
DR2 -0.077279 0.180199 -0.428850 0.6686
DR3 0.132709 0.175718 0.755237 0.4513
DR4 0.463686 0.173303 2,675,576 0.0083
U1 -0.278126 0.198378 -1,401,999 0.1630
U2 -0.115305 0.215692 -0.534580 0.5937
U3 -0.130854 0.200704 -0.651975 0.5154
U4 0.108721 0.243911 0.445739 0.6564
D40 -6,901,958 0.450851 -1,530,872 0.0000
R-squared 0.740115     ependent var 5,315,025
Adjusted R-s 0.695367     ependent var 1,123,542
S.E. of regres 0.620123     nfo criterion 2,021,069
Sum squared 5,806,743    warz criterion 2,503,699
Log likelihoo -1,528,752     F-statistic 1,653,948
Durbin-Wats  1,833,356    b(F-statistic) 0.000000  
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1. Change in the adjusted R2  
 
The adjusted R2 after removing the variable method of valuation, remains high, passing from 0.711844 to 
0.695367. In this case we must note that the slight reduction in the R2 shows that the cancelled variable 
has an explainable role and is another sign of pertinence of the variable in the model. 
 
2. Modification of estimated coefficients, mainly change of signs of the Dummy variables 
 
We analyze the practical significance comparing the size and sign of the Bj coefficient between both 
models. 
 
The signs of each variable according to the Dummy pair maintain the same behavior, with the exception of 
municipalities M5 and M8 and the valuation method 2 (from 11 to 20 years of usufruct)  
 
The comparison between the coefficients for each Dummy pair is the following: 
 
Years: 
 
Original Model    Modified Model           
 
Y98 0.262230   0.187396 
Y99 0.016806 0.051247 
Y00 -0.123036 -0.064038 
Y01 -0.100379 -0.058876 
 
 
Municipalities: 
 
    Original Model    Modified Model           
 
M1 0.684111 0.618343 
M2 0.995038 0.915613 
M3 0.928306 0.950814 
M4 0.733805 0.776278 
M5 -0.033576 0.051019 
M6 -0.985539 -1,166,635 
M7 -0.582355 -0.615875 
M8 0.106112 -0.004714 
M10 0.019098 0.033194 
M11 1,056,371 1,049,275 
M12 -0.571997 -0.460333 
M13 -0.803020 -0.668126 
M14 -0.083782 -0.152003 
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Valuation Method: 
 
 Original Model  Modified Model           
DR1 -0.543067 -0.451366 
DR2 0.073616 -0.077279 
DR3 0.175025 0.132709 
DR4 0.433343 0.463686 
 
 
Granted Use: 
 
  Original Model  Modified Model           
 
U1 -0.390153 -0.278126 
U2 -0.140748 -0.115305 
U3 -0.250692 -0.130854 
U4 0.063549 0.108721 
 
 
With this behavior and despite the changes, we can state that in general the logic of the variables and the 
model estimation are robust. If there were endogeneity problems, the systematic error  of the estimation 
would stand out once the problematic variable was eliminated. This is not the case. 
 
 
3. Significance behavior of the Dummy variables according to the T test. 
 
In this analysis most of the significant variables remain the same way according to the t test. 
 
Original Model  Modified Model      
 
      
Variable Probability  Probability 
 Y98 0.0630 0.1366 
Y99 0.8611 0.5890 
Y00 0.2186 0.5226 
Y01 0.6228 0.7673 
M1 0.0000 0.0001 
M2 0.0000 0.0001 
M3 0.0013 0.0037 
M4 0.0377 0.0458 
M5 0.9391 0.8944 
M6 0.0000 0.0000 
M7 0.0142 0.0071 
M8 0.6928 0.9820 
M10 0.9569 0.9285 
M11 0.0001 0.0000 
M12 0.0714 0.1877 
M13 0.0155 0.0599 
M14 0.7915 0.5778 
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DR1 0.0092 0.0300 
DR2 0.7139 0.6686 
DR3 0.3328 0.4513 
DR4 0.0118 0.0083 
U1 0.0292 0.1630 
U2 0.4789 0.5937 
U3 0.1996 0.5154 
U4 0.7697 0.6564 
 
 
The variables that maintain the significance are marked (hatched) , as are the variables that modify their 
behavior in a positive way (in italics). This allows us to classify the variables as acceptable even 
considering 10% or 5% level of error.  
 
 
4. Global significance of the econometric model (F test)  
  
In both cases (the original model and the modified) the global significance validity is confirmed by the (F-
statistic) that is 0.000000. 
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2. Autocorrelation in the cross-section data (formal and informal models) 
 
In the research we processed variables obtained from transversal series (cross sections) and not time 
series. The observations are made in reference to the registered transactions regardless of the time of the 
events. The cross section is aggregated using random sampling and not according to a moment in time. 
Time sequences are then not relevant for the cross section analysis. In the case of formal transactions the 
samples were chosen from among different valuation entities. 
An advantage of this data selection is that it allows us to study specific features of the behaviour or the 
results arising from  a specific decision. 
The data provided by time series essentially offers the periodicity with which they are selected, they depart 
from the frequency.  
Normally there is no autocorrelation in the cross section data. This is tested using the residual correlogram 
with the Q statistic test.  In our case, the result for each model is: 
Autocorrelation analysis: 
Formal Model: 
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Informal Model: 
 
Both results show there is no autocorrelation, as the coefficients do not exceed the permissible limits. The 
probability that the Q test lies below the 5% significance proves that there is no rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. 
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3. Endogeneity caused by feedback between dependent variable and independent 
variables ‘land use’ and ‘municipality’ (formal model) 
 
In the Formal Price Model, the endogeneity concern is mainly in the dependent variables Land Use and 
Municipalities. However, in the case of the Municipality variable we consider that there is no risk of 
endogeneity because this variable is defined by multiple considerations of political and administrative, 
cultural, historical and infrastructural criteria and not by land prices. 
For the Land use variable we perform tests to investigate the possible endogeneity. This analysis is 
pertinent because the theory of land rents recognizes that prices (independent variables) can be 
determined by the land use potential (hotel, office, housing, etc.). Nevertheless this research shows that 
that this does not apply to the Cuban practice, as there are not enough signs of prices, and the values are 
influenced by discretional considerations and are just calculated for joint venture investments. There are 
many valuable land plots and buildings that could have high land prices and considerable land rent, that 
are empty or with inadequate urban functions: such  ‘distortions’ in the land use management do not favor 
endogeneity.    
In order to determine the endogeneity in the land use variable, one of the possibilities is to run the 
econometric model without this exogenous and potentially dependent variable, and then compare the new 
results with the original model. For this analysis we observe the following effects: 
1. Change in the adjusted R2  
2. Modification of the estimated coefficients, mainly sign change of the Dummy variables 
3. Significance Behaviour (T test) of the Dummy variables 
4. Situation of the Global Significance of the Econometric Model (F test)  
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Original Model  
 
    
Time: 12:45
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
original
C 5,305,829 0.166376 3,189,064 0.0000
Y98 0.262230 0.139974 1,873,422 0.0630
Y99 0.016806 0.095895 0.175250 0.8611
Y00 -0.123036 0.099575 -1,235,615 0.2186
Y01 -0.100379 0.203658 -0.492882 0.6228
M1 0.684111 0.153197 4,465,556 0.0000
M2 0.995038 0.218962 4,544,332 0.0000
M3 0.928306 0.282163 3,289,963 0.0013
M4 0.733805 0.349871 2,097,359 0.0377
M5 -0.033576 0.438894 -0.076501 0.9391
M6 -0.985539 0.230752 -4,270,987 0.0000
M7 -0.582355 0.234604 -2,482,291 0.0142
M8 0.106112 0.268031 0.395893 0.6928
M10 0.019098 0.352602 0.054164 0.9569
M11 1,056,371 0.258127 4,092,444 0.0001
M12 -0.571997 0.315022 -1,815,736 0.0714
M13 -0.803020 0.327799 -2,449,736 0.0155
M14 -0.083782 0.316398 -0.264800 0.7915
DR1 -0.543067 0.205672 -2,640,452 0.0092
DR2 0.073616 0.200389 0.367368 0.7139
DR3 0.175025 0.180124 0.971692 0.3328
DR4 0.433343 0.169960 2,549,683 0.0118
MT1 0.159857 0.128112 1,247,788 0.2141
MT2 0.128719 0.141403 0.910299 0.3642
MT3 0.556060 0.248970 2,233,441 0.0270
MT4 -0.712915 0.290912 -2,450,616 0.0154
U1 -0.390153 0.177209 -2,201,652 0.0292
U2 -0.140748 0.198265 -0.709895 0.4789
U3 -0.250692 0.194546 -1,288,604 0.1996
U4 0.063549 0.216683 0.293281 0.7697
D40 -6,845,353 0.428613 -1,597,093 0.0000
R-squared 0.760684
    Mean 
dependent 5,315,025
Adjusted R-squared 0.711844
     
dependent 1,123,542
S.E. of regression 0.603119
     
info criterion 1,983,559
Sum squared resid 5,347,163
     
criterion 2,537,690
Log likelihood -1,455,368     F-statistic 1,557,502
Durbin-Watson stat 1,810,590
    ob(
statistic) 0.000000
Dependent Variable: LOG(PR)
Method: Least Squares
Sample (adjusted): 1 178
Included observations: 178 after adjustments y   
Errors & Covariance
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model with land use variable 
 
Dependent Variable: LOG(PR)
Method: Least Squares
Date: 12/06/11   Time: 16:26
Sample (adjusted): 1 178
Included observations: 178 after adjustments
White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Standard Errors & Covariance
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
nuevo
C 5,113,341 0.126277 4,049,292 0.0000
Y98 0.215642 0.134952 1,597,914 0.1122
Y99 0.021021 0.096098 0.218747 0.8271
Y00 -0.096680 0.102972 -0.938894 0.3493
Y01 -0.111848 0.207329 -0.539472 0.5904
M1 0.654129 0.148361 4,409,048 0.0000
M2 0.986206 0.228556 4,314,938 0.0000
M3 0.979733 0.225740 4,340,087 0.0000
M4 0.761063 0.390400 1,949,445 0.0531
M5 0.019751 0.409242 0.048263 0.9616
M6 -1,033,040 0.224318 -4,605,250 0.0000
M7 -0.606283 0.224841 -2,696,497 0.0078
M8 0.024128 0.249723 0.096620 0.9232
M10 0.008485 0.362425 0.023412 0.9814
M11 1,035,179 0.267813 3,865,299 0.0002
M12 -0.476539 0.316875 -1,503,870 0.1347
M13 -0.771849 0.337508 -2,286,905 0.0236
M14 -0.166937 0.309629 -0.539151 0.5906
DR1 -0.442507 0.182248 -2,428,050 0.0164
DR2 0.088755 0.191891 0.462528 0.6444
DR3 0.135913 0.175277 0.775419 0.4393
DR4 0.358064 0.136237 2,628,251 0.0095
MT1 0.143696 0.129624 1,108,564 0.2694
MT2 0.086197 0.140968 0.611468 0.5418
MT3 0.461235 0.225085 2,049,158 0.0422
MT4 -0.588051 0.298695 -1,968,734 0.0508
D40 -6,769,509 0.442058 -1,531,363 0.0000
R-squared 0.748763     Mean dependent var 5,315,025
Adjusted R-squared 0.705503     S.D. dependent var 1,123,542
S.E. of regression 0.609719     Akaike info criterion 1,987,229
Sum squared resid 5,613,526     Schwarz criterion 2,469,859
Log likelihood -1,498,633     F-statistic 1,730,867
Durbin-Watson stat 1,884,273     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000
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1. Changes to the adjusted R2 
The adjusted R2 once we withdraw the land use variable remains high, going from 0.711844 to 0.705503. The slight 
reduction changes in the R2 proves that the cancelled variable has an explicative power, a sign of the pertinence to 
use this variable in the model. 
2. Modification of estimated coefficients, mainly change of sign of the Dummy variables. 
It is necessary to pay attention to the magnitude of the estimated coefficients besides the statistic t size. However, 
the practical significance of one variable is related to the size and the sign of Bj coefficient. 
In that respect, the sign of each variable according to the Dummy set keeps the same behavior, with exception to the 
Municipality (M5) highlighted  in the tables. 
The comparison of coefficient for each Dummy pair is as follows: 
Year 
     Original model            Modified model           
Variable Coefficient Variable Coefficient 
Y98 0.215642 Y98 0.262230 
Y99 0.021021 Y99 0.016806 
Y00 -0.096680 Y00 -0.123036 
Y01 -0.111848 Y01 -0.100379 
    
 
Municipality 
 
  Original model             Modified model           
M1 0.654129 M1 0.684111 
M2 0.986206 M2 0.995038 
M3 0.979733 M3 0.928306 
M4 0.761063 M4 0.733805 
M5 0.019751 M5 -0.033576 
M6 -1,033,040 M6 -0.985539 
M7 -0.606283 M7 -0.582355 
M8 0.024128 M8 0.106112 
M10 0.008485 M10 0.019098 
M11 1,035,179 M11 1,056,371 
M12 -0.476539 M12 -0.571997 
M13 -0.771849 M13 -0.803020 
M14 -0.166937 M14 -0.083782 
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Right granted 
 
  Original model             Modified model           
DR1 -0.442507 DR1 -0.543067 
DR2 0.088755 DR2 0.073616 
DR3 0.135913 DR3 0.175025 
DR4 0.358064 DR4 0.433343 
 
 
Valuation method 
 
Original model             Modified model           
MT1 0.143696 MT1 0.159857 
MT2 0.086197 MT2 0.128719 
MT3 0.461235 MT3 0.556060 
MT4 -0.588051 MT4 -0.712915 
 
 
According to this behaviour we have conditions to maintain the logic of the variables and therefore the robustness of 
the model. If there were effectively endogeneity problems, the systematic error of the estimation would stand out 
once we eliminated the variable with the problem. This is not the case. 
3. Significance behaviour of the Dummy variables according to the T test. 
In this analysis most of the variables that were significant maintain their status according to the t probability. 
   Original Model      Modified Model                    
 
Variable Prob.   
 
Prob.   
Y98 0.1122 
 
0.0630 
Y99 0.8271 
 
0.8611 
Y00 0.3493 
 
0.2186 
Y01 0.5904 
 
0.6228 
M1 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
M2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
M3 0.0000 
 
0.0013 
M4 0.0531 
 
0.0377 
M5 0.9616 
 
0.9391 
M6 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
M7 0.0078 
 
0.0142 
M8 0.9232 
 
0.6928 
M10 0.9814 
 
0.9569 
M11 0.0002 
 
0.0001 
M12 0.1347 
 
0.0714 
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M13 0.0236 
 
0.0155 
M14 0.5906 
 
0.7915 
DR1 0.0164 
 
0.0092 
DR2 0.6444 
 
0.7139 
DR3 0.4393 
 
0.3328 
DR4 0.0095 
 
0.0118 
MT1 0.2694 
 
0.2141 
MT2 0.5418 
 
0.3642 
MT3 0.0422 
 
0.0270 
MT4 0.0508 
 
0.0154 
 
We have highlighted (hatched) all the variables which maintain the significance,  and (in italics) those that are 
modified in a positive way, this allows us to establish these variables as acceptable with the probability below 10% or 
5% of error. 
4. Global Significance of the Econometric Model (F test)  
In both cases (original model and modified model) the global significance validity is confirmed with the (F-statistic) 
probability of 0.000000. 
Another alternative to avoid endogeneity is the method of instrumental variables that consists of excluding the 
valuating variable – key variable - replacing it with a Proxi variable that  “substitutes” the omitted one. The proxi 
variables are usually used if there is lack of data, it can be seen as the “unobserved” variable that we wish to control 
in our analysis. The main obstacle to doing this is to find the “instrument” variable.  
In our case, it was not possible to find the substitute variable, besides, after excluding the one that was potentially 
cause of endogeneity, we concluded that the results of the model were not drastically affected.   
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SUMMARIES 
 
English 
 
Urban land management is a broad concept that connects many areas of knowledge, including urbanism, 
economics, geography, sociology, urban and cultural anthropology. It has a rich and diverse theoretical 
background and is constantly being enriched and adjusted by learning from practical experience. Despite this 
vast theoretical background. it is not common to find agreement about how land management should be defined. 
In this work we will use the term land management in the following way: the government activity of 
systematically planning, guiding and coordinating the use of urban land in a sustainable manner, 
designing and applying a consistent land policy with an institutional framework, instruments and 
mechanisms to influence indirectly or determine directly the way in which land is used for social benefit.  
 
This research explores urban land management in the five decades that followed the revolution of January 1959. 
The main motivation is to describe and analyze the problems, causes and consequences connected with the sub-
optimal use of land and buildings in Cuba. The research is centred in Havana, capital of Cuba and largest city of 
the country, where all the tensions and contradictions around urban land reach higher complexity, and where the 
consequences of poor land management are very visible in the urban space: the poor state of repair of many 
buildings, the precarious condition and obsolescence of infrastructure and urban equipment, the increasing 
number of informal housing constructions, the inappropriate location of urban functions, and the inadequate uses 
often given to valuable buildings. There are other problems that are less evident and tangible: the deterioration in 
the provision of the necessary amount and quality of housing and public services, and the emergence of social 
and spatial inequalities. Among the causes and the political effects of those problems are the lack of institutional 
effectiveness, the proliferation of informality and corruption in the performance of public and private sectors, the 
loss of public confidence in the government structures, including a lack of organization, coordination and 
transparency in the administrative procedures concerning land and buildings.  
 
The first chapter explains how the mechanisms for urban land management in Cuba were chosen to achieve the 
provision of urban functions, and how equity aspects were prioritized over economic efficiency. We also explained 
the gradual breakdown of this approach, fair in concept, but hindered in practice by the ineffectiveness of various 
political, legal, economic and institutional factors. Part of chapter 1 explains the concept and relevance of land 
management and the existing allocation mechanisms - through the prevailing role of planning and institutions, 
through the market, and through the combinations of both. In this respect, we clearly state our preference for an 
environment where land-use planning, a legal and a fiscal framework, financial instruments, and appropriate 
governance can be used to implement land management by interacting with markets in land and real estate. 
In Cuba the lack of coherence and the malfunction of these rules and practices has led to the following problems 
with urban land management: 
• the urban land management does not always lead to land being used efficiently. 
• the urban land management does not always achieve the social aims which have been set for it. 
• the procedures do not always satisfy the aims of transparency and democratic decision making. 
• the procedures are not always followed correctly. 
This research is mainly focused on the first sort of problem: increasing the efficiency with which land is used. We 
look for ways of increasing the efficiency which do not harm the social aims which are a priority for the 
government. We deal with problems with the procedures focussing on the effects that they have on the results of 
urban land management; that is on the efficiency of land use and on the social aims.  
 
Because of our focus on the efficiency with which land is used, the following question is a relevant aspect: how 
could land management be changed so as to increase the economic efficiency with which land is used?  
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We believe that in Cuba the state should continue to play an important role in the control, regulation, and 
development of land at different territorial levels, but we also believe that the degree and scope of participation of 
the state, and its relations with other social and local actors, must change considerably in order to achieve better 
planning, an effective design of property rights, laws and land use regulations and also recognize and deal with 
the already existing market signs. For this reason, at the end of the text we have included recommendations for 
improving land management in Cuba. What changes in policies, instruments and practices might be expected to 
lead to better outcomes? 
 
In chapter 2, we focus on the various potentials of urban land as an economic resource: as a consumption good, 
as area to locate constructions for the production of goods and services, and as a financial asset. These 
categories are then linked to the efficiency concepts – allocative, spatial, technical and institutional - to prepare us 
conceptually for our proposals for improving the economic efficiency with which land is used. Our starting point is 
the concept of economic efficiency, measured in some sense of ratio of output to input. Efficiency in the 
production process increases if the value of the outcomes increases more than the value of the inputs. This 
allocative efficiency concept is central to our work, and other efficiency approaches such as the institutional, 
organizational and technical are directly or indirectly included in our analysis of the elements that integrate and 
affect the inputs and the outputs.  
 
We give examples in chapter 2 of cases where land and building resources in Havana are not optimally allocated. 
We expect that some of these problems could be tackled or removed by improving the land management 
mechanisms. To this end, more attention should be paid to the economic value of land. We are certain that if 
some of the rules and practices were changed in particular ways, land would be used more efficiently without 
harming the social and political ideas which are valued by the Cuban society. 
 
If the effects of applying new mechanisms can be measured and compared, then the change in efficiency can be 
measured too: the measurement need not be in absolute terms, but in relative terms. In chapter 2 we identify the 
areas and situations where changes can lead to more efficient outcomes. The economic effects of a change in 
land use are changes in one or more of the following: 
• Output (attainment of the expected goals and improvement of the outcomes in the provision of different 
functions, for example housing = change in consumer satisfaction, and goods and services = change in 
output) 
• input (changes in the kind, diversity, amount and organization of resources spent to produce the output) 
• external effects for others (positive or negative impacts not directly connected to the designed and 
expected goals e.g. more or less consumer satisfaction caused by change in neighbouring uses, e.g. 
more or less environmental nuisance caused by change in traffic or in discharges). Those external 
effects might be changes in either inputs or outputs. 
 
In chapter 2 we identify four types of situations where a change might lead to land being used more efficiently: 
Situation I: the area of land for each use remains the same, the location also, but the intensity of use (for 
some of the uses) increases. In this situation, the efficiency is improved if the desired outputs are increased, for 
example: producing an additional number of housing units or square meters of office space (extra outputs), with a 
value higher than the value of the inputs (extras-inputs). 
Situation II: in some locations, the area of land for some uses increases and for other uses decreases, 
the total area of land for each use remains the same, the intensity of use also. There is an increase in 
economic efficiency if the swapping of land use between two locations results in extra output giving more financial 
returns from a net growth of production, or an increase in the user satisfaction. This use change is beneficial for 
the consumers if it reduces their transport costs by the improved accessibility. 
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Situation III: in some locations, the area of land for some uses increases and for other uses decreases, 
this is not compensated in the whole land area, whereby the area of land for some uses increases in total 
and for other uses decreases in total, the intensity of use remains the same. In this situation there is 
efficiency increase if the results (extra output) after deducting the resource costs, construction, transportation and 
environmental costs, have an increased value compared to the value of the cancelled productive use. 
Situation IV: as for (III), but for those uses which lose land, this loss in output is compensated by higher 
use intensities. Here efficiency follows the logic of situation III, but the intensity of use is increased. 
In chapter 2 for each of these situations we provide real examples from Havana that illustrate the actual 
possibilities of raising efficiency – obtaining more outputs - by changes in the inputs.  
 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 give a picture of the complexities and peculiarities of the Cuban context. In them we describe 
the rules and how they are applied, and we discuss the effects on efficiency and on other social and political 
ideals. Chapter 3 describes the formal rules, and Chapter 4 specifically addresses the formal methods and 
practices for valuing land and buildings and their effects on the way in which land is used and allocated. Chapter 
5 “La Permuta: the informal housing market”, explains how the rules and practices described and analysed in 
chapters 3 and 4 have produced a situation where people cannot change or sell their dwellings easily. In 
response to this, an informal market has arisen in which people can swop dwellings – la Permuta.  
 
In chapter 6, econometric analyses are carried out on two separate data bases. One is of state property 
valuations carried out when foreign businesses acquire a user right on land. The other is of the value of 
properties informally exchanged in la Permuta. Those analyses give insights into the factors that influence prices 
and values. In that way, we can get a better understanding of how land could be used more efficiently. 
 
Finally, in chapter 7, we conclude that the current rules and practices for land management in Cuba often result in 
land being used inefficiently. The function of this last chapter is twofold. First, we apply explicitly the concept of 
allocative efficiency to the current land management in Cuba, as described and analysed in the chapters 3, 4, 5, 
and 6. We conclude that certain rules and practices of that land management result in land being used 
inefficiently. Second, and based on the outcome of those analyses, we propose changes to the rules and 
practices which would increase the efficiency with which land in Cuba is used, and which would not harm the 
realisation of other social and political goals: and which might even realise them better. Those changes concern 
mainly how the economic significance of land could better be taken into account.  
 
In spite of the recent political changes in Cuba, with a cautious but deep restructuring of the administration and 
the economy in order to achieve more efficiency, the Cuban government is persevering in its basic political 
principles about the highly centralized and planned control of the fundamental resources – including land - and of 
economic decisions, with a sectoral influence and a top-down approach. The main objective of these principles is 
to protect the social achievements of the Revolution, even though up to the present, some of the social goals 
have not been entirely met and - what is worse - some have begun to recede. Our analysis of land management 
in Cuba has not led us to conclude that those fundamental principles are incompatible with better land 
management as we have proposed it. We retain the principle that land management is basically a state function, 
where various agencies have the legal power, given by the constitutional law, to plan, guide and implement rural 
and urban land repartition, redistribution of property, forms of tenures and land development. However, some 
fundamental and structural changes are required in order to change the idea that land and the financial value of 
land and other assets are, because they incorporate capitalist elements, obstacles to the development of 
government social policies. 
 
We hope that this research helps to raise awareness about the relevance of land management and land valuation 
in Cuba, where the value of land and properties is not part of the current government agenda. There are 
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enormous possibilities for mobilizing financial resources through land values, or for using that value as collateral 
in credits and other financing which are largely ignored. Despite recent changes to the legal framework, 
undoubtedly necessary, the municipal and provincial authorities lack coherent mechanisms to manage efficiently 
state and private property, taking account of their economic value.. There is no discussion about introducing 
public policies for capturing land values. The plan, whether economic or spatial, does not consider the importance 
of land and property values. 
 
The present slow dynamics of land and urban development in Cuba give a good opportunity to ponder and plan 
for the coming changes. It is a good moment to analyze what has happened in the last fifty years, and to clarify 
and understand the causes and effects of good and bad decisions made with land and buildings. Everybody can 
see that Cuba is already in a transition, with its development model moving towards a more decentralized and 
diversified administration. It is certain that this change of economic dynamics will have impacts on land and urban 
development, and we need to anticipate and plan for these. The outcomes of this research then become 
important not only as a contribution to improving land management under the present circumstances, but also to 
preparing the city for the future changes. 
 
The new agenda must favour the city’s articulation with the external world, with the international circuits of capital 
flows, and with the new technological advances. The authorities must envision the development of new valuable 
areas and the preservation of existing ones as part of the global world and for the future. But a careful internal 
look is just as important. Land resources, both land and buildings, must become a priority and be reconsidered in 
their full significance and importance. Havana and the other Cuban cities are not fully prepared for a scenario 
where planning and institutional performance interact with market forces, and sometimes events expected in the 
long term can suddenly become short term. There is great danger that if we do not have a well-considered and 
well prepared land management, we will not be in a good position to develop our city, generate efficiency, and 
support development programs.  
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Dutch 
 
Het overheidsbeleid voor de stedelijke ruimte omvat vele activiteiten en is onderwerp van vele disciplines 
waaronder economie, geografie, sociologie, urbane en culturele antropologie. De wetenschap hierover is rijk en 
divers en wordt voortdurend verdiept en verbeterd aan de hand van ervaringen in de praktijk. Desondanks is er 
weinig overeenkomst over de omschrijving en afbakening van dit beleidsveld. In dit onderzoek wordt het als volgt 
omschreven: het is een activiteit van overheidsinstanties waarbij zij het gebruik van de stedelijke ruimte 
stelselmatig plannen, geleiden en coördineren. Samenhangend en duurzaam beleid hiervoor wordt door 
die instanties gemaakt en uitgevoerd, door het inzetten van organisaties, instrumenten en technieken 
teneinde het grondgebruik direct of indirect en ter wille van sociale doeleinden te beïnvloeden. 
 
Dit is een onderzoek naar dat overheidsbeleid voor de stedelijke ruimte in Cuba in de vijf decennia na de 
revolutie van januari 1959. Dit beleid heeft er toe geleid dat grond en gebouwen in Cuba, lang niet altijd op de 
beste manier worden gebruikt. Deze studie wil de daardoor veroorzaakte problemen en gevolgen onderzoeken. 
Het richt zich op Havana, de hoofd- en grootste stad van Cuba, waar de spanningen en tegenstrijdigheden 
rondom stedelijke grond zich ophopen en een hoge complexiteit bereiken, en waar de gevolgen van een slecht 
ruimtelijk beleid goed zichtbaar zijn: vele gebouwen zijn in een belabberde toestand, de infrastructuur en 
stedelijke diensten zijn verouderd en er slecht aan toe, het aantal informeel gebouwde woningen neemt toe; vele 
stedelijke functies hebben een ongeschikte locatie, en vaak geven waardevolle gebouwen onderdak aan 
ongepaste activiteiten. Ook zijn er problemen die minder zichtbaar zijn: de achteruitgang – zowel kwalitatief als 
kwantitatief – van het woningbestand en de openbare diensten; het ontstaan van grote sociale en ruimtelijke 
ongelijkheden. De oorzaken van deze problemen, maar ook de politieke gevolgen ervan, zijn te vinden in de 
ondoelmatigheid van regels en instanties, de toename van informaliteit en corruptie in zowel de publieke als de 
private sectoren, het verlies aan vertrouwen in sommige overheidsdiensten, waaronder de procedures 
betreffende grond en gebouwen, activiteiten die ondoorzichtig zijn en slecht georganiseerd en gecoördineerd. 
 
In het eerste hoofdstuk wordt uitgelegd hoe en waarom in Cuba de procedures en technieken voor het beleid 
voor de stedelijke ruimte waren gekozen: de bedoeling was het waarborgen van een goed aanbod aan stedelijke 
functies, waardoor overwegingen van sociale gelijkheid de voorrang kregen boven die van economische 
efficiëntie. Deze benadering, hoe sociaal verantwoord ook, begon te haperen vanwege bepaalde politieke, 
juridische, economische en bestuurlijke omstandigheden.  
 
In dit hoofdstuk wordt het begrip beleid voor de stedelijke ruimte uiteengezet: waarom dit beleid belangrijk is en 
hoe het kan worden ingezet om de toewijzing van grond te sturen. De volgende mogelijkheden kunnen worden 
onderscheiden: toewijzing door overheidsbeleid, toewijzing door de markt, en toewijzing door een combinatie van 
beide. Onze voorkeur gaat uit naar het door de overheid inzetten van de ruimtelijk ordening, juridische en fiscale 
kaders, financiële instrumenten en gepaste bestuurlijke structuren teneinde de werking van markten in grond en 
vastgoed beleidsmatig te beïnvloeden. 
 
In Cuba heeft de gebrekkige samenhang tussen en de gebrekkige toepassing van deze regels en praktijken tot 
de volgende problemen geleid: 
 
• Grond wordt niet altijd efficiënt gebruik 
• De sociale doeleinden waarvoor het ruimtelijk beleid is bedoeld worden niet altijd bereikt 
• De procedures voldoen lang niet altijd aan de normen van transparantie en democratische 
besluitvorming 
• De voorgeschreven procedures worden niet altijd juist gevolgd. 
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Dit onderzoek richt zich voornamelijk op het eerste probleem: hoe kan stedelijke grond efficiënter worden 
gebruikt? Er wordt gezocht naar manieren om deze efficiëntie te verhogen zonder de sociale doeleinden – waar 
de regering voorrang aan geeft – in gevaar te brengen. De problemen met procedures krijgen aandacht voor 
zover zij gevolgen hebben voor de uitkomst van het stedelijke ruimtelijk beleid, dat wil zeggen de gevolgen voor 
de efficiëntie waarmee de grond wordt gebruikt en voor de sociale doeleinden. 
 
De gerichtheid op efficiëntie leidt tot de volgende onderzoeksvraag: hoe zou het beleid voor de stedelijke 
ruimte kunnen worden gewijzigd teneinde de economische efficiëntie van het gebruik van die ruimte te 
verhogen? 
 
Het uitgangspunt is dat de Cubaanse staat een belangrijke rol moet blijven spelen in het bepalen en reguleren 
van het gebruik en de ontwikkeling van grond op alle ruimtelijke niveaus; maar ook dat de omvang en aard van 
die rol alsmede de verhouding van de staat met andere actoren, binnen en buiten de overheid en op alle niveaus, 
aanzienlijk moet veranderen. Dit is nodig voor een beter ruimtelijk beleid, doelmatigere rechten in onroerend 
goed, betere wetten en verordeningen, ook opdat de overheid de al bestaande signalen uit de markt kan 
onderkennen en daarop inspelen. Het is om die reden dat het onderzoek wordt afgerond met aanbevelingen voor 
een beter ruimtelijk beleid in Cuba. Welke veranderingen in beleid, in regels en in praktijken zijn nodig voor een 
beter gebruik van de stedelijke ruimte? 
 
Het tweede hoofdstuk verkent de verschillende economische potenties van de stedelijke ruimte: het is een 
consumptiegoed, het geeft ruimte voor de productie van goederen en diensten, het kan ook worden gebruikt als 
financieel activa. Deze verschillende potenties worden gekoppeld aan vier interpretaties van het begrip efficiëntie 
– allocatief, ruimtelijk, technisch en institutioneel – als benodigde voorbereiding voor de theoretische uitwerking.  
 
Uitgangspunt is het begrip economische efficiëntie, dat altijd een verhouding tussen output en input betekent. 
Bijvoorbeeld, efficiëntie in productie neemt toe wanneer de waarde van de output meer toeneemt dan de waarde 
van de input. Dit is de interpretatie allocatieve efficiëntie, die hier centraal wordt geplaatst. De andere 
interpretaties, zoals ruimtelijk, technisch, institutioneel, worden in dit onderzoek betrokken voor zover zij aspecten 
van die inputs en outputs direct of indirect beïnvloeden. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 bevat voorbeelden van gevallen in Havana waar grond en gebouwen niet optimaal efficiënt worden 
benut. De verwachting is dat een aantal van dit soort gevallen zouden kunnen worden verbeterd door een beter 
ruimtelijk beleid, waaronder een beleid dat meer belang aan de economische waarde van grond besteedt, zonder 
dat de sociale en politieke beginselen die de Cubaanse samenleving zo hoog waardeert in gevaar worden 
gebracht. 
 
Uitgaande van het begrip efficiëntie is het belangrijk dat de gevolgen van de toepassing van regels kunnen 
worden gemeten en wel in termen van outputs en inputs. Dat meten hoeft niet in absolute termen maar in termen 
van de verandering in outputs en inputs ten gevolge van een bepaalde verandering. Dit is in hoofdstuk 2 
uitgewerkt: de economische gevolgen van een verandering in ruimtegebruik zijn veranderingen in een of meer 
van de volgende. 
 
• Output. Het bereiken van de gewenste doeleinden alsook verbeteringen in de productie van goederen 
en diensten. Op het wonen toegepast zou dit betekenen een verandering in het woongerief, op 
goederen en diensten toegepast zou dit betekenen een verandering in output. 
• Input. Veranderingen in de aard, diversiteit, omvang en organisatie van de ingezette productiefactoren 
waaronder grond. 
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• Externe effecten. Dit zijn de positieve of negatieve effecten die niet direct gebonden zijn met de 
vastgestelde doeleinden. Het kan bijvoorbeeld zijn min of meer woongerief ten gevolge van 
veranderingen in de directe woonomgeving, zoals min of meer overlast vanwege het verkeer of 
emissies. Dergelijke externe effecten kunnen veranderingen zijn in zowel inputs als outputs. 
 
Hoofdstuk 2 onderscheidt vier soorten veranderingen in het gebruik van de grond die tot hogere efficiëntie 
zouden kunnen leiden: 
Situatie I: alle soorten grondgebruik blijven dezelfde oppervlakte op dezelfde locaties benutten, maar de 
intensiteit waarmee de grond wordt gebruikt neemt toe.  
Dan stijgt de efficiëntie als de gewenste outputs ook stijgen – bijvoorbeeld het aantal woningen of het areaal 
kantoorruimte – met een waarde hoger dan de waarde van de extra inputs. 
 
Situatie II: op bepaalde locaties nemen sommige functies meer ruimte in beslag en andere functies 
minder, terwijl het door iedere functie gebruikte totale oppervlakte hetzelfde blijft, de gebruiksintensiteit 
ook. 
De economische efficiëntie neemt toe als de grondruil tussen twee locaties tot hogere outputs leidt, of tot hogere 
satisfactie onder consumenten, waarbij de toename groter is dan enige toename in inputs. De verbetering kan er 
ook uit bestaan dat vervoerskosten afnemen. 
 
Situatie III: op bepaalde locaties nemen sommige functies meer grond in beslag ten koste van de grond 
voor andere functies; dat grondverlies wordt niet elders gecompenseerd, waardoor sommige functies 
meer grond in totaal krijgen en andere functies minder; maar de gebruiksintensiteit blijft onveranderd. 
Dit leidt tot een hogere efficiëntie als de extra outputs minus de extra inputs (productiefactoren, verkeer, bouw, 
milieu) meer waarde hebben dan de verloren productie. 
 
Situatie IV: hetzelfde als voor (III), maar voor die functies die minder grond krijgen wordt de verloren 
productie goed gemaakt door een hogere gebruiksintensiteit. 
De logica is hetzelfde als bij situatie III, aangevuld met een hogere gebruiksintensiteit. 
 
In hoofdstuk 2 worden uit de actualiteit van Havana voorbeelden van ieder van deze situaties gegeven, teneinde 
de reële mogelijkheden om de efficiëntie te verhogen aan te geven. 
 
De huidige situatie in Cuba betreffende het gebruik van en het beleid voor de ruimte wordt in hoofdstukken 3, 4 
en 5 uiteengezet. De complexiteit en de bijzonderheden worden duidelijk gemaakt. De nadruk ligt op de regels en 
hoe die worden toegepast, alsook op de gevolgen voor de economische efficiëntie en voor de andere sociale en 
politieke doeleinden. De formele regels zijn onderwerp van hoofdstuk 3; de voorgeschreven methoden voor de 
taxatie van grond en gebouwen van hoofdstuk 4. In beide hoofdstukken worden geanalyseerd de gevolgen voor 
de manier waarop grond wordt toegedeeld en gebruikt. Hoofdstuk 5 gaat over de informele woningmarkt – la 
permuta. Hier wordt uitgelegd hoe de in hoofdstukken 3 en 4 omschreven regels en praktijken een situatie 
hebben geproduceerd waarin mensen niet gemakkelijk kunnen verhuizen: het is in reactie hierop dat een 
informele markt voor het ruilen van woningen is ontstaan. 
 
Twee databestanden worden in hoofdstuk 6 econometrisch geanalyseerd. Eén bestand is van door de staat 
uitgevoerde taxaties wanneer buitenlandse bedrijven een gebruiksrecht op grond verwerven. Het tweede bestand 
is van de geldtransacties bij de woningruil onder ‘la permuta’. Beide analyses geven inzichten in de factoren die 
de prijs van grond en gebouwen beïnvloeden. Met deze inzichten is het beter te begrijpen hoe grond efficiënter 
zou kunnen worden gebruikt.  
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In het laatste hoofdstuk – nummer 7 – worden de resultaten van de eerdere hoofdstukken bijeengebracht en 
hieruit worden twee soorten conclusies getrokken. 
 
Ten eerste wordt het begrip allocatieve efficiëntie toegepast op het huidige Cubaanse beleid voor de stedelijke 
ruimte, zoals in de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 is omschreven en geanalyseerd. Hieruit valt de conclusie te trekken 
dat sommige van de huidige regels en praktijken er toe leiden dat de grond inefficiënt wordt gebruikt.  
 
Ten tweede en voortbouwend op de eerste conclusie wordt uiteengezet hoe die regels en praktijken zouden 
kunnen worden veranderd, teneinde die efficiëntie te verhogen zonder de realisatie van de andere sociale en 
politieke doeleinden te beschadigen, wellicht zelfs leidende tot een betere realisatie ervan. Die veranderingen 
betreffen voornamelijk het beter rekenschap geven aan de economische betekenis van grond. 
 
De recente politieke hervormingen in Cuba laten een voorzichtige maar toch diepgaande herstructurering van het 
openbaar bestuur en van de economie zien, met algemene efficiëntieverhoging als doel. Desalniettemin houdt de 
Cubaanse regering vast aan haar politieke principes dat de fundamentele hulpbronnen – waaronder grond – 
centraal en planmatig moeten worden beheerd door middel van sectoraal en top-down beleid. De bedoeling is de 
sociale verworvenheden van de Revolutie te beschermen: en dit ondanks het gegeven dat niet alle sociale 
doeleinden zijn gerealiseerd en – nog erger – dat sommige verder weg zijn geraakt. Deze analyse van het beleid 
voor de stedelijke ruimte laat zien dat de politieke principes van centrale en planmatige beheersing van de grond 
niet te rijmen zijn met de behoeftes aan een beter beleid voor die ruimte. Wij behouden het standpunt dat een 
dergelijk beleid een overheidstaak is, waarbij de verschillende openbare instanties wettelijk bevoegd moeten zijn 
om ruimtelijke plannen te maken, om urbane en rurale grond te herverkavelen, om grondbezit te herverdelen, om 
onroerend-goedrechten te bepalen. Toch is het nodig om het idee los te laten dat grondbezit en de financiële 
waarde die dat meebrengt in de weg kunnen staan van het ontwikkelen van een sociaal verantwoorde 
maatschappij, louter omdat grondbezit ook deel uitmaakt van het kapitalisme. Om van dat idee los te komen zijn 
fundamentele en structurele veranderingen nodig. 
 
Dit onderzoek moet mensen meer bewust maken hoe belangrijk voor Cuba beleid voor de stedelijke ruimte is, 
waaronder het belang van de waarde van grond, al staat dit beleid momenteel niet op de agenda van de 
regering. De mogelijkheden zijn enorm – maar verwaarloosd - om financiën te mobiliseren door middel van 
grondwaarde en van het inzetten ervan als borg voor krediet. Ondanks recente veranderingen in de wetgeving 
ontbreekt het bij de gemeentelijke en provinciale overheden aan samenhangende manieren om grond en 
vastgoed efficiënt te beheren, rekening houdend met de waarde ervan. Discussies over beleid voor ‘value 
capturing’ blijven uit. De plannen, zij het voor de ruimte zij het voor de afzonderlijke sectoren, negeren het belang 
van de waarde van grond en gebouwen. 
 
Momenteel gaat de stedelijke ontwikkeling in Cuba langzaam, wat de gelegenheid geeft goed na te denken over, 
en voor te bereiden op, de gewenste veranderingen. Het is een gunstig tijdstip om de gebeurtenissen van de 
afgelopen 50 jaar te overzien en te analyseren, teneinde meer duidelijkheid en inzicht in krijgen in de oorzaken 
en gevolgen van de beslissingen - goed en slecht – die over grond en gebouwen zijn genomen. Het is voor 
iedereen duidelijk dat Cuba in transitie is, dat het kiest voor een minder gecentraliseerde en meer diverse 
ontwikkeling. Deze bestuurlijke en economische veranderingen zullen ook voor het grondgebruik en de stedelijke 
ontwikkeling gevolgen hebben. Het is wenselijk hierop vooruit te lopen en hier plannen voor te maken. Om die 
redenen kunnen de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek dienen, niet alleen om het beleid onder de huidige 
omstandigheden te verbeteren, maar ook om de stad op de komende veranderingen voor te bereiden. 
 
Op de nieuwe politieke agenda moet staan hoe Cuba met de externe wereld, met de internationale 
kapitaalcircuits en met de technologische vooruitgang beter kan worden verbonden. De overheid moet nieuwe 
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locaties ontwikkelen en bestaande, waardevolle locaties beschermen, met het oog op de externe wereld en op de 
toekomst. Maar ook naar binnen toe moet zij zorgvuldig kijken. De volle betekenis van grond en gebouwen moet 
centraal de aandacht krijgen. Noch Havana noch de andere Cubaanse steden zijn ingesteld op een toekomst 
waarin het overheidsbeleid in wisselwerking met marktkrachten moet staan en waarin gebeurtenissen die pas op 
de lange termijn worden verwacht plotseling kunnen opdoemen. Het gevaar is groot dat zonder een goed 
doordacht en voorbereid beleid voor de stedelijke ruimte Cuba niet in staat zal zijn zijn steden te beheren en te 
ontwikkelen, economische voordelen daaruit te halen en zijn sociale ontwikkeling voort te zetten. 
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La gestión o manejo del suelo urbano es un amplio tema que relaciona diferentes áreas del conocimiento: el 
urbanismo, la historia, la economía, la geografía, la sociología y la antropología forman parte de su campo de 
acción. El manejo del suelo se afirma, por tanto, sobre un universo teórico diverso, que se enriquece y ajusta 
constantemente a partir del aprendizaje en la práctica. Sin embargo, esta vastedad multidisciplinar y teórica no 
garantiza que exista un claro consenso en torno a su definición más acertada. Es por ello que  esta investigación 
parte de adoptar una definición de gestión del suelo urbano de la siguiente forma: por gestión del suelo urbano 
se entiende la actividad gubernamental sistemática de planificar, guiar y coordinar el uso del suelo urbano de 
forma sostenible, mediante el diseño y la aplicación de una consistente política del suelo y sobre la base de una 
estructura institucional dotada de instrumentos y mecanismos que influyan indirectamente o determinen 
directamente la forma en la que se utiliza el suelo urbano para el beneficio social. 
Esta investigación explora el manejo del suelo urbano en Cuba durante las cinco décadas subsiguientes al 
triunfo revolucionario de enero de 1959. La principal motivación para llevarla a cabo ha sido describir y analizar 
los problemas, las causas y las consecuencias generadas por la subutilización del este valioso recurso y del 
patrimonio  edificado sobre él. 
El trabajo se centra en la ciudad de La Habana, capital de Cuba y mayor ciudad del país, en la cual se 
concentran y exacerban todas las contradicciones y problemas y donde se hacen particularmente visibles las 
consecuencias del manejo inadecuado del suelo y las edificaciones: mal estado técnico constructivo de una gran 
parte de los edificios públicos y privados, infraestructura y equipamientos urbanos obsoletos y en precario 
estado, informalidad creciente en el tema del hábitat, inadecuada localización de las funciones urbanas, 
numerosos edificios valiosos destinados a usos inadecuados, por solo poner algunos ejemplos. A esta situación 
se suman otras dificultades menos evidentes y tangibles pero igualmente relevantes como el  retroceso en la 
provisión (en cantidad y calidad) de viviendas y servicios públicos y el aumento de la desigualdad social y 
espacial. Entre las causas y efectos políticos y sociales de estos problemas se destaca la falta de efectividad 
institucional, la proliferación de la informalidad y de la corrupción en el desempeño de los sectores público y 
privado y la pérdida de la confianza pública en las estructuras gubernamentales ,incluyendo la falta de 
organización, coordinación y transparencia en los procedimientos administrativos en lo concerniente al suelo e 
inmuebles. 
En el primer capítulo se exponen los mecanismos adoptados en Cuba luego de la revolución para dar solución a 
las necesidades de desarrollo urbano y se demuestra cómo las cuestiones relacionadas con la equidad fueron 
priorizadas sobre la eficiencia económica. Además se aborda el deterioro gradual de este enfoque, correcto en 
su concepción pero lastrado en la práctica por numerosos factores de corte político, legal, económico e 
institucional. Parte del capitulo 1 explica el concepto y la relevancia de la gestión del suelo y los mecanismos 
adoptados para su distribución –concediendo un rol determinante a la planificación y la institucionalidad, a través 
de los mecanismos de mercado, o mediante la combinación de ambas dimensiones. Al respecto se deja clara la 
preferencia del autor por un ambiente que apueste por la integración del plan de usos del suelo, las estructuras 
legal y fiscal, los instrumentos financieros y la gobernabilidad en interacción con los mercados del suelo y la 
gestión inmobiliaria. 
En Cuba, la falta de coherencia en las normativas y en las prácticas relacionadas con el manejo del suelo ha 
llevado a los siguientes problemas: 
• La gestión del suelo urbano no siempre ha conducido al uso eficiente de este recurso 
• La gestión del suelo urbano no siempre ha permitido lograr las aspiraciones sociales relacionadas con 
este recurso 
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• Los procedimientos establecidos para el manejo del suelo no siempre han satisfecho los principios de 
de transparencia y democracia en la toma de decisiones 
• Los procedimientos establecidos a menudo no se han llevado a cabo correctamente 
Esta investigación se concentra fundamentalmente en el primer problema planteado: cómo incrementar la 
eficiencia en el uso del suelo. El análisis se concentra en aquellas formas que permitan incrementar la eficiencia 
sin dañar las aspiraciones sociales que han representado una prioridad para el gobierno cubano. Partiendo de 
este objetivo, se abordan temas relacionados con los procedimientos y los efectos que estos han tenido  sobre la 
gestión del suelo en lo relacionado con la eficiencia y la consecución de las aspiraciones sociales. 
  
Por lo anterior surge la siguiente interrogante: ¿cómo realizar cambios en la gestión del suelo que permitan 
incrementar la eficiencia en el uso y aprovechamiento del suelo urbano? 
Reconocemos que en Cuba el estado debería continuar desempeñando un importante papel en el control, la 
regulación y el desarrollo del suelo urbano en los diferentes niveles del territorio, pero también es preciso 
considerar que el grado y alcance de la participación estatal así como sus relaciones con los actores sociales y 
locales debe modificarse considerablemente para permitir un planeamiento más efectivo, un rediseño de los 
derechos de propiedad, la introducción de leyes y regulaciones para la distribución y el uso del suelo y reconocer 
e intercambiar con las señales del mercado, ya existentes. Por esta razón, al final del documento, se incluyen 
recomendaciones para mejorar el manejo del suelo en Cuba ¿Qué cambios de política, instrumentos y prácticas 
deberían esperarse para que se llegue a mejores resultados? 
 
El capítulo  2 está dedicado a dimensionar el potencial del suelo urbano como recurso económico: como bien de 
consumo, como superficie donde localizar construcciones para la producción de bienes y servicios y como activo 
financiero. Estas categorías se vinculan a los conceptos de eficiencia – distributiva, espacial, técnica e 
institucional –lo cual contribuye a fundamentar conceptualmente el propósito de mejorar la eficiencia económica 
en el uso del suelo. En este sentido, se parte de que el concepto de eficiencia económica siempre es medido por 
la relación de  valores resultantes o outputs con respecto a determinados costos de entrada o inputs. La 
eficiencia en el proceso productivo se incrementa cuando el valor de los outputs es mayor que valor de los 
inputs. El concepto de eficiencia distributiva es central en esta investigación, mientras que otros acercamientos a 
la eficiencia institucional, organizacional y técnica aparecen directa o indirectamente integrados al análisis de los 
elementos que  influyen sobre los outputs y los inputs. 
 
Para facilitar la comprensión de lo expuesto, en el capítulo 2 se recogen casos que ejemplifican por qué la 
distribución del suelo y los edificios no se ha realizado de la forma más óptima. Muchos de esos problemas 
podrían ser resueltos mejorando los mecanismos existentes de gestión del suelo, partiendo de reconocer su 
valor económico. Consideramos que el suelo urbano podría ser utilizado de forma más eficiente mejorando, en 
particular, las reglas y los procedimientos que rigen en la práctica su manejo, sin dañar la esencia de las ideas 
políticas y sociales altamente valoradas por la sociedad cubana. 
 
Si los efectos de la aplicación de nuevos mecanismos pueden ser medidos y comparados, otro tanto puede 
hacerse con los cambios en la eficiencia. No es preciso que estas mediciones se realicen en términos absolutos 
sino relativos. En el capítulo 2 se identifican diferentes situaciones en las cuales se proponen cambios que  
pueden conducir a resultados más eficientes. Los efectos económicos de  cambios en el uso del suelo se deben 
realizar en uno o varios de los siguientes factores: 
• Output (lograr los resultados esperados y mejorarlos al proveer diferentes funciones, por ejemplo en la 
vivienda = cambio en la satisfacción del consumidor, cambio en los bienes y servicios = significan un 
cambio de los outputs) 
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• input (cambios en el tipo, diversidad, cantidad y organización de los recursos empleados para producir 
el output) 
• efectos externos sobre otros (impactos positives o negativos no directamente conectados con los 
propósitos iniciales, por ejemplo, aumento o disminución en la satisfacción de los consumidores 
causada por cambios de uso en la vecindad, aumento o disminución de los danos  medioambientales 
debidos a un cambio en el tráfico o en la descarga. Esos efectos externos pueden generarse por 
cambios en los inputs o en los outputs. 
 
Como resultado de este razonamiento, en el capítulo 2 se identifican cuatro tipos de situaciones en las cuales 
determinada modificación puede conducir a un uso más eficiente del suelo: 
Situación  I: el área de suelo para cada uso se mantiene igual, la localización también, pero se 
incrementa la intensidad del uso (para algunos de los usos).  En esta situación, la eficiencia aumenta si se 
aumentan los outputs esperados. Por ejemplo si se logra producir un número adicional de unidades de vivienda 
o se incrementan los metros cuadrados de espacio para uso de oficinas (extra outputs) que proporcionan un 
valor mayor que el valor de los inputs (extra inputs). 
 
Situación II: En ciertas localizaciones, el área de suelo para algunos usos se incrementa mientras que 
para otros usos disminuye, el área total de suelo se mantiene igual, la intensidad de uso también. Se 
produce un incremento de la eficiencia si el cambio de usos del suelo entre las dos localizaciones resulta en un 
extra output que genera mayores ingresos financieros a partir de un crecimiento neto de la producción, o un 
incremento en la satisfacción del consumidor. Este cambio de uso es beneficioso para los consumidores si 
reduce sus costos de transporte a partir del mejoramiento de las condiciones de accesibilidad. 
 
Situación III: En ciertas localizaciones, el área de suelo para algunos usos se incrementa y para otros 
usos disminuye, esto no se compensa en el área total, ya que el área total para unos usos aumenta y el 
área total de otros disminuye, la intensidad de uso se mantiene igual.  En esta situación se produce un 
incremento de la eficiencia si el resultado (extra output) después de deducir los costos de los recursos, la 
construcción, el transporte y los gastos del medioambiente, tienen un valor superior comparado al valor del uso 
cancelado.  
 
Situación IV: Igual que para el caso III, pero para aquellos usos que pierden suelo, la pérdida de outputs 
se compensa con un incremento de la intensidad de usos.  En este caso la eficiencia sigue la lógica de la 
situación III pero la intensidad de uso se incrementa. 
 
En el capítulo 2 se dan ejemplos reales en la ciudad de La Habana para ilustrar cada uno de los casos 
demostrando las posibilidades reales de elevar la eficiencia –y obtener mayor outputs- realizando determinados 
cambios en los inputs. 
 
Los capítulos 3, 4 y 5 brindan un panorama de las complejidades y peculiaridades del contexto cubano. En ellos 
se describe el contexto regulatorio y de qué forma se aplica y se discuten los efectos sobre la eficiencia y sobre 
otros aspectos sociales y políticos. El capitulo 3 abarca las reglas formales, mientras que el 4 específicamente se 
dedica a los métodos y prácticas en la valoración del suelo y los edificios en el contexto oficial así como sus 
efectos en la forma en que el suelo se usa y se distribuye. El capitulo 5 “La Permuta: el Mercado informal de la 
vivienda”, detalla como las reglas y practicas descritas y analizadas en los capítulos 3 y 4 han generado una 
situación en la que los individuos no pueden intercambiar o vender sus viviendas con facilidad. En respuesta a 
esto, se ha desarrollado un mercado informal en el cual los individuos intercambian sus viviendas a través del 
mecanismo de la permuta. 
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En el capítulo  6, se desarrollan sendos análisis econométricos a bases de datos independientes. La primera 
abarca las evaluaciones inmobiliarias realizadas por el estado para negocios con socios extranjeros –empresas 
mixtas- en los cuales la parte extranjera adquiere determinados derechos de usufructo. La segunda abarca los 
valores de las propiedades intercambiadas informalmente mediante el mecanismo de la permuta. Ambos análisis 
ofrecen una introspección de los factores que influencian los precios y los valores. De esa forma es posible llegar 
a definir cómo actuar sobre determinados mecanismos para usar el suelo de forma más eficiente.  
 
Finalmente, en el capítulo 7, se llega a la conclusión de que las reglas y prácticas que rigen el manejo del suelo 
en la actualidad, frecuentemente, resultan en un uso ineficiente de este recurso. Este capítulo tiene una doble 
función, en primer lugar se aplica  el concepto de la eficiencia distributiva de forma explícita a la gestión del 
suelo, descrita y analizada en los capítulos 3, 4, 5, y 6 para validar la conclusión ya mencionada. En segundo 
lugar, sobre la base de los resultados de esos análisis, se proponen cambios en las regulaciones y prácticas que 
pueden contribuir a aumentar la eficiencia en el uso del suelo y que lejos de dañar los objetivos sociales y 
políticos fundamentales del gobierno los hacen ser más efectivos. Se trata de concentrar las propuestas de 
cambio sobre aquellas de corte económico.  
 
Independientemente de que cambios recientemente anunciados en Cuba se han encaminado a una cautelosa 
pero profunda restructuración del sistema de la administración y de la economía con el objetivo de alcanzar 
mayores niveles de eficiencia, el gobierno cubano persiste en mantener los principios básicos que guían la 
conducta del país a partir de una fuerte centralización de los recursos fundamentales –incluyendo el suelo 
urbano y rural- y de las decisiones económicas, apoyándose en la planificación, el enfoque sectorial de la 
economía y el modelo de dirección vertical de arriba hacia abajo. 
 
El principal objetivo de este proceder, según el discurso oficial, es proteger los logros sociales de la Revolución 
cubana, aunque hasta el presente muchos de estos objetivos no hayan sido logrados y lo que es peor que 
algunos hayan comenzado a retroceder. El análisis que se presenta sobre la gestión del suelo en Cuba ha 
llevado a la conclusión de que los principios fundamentales establecidos por el país no son incompatibles con 
una gestión más eficiente tal y como se ha analizado. De hecho se ha partido de mantener inalterable el principio 
de que la gestión del suelo urbano debe ser fundamentalmente una tarea del estado, para cuyo desempeño es 
necesario articular el poder legal, refrendado por la constitución, de planificar, guiar e implementar la distribución 
del suelo, la redistribución de la propiedad, las formas de tenencia y el desarrollo territorial. Sin embargo, para 
lograr estos objetivos es preciso no dilatar más los cambios estructurales sustanciales y eliminar la idea de que 
el valor del suelo y el potencial financiero de este y otros bienes es, por incorporar elementos capitalistas, un 
obstáculo para el desarrollo de políticas gubernamentales de beneficio social. 
 
Esta investigación pretende despertar el interés cognoscitivo y práctico en torno a la relevancia del manejo del 
suelo y la necesidad de su adecuada valorización en Cuba, donde las agendas gubernamentales han carecido 
de esa visión. Es necesario incorporar las grandes posibilidades de movilizar recursos financieros a partir del 
valor del suelo y las propiedades y de usar esos valores como colateral en créditos y otras alternativas de 
financiamiento que hasta el momento han sido ignoradas. Independientemente de los recientes cambios a los 
que se han sometido los esquemas legales del país, sin duda necesarios, las autoridades provinciales y 
municipales todavía carecen de mecanismos coherentes que faciliten la gestión eficiente de las propiedades 
públicas y privadas. Por otra parte ha estado ausente el debate en torno a la introducción de políticas públicas 
para la captura de plusvalías del suelo, tema que tampoco se considera  en la planificación económica y 
espacial. 
 
La falta de dinamismo en el desarrollo urbano y particularmente del suelo en Cuba brinda una buena oportunidad 
para ponderar y planificar los cambios futuros. El contexto actual ofrece un excelente momento para analizar lo 
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sucedido en los últimos 50 años y analizar las causas y efectos de las buenas y malas decisiones adoptadas con 
respecto al suelo y las edificaciones. Evidentemente Cuba se encuentra en una transición de su modelo 
económico hacia formas más descentralizadas de gestión económica y administrativa que generarán cambios 
económicos  con impactos en el suelo y el desarrollo urbano que es preciso planificar. Desde ese punto de vista, 
los resultados de esta investigación pueden representar una contribución importante no solo en el manejo del 
suelo en el presente sino además predecir escenarios futuros. 
 
La nueva agenda cubana debería favorecer la articulación de la ciudad y el país con el mundo, la inserción en 
los circuitos internacionales de flujos de capital y la contribución y recepción de los avances tecnológicos. Las 
autoridades cubanas deben asumir los retos del desarrollo como agentes partícipes del mundo global, pero esto 
debe hacerse sin perder de vista una mirada interna, la cual resulta igualmente indispensable. El suelo urbano 
como recurso indispensable para estos procesos, debe convertirse en una prioridad y ser reconsiderado en su 
más amplia significación e importancia. La Habana, así como las otras ciudades del país no están totalmente 
preparadas para un escenario en el cual el planeamiento y el desempeño institucional interactúen con las 
fuerzas del mercado. De esta limitación se derivan riesgos considerables vinculados a la subestimación  del 
manejo del suelo y las propiedades, esto equivale a no estar en condiciones de asumir el desarrollo eficiente de 
las ciudades cubanas y  de que no exista capacidad de manejar eventos y conflictos que esperados a largo 
plazo sucedan en un marco de tiempo menor. 
 
